indictment against the wife for stealing the
property of the husband, notwithstanding
sect. 16 of the Married Women's Property
Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75). See, how-
ever, sect. 1 of the Married Women's Pro-
perty Act, 1884, ante, p. xxxiii. (Reg. v.
Brittleton and Bate. March, 1884.
C. C. R.) 431.

IDLE AND DISORDERLY PERSONS.
(See Vagrancy Act.)

INDECENT EXPOSURE.
(See Public Place.)

INDICTMENT.

MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS.
(See Compounding Felony.)
STATUTABLE WORD NOT USED.
(See Practice.)

INFANT.
ABDUCTION of.

(See Abduction.)

CONTRACT BY.

(See Larceny by Bailee.)

NEGLECT TO SUPPLY MEDICAL AID TO.

(See Manslaughter.)

INJURY TO PROPERTY.

(See Malicious Injury.)

JERVIS'S ACT, 1848.
(See Criminal Prisoner.)

JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF
ASSIZE.

(See Gaol Delivery.)

JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES.
(See Sureties for Good Behaviour.)
SEDITIOUS LIBEL-EVIDence.
(See Libel.)

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
Dispersing assembly believed to be unlawful
-Authority to disperse-Apprehended
breach of the peace-Duty of a Justice of
the Peace.-In an action for assault and
battery the defendant alleged that the
assault was committed by him as a justice
of the peace in order to separate and dis-

perse a meeting of certain persons who
had previously unlawfully conspired to do
certain acts; and that the plaintiff and
others met and assembled with intent, as
defendant believed and had reasonable
grounds for believing, to aid and promote
the said conspiracy. Held (1), That the
defence was bad, on demurrer, on the
ground that it did not allege as a matter
of fact that the meeting was held to pro-
mote or carry into effect the unlawful con-
spiracies mentioned; and (2) that a justice
of the peace has no authority to disperse a
meeting not shown to be unlawful because
he reasonably believes it to be held with
an unlawful intent.

In his defence the defendant set out certain
inflammatory placards posted by the pro-
moters of the meeting and their opponents,
and alleged that informations were sworn
from which it appeared that if the meet-
ing was held the public peace would be
broken; that the defendant had reasonable
grounds for believing them and believed
them to be true; and believed and had
reasonable grounds for believing that a
breach of the peace would occur if the
meeting were allowed to be held and con-
tinued, and that the public peace and
tranquillity could not otherwise be pre-
served than by separating and dispersing
the persons assembled; and that in order
to separate and disperse the plaintiff and
the other persons so assembled the assault
complained of was committed. Held, that
from these statements it could not reason-
ably be assumed that the meeting therein
mentioned was in itself an unlawful
assembly; but that, assuming the plain-
tiff and others assembled with him to be
doing nothing unlawful, yet, if there were
reasonable grounds for the defendant, being
a justice of the peace, believing, as he
alleged he did, that there would be a breach
of the peace if they continued so assembled,
and that there was no other way in which
the breach of the peace could be avoided
but by stopping and dispersing the plain-
tiff's meeting, the defendant was justified
in taking the necessary steps to stop and
disperse it. Humphries v. Connor (17
Ir. C. L. R. 1) approved of. Beatty v.
Gillbanks (9 Q. B. Div. 308) commented
on and distinguished. (O'Kelly v. Harvey,
Feb., 1882. Ct. of App. Ir.) 435.
Sureties for good behaviour-Summons-
Objection of several distinct offences
charged-Party accused as witness-
Criminal proceeding.-F. (a Roman
Catholic priest) addressed a meeting com-
posed mainly of his parishioners, who were

tenants of C., and advised them, if any
of them should be evicted for nonpay-
ment of rent, not to pay rent until the
evicted tenant should be reinstated in his
holding. F. was thereupon summoned to
the petty sessions to show cause why he
should not give security for future good
behaviour. The summons recited that F.
had endeavoured to excite discontent in
the minds of Her Majesty's subjects and
incite them not to fulfil their lawful
duties, and to injure and impoverish
persons who would not obey the orders of
an unlawful society. At the hearing of
the summons a resolution proposed by F.
at the meeting was read from a copy of a
newspaper by his counsel, whereupon the
solicitor for the prosecution proposed to
read the speech of F. from the report in
the same copy. This was objected to, but
allowed by the justices. F. was then
tendered as a witness on his own behalf,
but the justices refused to allow him to be
examined. Held (1) that the justices had
jurisdiction to make the order, and that
the evidence was sufficient; (2) that it was
no objection that the summons recited
several distinct acts of misconduct of F.;
(3) that the copy of the paper was admis-
sible as evidence of the speech of F. at the
meeting; (4) that F. was not a competent
witness, this being a criminal proceeding;
(5) On a summons to find sureties for good
behaviour the defendant may disprove the
matters charged. (Reg. v. The Justices of
Cork, May, 1882. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 149.
(See also Sureties for Good Behaviour.)

LARCENY.

APPROPRIATION OF PRICE BY PERSON
AUTHORISED TO SELL.
(See Embezzlement.)
Restitution of stolen property-Owner of
a stolen negotiable instrument-Bonâ
fide transfer-Action to recover-24 & 25
Vict. c. 96, s. 100.-Sect. 100 of the Larceny
Act, 1861, enacts that upon conviction for
felony or misdemeanour under that Act the
property acquired shall be restored to the
owner, and in every case the court before
which the conviction takes place shall have
power to order restitution in a summary
manner, provided that in case of a bona
fide transfer of a negotiable instrument for
value, and without notice or reasonable
cause to suspect, the court shall not award
or order the restitution of such security.
The defendants had bona fide and without
cause to suspect acquired the possession

for value of a New Zealand bond for 10007.,
which had been stolen from the plaintiff's
possession, after the conviction of a person
for feloniously receiving the same: Held,
that the proviso in the above section applies
to the right to recover as well to the sum-
mary restitution of a negotiable instrument,
and that, under the circumstances, the
owner of the bond could not recover it
from the transferees. (Chichester v. Hill
and Son. Dec. 1882. Q. B. Div.) 258.
Restitution of stolen property-Public sales-
masters-Stolen sheep-Sale in market
overt-Transfer of property-Conversion.
-D. was a farmer residing in the Queen's
County. C., who was also a farmer
residing in the same county, on the 17th
day of January, 1883, took twenty-one
sheep, the property of D., off his lands,
and brought them to Dublin, where there
is a cattle market established by the Cor-
poration of Dublin under the provisions of
the Dublin Improvement Act (12 & 13
Vict. c. 97, s. 80), and in which there is
held a public market for the sale of cattle
and sheep every Thursday, the legal hour
for commencing sales being eight o'clock
in the morning. On Thursday, the 18th
day of January, 1883, C. brought the
twenty-one stolen sheep to the market,
between eight and nine o'clock in the
morning, and asked W. and Sons, who
were salesmasters in the market, to have
the sheep sold for him. W. and Sons, in
ignorance of the theft, put the sheep into
their pens, and in a few minutes they were
purchased by G. at 63s. each. Immediately
after the sale G. removed the sheep, and
W. and Son paid to C. the purchase-money,
less their own commission. The next
day D. informed W. and Sons that the
sheep had been stolen from him, and
thereupon W. and Sons gave him all the
information in their power. C. was arrested,
and convicted of the theft. D. having
brought an action against W. and Sons for
71l. 88., which he alleged was the value of
the sheep to him, a special case was stated
for the opinion of the court as to the
liability of W. and Sons. Held, by the
Exchequer Division and by the Court of
Appeal that W. and Sons were liable to D.
for the conversion of the sheep. (Delaney
v. Wallis and Sons. Jan. 1884. Ct. of
App.) 525.

Ringing the changes-Money obtained by a
trick.-The prisoner and another person
went to an inn. The prisoner asked the
barmaid for whisky. He put down half a
sovereign, and received 9s. 6d. in silver in

change. He then asked for the half-
sovereign back, saying he thought he had
change. She gave it back. His companion
then asked for a cigar. She served him
with it. The prisoner then put down 108.
in silver and a half-sovereign, asking the
barmaid to give him a sovereign for it,
which she did. His companion kept on
engaging the barmaid's attention. The
prisoner never returned the 9s. 6d. which
the barmaid gave him in the first instance.
The barmaid never intended to part with
her master's money except for full con-
sideration. The prisoner having been con-
victed on an indictment for larceny of the
money, the Court sustained the conviction.
(Reg. v. Hollis. Nov. 1883. C. C. R.)
345.

Water in pipes.-Water supplied by a water
company to a consumer, and standing in
his pipes, if taken without his permission,
may be the subject of larceny. (Ferrens
(app.) v. O'Brien (resp.). April, 1883,
Q. B. Div.) 332.

LARCENY ACT, 1861.

Sect. 75-Direction in writing-Vendee of
goods-Undertaking by, whether within
statute. A vendee of goods cannot be
convicted under sect. 75 of 24 & 25 Vict.
c. 96, for having misapplied the proceeds.
of the delivery orders of such goods.
That section contemplates a direction
coming from a vendor, or from the person
who entrusts, but does not contemplate a
transaction in which the ownership of
goods or money has passed to the person
charged. (Reg. v. Bredin. Feb., 1884.
Butt, J.) 412.

Sect. 80-Banker and customer-Trustee of
proceeds of goods-Hypothecation note-
Bills of Sale Acts What documents
within.-T., a fruit broker applied to his
bankers for an advance as against certain
goods which had been consigned to him
and were then at sea, he depositing with
them the indorsed bills of lading. Before
making the advance the bankers required
him to sign a letter of hypothecation by
which he undertook to hold the goods in
trust for the bankers, and to hand over to
them the proceeds, "as and when received,"
to the amount of the advance. Held, by
Day, J., that this letter contained a de-
claration of an express trust such as would
make the giver of it a trustee of the pro-
ceeds within the meaning of sect. 80 of
the Larceny Act, and his appropriation of
them to his own use an offence against

that section: Held, also, that such hypo-
thecation note was a bill of sale within the
definition in the Acts of 1878 and 1882 as
being a declaration of trust without
transfer; but that the goods not having
arrived at the date of its execution, it
came within the exception as to goods
at sea
contained in the Bills of Sale
Acts, and so was not affected by the pro-
visions therein as to form and registration.
(Reg. v. Townsend. May, 1884. Day, J.)
466.

دو

LARCENY BY BAILEE.

Contract by infant-Hire and purchase
system-Conversion of hired goods during
bailment Special property-24 & 25 Vict.
c. 96, s. 3.-M., a minor, hired property on
the "hire and purchase" system under a
contract by which he undertook to pay for
the furniture in quarterly instalments.
After having paid four of such instal-
ments, and previously to the fifth instal-
ment becoming due, M. removed and sold
the furniture without the knowledge and
consent of the person from whom it was
hired, and having been indicted for larceny
of furniture of which he was a bailee, was
found guilty. Held, upon a case reserved
at the trial, that though the contract was
void by reason of M.'s minority, the bail-
ment was nevertheless completed on the
delivery of the furniture; that the bail-
ment created a special property in the
furniture while in M.'s possession; and
that the abuse of such special property was
an act of larceny under 24 & 25 Vict.
c. 96, s. 3, of which M. was rightly con-
victed. (Reg. v. Macdonald. May, 1885.
C. C. R.) 757.

LIBEL.

Blasphemous libel, definition of-Evidence
of publication-Editor or publisher.-On
the trial of two persons on an indictment
for publishing blasphemous libels in a
certain print or paper, on which their names
were given, one as printer, the other as
publisher-proof of their identity with the
persons whose names were so given, or any
evidence merely connecting them with the
paper, held, not sufficient to fix them with
liability. The 7th section of the Libel
Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 76), being held to
apply, and to require evidence that they
published the libels, and not merely the
papers in which they were contained
Evidence that one of them published the
paper held sufficient prima facie case as
against him, without any express evidence

that he knew of the libels. But express
evidence as to the other, that he was editor,
held not sufficient, without evidence that
he directed the insertion of the libels.
The mere denial of the truth of the
Christian religion, or of the Scriptures, is
not enough, per se, to constitute a writing
a blasphemous libel, so as to render the
writer or publisher indictable. But inde-
cent and offensive attacks on Christianity
or the Scriptures, or sacred persons or ob-
jects, calculated to outrage the feelings
of the general body of the community, do
constitute the offence of blasphemy, and
render writers or publishers liable at com-
mon law to criminal prosecution. (Reg. v.
Ramsay and Foote. April, 1883. Lord
Coleridge, C.J.) 231.

Blasphemous libel-Liability for publication
of-Trial-Practice-Evidence-Indict-
ment charging several jointly-Separate
trial of one-Competence of other defen-
dents as witnesses in his defence-Lord
Campbell's Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96)
s. 7, as to exculpatory evidence in answer
to a prima facie case of liability for
publication-Sale of paper of known
character, but with which defendant was
not connected, on premises of defendant,
by his servants - Applicability of the
doctrine of Reg. v. Holbrook, 13 Cox C. C.
653, and 14 Cox C. C. 199-Evidence of
Liability of defendant for publication,
not merely of the paper but of the libels
contained in it-Direction to the jury.-
1. On an indictment of three persons jointly
for publishing blasphemous libels in certain
numbers of a newspaper, two of them,
whose names were on it as editor and
publisher, having already been convicted
on a charge of publishing similar libels in
another number of the paper, held that the
third, whose case was that he was not con-
nected with the paper at all, ought to be,
on his application, tried separately, as his
trial with the others might possibly pre-
judice him in his defence, especially as he
desired to call them as witnesses, while it
did not appear that his separate trial could
at all embarrass the case for the prosecu-
tion, as the prosecutor would be entitled to
give any evidence in his power to fix the
defendant with a joint liability for the acts
of the others. 2. Held, that the defendant,
thus tried first and separately, was entitled
to call the other defendants as witnesses on
his behalf, though they could not be called
as witnesses for the prosecution without
taking a verdict of acquittal against them,
the trial being separate. The observations

of Cockburn, C.J. in Reg. v. Winsor and
Harris held not applicable, as there the
fellow prisoner was called for the Crown.
3. The provision in Lord Campbell's Libel
Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), s. 7, as to allowing
exculpatory evidence in answer to a primâ
facie case of liability for publication,
being quite general in its terms, was held
to apply to a prosecution for the publication
of a blasphemous libel. 4. The defendant
first tried, having originally published the
paper, and having, after he had ceased to
be ostensibly connected with it, continued
to allow it-knowing its character-to be
published on his premises, by a person in
his employ, but who was allowed (in con-
sideration of a reduction of salary) to carry
on there a business of his own as bookseller
and newspaper publisher-the defendant
being occasionally on the premises, and
knowing that the paper was sold there,
though not proved to have had knowledge
of any particular numbers or articles in it,
and not being shown to have had otherwise
any connection with it during the publica-
tion of the libels; held, that though there
was a prima facie case against him, yet
there was also a case in answer to it, under
the provisions in the Libel Act, on which
the jury might well acquit him. 5. Publi-
cations discussing with gravity and decency,
and in an argumentive way, questions as to
Christian doctrine or statements in the
Hebrew Scriptures, and even questioning
their truth, are not to be deemed blasphe-
mous, so as to be fit subjects for criminal
prosecution. But publications which, in
an indecent and malicious spirit, assail and
asperse the truth of Christianity, or of the
Scriptures, in language calculated and
intended to shock the feelings and outrage
the belief of mankind, are properly to be
regarded as blasphemous libels. (Reg. v.
Bradlaugh and others. April, 1883. Lord
Coleridge, C.J.) 217.

-

Criminal information-Preliminary inves-
tigation before magistrates Seditious
libel-Evidence-Truth of seditious libel
not a subject of inquiry before magistrates
-6 & 7 Vict. c. 96-44 & 45 Vict. c. 60,
8. 4.-Upon an application for a criminal
information against the proprietor of a
newspaper for publishing a seditious libel,
evidence was tendered under the 44 & 45
Vict. c. 60, s. 4, of the truth of the libel,
and that it was for the public benefit that
it should be published. The magistrate
refused to receive such evidence. Upon
an application to the Queen's Bench
Division for a conditional order for a man-

-

damus to compel the magistrate to receive
the evidence so tendered. Held, that no
such matters could be given in evidence at
the trial, and that, therefore, the magistrate
was right in refusing to admit the evidence
at the preliminary investigation. Reg. v.
Duffy (9 Ir. L. Rep. 329), approved of and
followed. (Ex parte Wm. O'Brien. Jan.,
1883. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 180.
Criminal prosecution
Criminal informa-
tion-Fiat of Director of Public Prose-
cutions-Newspaper Libel and Registra-
tion Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60) s. 3.-
By the Newspaper Libel and Registration
Act, 1881, (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), s. 3, “ no
criminal prosecution shall be commenced
against any proprietor, publisher, editor,
or any person responsible for the publica-
tion of a newspaper, for any libel published
therein, without the written fiat or allow-
ance of the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions
being first had and
obtained." Held, that the section does not
apply to criminal informations filed by
leave of the court, and therefore the plain-
tiff in error was rightly convicted on such
an information, for a libel published in a
newspaper of which he was the proprietor,
although the fiat of the Director of
Public Prosecutions had not been obtained.
(Yates (plaintiff in error) v. The Queen.
Jan., 1885. Ct. of App.) 686.
Letters from employer to employed-Pri-
vileged occasion.-The defendant, the wife
of a tradesman, being informed that a
female assistant in her husband's employ-
ment was dishonest, wrote at his request
and sent a letter accusing her of theft, and
strongly reproaching her. On an indict-
ment for libel: Held, that the occasion
was privileged, and that, therefore, in the
absence of malice the defendant was not
liable, and held also, that the terms of a
letter written under such circumstances
ought not to be too nicely criticised. (Reg.
v. Perry. Jan., 1883. Huddleston, B.)
169.

Libel on a deceased individual-Criminal
information-Applicant a foreign noble-
man resident abroad-Principles on which
criminal information should be granted.-
A foreign nobleman, resident abroad,
applied for and obtained a rule nisi for a
criminal information against the defendant,
the proprietor of a newspaper, for a libel
published therein imputing infamous and
disgraceful conduct to the applicant's
deceased father, upon an affidavit categori-
cally negativing the statements in the libel,
and stating the applicant's belief that it

was published maliciously, and with intent
to bring scandal and reproach upon the
memory of his deceased father, and to cast
a gross insult upon himself and his family,
and to bring them into public hatred, con-
tempt, and ridicule. In showing cause
against the rule, it was contended for the
defendant that the applicant was a foreigner
neither resident nor sojourning in England,
nor holding any political, official, or public
position, either here or abroad; that it was
not the applicant but his deceased father
who was the subject of the libel; and that,
in any view, the court, having a discretion
in the matter, would not grant the extra-
ordinary remedy asked for, but leave the
applicant to the ordinary remedy of indict-
ment or action. Held, by Lord Coleridge,
C.J. and Denman, Field, Hawkins, and
Mathew, JJ. (discharging the rule), (1)
That without laying it down as a rule of
law, that under no circumstances would
this court interfere, by way of criminal
information, on the application of a non-
resident foreigner, yet, having regard to
the principles on which, from very early
times, this court has acted, the non-resi-
dence of the applicant is a cogent argument
against such interference, and a reason
why, especially when, as here, there was no
intention to provoke and no reason to
apprehend a breach of the peace, the court
in the exercise of its discretion should not
interfere. (2.) That, although the authori-
ties are not absolutely conclusive on the
point, yet the weight of authorities inclines
in favour of the objection that the subject
of the libel is dead (see Rex v. Popham
4 T. R. 126), and upon that ground also
the court in its discretion declines to
interfere. (3.) (Denman, J. slightly differ-
ing on this head, as hereunder stated.)
That criminal informations upon the com-
plaint of a private person not holding any
public office or position entitling him to
that extraordinary remedy, should not be
granted in cases of "gross or notorious
misdemeanours, riots, batteries, libels, and
other immoralities of an atrocious kind,
not particularly tending to disturb the
Government (for those are left to the care
of the Attorney-General), but which, on
account of their magnitude or pernicious
example, deserve the most public animad-
version (Blackstone, book 4, c. 23,
p. 300); and a peer, if libelled in his private
capacity, and not as regards his conduct in
Parliament, or as a lord-lieutenant, or
magistrate, or as the holder of a public
office, is no more entitled to a criminal
information than the humblest subject of