Connivance of Child-Indictment-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 56.-An indictment under sect. 56 of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, for unlawfully, by force or fraud, taking away, enticing away, or detaining a child under the age of fourteen, with intent to deprive the parent or guardian of the possession of such child, is not supported by evidence of force or fraud exercised upon the guar- dian of the child, or any other person than the child so taken or detained; the force or fraud must have been practised upon the child himself in order to bring it within the statute. (Reg. v. Barrett. April, 1885. Smith, J.) 659.
Evidence-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 56.-The prisoner, being indicted under the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 56, for that she did feloni- ously and unlawfully, by fraud, detain a child, under the age of fourteen, with in- tent to deprive the mother of the posses- sion of her-the evidence being that the child had been in the service of the pri soner, and was missing and could not be discovered; and that she gave different accounts of what had become of the child, but implying that the prisoner had given her up to some third persons; and there being no evidence that the child was still in her actual custody, nor, indeed, any evidence where she was: Held, that, upon the principle of Jones v. Dowle (9 M. & W. 19), the prisoner was rightly convicted; because, whether her stories were all utterly false, and the child was secreted by her- self, or whether they were so far true, and the child was in the actual custody of some third parties, to whom she had wrongfully delivered her, it was equally true that she unlawfully detained the child by fraud. (Reg. v. Annie Johnson. 1884. Č. C. R.)
ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS. (See Conspiracy to Defraud.)
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. (See Felonious Receiving.)
ADMISSIONS.
(See Evidence.)
ADULTERATION OF FOOD. Notice of intention to submit to analysis- Contract to supply milk-Corporation aggregate-Purchaser-Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 14. The notice of intention to have an article analysed, and the other procedure which is prescribed by sect. 14 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875, only applies to proceedings taken under that Act by the persons mentioned in sect. 13 of the Act, and to proceedings by persons who at the time of making a purchase intend to sub- mit the article purchased to analysis. Upon the supply of articles, in pursuance of a general contract to supply, there cannot be an intention on the part of the person to whom the articles are supplied, to sub- mit those articles to analysis within sect. 14. And the fact that an article, for the sale of which a person is prosecuted under the Act, was supplied in pursuance of a contract, is immaterial. Corporations ag- gregate are purchasers within the meaning of the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts. Parsons v. The Birmingham Dairy Company (9 Q. B. Div. 172) not followed. (Guardians of Enniskillen Union v. Hilliard. April, 1884. Exch. Div. Ir.) 643.
Skim-milk-Deficiency of butter fat-38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, s. 6.-In answer to a request for milk, the respondent sold to the appel- lant skim-milk, which was proved by the analyst to be 60 per cent. butter-fat defi- cient, and not a normal whole milk. Held, upon a case stated, that a magistrate was justified in finding this was no offence within the 6th section of the Sale of Food
and Drugs Act 1875. (Lane (app.) v. Collins (resp.). Dec., 1884. Q. B. Div.) 677.
AIDING AND ABETTING. (See Prize Fight.)
AMENDMENT OF SENTENCE. (See False Pretences.)
REFUSAL OF APPLICATION FOR BAILJURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEAL. (See Practice.)
REFUSAL OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUSJURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEAL. (See Extradition.)
REFUSAL TO COMMIT.
(See Debtors' Act.)
Setting fire to a picture frame in a house, and so setting fire to the floor of the houseIntent-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7.-The prisoner was indicted under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7, for wilfully and maliciously setting fire to a picture frame in a building under such circumstances that if the building were thereby set fire to would amount to a felony. The jury found that the prisoner did not set fire to the house apart from the frame; that he did set fire to the frame; that the probable result would be setting fire to the floor of the house; that he did not intend to set fire to the house; that he was not aware that what he did would probably set the house on fire, and so injure the owner; and that he was not reckless or indifferent whether the house was set on fire or not. Upon these findings a verdict of Not guilty was directed by the judge. (Reg. v. Harris and Atkins. March, 1882. Hawkins, J.) 75.
Setting fire to things in a building under such circumstances that if the building were thereby set fire to, the offence would amount to felony-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s.7. -A servant girl entered on her service on the 2nd day of January, and on the 10th received notice to leave at the end of one month. On the 15th a sheet was discovered burning on a chair in front of, but four feet from, the kitchen fire. The girl was in the kitchen, and either could not or would not give any account of the occurrence. Later in the same day the prisoner's apron was on fire, although it was hanging on the kitchen wall, ten feet away from the fire. At 5 p.m. on the same day there was a
third fire, and at 7 p.m. the bed and bedding in the nursery were on fire, the girl being there at the time. No part of the house was actually burnt. Held, that, upon the above facts, the girl could not be indicted for the felony under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7, for setting fire to things in a building under such circumstances that if the building were thereby set fire to would amount to felony. If a person maliciously, with intent to injure another by merely burning his goods, sets fire to such goods in his house, that does not amount to a felony under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7, even although the house catches fire, unless the circumstances are such as to show that the person setting fire to the goods knew that by so doing he would probably cause the house also to take fire, and was reckless whether it did so or not; in which case there would be abundant evidence that he intended to bring about the probable consequence of his act, viz., the burning of the house. (Reg. v. Maggie_Nattrass. March, 1882. Hawkins, J.) 73.
Elementary Education Acts 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75) and 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 79)— Power to impose home lessons-Detention of child at school after school hours.-The master of a board school established under the Elementary Education Acts 1870 and 1876 is not authorised by those Acts in setting lessons to be prepared at home by children attending such school, and the detention of a child at school after school hours for not doing home lessons amounts to a criminal assault. (Hunter v. Johnson. June, 1884. Q. B. Div.) 600.
ATTEMPT TO MURDER. (See Murder.)
AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF. (See Practice.)
BAIL, APPEAL FROM REFUSAL of. (See Practice.)
Convicted felon-Liability to be made bankrupt-Felony Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23), . 88.7 and 8-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 6, sub-sect. 6.—A convicted felon may be adjudicated a bankrupt on an act of bankruptcy committed either before or after his conviction. If a debtor's summons be served on a convicted felon
during his imprisonment, his neglect to pay, secure, or compound for the debt will be an act of bankruptcy. (Ex parte Graves; Re Harris. Nov., 1881. Ct. of App.) 118.
NOTICES IN THE "LONDON GAZETTE."
Proof-Felony-Forged acceptances-De- posit to secure overdraft at bank-Right to prove for overdraft-Compounding felony. The bankrupt had obtained an overdraft from his bankers on depositing certain bills of exchange as security. It was afterwards discovered that the accept- ances to the bills were forgeries. The bills were subsequently delivered up to the bankrupt in exchange for joint and several promissory notes of himself and his father. It was alleged that part of the arrangement was that the bankers would not prosecute the bankrupt for forgery. The notes were not paid at maturity. Held, that, assuming the alleged corrupt agreement had been made, the bankers could prove for the amount of the overdraft without first pro- secuting the bankrupt. (Ex parte Leslie; Re Guerrier. Feb., 1882. Ct. of App.) 125.
Voluntary witness-Refusal to answer ques- tions-Power of justices to commit to prison-7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 70-35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 4.-By sect. 70 of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, justices in petty or special sessions may, upon the request of any party to any bastardy proceedings before them, summon any person to appear as a witness in such proceedings; and if any person so summoned neglect or refuse to appear to give evidence at the time and place ap- pointed in such summons it shall be lawful for such justices by war- rant . to require such person to be brought before them; and if any person coming or brought before any such jus- tices in any such proceedings refuse to give evidence therein, it shall be lawful for such justices to commit any person to any house of correction within their jurisdiction, &c. On the hearing of a bastardy summons, the alleged putative father went into the witness-box and denied the statement of the mother. In cross-examination he de- clined to answer a question (considered by the justices to be material), and offered to withdraw from the case and consent to an order being made against him. The jus- tices committed him to prison for refusing to answer the question. Held, by Grove
and Hawkins, JJ. (dissentiente Smith, J.) that the justices had jurisdiction to commit, for that the words "if any person coming or brought before such justices," in the above section, were not limited to persons who had been summoned to appear and give evidence. (Reg. v. Flavell and another. Dec., 1884. Q. B. Div.) 660.
Place kept or used for betting-Moving about in inclosed field-Betting Houses Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119).-An inclosed field was let to a committee for the purpose of hold- ing certain dog races, to which the public were admitted on payment of an entrance fee. The appellant attended the meeting, and moved about in the field and made bets with various persons present. Held, that the appellant could not be convicted under the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, sects. 1 and 3, of having "used a place for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto." (Snow (app.) v. Hill (resp.). March, 1885. Q. B. Div.) 737.
Cohabitation-Continuance of cohabitation doubtful-Presumption of law. It was proved that the prisoner and his wife were married in 1865, and that they lived together after marriage, but how long did not appear. There was no evidence of separation or when they last saw each other. In 1882 the prisoner married a second time, and was indicted for and con- victed of bigamy. Held, that there was no evidence to displace the presumption arising on this state of facts that the first wife was living at the date of the second marriage. (Reg. v. Thomas Jones. June, 1883. C. C. R.) 284.
Evidence.-On a trial for bigamy two certi- ficates were produced, one purporting to be the certificate of the marriage in 1843, of the first wife to A. B., prior to the mar- riage with the prisoner in 1875; the other purporting to be a certificate of the death of A. B. in 1880, subsequent to the mar- riage with the prisoner. Held (after con- sultation with the Recorder of London), that as prima facie the marriage with the prisoner was illegal, the so-called first wife could give evidence on the trial of the accused. (Reg. v. David Ayley. Nov., 1881. Deputy Recorder of London.) 328. Evidence-Proof of first marriage.-Where the proof of marriage is supported by a copy of the certificate and evidence that
Irishmen must shun him as their deadly enemy." The indictment alleged that the notice tended (1) to excite an unlawful confederacy; (2) to excite a riot; (3) to induce persons to shun George Thompson against the form of the statute. The judge at the trial, upon the requisition of the counsel for the Crown, ruled that the notice on the face of it was an unlawful notice within the meaning of the statute, but reserved for the court the point whether he should have so ruled or should have left the question to the jury. The jury, in answer to the only question sub- mitted to them, found that the prisoner had in fact posted the notice, and the prisoner was accordingly convicted. Held, that the notice was capable of bearing the meaning alleged in the indictment; but that the question whether it did in fact bear such meaning should not have been withdrawn from the jury. (Reg. v. Coady. Feb., 1882. C. C. R. Ir.) 89.
BREACH OF THE PEACE. AUTHORITY ΤΟ DISPERSE
(See Justice of the Peace.)
BREAD, SALE OF.
Baker not provided with scales and weights -Delivery of bread from a cart at a cus- tomer's house in pursuance of a previous order-6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 7.-By 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 7, "Every baker or seller of bread
who shall convey or carry out bread for sale in and from any cart or other carriage shall be provided with and shall constantly carry in such cart or other carriage a correct beam and scales
with proper weights . and in case any such baker or seller of bread shall at any time carry out or de- liver any bread without being provided with such beam and scales, with proper weights then, and in every such case, every such baker or seller of bread shall for every such offence forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding five pounds." Held, that this section applies to cases where bread is delivered in pursuance of a pre- vious order, and not merely to cases where the baker sends out bread for sale in a cart. (Ridgway (app.) v. Ward (resp.). Dec., 1884. Q. B. Div.) 603.
Baker-Sale and delivery-Loaves sold and weighed at shop in customer's presence- Delivered at customer's house by baker's cart at customer's request-Cart not pro- vided with beam and scales, &c.-6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37-Sect. 7-Bread" carried out and delivered for sale."-Bread, bought by a customer at a baker's shop, and then and there weighed in the customer's pre- sence, was afterwards, at the customer's request and to oblige her, sent by the baker in his cart, with other goods purchased by the customer, to her house three miles off, where it was delivered by the baker's man, the cart not being provided with beam and scales with proper weights as directed by sect. 7 of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37. The justices having convicted the baker of an offence under sect. 7, in carrying out and delivering bread from a cart not provided with beam and scales, &c.: Held, that the bread was not "carried out and delivered" by the appellant as a baker "for sale," but for the convenience and at the request of the customer, the sale and weighing having taken place at the shop, and that therefore no offence had been committed under sect. 7. Robinson v. Cliffe (1 Ex. Div. 295; 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 689) and Ridgway v. Ward (15 Cox C. C. 603; 14 Q. B. Div. 110; 51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 704) distinguished. (Daniel v. Whitefield. June, 1885. Q. B. Div.) 762.
CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. Superior Court Mandamus-4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36.-A mandamus from the High Court of Justice will not lie to the Central Criminal Court, that being a Superior and not an inferior court. The Recorder of London, one of the justices of the Central Criminal Court, by the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, having refused to make an order for the restitution of stolen property under sect. 100 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, this court has
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