indictment against the wife for stealing the property of the husband, notwithstanding sect. 16 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75). See, how- ever, sect. 1 of the Married Women's Pro- perty Act, 1884, ante, p. xxxiii. (Reg. v. Brittleton and Bate. March, 1884. C. C. R.) 431.
IDLE AND DISORDERLY PERSONS. (See Vagrancy Act.)
INDECENT EXPOSURE. (See Public Place.)
INDICTMENT.
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS. (See Compounding Felony.) STATUTABLE WORD NOT USED. (See Practice.)
INFANT. ABDUCTION of.
(See Abduction.)
CONTRACT BY.
(See Larceny by Bailee.)
NEGLECT TO SUPPLY MEDICAL AID TO.
INJURY TO PROPERTY.
(See Malicious Injury.)
JERVIS'S ACT, 1848. (See Criminal Prisoner.)
JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF ASSIZE.
(See Gaol Delivery.)
JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES. (See Sureties for Good Behaviour.) SEDITIOUS LIBEL-EVIDence. (See Libel.)
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. Dispersing assembly believed to be unlawful -Authority to disperse-Apprehended breach of the peace-Duty of a Justice of the Peace.-In an action for assault and battery the defendant alleged that the assault was committed by him as a justice of the peace in order to separate and dis-
perse a meeting of certain persons who had previously unlawfully conspired to do certain acts; and that the plaintiff and others met and assembled with intent, as defendant believed and had reasonable grounds for believing, to aid and promote the said conspiracy. Held (1), That the defence was bad, on demurrer, on the ground that it did not allege as a matter of fact that the meeting was held to pro- mote or carry into effect the unlawful con- spiracies mentioned; and (2) that a justice of the peace has no authority to disperse a meeting not shown to be unlawful because he reasonably believes it to be held with an unlawful intent.
In his defence the defendant set out certain inflammatory placards posted by the pro- moters of the meeting and their opponents, and alleged that informations were sworn from which it appeared that if the meet- ing was held the public peace would be broken; that the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing them and believed them to be true; and believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that a breach of the peace would occur if the meeting were allowed to be held and con- tinued, and that the public peace and tranquillity could not otherwise be pre- served than by separating and dispersing the persons assembled; and that in order to separate and disperse the plaintiff and the other persons so assembled the assault complained of was committed. Held, that from these statements it could not reason- ably be assumed that the meeting therein mentioned was in itself an unlawful assembly; but that, assuming the plain- tiff and others assembled with him to be doing nothing unlawful, yet, if there were reasonable grounds for the defendant, being a justice of the peace, believing, as he alleged he did, that there would be a breach of the peace if they continued so assembled, and that there was no other way in which the breach of the peace could be avoided but by stopping and dispersing the plain- tiff's meeting, the defendant was justified in taking the necessary steps to stop and disperse it. Humphries v. Connor (17 Ir. C. L. R. 1) approved of. Beatty v. Gillbanks (9 Q. B. Div. 308) commented on and distinguished. (O'Kelly v. Harvey, Feb., 1882. Ct. of App. Ir.) 435. Sureties for good behaviour-Summons- Objection of several distinct offences charged-Party accused as witness- Criminal proceeding.-F. (a Roman Catholic priest) addressed a meeting com- posed mainly of his parishioners, who were
tenants of C., and advised them, if any of them should be evicted for nonpay- ment of rent, not to pay rent until the evicted tenant should be reinstated in his holding. F. was thereupon summoned to the petty sessions to show cause why he should not give security for future good behaviour. The summons recited that F. had endeavoured to excite discontent in the minds of Her Majesty's subjects and incite them not to fulfil their lawful duties, and to injure and impoverish persons who would not obey the orders of an unlawful society. At the hearing of the summons a resolution proposed by F. at the meeting was read from a copy of a newspaper by his counsel, whereupon the solicitor for the prosecution proposed to read the speech of F. from the report in the same copy. This was objected to, but allowed by the justices. F. was then tendered as a witness on his own behalf, but the justices refused to allow him to be examined. Held (1) that the justices had jurisdiction to make the order, and that the evidence was sufficient; (2) that it was no objection that the summons recited several distinct acts of misconduct of F.; (3) that the copy of the paper was admis- sible as evidence of the speech of F. at the meeting; (4) that F. was not a competent witness, this being a criminal proceeding; (5) On a summons to find sureties for good behaviour the defendant may disprove the matters charged. (Reg. v. The Justices of Cork, May, 1882. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 149. (See also Sureties for Good Behaviour.)
APPROPRIATION OF PRICE BY PERSON AUTHORISED TO SELL. (See Embezzlement.) Restitution of stolen property-Owner of a stolen negotiable instrument-Bonâ fide transfer-Action to recover-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100.-Sect. 100 of the Larceny Act, 1861, enacts that upon conviction for felony or misdemeanour under that Act the property acquired shall be restored to the owner, and in every case the court before which the conviction takes place shall have power to order restitution in a summary manner, provided that in case of a bona fide transfer of a negotiable instrument for value, and without notice or reasonable cause to suspect, the court shall not award or order the restitution of such security. The defendants had bona fide and without cause to suspect acquired the possession
for value of a New Zealand bond for 10007., which had been stolen from the plaintiff's possession, after the conviction of a person for feloniously receiving the same: Held, that the proviso in the above section applies to the right to recover as well to the sum- mary restitution of a negotiable instrument, and that, under the circumstances, the owner of the bond could not recover it from the transferees. (Chichester v. Hill and Son. Dec. 1882. Q. B. Div.) 258. Restitution of stolen property-Public sales- masters-Stolen sheep-Sale in market overt-Transfer of property-Conversion. -D. was a farmer residing in the Queen's County. C., who was also a farmer residing in the same county, on the 17th day of January, 1883, took twenty-one sheep, the property of D., off his lands, and brought them to Dublin, where there is a cattle market established by the Cor- poration of Dublin under the provisions of the Dublin Improvement Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 97, s. 80), and in which there is held a public market for the sale of cattle and sheep every Thursday, the legal hour for commencing sales being eight o'clock in the morning. On Thursday, the 18th day of January, 1883, C. brought the twenty-one stolen sheep to the market, between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, and asked W. and Sons, who were salesmasters in the market, to have the sheep sold for him. W. and Sons, in ignorance of the theft, put the sheep into their pens, and in a few minutes they were purchased by G. at 63s. each. Immediately after the sale G. removed the sheep, and W. and Son paid to C. the purchase-money, less their own commission. The next day D. informed W. and Sons that the sheep had been stolen from him, and thereupon W. and Sons gave him all the information in their power. C. was arrested, and convicted of the theft. D. having brought an action against W. and Sons for 71l. 88., which he alleged was the value of the sheep to him, a special case was stated for the opinion of the court as to the liability of W. and Sons. Held, by the Exchequer Division and by the Court of Appeal that W. and Sons were liable to D. for the conversion of the sheep. (Delaney v. Wallis and Sons. Jan. 1884. Ct. of App.) 525.
Ringing the changes-Money obtained by a trick.-The prisoner and another person went to an inn. The prisoner asked the barmaid for whisky. He put down half a sovereign, and received 9s. 6d. in silver in
change. He then asked for the half- sovereign back, saying he thought he had change. She gave it back. His companion then asked for a cigar. She served him with it. The prisoner then put down 108. in silver and a half-sovereign, asking the barmaid to give him a sovereign for it, which she did. His companion kept on engaging the barmaid's attention. The prisoner never returned the 9s. 6d. which the barmaid gave him in the first instance. The barmaid never intended to part with her master's money except for full con- sideration. The prisoner having been con- victed on an indictment for larceny of the money, the Court sustained the conviction. (Reg. v. Hollis. Nov. 1883. C. C. R.) 345.
Water in pipes.-Water supplied by a water company to a consumer, and standing in his pipes, if taken without his permission, may be the subject of larceny. (Ferrens (app.) v. O'Brien (resp.). April, 1883, Q. B. Div.) 332.
LARCENY ACT, 1861.
Sect. 75-Direction in writing-Vendee of goods-Undertaking by, whether within statute. A vendee of goods cannot be convicted under sect. 75 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, for having misapplied the proceeds. of the delivery orders of such goods. That section contemplates a direction coming from a vendor, or from the person who entrusts, but does not contemplate a transaction in which the ownership of goods or money has passed to the person charged. (Reg. v. Bredin. Feb., 1884. Butt, J.) 412.
Sect. 80-Banker and customer-Trustee of proceeds of goods-Hypothecation note- Bills of Sale Acts What documents within.-T., a fruit broker applied to his bankers for an advance as against certain goods which had been consigned to him and were then at sea, he depositing with them the indorsed bills of lading. Before making the advance the bankers required him to sign a letter of hypothecation by which he undertook to hold the goods in trust for the bankers, and to hand over to them the proceeds, "as and when received," to the amount of the advance. Held, by Day, J., that this letter contained a de- claration of an express trust such as would make the giver of it a trustee of the pro- ceeds within the meaning of sect. 80 of the Larceny Act, and his appropriation of them to his own use an offence against
that section: Held, also, that such hypo- thecation note was a bill of sale within the definition in the Acts of 1878 and 1882 as being a declaration of trust without transfer; but that the goods not having arrived at the date of its execution, it came within the exception as to goods at sea contained in the Bills of Sale Acts, and so was not affected by the pro- visions therein as to form and registration. (Reg. v. Townsend. May, 1884. Day, J.) 466.
Contract by infant-Hire and purchase system-Conversion of hired goods during bailment Special property-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 3.-M., a minor, hired property on the "hire and purchase" system under a contract by which he undertook to pay for the furniture in quarterly instalments. After having paid four of such instal- ments, and previously to the fifth instal- ment becoming due, M. removed and sold the furniture without the knowledge and consent of the person from whom it was hired, and having been indicted for larceny of furniture of which he was a bailee, was found guilty. Held, upon a case reserved at the trial, that though the contract was void by reason of M.'s minority, the bail- ment was nevertheless completed on the delivery of the furniture; that the bail- ment created a special property in the furniture while in M.'s possession; and that the abuse of such special property was an act of larceny under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 3, of which M. was rightly con- victed. (Reg. v. Macdonald. May, 1885. C. C. R.) 757.
Blasphemous libel, definition of-Evidence of publication-Editor or publisher.-On the trial of two persons on an indictment for publishing blasphemous libels in a certain print or paper, on which their names were given, one as printer, the other as publisher-proof of their identity with the persons whose names were so given, or any evidence merely connecting them with the paper, held, not sufficient to fix them with liability. The 7th section of the Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 76), being held to apply, and to require evidence that they published the libels, and not merely the papers in which they were contained Evidence that one of them published the paper held sufficient prima facie case as against him, without any express evidence
that he knew of the libels. But express evidence as to the other, that he was editor, held not sufficient, without evidence that he directed the insertion of the libels. The mere denial of the truth of the Christian religion, or of the Scriptures, is not enough, per se, to constitute a writing a blasphemous libel, so as to render the writer or publisher indictable. But inde- cent and offensive attacks on Christianity or the Scriptures, or sacred persons or ob- jects, calculated to outrage the feelings of the general body of the community, do constitute the offence of blasphemy, and render writers or publishers liable at com- mon law to criminal prosecution. (Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote. April, 1883. Lord Coleridge, C.J.) 231.
Blasphemous libel-Liability for publication of-Trial-Practice-Evidence-Indict- ment charging several jointly-Separate trial of one-Competence of other defen- dents as witnesses in his defence-Lord Campbell's Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96) s. 7, as to exculpatory evidence in answer to a prima facie case of liability for publication-Sale of paper of known character, but with which defendant was not connected, on premises of defendant, by his servants - Applicability of the doctrine of Reg. v. Holbrook, 13 Cox C. C. 653, and 14 Cox C. C. 199-Evidence of Liability of defendant for publication, not merely of the paper but of the libels contained in it-Direction to the jury.- 1. On an indictment of three persons jointly for publishing blasphemous libels in certain numbers of a newspaper, two of them, whose names were on it as editor and publisher, having already been convicted on a charge of publishing similar libels in another number of the paper, held that the third, whose case was that he was not con- nected with the paper at all, ought to be, on his application, tried separately, as his trial with the others might possibly pre- judice him in his defence, especially as he desired to call them as witnesses, while it did not appear that his separate trial could at all embarrass the case for the prosecu- tion, as the prosecutor would be entitled to give any evidence in his power to fix the defendant with a joint liability for the acts of the others. 2. Held, that the defendant, thus tried first and separately, was entitled to call the other defendants as witnesses on his behalf, though they could not be called as witnesses for the prosecution without taking a verdict of acquittal against them, the trial being separate. The observations
of Cockburn, C.J. in Reg. v. Winsor and Harris held not applicable, as there the fellow prisoner was called for the Crown. 3. The provision in Lord Campbell's Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), s. 7, as to allowing exculpatory evidence in answer to a primâ facie case of liability for publication, being quite general in its terms, was held to apply to a prosecution for the publication of a blasphemous libel. 4. The defendant first tried, having originally published the paper, and having, after he had ceased to be ostensibly connected with it, continued to allow it-knowing its character-to be published on his premises, by a person in his employ, but who was allowed (in con- sideration of a reduction of salary) to carry on there a business of his own as bookseller and newspaper publisher-the defendant being occasionally on the premises, and knowing that the paper was sold there, though not proved to have had knowledge of any particular numbers or articles in it, and not being shown to have had otherwise any connection with it during the publica- tion of the libels; held, that though there was a prima facie case against him, yet there was also a case in answer to it, under the provisions in the Libel Act, on which the jury might well acquit him. 5. Publi- cations discussing with gravity and decency, and in an argumentive way, questions as to Christian doctrine or statements in the Hebrew Scriptures, and even questioning their truth, are not to be deemed blasphe- mous, so as to be fit subjects for criminal prosecution. But publications which, in an indecent and malicious spirit, assail and asperse the truth of Christianity, or of the Scriptures, in language calculated and intended to shock the feelings and outrage the belief of mankind, are properly to be regarded as blasphemous libels. (Reg. v. Bradlaugh and others. April, 1883. Lord Coleridge, C.J.) 217.
Criminal information-Preliminary inves- tigation before magistrates Seditious libel-Evidence-Truth of seditious libel not a subject of inquiry before magistrates -6 & 7 Vict. c. 96-44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, 8. 4.-Upon an application for a criminal information against the proprietor of a newspaper for publishing a seditious libel, evidence was tendered under the 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, s. 4, of the truth of the libel, and that it was for the public benefit that it should be published. The magistrate refused to receive such evidence. Upon an application to the Queen's Bench Division for a conditional order for a man-
damus to compel the magistrate to receive the evidence so tendered. Held, that no such matters could be given in evidence at the trial, and that, therefore, the magistrate was right in refusing to admit the evidence at the preliminary investigation. Reg. v. Duffy (9 Ir. L. Rep. 329), approved of and followed. (Ex parte Wm. O'Brien. Jan., 1883. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 180. Criminal prosecution Criminal informa- tion-Fiat of Director of Public Prose- cutions-Newspaper Libel and Registra- tion Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60) s. 3.- By the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), s. 3, “ no criminal prosecution shall be commenced against any proprietor, publisher, editor, or any person responsible for the publica- tion of a newspaper, for any libel published therein, without the written fiat or allow- ance of the Director of Public Prosecu- tions being first had and obtained." Held, that the section does not apply to criminal informations filed by leave of the court, and therefore the plain- tiff in error was rightly convicted on such an information, for a libel published in a newspaper of which he was the proprietor, although the fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions had not been obtained. (Yates (plaintiff in error) v. The Queen. Jan., 1885. Ct. of App.) 686. Letters from employer to employed-Pri- vileged occasion.-The defendant, the wife of a tradesman, being informed that a female assistant in her husband's employ- ment was dishonest, wrote at his request and sent a letter accusing her of theft, and strongly reproaching her. On an indict- ment for libel: Held, that the occasion was privileged, and that, therefore, in the absence of malice the defendant was not liable, and held also, that the terms of a letter written under such circumstances ought not to be too nicely criticised. (Reg. v. Perry. Jan., 1883. Huddleston, B.) 169.
Libel on a deceased individual-Criminal information-Applicant a foreign noble- man resident abroad-Principles on which criminal information should be granted.- A foreign nobleman, resident abroad, applied for and obtained a rule nisi for a criminal information against the defendant, the proprietor of a newspaper, for a libel published therein imputing infamous and disgraceful conduct to the applicant's deceased father, upon an affidavit categori- cally negativing the statements in the libel, and stating the applicant's belief that it
was published maliciously, and with intent to bring scandal and reproach upon the memory of his deceased father, and to cast a gross insult upon himself and his family, and to bring them into public hatred, con- tempt, and ridicule. In showing cause against the rule, it was contended for the defendant that the applicant was a foreigner neither resident nor sojourning in England, nor holding any political, official, or public position, either here or abroad; that it was not the applicant but his deceased father who was the subject of the libel; and that, in any view, the court, having a discretion in the matter, would not grant the extra- ordinary remedy asked for, but leave the applicant to the ordinary remedy of indict- ment or action. Held, by Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Denman, Field, Hawkins, and Mathew, JJ. (discharging the rule), (1) That without laying it down as a rule of law, that under no circumstances would this court interfere, by way of criminal information, on the application of a non- resident foreigner, yet, having regard to the principles on which, from very early times, this court has acted, the non-resi- dence of the applicant is a cogent argument against such interference, and a reason why, especially when, as here, there was no intention to provoke and no reason to apprehend a breach of the peace, the court in the exercise of its discretion should not interfere. (2.) That, although the authori- ties are not absolutely conclusive on the point, yet the weight of authorities inclines in favour of the objection that the subject of the libel is dead (see Rex v. Popham 4 T. R. 126), and upon that ground also the court in its discretion declines to interfere. (3.) (Denman, J. slightly differ- ing on this head, as hereunder stated.) That criminal informations upon the com- plaint of a private person not holding any public office or position entitling him to that extraordinary remedy, should not be granted in cases of "gross or notorious misdemeanours, riots, batteries, libels, and other immoralities of an atrocious kind, not particularly tending to disturb the Government (for those are left to the care of the Attorney-General), but which, on account of their magnitude or pernicious example, deserve the most public animad- version (Blackstone, book 4, c. 23, p. 300); and a peer, if libelled in his private capacity, and not as regards his conduct in Parliament, or as a lord-lieutenant, or magistrate, or as the holder of a public office, is no more entitled to a criminal information than the humblest subject of
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