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indictment against the wife for stealing the perse a meeting of certain persons who
property of the husband, notwithstanding had previously unlawfully conspired to do
sect. 16 of the Married Women's Property certain acts; and that the plaintiff and
Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 See, how. others met and assembled with intent, as
ever, sect. 1 of the Married Women's Pro- defendant believed and had reasonable
perty Act, 1884, ante, p. xxxiii. (Reg. v. grounds for believing, to aid and promote
Brittleton and Bate. March, 1884. the said conspiracy. Held (1), That the
C.C. R.) 431.

defence was "bad, on demurrer, on the

ground that it did not allege as a matter
IDLE AND DISORDERLY PERSONS. of fact that the meeting was held to pro-
(See Vagrancy Act.)

mote or carry into effect the unlawful con-

spiracies mentioned; and (2) that a justice
INDECENT EXPOSURE.

of the peace has no authority to disperse a

meeting not shown to be unlawful because
(See Public Place.)

he reasonably believes it to be held with

an unlawful intent.
INDICTMENT.

In his defence the defendant set out certain
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS.

inflammatory placards posted by the pro-
moters of the meeting and their

opponents,
(See Compounding Felony.)

and alleged that informations were sworn
STATUTABLE WORD NOT USED.

from which it appeared that if the meet-

ing was held the public peace would be
(See Practice.)

broken; that the defendant had reasonable

grounds for believing them and believed
INFANT.

them to be true; and believed and had
ABDUCTION OF.

reasonable grounds for believing that a

breach of the peace would occur if the
(See Abduction.)

meeting were allowed to be held and con-
CONTRACT BY.

tinued, and that the public peace and

tranquillity could not otherwise be pre-
(See Larceny by Bailee.)

served than by separating and dispersing
NEGLECT TO SUPPLY MEDICAL AID TO.

the persons assembled; and that in order

to separate and disperse the plaintiff and
(See Manslaughter.)

the other persons so assembled the assault

complained of was committed. Held, that
INJURY TO PROPERTY.

from these statements it could not reason-
(See Malicious Injury.)

ably be assumed that the meeting therein

mentioned was in itself an unlawful
JERVIS'S ACT, 1848.

assembly; but that, assuming the plain-

tiff and others assembled with him to be
(See Criminal Prisoner.)

doing nothing unlawful, yet, if there were

reasonable grounds for the defendant, being
JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF

a justice of the peace, believing, as he
ASSIZE.

alleged he did, that there would be a breach
(See Gaol Delivery.)

of the peace if they continued so assembled,

and that there was no other way in which
JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES. the breach of the peace could be avoided
(See Sureties for Good Behaviour.)

but by stopping and dispersing the plain-

tiff's meeting, the defendant was justified
SEDITIOUS LIBEL-EVIDENCE.

in taking the necessary steps to stop and

disperse it. Humphries v. Connor (17
(See Libel.)

Ir. C. L. R. 1) approved of. Beatty v.

Gillbanks (9 Q. B. Div. 308) commented
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

on and distinguished. (O'Kelly v. Harvey,
Dispersing assembly believed to be unlawful Feb., 1882. Ct. of App. Ir.) 435.

-- Authority to disperseApprehended Sureties for good behaviour_Summons-
breach of the peace-Duty of a Justice of Objection of several distinct offences
the Peace. In an action for assault and

charged-Party accused as witness-
battery the defendant alleged that the Criminal proceeding. -F. (a. Roman
assault was committed by him as a justice Catholic priest) addressed a meeting com-
of the
peace
in order to separate and dis- posed mainly of his parishioners, who were

tenants of C., and advised them, if any for value of a New Zealand bond for 10001.,
of them should be evicted for nonpay- which had been stolen from the plaintiff's
ment of rent, not to pay rent until the possession, after the conviction of a person
victed tenant should be reinstated in his for feloniously receiving the same: Held,
holding. F. was thereupon summoned to that the proviso in the above section applies
the petty sessions to show cause why he to the right to recover as well to the sum-
should not give security for future good mary restitution of a negotiable instrument,
behaviour. The summons recited that F. and that, under the circumstances, the
had endeavoured to excite discontent in owner of the bond could not recover it
the minds of Her Majesty's subjects and from the transferees. (Chichester v. Hill
incite them not to fulfil their lawful and Son. Dec. 1882. Q. B. Div.) 258.
duties, and to injure and impoverish
persons who would not obey the orders of

Restitution of stolen property-Public sales.
an unlawful society. At the hearing of

masters-Stolen sheep-Sale in market
the summons a resolution proposed by F.

overtTransfer of property-Conversion.
at the meeting was read from a copy of a

-D. was a farmer residing in the Queen's
newspaper by his counsel, whereupon the

County. C., who was also a farmer
solicitor for the prosecution proposed to

residing in the same county, on the 17th
read the speech of F. from the report in

day of January, 1883, took twenty-one
the same copy. This was objected to, but

sheep, the property of D., off his lands,
allowed by the justices. F. was then

and brought them to Dublin, where there
tendered as a witness on his own behalf,

is a cattle market established by the Cor.
but the justices refused to allow him to be

poration of Dublin under the provisions of
examined. Held (1) that the justices had

the Dublin Improvement Act (12 & 13
jurisdiction to make the order, and that

Vict. c. 97, s. 80), and in which there is
the evidence was sufficient; (2) that it was

held a public market for the sale of cattle
no objection that the summons recited

and sheep every Thursday, the legal hour
several distinct acts of misconduct of F.;

for commencing sales being eight o'clock
(3) that the copy of the paper was admis.

in the morning. On Thursday, the 18th
sible as ovidence of the speech of F. at the

day of January, 1883, C. brought the
meeting ; (4) that F. was not a competent

twenty-one stolen sheep to the market,
witness, this being a criminal proceeding;

between eight and nine o'clock in the
(5) On a summons to find suretios for good

morning, and asked W. and Sons, who
behaviour the defendant may disprove the

were salesmasters in the market, to have
matters charged. (Reg. v. The Justices of

the sheep sold for him. W. and Sons, in
Cork, May, 1882. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 149.

ignorance of the theft, put the sheep into

their pons, and in a few minutes they were
(See also Sureties for Good Behaviour.) purchased by G. at 638. each. Immediately

after the sale G. removed the sheep, and
LARCENY.

W. and Son paid to C. the purchase-money,

less their own commission. The next
APPROPRIATION OF PRICE BY PERSON

day D. informed W. and Sons that the
AUTHORISED TO SELL.

shoep had been stolen from him, and
(See Embezzlement.)

thereupon W. and Sons gave him all the

information in their power. C.was arrested,
Restitution of stolen property-Owner of

and convicted of the theft. D. having
a stolen negotiable instrument-Bona

brought an action against W. and Sons for
fide transfer-Action to recover–24 & 25
Vict. c. 96, s. 100.-Sect. 100 of the Larceny

711. 88., which he alleged was the value of
Act, 1861, enacts that upon conviction for

the sheep to him, a special case was stated
felony or misdemeanour under that Act the

for the opinion of the court as to the
property acquired shall be restored to the

liability of W. and Sons. Held, by the

Exchequer Division and by the Court of
owner, and in every case the court before
which the conviction takes place shall have

Appeal that W. and Sons were liable to D.

for the conversion of the sheep. (Delaney
power to order restitution in a summary

v. Wallis and Sons. Jan. 1884. Ct. of
manner, provided that in case of a bona
fide transfer of a negotiable instrument for

App.) 525.
value, and without notice or reasonable Ringing the changes-Money obtained by a
cause to suspect, the court shall not award trick.— The prisoner and another person
or order thò restitution of such security. went to an inn. The prisoner asked the
The defendants had bona fide and without barmaid for whisky. He put down half a
cause to suspect acquired the possession sovereign, and received 98. 6d. in silver in
change. He then asked for the half. that section : Held, also, that such hypo-
sovereign back, saying he thought he had thecation note was a bill of sale within the
change. She gave it back. His companion definition in the Acts of 1878 and 1882 as
then asked for a cigar. She served him being a declaration of trust without
with it. The prisoner then put down 108. transfer ; but that the goods not having
in silver and a half-sovereign, asking the arrived at the date of its execution, it
barmaid to give him a sovereign for it, came within the exception as to " goods
which she did. His companion kept on at sea” contained in the Bills of Sale
engaging the barmaid's attention. The Acts, and so was not affected by the pro-
prisoner never returned the 9s. 6d. which visions therein as to form and registration.
the barmaid gave him in the first instance. (Reg. v. Townsend. May, 1884. Day, J.)
The barmaid never intended to part with 466.
her master's money except for full con-
sideration. The prisoner having been con.

LARCENY BY BAILEE.
victed on an indictment for larceny of the
money, the Court sustained the conviction.

Contract by infant-Hire and purchase
(Reg. v. Hollis. Nov. 1883. C. C. R.)

system-Conversion of hired goods during
345.

bailmentSpecial property-24 & 25 Vict.

c. 96, s. 3.-M., a minor, hired property on
Water in pipes.-Water supplied by a water the “hire and purchase.” system under a

company to a consumer, and standing in contract by which he undertook to pay for
his pipes, if taken without his permission, the furniture in quarterly instalments.
may be the subject of larceny. (Ferrens After having paid four of such instal.
(app.) v. O'Brien (resp.). April, 1883, ments, and previously to the fifth instal-
Q. B. Div.) 332.

ment becoming due, M. removed and sold
the furniture without the knowledge and

consent of the person from whom it was
LARCENY ACT, 1861.

hired, and having been indicted for larceny
Sect. 75-Direction in writing-Vendee of of furniture of which he was a bailee, was
goods-Undertaking by, whether within

found guilty. Held, upon a case reserved
statute.-A vendee of goods cannot be at the trial, that though the contract was
convicted under sect. 75 of 24 & 25 Vict.

void by reason of M.'s minority, the bail.
c. 96, for having misapplied the proceeds ment was nevertheless completed on the
of the delivery orders of such goods. delivery of the furniture; that the bail-
That section contemplates a direction ment created a special property in the
coming from a vendor, or from the person furniture while in M.'s possession; and
who entrusts, but does not contemplate a that the abuse of such special property was
transaction in which the ownership of an act of larceny under 24 & 25 Vict.
goods or money has passed to the person c. 96, s. 3, of which M. was rightly con-
charged. (Reg. v. Bredin. Feb., 1884. victed. (Reg. v. Macdonald. May, 1885.
Butt, J.) 412

C. C. R.) 757.
Sect. 80-Banker and customer-Trustee of

LIBEL,
proceeds of goods-Hypothecation note-
Bills of Sale Acts – What documents Blasphemous libel, definition of-Evidence
within.-T., a fruit broker applied to his of publication-Editor or publisher.-On
bankers for an advance as against certain the trial of two persons on an indictment
goods which had been consigned to him for publishing blasphemous libels in a
and were then at sea, he depositing with certain print or paper, on which their names
them the indorsed bills of lading. Before were given, one as printer, the other as
making the advance the bankers required publisher-proof of their identity with the
him to sign a letter of hypothecation by persons whose names were so given, or any
which he undertook to hold the goods in evidence merely connecting them with the
trust for the bankers, and to hand over to paper, held, not sufficient to fix them with
them the proceeds, “as and when received," liability. The 7th section of the Libel
to the amount of the advance. Held, by Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 76), being held to
Day, J., that this letter contained a de- apply, and to require evidence that they
claration of an express trust such as would published the libels, and not merely the
make the giver of it a trustee of the pro- papers in which they were contained
ceeds within the meaning of sect. 80 of Evidence that one of them published the
the Larceny Act, and his appropriation of paper held sufficient primâ facie case as
them to his own use an offence against against him, without any express evidence

that he knew of the libels. But express
evidence as to the other, that he was editor,
held not sufficient, without evidence that
he directed the insertion of the libels.
The mere denial of the truth of the
Christian religion, or of the Scriptures, is
not enough, per se, to constitute a writing
a blasphemous libel, so as to render the
writer or publisher indictable. But inde-
cent and offensive attacks on Christianity
or the Scriptures, or sacred persons or ob-
jects, calculated to outrage the feelings
of the general body of the community, do
constitute the offence of blasphemy, and
render writers or publishers liable at com-
mon law to criminal prosecution. (Reg. v.
Ramsay and Foote. April, 1883. Lord
Coleridge, C.J.) 231.

Blasphemous libel-Liability for publication
damus to compel the magistrate to receive
the evidence so tendered. Held, that no
such matters could be given in evidence at
the trial, and that, therefore, the magistrate
was right in refusing to admit the evidence
at the

of - Trial— Practice-Evidence-Indict.
ment charging several jointly-Separate
trial of one-Competence of other defen-
dents as witnesses in his defence-Lord
Campbell's Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96)
8. 7, as to exculpatory evidence in answer
to a primâ facie case of liability for
publication - Sale of paper of known
character, but with which defendant was
not connected, on premises of defendant,
by his servants Applicability of the
doctrine of Reg. v. Holbrook, 13 Cox C. C.
653, and 14 Cox C. C. 199—Evidence of
Liability of defendant for publication,
not merely of the paper but of the libels
contained in it-Direction to the jury.-
1. On an indictment of three persons jointly
for publishing blasphemous libels in certain
numbers of a newspaper, two of them,
whose names were on it as editor and
publisher, having already been convicted
on a charge of publishing similar libels in
another number of the paper, held that the
third, whose case was that he was not con-
nected with the paper at all, ought to be,
on his application, tried separately, as his
trial with the others might possibly pre-
judice him in his defence, especially as he
desired to call them as witnesses, while it
did not appear that his separate trial could
at all embarrass the case for the prosecn-
tion, as the prosecutor would be entitled to
give any evidence in his power to fix the
defendant with a joint liability for the acts
of the others. 2. Held, that the defendant,
thus tried first and separately, was entitled
to call the other defendants as witnesses on
his behalf, though they could not be called
as witnesses for the prosecution without
taking a verdict of acquittal against them,
the trial being separate. The observations

of Cockburn, C.J. in Reg. v. Winsor and
Harris held not applicable, as there the
fellow prisoner was called for the Crown.
3. The provision in Lord Campbell's Libel
Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), s. 7, as to allowing
exculpatory evidence in answer to a prima
facie case of liability for publication,
being quite general in its terms, was held
to apply to a prosecution for the publication
of a blasphemous libel. 4. The defendant
first tried, having originally published the
paper, and having, after he had ceased to
be ostensibly connected with it, continued
to allow it-knowing its characterto be
published on his premises, by a person in
his employ, but who was allowed in con-
sideration of a reduction of salary) to carry
on there a business of his own as bookseller
and newspaper publisher-the defendant
being occasionally on the premises, and
knowing that the paper was sold there,
though not proved to have had knowledge
of any particular numbers or articles in it,
and not being shown to have had otherwise
any connection with it during the publica-
tion of the libels; held, that though there
was a primâ facie case against him, yet
there was also a case in answer to it, under
the provisions in the Libel Act, on which
the jury might well acquit him. 5. Publi-
cations discussing with gravity and decency,
and in an argumentive way, questions as to
Christian doctrine or statements in the
Hebrew Scriptures, and even questioning
their truth, are not to be deemed blasphe-
mous, so as to be fit subjects for criminal
prosecution. But publications which, in
an indecent and malicious spirit, assail and
asperse the truth of Christianity, or of the
Scriptures, in language calculated and
intended to shock the feelings and outrage
the belief of mankind, are properly to be
regarded as blasphemous libels. (Reg. v.
Bradlaugh and others. April, 1883. Lord

Coleridge, C.J.) 217.
Criminal information-Preliminary inves-

tigation before magistrates -- Seditious
libel-Evidence-Truth of seditious libel
not a subject of inquiry before magistrates
-6 & 7 Vict. c. 96—44 & 45 Vict. c. 60,
8. 4.-Upon an application for a criminal
information against the proprietor of a
newspaper for publishing a seditious libel,
evidence was tendered under the 44 & 45
Vict. c. 60, s. 4, of the truth of the libel,
and that it was for the public benefit that
it should be published. The magistrate
refused to receive such evidence. Upon
an application to the Queen's Bench
Division for a conditional order for a man.

preliminary investigation. Reg. v.
Duffy (9 Ir. L. Rep. 329), approved of and
followed. (Ex parte Wm. O Brien. Jan.,

1883. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 180.
Criminal prosecution - Criminal informa-

tion-Fiat of Director of Public Prose-
cutions-Newspaper Libel and Registra-
tion Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60) 8. 3.-
By the Newspaper Libel and Registration
Act, 1881, (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), s. 3,“ no
criminal prosecution shall be commenced
against any proprietor, publisher, editor,
or any person responsible for the publica-
tion of a newspaper, for any libel published
therein, without the written fiat or allow-
ance of the Director of Public Prosecu.
tions

being first had and
obtained.” Held, that the section does not
apply to criminal informations filed by
leave of the court, and therefore the plain-
tiff in error was rightly convicted on such
an information, for a libel published in a
newspaper of which he was the proprietor,
although the fiat of the Director of
Public Prosecutions had not been obtained.
(Yates (plaintiff in error) v. The Queen.

Jan., 1885. Ct. of App.) 686.
Letters from employer to employedPri-

vileged occasion. The defendant, the wife
of a tradesman, being informed that a
female assistant in her husband's employ-
ment was dishonest, wrote at his request
and sent a letter accusing her of theft, and
strongly reproaching her. On an indict.
ment for libel: Held, that the occasion
was privileged, and that, therefore, in the
absence of malice the defendant was not
liable, and held also, that the terms of a
letter written under such circumstances
ought not to be too nicely criticised. (Reg.
V. Perry. Jan., 1883. Huddleston, B.)

169.
Libel on a deceased individual-Criminal

information-Applicant a foreign noble-
man resident abroad-Principles on which
criminal information should be granted.-
A foreign nobleman, resident abroad,
applied for and obtained a rule nisi for a
criminal information against the defendant,
the proprietor of a newspaper, for a libel
published therein imputing infamous and
disgraceful conduct to the applicant's
deceased father, upon an affidavit categori-
cally negativing the statements in the libel,
and stating the applicant's belief that it

was published maliciously, and with intent
to bring scandal and reproach upon the
memory of his deceased father, and to cast
a gross insult upon himself and his family,
and to bring them into public hatred, con-
tempt, and ridicule. In showing cause
against the rule, it was contended for the
defendant that the applicant was a foreigner
neither resident nor sojourning in England,
nor holding any political, official, or public
position, either here or abroad; that it was
not the applicant but his deceased father
who was the subject of the libel; and that,
in any view, the court, having a discretion
in the matter, would not grant the extra-
ordinary remedy asked for, but leave the
applicant to the ordinary remedy of indict-
nent or action. Held, by Lord Coleridge,
C.J. and Denman, Field, Hawkins, and
Mathew, JJ. (discharging the rule), (1)
That without laying it down as a rule of
law, that under no circumstances would
this court interfere, by way of criminal
information, on the application of a non-
resident foreigner, yet, having regard to
the principles on which, from very early
times, this court has acted, the non-resi.
dence of the applicant is a cogent argument
against such interference, and a reason
why, especially when, as here, there was no
intention to provoke and no reason to
apprehend a breach of the peace, the court
in the exercise of its discretion should not
interfere. (2.) That, although the authori.
ties are not absolutely conclusive on the
point, yet the weight of authorities inclines
in favour of the objection that the subject
of the libel is dead (see Rex v. Popham
4 T. R. 126), and upon that ground also
the court in its discretion declines to
interfere. (3.) (Denman, J. slightly differ-
ing on this head, as hereunder stated.)
That criminal informations upon the com-
plaint of a private person not holding any
public office or position entitling him to
that extraordinary remedy, should not be
granted in cases of " gross or notorious
misdemeanours, riots, batteries, libels, and
other immoralities of an atrocious kind,
not particularly tending to disturb the
Government (for those are left to the care
of the Attorney-General), but which, on
account of their magnitude or pernicious
example, deserve the most public animad-
version (Blackstone, book 4, c. 23,
p. 300); and a peer, if libelled in his private
capacity, and not as regards his conduct in
Parliament, or as a lord-lieutenant, or
magistrate, or as the holder of a public
office, is no more entitled to a criminal
information than the humblest subject of

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