CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS BY WITNESS.
Dying declaration-Consciousness of im- pending dissolution. shortly after the occurrence which re- deceased, sulted in her death, was seen standing at the door of a neighbour's house in a faint- ing condition, and apparently dying. She said, "I am dying; look to my children;" and she then made a statement as to the cause of her injuries. Held, by Hawkins, J., after consulting Baggallay, L.J., that the statement then made was admissible in evidence as a dying declaration. (Reg. v. Goddard. Feb., 1882. Hawkins, J.)~ 7.
DYING DECLARATIONS. (See also Murder.)
FALSE PRETENCES.
(See Conspiracy to Defraud and False Pretences.)
INTENT TO Defraud Creditors. (See Debtors Act.)
NEGLECT TO SUPPLY MEDICAL AID. (See Manslaughter.)
NEWSPAPER REPORT OF SPEECH. (See Justices of the Peace.)
(See Treason Felony.) PARTY ACCUSED AS WITNESS. (See Justice of the Peace.)
Privilege-Question tending to criminate.A witness is not the sole judge whether a question put to him may tend to criminate him. To entitle a witness to the privilege of silence the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called upon to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer; but, if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question. Reg. v. Boyes (5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 147; 1 B. & S. 311) approved. (Ex parte Reynolds; Re Reynolds. March, 1882. Ct. of App.) 108.
Privilege-Solicitor and client-Communication prior to commission of crimeIndictment of client-Admissibility of
evidence of solicitor-Professional employ- ment.-Professional confidence and pro- fessional employment are essential to render communications between solicitors and their clients privileged. Where, therefore, the client has a criminal object in view in his communications with his solicitor, one of these elements must necessarily be absent, and a communication between a solicitor and his client, which was a step preparatory to the commission of a criminal offence, is admissible as evidence in the prosecution of the client for such offence. In each particular case the court must determine upon the facts actually given in evidence, or proposed to be given in evi- dence, whether it seems probable that the accused person may have consulted his legal adviser, not after the commission of the crime for the legitimate purpose of being defended, but before the commission of the crime for the purpose of being guided or helped in committing it. And every precaution must be taken not to hamper prisoners in making their defence, nor to enable knowledge to be acquired improperly, nor to compel unnecessary disclosures. (Reg. v. Cox and Railton. Dec., 1884. C. Č. R.) 611.
PROOF OF FIRST MARRIAGE. (See Bigamy.)
Receiving stolen property-Account given by the prisoner-Evidence to negative it.— On an indictment for receiving goods knowing them to have been stolen, the prisoner's account being that he had purchased them of a tradesman in the same town, other circumstances in the case tending to negative it, though the tradesman was not called for the prosecution: Held, that it was not necessary to call him on the part of the prosecution, there being other circumstances in the case from which the jury might fairly infer the falsehood of the prisoner's story. (Reg. v. Ritson, June, 1884. C. C. R.) 478.
Receiving stolen property-Guilty knowledge -Possession of other property stolen within preceding twelve months · Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112), s. 19.-Upon an indictment for stealing and receiving certain property, in order to show guilty knowledge evidence was admitted that the prisoner within the preceding twelve months had been in possession of certain other property, which was proved to have been stolen, but of which he had parted with the possession before the date of the larceny alleged
in the indictment. Held, that the words of the statute 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 19, did not extend to such evidence, which was therefore inadmissible. (Reg. v. Carter. April, 1884. C. C. R.) 448. Receiving stolen property-Guilty knowledge -Statement of price of articles produced by wife in prisoner's presence, as made out at his direction. The prisoner was indicted for receiving stolen goods, know- ing them to have been stolen. To prove his guilty knowledge, evidence was given that, being asked by the police as to the prices he had given, he said he did not then know, but his wife would make out a list of them, and next day she, in his pre- sence, produced a list, which was received in evidence against him. Held, that it was admissible. (Reg. v. Mallory. May, 1884. C. C. R.) 456.
SEDITIOUS LIBEL-JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES.
TREASONABLE INTENTION. (See Treason Felony.)
Apprehension · Detention of person already in custody-Extradition Act, 1870, s. 8-Court of appeal-Jurisdic- tion Habeas Corpus-Judicature Act, 1873, ss. 19, 47.-Where a fugitive criminal is arrested without a warrant, he may be detained in custody for an offence coming within the Act on a warrant for his ap- prehension under sect. 8 of the Extradi- tion Act, 1870, as the word "apprehen-
sion in that section includes "deten- tion." Quære, whether, having regard to the provisions of the Judicature Acts, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the refusal of a divisional court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in such a case. (Reg v. Weil. July, 1882. Ct. of App.) 189.
Foreign warrant-Warrant of committal- Sufficiency of description of offence- Fraud by an agent' Extradition Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), s. 10-Treaty with France, 1876-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 8. 75.-A French subject and fugitive criminal was apprehended in England upon a warrant issued by the chief metro- politan police magistrate, after notice from the Home Secretary that a requisition had been made for his extradition under the treaty with France (1876) for the sur- render of fugitive criminals, and he was
committed under sect. 10 of the Extra- dition Act, 1870. In the foreign warrant issued in France the prisoner was accused of the crime of "abus de confiance; " and by Article 3 of the treaty one of the crimes for which extradition is to be granted is "abus de confiance ou détourne- ment par un banquier, commissionaire, administrateur," &c. In the police magis- trate's warrant of committal the offence was described as "fraud by an agent." Held, that the description of the offence in the warrant was sufficient, and that the facts upon the depositions disclosed a prima facie case of fraud by an agent within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75, to justify the prisoner's committal for trial if the offence had been committed in England, and therefore the magistrate was right in committing him under the Extradition Act. (Ex parte Piot. Jan., 1883. Q. B. Div.) 208.
Fugitive criminal-Duty of magistrate- Evidence necessary for committal — Extradition Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), ss. 10, 26.-To satisfy a magistrate in committing a prisoner, charged with an extradition crime, under sect. 10 of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, there must be some evidence that the prisoner committed such crime within the jurisdiction of the country seeking extradition. (Reg. v. Lavaudier, Tressard, Laudais, Patureau, and Schwartz. Aug., 1881. Q. B. Div.) 329.
FALSE PRETENCES.
(See Conspiracy to Defraud.) Existing fact-Evidence. The prisoner ob- tained money by representing that he was collecting information for a new county directory that W. and Co. were getting up, and that by paying one shilling the prosecutor could have his name inserted in large type and would receive other advan- tages. There were several similar charges. W. and Co., an existing firm, were not getting up a new county directory, and the prisoner was not employed by them to canvass or collect information. The pri- soner's defence before the magistrates (in evidence at the trial) was, that he was going to bring out a directory, and that he was not aware he was doing wrong in using the name of W. and Co. At the trial the prisoner's counsel urged that there was no misrepresentation of any existing fact, but only a promise to do something in future. Held, that this was a misrepre- sentation of an existing fact. (Reg v. Speed. March, 1882. C. C. R.) 24.
Jurisdiction-Posting the letter containing the pretence-Obtaining of money thereby. —A false pretence was made by letter in N., England, and posted there to, and received by, a person in France. In con- sequence of the letter that person drew a cheque in France, payable at N. in Eng- land, and sent it to the prisoner at N. in England, who cashed the cheque in England. Held, that the prisoner was properly in- dicted and tried at N. in England. (Reg. v. G. Holmes. Nov., 1883. C. C. R.) 343. Obtaining goods by false pretences-Neces- sity for proof that the goods were deli- vered on the faith of the false pretence. -On an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences, the false pretence charged and proved being that the prisoner was daughter of a lady of the same name, residing at a certain place, there being no evidence that the goods were not delivered to the prisoner before her name and ad- dress were asked for: Held, that there was no sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment, it being essential on a pro- secution for obtaining goods by false pretences to prove that the goods were delivered on the faith of the false pretence charged. (Reg. v. Catherine Jones. June, 1884. C. C. R.) 475.
Obtaining premium on policy of insurance- Policy treated as lapsed-Suppression of material facts-Knowledge by prisoner of facts which would have prevented payment-Misrepresentation by conduct. P., an agent of a life assurance company, received from V. the premium for the year 1883 to 1884 on a policy effected by V. with the company in 1881, but instead of giving V. the official receipt, gave him an informal receipt, appropriated the money, and returned the official receipt to the company, who treated the policy as lapsed. On the 7th day of April, 1884, P. called on V. for the premium for the year 1884 to 1885. V. being then unable to pay, P. called again on the 21st day of April, the days of grace allowed by the policy having to the knowledge of V. ex- pired on the 15th day of April, and told V. that payment on that day "would be effectual," and V. understood that P. was to "apply to the company to let the policy go on. The company were in the habit of allowing lapsed policies to be revived, upon the payment of overdue premiums; and upon the representations thus made by P., V. paid him a sum of money. Upon a case reserved at the trial of an indictment which charged P. with having obtained
this sum of money by false pretences: Held, by the majority of the court, that P.'s conduct on the 7th and 21st days of April amounted to a representation that the policy had not lapsed nor become void, and that he had authority to say that the payment on the 21st would keep the policy alive for another year, and that there was, therefore, sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Grove and Manisty, JJ., dissentientibus, on the ground that the payment of the premium in 1883 to P., as agent of the company, was a payment to the company, and that the policy had not therefore lapsed or become void, except so far as both V. and P. knew that it had lapsed on the 15th day of April. (Reg. v. Powell. Dec., 1884. C. C. R.) 568.
Previous conviction-Term of penal servi- tude-Amendment of sentence.—The pri- soner was convicted on an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences, and also pleaded guilty to a previous convic- tion for false pretences charged in the indictment. He was sentenced to seven years' penal servitude. Held, that the sentence was wrong, and it was amended by reducing it to five years' penal servi- tude. (Reg. v. Frederick Horne. March, 1883. C. C. R.) 205.
Winning at tossing with coins by fraud and ill-practice-8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, 8. 17—
Game, sport, pastime, or exercise." The prisoners were indicted and convicted under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17, of obtaining by fraud and unlawful device and ill-practice in playing at a certain game or sport, to wit in and by wagering on the event of a certain game or sport, a watch and other things from the prosecutor. The evidence was that the prosecutor was induced to go to a public-house and drink and toss for wagers with one of the pri- soners, and the event was that the prose- cutor lost, and the prisoners took away the property stated. Held, that this was a sport, pastime, or exercise, if not a game, within the meaning of sect. 17 of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109. (Reg. v. O'Connor and Brown. Nov., 1881. C. C. R.) 3.
FELONIOUS RECEIVING. Bonds stolen from a British ship in a foreign river-Admiralty jurisdiction.-Egyptian and other bonds were put on board a British ship lying in the river, and moored to the shore, at Rotterdam, for conveyance to England. The bonds were stolen, and the prisoners, British subjects, were found dealing with them in England, and were tried at the Central Criminal Court, and found guilty of feloniously receiving the same, well knowing them to have been stolen. Held, assuming the bonds to have been stolen by a foreigner, or other person not being one of the crew, from the ship at Rotterdam, whilst so moored in the river, that the Admiralty had jurisdiction over the offence, and that the prisoners were properly tried at the Central Criminal Court. (Reg. v. Carr and Wilson. Nov. 1882. C. C. R.) 129.
FRAUD.
BY AN AGENT.
(See Extradition.)
FREQUENTING HIGHWAY. WITH INTENT TO COMMIT FELONY. (See Vagrancy Act.)
FUGITIVE CRIMINAL. (See Extradition.)
GAME, OR SPORT. (See False Pretences.)
Common gaming-house-Unlawful gaming- Baccarat-Proprietary club-Proprietor -Committee-Players-33 Hen. 8, c. 9— 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109-17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4. By 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 11, "No manner of person or persons shall for his
or their gain, lucre, or living, keep, have, hold, occupy, exercise, or maintain any common house, alley, or place of bowling, coiting, cloysh-cayls, half-bowl, tennis, dicing table, or carding, or any other manner of game prohibited by any statute heretofore made, or any other unlawful new game now invented or made, or any other new unlawful game hereafter to be invented, found, had, or made, upon pain to forfeit," &c. By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 1, so much of the above Act, "whereby any game of mere skill, such as bowling, coyting, cloysh-cayls, half-bowl, tennis, or the like is declared an unlawful game," is repealed; and by sect. 2, "in default of other evidence proving any house or place to be a common gaming-house, it shall be sufficient in support of the allegation
to prove that such house or place is kept or used for playing therein at any unlawful game, and that a bank is kept there by one or more of the players exclusively of the others; or that the chances of any game played therein are not alike favourable to all the players, in- cluding among the players the banker or other person by whom the game is managed, or against whom the other players stake, play, or bet; and every such house or place shall be deemed a common gaming-house, such as is contrary to law, and forbidden to be kept by 33 Hen. 8, c. 9." By 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4, "Any person being the owner or occupier, or having the use of any house, room, or place, who shall open, keep, or use the same for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein, and any person who, being the owner or occupier of any house or room, shall know- ingly and wilfully permit the same to be opened, kept, or used by any other person for the purpose aforesaid, and any person having the care or management of, or in any manner assisting in conducting the business of any house, room, or place, opened, kept, or used for the purpose afore- said, and any person who shall advance or furnish money for the purpose of gaming with persons frequenting such house, room, or place, may, on summary conviction thereof before any two justices of the peace, be adjudged by such justices to forfeit and pay such penalty, not exceeding
five hundred pounds, as to such justices shall seem fit, &c." The P. proprietary club was, by its rules, to consist of 500 members; its internal arrangements were to be managed by a committee of twelve of them, with whom also rested the elec- tion of members; hazard was not to be played, nor dice used in the club-house; the points at whist were not to exceed 11.; and the committee had power to make such bye-laws and regulations as might appear necessary for the good order and regula tion of the club. The proprietor was re- munerated by the entrance fees and annual subscriptions of members and card money, the kitchen being carried on at a loss, and the wines and cigars being sold at almost cost price. There was habitually played in the club, for from eight to thirteen hours nightly, the game of baccarat, a game of chance played with cards, at which sums of money from 251. to 1000l. were lost every twenty minutes, by reason whereof the pro- prietor became possessed of money com- pared with which the sums received for the entrance fees and subscriptions were insignificant. The proprietor of the club, four members of the committee, and three players of baccarat in the house, having been convicted by a magistrate of an offence against 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4: Held, on case stated, that the game of baccarat, being a game of cards other than a game of mere skill, was an "unlawful game within the meaning of 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 11, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 1, and the club a common gaming-house within the meaning of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 2; and that, therefore, the proprietor was, on the facts stated, rightly convicted under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4, of "being the occupier of, and opening, keeping, or using," and the committee-men of having the care and management of and assisting in conducting the business of" the club "for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein;" but that the players were wrongly convicted under the said section, inasmuch as the mere membership of and playing in the club did not amount " assisting in conducting the business" of it within the meaning of the section. (Jenks and others (apps.) v. Turpin and another (resps.). June, 1884. Q. B. Div.) 486.
(See also Vagrancy Acts.)
Office Circular of March, 1883.- The general authority given by the commission of general gaol delivery to justices of assize to deliver the gaols of all manner of prisoners found therein, confers no juris- diction over prisoners directed by statute to be dealt with by the court of general or quarter sessions, though found within the prison of the county. A commitment, therefore, of such a prisoner to the assizes will be bad, and will entitle the prisoner to his discharge from custody. The effect of the Home Office Circular of March, 1883, on the form of commitments. (Reg. v. Mary Ward. July, 1883. West. Q. C. Commissioners. 321.
HABEAS CORPUS.
APPEAL FROM REFUSAL OF DIVISIONAL COURT TO ISSUE WRIT OF. (See Extradition.)
Obstruction-Traction Engine - User on narrow road-Indictment for obstruction. -Persons using a traction engine and trucks on a highway six hours daily for seven weeks cannot be found guilty upon an indictment for a nuisance to the highway unless they create a substantial obstruction and occasion delay and inconvenience to the public substantially greater than would have been caused by horses and carts. (Reg. v. Chittenden and another. July, 1885. Hawkins, J.) 725.
HIRE AND PURCHASE SYSTEM. CONVERSION OF HIRED GOODS.
(See Larceny by Bailee.)
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Coercion-Felony-Highway robbery with violence.-Upon an indictment for high- way robbery with violence, D. and his wife were found guilty, the jury finding as to the wife that she had acted under the compulsion of her husband: Held, that as to the wife the verdict amounted to one of not guilty. (Reg. v. Dykes et Uxor Oct. 1885. Stephen, J.) 771.
Wife indicted for stealing husband's pro- perty Admissibility of husband's ́evi- dence. The evidence of a husband is inadmissible in proceedings by way of
« 이전계속 » |