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INDEX.

CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS BY WITNESS.

(See Rape.)

The

Dying declaration-Consciousness of im-
pending dissolution.
shortly after the occurrence which re-
deceased,
sulted in her death, was seen standing at
the door of a neighbour's house in a faint-
ing condition, and apparently dying. She
said, "I am dying; look to my children;"
and she then made a statement as to the
cause of her injuries. Held, by Hawkins, J.,
after consulting Baggallay, L.J., that the
statement then made was admissible in
evidence as a dying declaration. (Reg. v.
Goddard. Feb., 1882. Hawkins, J.)~ 7.

DYING DECLARATIONS.
(See also Murder.)

FALSE PRETENCES.

(See Conspiracy to Defraud and False Pretences.)

INTENT TO Defraud Creditors.
(See Debtors Act.)

MOTIVE. (See Murder.)

NEGLECT TO SUPPLY MEDICAL AID. (See Manslaughter.)

NEWSPAPER REPORT OF SPEECH. (See Justices of the Peace.)

OVERT ACT.

(See Treason Felony.) PARTY ACCUSED AS WITNESS. (See Justice of the Peace.)

Privilege-Question tending to criminate.A witness is not the sole judge whether a question put to him may tend to criminate him. To entitle a witness to the privilege of silence the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called upon to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer; but, if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question. Reg. v. Boyes (5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 147; 1 B. & S. 311) approved. (Ex parte Reynolds; Re Reynolds. March, 1882. Ct. of App.) 108.

Privilege-Solicitor and client-Communication prior to commission of crimeIndictment of client-Admissibility of

evidence of solicitor-Professional employ-
ment.-Professional confidence and pro-
fessional employment are essential to render
communications between solicitors and
their clients privileged. Where, therefore,
the client has a criminal object in view in
his communications with his solicitor, one
of these elements must necessarily be
absent, and a communication between a
solicitor and his client, which was a step
preparatory to the commission of a criminal
offence, is admissible as evidence in the
prosecution of the client for such offence.
In each particular case the court must
determine upon the facts actually given in
evidence, or proposed to be given in evi-
dence, whether it seems probable that the
accused person may have consulted his
legal adviser, not after the commission of
the crime for the legitimate purpose of
being defended, but before the commission
of the crime for the purpose of being
guided or helped in committing it. And
every precaution must be taken not to
hamper prisoners in making their defence,
nor to enable knowledge to be acquired
improperly, nor to compel unnecessary
disclosures. (Reg. v. Cox and Railton.
Dec., 1884. C. Č. R.) 611.

PROOF OF FIRST MARRIAGE.
(See Bigamy.)

Receiving stolen property-Account given by the prisoner-Evidence to negative it.— On an indictment for receiving goods knowing them to have been stolen, the prisoner's account being that he had purchased them of a tradesman in the same town, other circumstances in the case tending to negative it, though the tradesman was not called for the prosecution: Held, that it was not necessary to call him on the part of the prosecution, there being other circumstances in the case from which the jury might fairly infer the falsehood of the prisoner's story. (Reg. v. Ritson, June, 1884. C. C. R.) 478.

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Receiving stolen property-Guilty knowledge -Possession of other property stolen within preceding twelve months · Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112), s. 19.-Upon an indictment for stealing and receiving certain property, in order to show guilty knowledge evidence was admitted that the prisoner within the preceding twelve months had been in possession of certain other property, which was proved to have been stolen, but of which he had parted with the possession before the date of the larceny alleged

in the indictment. Held, that the words
of the statute 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 19,
did not extend to such evidence, which was
therefore inadmissible. (Reg. v. Carter.
April, 1884. C. C. R.) 448.
Receiving stolen property-Guilty knowledge
-Statement of price of articles produced
by wife in prisoner's presence, as made
out at his direction. The prisoner was
indicted for receiving stolen goods, know-
ing them to have been stolen. To prove
his guilty knowledge, evidence was given
that, being asked by the police as to the
prices he had given, he said he did not
then know, but his wife would make out a
list of them, and next day she, in his pre-
sence, produced a list, which was received
in evidence against him. Held, that it
was admissible. (Reg. v. Mallory. May,
1884. C. C. R.) 456.

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SEDITIOUS LIBEL-JURISDICTION OF
JUSTICES.

(See Libel.)

TREASONABLE INTENTION.
(See Treason Felony.)

EXTRADITION.

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Apprehension · Detention of person
already in custody-Extradition Act,
1870, s. 8-Court of appeal-Jurisdic-
tion Habeas Corpus-Judicature Act,
1873, ss. 19, 47.-Where a fugitive criminal
is arrested without a warrant, he may be
detained in custody for an offence coming
within the Act on a warrant for his ap-
prehension under sect. 8 of the Extradi-
tion Act, 1870, as the word "apprehen-

sion in that section includes "deten-
tion." Quære, whether, having regard to
the provisions of the Judicature Acts, the
Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear
an appeal from the refusal of a divisional
court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in
such a case. (Reg v. Weil. July, 1882.
Ct. of App.) 189.

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Foreign warrant-Warrant of committal-
Sufficiency of description of offence-
Fraud by an agent' Extradition Act,
1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), s. 10-Treaty
with France, 1876-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96,
8. 75.-A French subject and fugitive
criminal was apprehended in England
upon a warrant issued by the chief metro-
politan police magistrate, after notice from
the Home Secretary that a requisition had
been made for his extradition under the
treaty with France (1876) for the sur-
render of fugitive criminals, and he was

committed under sect. 10 of the Extra-
dition Act, 1870. In the foreign warrant
issued in France the prisoner was accused
of the crime of "abus de confiance;
" and
by Article 3 of the treaty one of the
crimes for which extradition is to be
granted is "abus de confiance ou détourne-
ment par un banquier, commissionaire,
administrateur," &c. In the police magis-
trate's warrant of committal the offence
was described as "fraud by an agent."
Held, that the description of the offence in
the warrant was sufficient, and that the
facts upon the depositions disclosed a
prima facie case of fraud by an agent
within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96,
s. 75, to justify the prisoner's committal
for trial if the offence had been committed
in England, and therefore the magistrate
was right in committing him under the
Extradition Act. (Ex parte Piot. Jan.,
1883. Q. B. Div.) 208.

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Fugitive criminal-Duty of magistrate-
Evidence necessary for committal —
Extradition Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52),
ss. 10, 26.-To satisfy a magistrate in
committing a prisoner, charged with an
extradition crime, under sect. 10 of 33 &
34 Vict. c. 52, there must be some evidence
that the prisoner committed such crime
within the jurisdiction of the country
seeking extradition. (Reg. v. Lavaudier,
Tressard, Laudais, Patureau, and
Schwartz. Aug., 1881. Q. B. Div.) 329.

FALSE PRETENCES.

(See Conspiracy to Defraud.)
Existing fact-Evidence. The prisoner ob-
tained money by representing that he was
collecting information for a new county
directory that W. and Co. were getting
up, and that by paying one shilling the
prosecutor could have his name inserted in
large type and would receive other advan-
tages. There were several similar charges.
W. and Co., an existing firm, were not
getting up a new county directory, and
the prisoner was not employed by them to
canvass or collect information. The pri-
soner's defence before the magistrates (in
evidence at the trial) was, that he was going
to bring out a directory, and that he was
not aware he was doing wrong in using
the name of W. and Co. At the trial the
prisoner's counsel urged that there was
no misrepresentation of any existing fact,
but only a promise to do something in
future. Held, that this was a misrepre-
sentation of an existing fact. (Reg v.
Speed. March, 1882. C. C. R.) 24.

Jurisdiction-Posting the letter containing
the pretence-Obtaining of money thereby.
—A false pretence was made by letter in
N., England, and posted there to, and
received by, a person in France. In con-
sequence of the letter that person drew a
cheque in France, payable at N. in Eng-
land, and sent it to the prisoner at N. in
England, who cashed the cheque in England.
Held, that the prisoner was properly in-
dicted and tried at N. in England. (Reg. v.
G. Holmes. Nov., 1883. C. C. R.) 343.
Obtaining goods by false pretences-Neces-
sity for proof that the goods were deli-
vered on the faith of the false pretence.
-On an indictment for obtaining goods
by false pretences, the false pretence
charged and proved being that the prisoner
was daughter of a lady of the same name,
residing at a certain place, there being no
evidence that the goods were not delivered
to the prisoner before her name and ad-
dress were asked for: Held, that there
was no sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment, it being essential on a pro-
secution for obtaining goods by false
pretences to prove that the goods were
delivered on the faith of the false pretence
charged. (Reg. v. Catherine Jones. June,
1884. C. C. R.) 475.

Obtaining premium on policy of insurance-
Policy treated as lapsed-Suppression of
material facts-Knowledge by prisoner
of facts which would have prevented
payment-Misrepresentation by conduct.
P.,
an agent of a life assurance
company, received from V. the premium
for the year 1883 to 1884 on a policy
effected by V. with the company in 1881,
but instead of giving V. the official receipt,
gave him an informal receipt, appropriated
the money, and returned the official receipt
to the company, who treated the policy as
lapsed. On the 7th day of April, 1884,
P. called on V. for the premium for the
year 1884 to 1885. V. being then unable
to pay, P. called again on the 21st day of
April, the days of grace allowed by the
policy having to the knowledge of V. ex-
pired on the 15th day of April, and told
V. that payment on that day "would be
effectual," and V. understood that P. was
to "apply to the company to let the policy
go on. The company were in the habit
of allowing lapsed policies to be revived,
upon the payment of overdue premiums;
and upon the representations thus made by
P., V. paid him a sum of money. Upon a
case reserved at the trial of an indictment
which charged P. with having obtained

this sum of money by false pretences:
Held, by the majority of the court, that
P.'s conduct on the 7th and 21st days of
April amounted to a representation that
the policy had not lapsed nor become void,
and that he had authority to say that the
payment on the 21st would keep the
policy alive for another year, and that
there was, therefore, sufficient evidence to
support the conviction. Grove and Manisty,
JJ., dissentientibus, on the ground that
the payment of the premium in 1883 to P.,
as agent of the company, was a payment
to the company, and that the policy
had not therefore lapsed or become void,
except so far as both V. and P. knew that
it had lapsed on the 15th day of April.
(Reg. v. Powell. Dec., 1884. C. C. R.)
568.

Previous conviction-Term of penal servi-
tude-Amendment of sentence.—The pri-
soner was convicted on an indictment for
obtaining goods by false pretences, and
also pleaded guilty to a previous convic-
tion for false pretences charged in the
indictment. He was sentenced to seven
years' penal servitude. Held, that the
sentence was wrong, and it was amended
by reducing it to five years' penal servi-
tude. (Reg. v. Frederick Horne. March,
1883. C. C. R.) 205.

Winning at tossing with coins by fraud and
ill-practice-8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, 8. 17—

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Game, sport, pastime, or exercise."
The prisoners were indicted and convicted
under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17, of
obtaining by fraud and unlawful device and
ill-practice in playing at a certain game or
sport, to wit in and by wagering on the
event of a certain game or sport, a watch
and other things from the prosecutor.
The evidence was that the prosecutor was
induced to go to a public-house and drink
and toss for wagers with one of the pri-
soners, and the event was that the prose-
cutor lost, and the prisoners took away
the property stated. Held, that this was a
sport, pastime, or exercise, if not a game,
within the meaning of sect. 17 of 8 & 9
Vict. c. 109. (Reg. v. O'Connor and
Brown. Nov., 1881. C. C. R.) 3.

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FELONIOUS RECEIVING.
Bonds stolen from a British ship in a foreign
river-Admiralty jurisdiction.-Egyptian
and other bonds were put on board a
British ship lying in the river, and moored
to the shore, at Rotterdam, for conveyance
to England. The bonds were stolen, and
the prisoners, British subjects, were found
dealing with them in England, and were
tried at the Central Criminal Court, and
found guilty of feloniously receiving the
same, well knowing them to have been
stolen. Held, assuming the bonds to
have been stolen by a foreigner, or other
person not being one of the crew, from the
ship at Rotterdam, whilst so moored in the
river, that the Admiralty had jurisdiction
over the offence, and that the prisoners
were properly tried at the Central Criminal
Court. (Reg. v. Carr and Wilson. Nov.
1882. C. C. R.) 129.

FRAUD.

BY AN AGENT.

(See Extradition.)

FREQUENTING HIGHWAY.
WITH INTENT TO COMMIT FELONY.
(See Vagrancy Act.)

FUGITIVE CRIMINAL.
(See Extradition.)

GAME, OR SPORT.
(See False Pretences.)

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GAMING.

Common gaming-house-Unlawful gaming-
Baccarat-Proprietary club-Proprietor
-Committee-Players-33 Hen. 8, c. 9—
8 & 9 Vict. c. 109-17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4.
By 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 11, "No manner of
person or persons
shall for his

or their gain, lucre, or living, keep, have,
hold, occupy, exercise, or maintain any
common house, alley, or place of bowling,
coiting, cloysh-cayls, half-bowl, tennis,
dicing table, or carding, or any other
manner of game prohibited by any statute
heretofore made, or any other unlawful
new game now invented or made, or
any other new unlawful game hereafter to
be invented, found, had, or made, upon
pain to forfeit," &c. By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109,
s. 1, so much of the above Act, "whereby
any game of mere skill, such as bowling,
coyting, cloysh-cayls, half-bowl, tennis, or
the like is declared an unlawful game," is
repealed; and by sect. 2, "in default of
other evidence proving any house or place
to be a common gaming-house, it shall be
sufficient in support of the allegation

to prove that such house or
place is kept or used for playing therein
at any unlawful game, and that a bank is
kept there by one or more of the players
exclusively of the others; or that the
chances of any game played therein are
not alike favourable to all the players, in-
cluding among the players the banker or
other person by whom the game is managed,
or against whom the other players stake,
play, or bet; and every such house or place
shall be deemed a common gaming-house,
such as is contrary to law, and forbidden
to be kept by 33 Hen. 8, c. 9." By 17 & 18
Vict. c. 38, s. 4, "Any person being the
owner or occupier, or having the use of
any house, room, or place, who shall open,
keep, or use the same for the purpose of
unlawful gaming being carried on therein,
and any person who, being the owner or
occupier of any house or room, shall know-
ingly and wilfully permit the same to be
opened, kept, or used by any other person
for the purpose aforesaid, and any person
having the care or management of, or in
any manner assisting in conducting the
business of any house, room, or place,
opened, kept, or used for the purpose afore-
said, and any person who shall advance or
furnish money for the purpose of gaming
with persons frequenting such house, room,
or place, may, on summary conviction
thereof before any two justices of the
peace, be adjudged by such justices to
forfeit and pay such penalty, not exceeding

five hundred pounds, as to such justices
shall seem fit, &c." The P. proprietary
club was, by its rules, to consist of 500
members; its internal arrangements were
to be managed by a committee of twelve
of them, with whom also rested the elec-
tion of members; hazard was not to be
played, nor dice used in the club-house;
the points at whist were not to exceed 11.;
and the committee had power to make such
bye-laws and regulations as might appear
necessary for the good order and regula
tion of the club. The proprietor was re-
munerated by the entrance fees and annual
subscriptions of members and card money,
the kitchen being carried on at a loss, and
the wines and cigars being sold at almost
cost price. There was habitually played
in the club, for from eight to thirteen hours
nightly, the game of baccarat, a game of
chance played with cards, at which sums of
money from 251. to 1000l. were lost every
twenty minutes, by reason whereof the pro-
prietor became possessed of money com-
pared with which the sums received for
the entrance fees and subscriptions were
insignificant. The proprietor of the club,
four members of the committee, and three
players of baccarat in the house, having
been convicted by a magistrate of an
offence against 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4:
Held, on case stated, that the game of
baccarat, being a game of cards other than
a game of mere skill, was an "unlawful
game within the meaning of 33 Hen. 8,
c. 9, s. 11, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 1, and
the club a common gaming-house within
the meaning of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 2;
and that, therefore, the proprietor was, on
the facts stated, rightly convicted under
17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4, of "being the
occupier of, and opening, keeping, or
using," and the committee-men of having
the care and management of and assisting
in conducting the business of" the club
"for the purpose of unlawful gaming being
carried on therein;" but that the players
were wrongly convicted under the said
section, inasmuch as the mere membership
of and playing in the club did not amount
"
assisting in conducting the business"
of it within the meaning of the section.
(Jenks and others (apps.) v. Turpin and
another (resps.). June, 1884. Q. B. Div.)
486.

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(See also Vagrancy Acts.)

GAOL DELIVERY.

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Office Circular of March, 1883.- The
general authority given by the commission
of general gaol delivery to justices of
assize to deliver the gaols of all manner of
prisoners found therein, confers no juris-
diction over prisoners directed by statute
to be dealt with by the court of general or
quarter sessions, though found within the
prison of the county. A commitment,
therefore, of such a prisoner to the assizes
will be bad, and will entitle the prisoner to
his discharge from custody. The effect of
the Home Office Circular of March, 1883,
on the form of commitments. (Reg. v.
Mary Ward. July, 1883. West. Q. C.
Commissioners. 321.

HABEAS CORPUS.

APPEAL FROM REFUSAL OF DIVISIONAL
COURT TO ISSUE WRIT OF.
(See Extradition.)

HIGHWAY.

Obstruction-Traction Engine - User on
narrow road-Indictment for obstruction.
-Persons using a traction engine and
trucks on a highway six hours daily for
seven weeks cannot be found guilty upon
an indictment for a nuisance to the highway
unless they create a substantial obstruction
and occasion delay and inconvenience to
the public substantially greater than would
have been caused by horses and carts.
(Reg. v. Chittenden and another. July,
1885. Hawkins, J.) 725.

HIGHWAY ROBBERY.

COERCION.

(See Husband and Wife.)

HIRE AND PURCHASE SYSTEM.
CONVERSION OF HIRED GOODS.

(See Larceny by Bailee.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Coercion-Felony-Highway robbery with
violence.-Upon an indictment for high-
way robbery with violence, D. and his
wife were found guilty, the jury finding
as to the wife that she had acted under
the compulsion of her husband: Held,
that as to the wife the verdict amounted to
one of not guilty. (Reg. v. Dykes et Uxor
Oct. 1885. Stephen, J.) 771.

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Wife indicted for stealing husband's pro-
perty Admissibility of husband's ́evi-
dence. The evidence of a husband is
inadmissible in proceedings by way of

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