the Queen. Per Denman, J.: I cannot
accept the above passage from Blackstone
as exhaustive of the cases in which the
court ought to interfere, for, if a news-
paper or an individual should, by repeated
and widely circulated attacks upon a pri-
vate individual, British or foreign, resi-
dent or abroad, show a persistent deter-
mination to persecute, it would be the duty,
in many cases, of this court to protect that
individual by granting a rule, and even, in
case of a further persistence, by making it
absolute. (Reg. v. Labouchere; Duke of
Vallombrosa's case. Feb., 1884. Q. B.
Div.) 415.

Newspaper-Charge of libel not contained
in original summons withdrawn before
police magistrate-Counts subsequently
added to indictment containing charge of
libel so withdrawn-Consent of court-
Vexatious Indictments Amendment Act,
1867, and Newspaper Libel Act, 1881-22
& 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 1-30 & 31 Vict. c. 35,
8. 1-44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, ss. 3, 6.-The
defendant B., with others, was charged
with having published alleged blasphemous
libels on certain dates, in the F. news-
paper. The fiat of the Director of Criminal
Prosecutions had been obtained authoris-
ing the prosecution. The summons on
which the defendants were charged
specified the particular dates of the libels
on which the prosecution relied. At the
first hearing before the magistrates the
alleged libels were not read out in court,
but the counsel for the prosecution gave
an undertaking to furnish both to the
court and the defendants particulars of the
numbers of the newspaper and articles
prosecuted. At the adjourned hearing the
defendant B. called the attention of the
court to the fact that the particulars
furnished in pursuance of the undertaking
contained a reference to an alleged libel
published in an earlier number of the
same newspaper, but not included in the
summons. The counsel for the prosecu-
tion then withdrew the number as not
being in the summons. The defendants
were committed for trial. The counsel for
the prosecution subsequently applied ex
parte to the Recorder of London under
30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 1, to add two counts
to the indictment based upon the alleged
libel contained in the number withdrawn
before the police magistrate; the counsel
for the prosecution did not state in his
application that he had so withdrawn the
said number of the newspaper. The Re-
corder granted leave; the two counts were

added, and the indictment sent up to the
grand jury, who found a true bill against
the defendants in respect of the whole
indictment. The indictment was removed
by certiorari from the Central Criminal
Court into the Queen's Bench Division of
the High Court. The defendants then
obtained a rule nisi, calling upon the
prosecution to show cause why the two
additional counts should not be quashed.
Held, on argument of the rule, that the
counts must be quashed on the ground
that the leave of the court to add them was
obtained on materials insufficient for the
exercise of its discretion; and that the
obtaining of such leave in cases under the
Vexatious Indictments Act, and Acts
amending it, is not a mere formality, but
must conform to the spirit and intention of
those Acts. (Reg. (on the Prosecution of
Sir Henry Tyler, M.P.) v. Bradlaugh and
others. Dec., 1882. Q. B. Div.) 156.
Newspaper-Criminal informations against
proprietors of newspapers for libel-News-
paper Libel Act, 1881-Fiat of the Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions not necessary
for criminal informations.-An applica-
tion upon the part of the proprietor of a
newspaper, defendant on a criminal infor-
mation for libel, to quash the information
on the ground that the fiat of the Director
of Public Prosecutions had not been
obtained, the point not being here taken
on the argument of the rule, was dismissed,
and held by Field, Denman, and Mathew,
JJ., (Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Hawkins,
J. contra), that in such a case the fiat is
not required. (Reg. v. Yates. July, 1883.
Q. B. Div.) 272.

Newspaper-Fiat for criminal prosecution
—Discretion of the Director of Public
Prosecutions-44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, s. 3.-
When the Director of Public Prosecutions
in England has refused to grant his fiat
under 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, s. 3, for a
criminal prosecution against the proprietor,
&c., of a newspaper for a libel published
therein, the High Court of Justice has no
power to interfere, the matter being left
by the enactment entirely to his discretion.
(Ex parte Hubert and Co., Jan., 1882.
Q. B. Div.) 166.

"LONDON GAZETTE,"

CUTTINGS FROM.
(See Evidence.)

LUNATIC (CRIMINAL).
(See Criminal Lunatic.)

MALICIOUS INJURY.
Property-Incorporeal right-24 & 25 Vict.
c. 97, s. 52.-The resident freemen and
widows of freemen of the borough of N.
were each entitled by right, declared and
confirmed by local Acts, to "the full right
and benefit to the herbage of the town
moor for two milch cows." Subject to the
'herbage right" aforesaid, the corpora-
tion of the borough were declared to be
owners of the soil in fee simple. The
respondent having played at bowls on the
town moor, and done nominal damage, the
appellant, one of the freemen, laid an in-
formation against him under the Malicious
Injuries to Property Act, 1861 (24 & 25
Vict. c. 97), s. 52. Held, that the "herbage
right" was not real or personal property
within that Act, which contemplated tan-
gible and visible property only. (Laws v.
Eltringham. Dec., 1881. Q. B. Div.) 22.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Burden of proof.-In an action for malicious
prosecution the burden of proof as to want
of reasonable and probable cause lies on
the plaintiff, and if in order to show
absence of reasonable and probable cause it
is necessary to establish any minor propo-
sitions, the burden of proving each of
such propositions also lies on the plaintiff.
(Arbrath v. The North-Eastern Railway
Company. June, 1883. Ct. of App.) 354.

MANDAMUS

WILL NOT LIE TO CENTRAL CRIMINAL
COURT.

(See Central Criminal Court.)

MANSLAUGHTER.
Infant-Neglect of parent to supply medical
aid-Evidence.-Where a parent neglects
to supply medical aid for his child who is
suffering from malignant disease, and the
infant dies, in order to convict the parent
of the crime of manslaughter it must
be proved affirmatively that the death was
caused by such neglect, and if the medical
evidence on behalf of the prosecution only
goes to the extent that the life probably
might have been prolonged by calling in
medical aid, it is not sufficient to support
a conviction. If death is accelerated by a
parent's wilfully neglecting to provide
medical aid, in such a case the parent is
guilty of manslaughter. (Reg. v. Morbey.
March, 1882. C. C. R.) 35.

Injury causing medical treatment necessary
-Death resulting during an operation

under medical advice.-Where an injury
was inflicted on a person by a blow which
in the judgment of competent medical
men rendered an operation advisable, and,
as a preliminary to the operation, chloro-
form was administered to the patient, who
died during its administration, and it was
agreed that the patient would not have
died but for its administration: Held,
that the person causing the injury was
liable to be indicted for manslaughter.
(Reg. v. Davis and Wagstaffe. Jan. 1883.
Mathew, J.) 174.

Neglect of duty-Refusal of medical assis-
tance by relieving officer-Destitute person

Local government orders General
Order (Consolidated), 24th July, 1847,
art. 215 (3), and Outdoor Relief Regula-
tion Order, 14th Dec. 1852, arts. 5 and 7.
-The law imposes upon relieving officers
the duty and obligation, in cases where
bona fide applications are made to them
for medical assistance by destitute persons
in cases of sudden and urgent necessity, to
give such assistance promptly, so that the
mischief may be dealt with in its infancy;
and where application is made to a relieving
officer for medical assistance in a case of
emergency, and death or bodily harm
results from a refusal to grant such assis-
tance, it is no answer to an indictment
against the relieving officer for man-
slaughter or for causing bodily harm that
the applicant was in employment for wages
or other hire or remuneration, if at the
time the application was made the applicant
was in fact destitute of the means of pro-
viding independent medical assistance.
(Reg. v. Curtis. Sept., 1885. Hawkins, J.)
746.

Unlawful Act-Negligence.-The mere fact.
of a civil wrong committed by one person
against another ought not to be used as an
incident which is a necessary step in a
criminal case, apart from the question of
criminal negligence. Therefore the mere
fact of a person wrongfully taking up
a box from a refreshment stall on a sea
pier and wantonly throwing it into the sea,
and thereby unintentionally causing the
death of another bathing in the sea, is not
per se and apart from the question of
negligence sufficient to constitute the
offence of manslaughter. (Reg. v. C. H.
Franklin. Jan., 1882. Field, J.) 163.

MARRIED WOMEN.
CARNAL CONNECTION OBTAINED BY
FRAUD.
(See Rape.)

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

REFUSAL OF.

(See Manslaughter.)

MURDER.

Attempt to murder-Taking out a pistol
from pocket-Pistol seized by bystander-
24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 14, 15.-B. was
indicted for attempting to discharge a
loaded pistol at S., with intent to murder.
B., having a grudge against S., went to S.'s
house. B. was observed to draw a pistol
from his pocket, a third person snatched
the pistol away, and B. was arrested.
Held, that this was not an offence within
sect. 15 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100. Quære,
whether the case was within sect. 14. The
cases of Reg. v. St. George and Reg. v.
Lewis (9 Car. & P. 483 and 523) commented
(Reg. v. Samuel Brown. March,
upon.
1883. C. Č. R.) 199.
Evidence-Dying declarations.-Statements
made behind the back of the prisoner are
not admissible in evidence as dying declara-
tions unless the person making them
entertains at the time a settled hopeless
expectation of immediate death. Answers
in the affirmative to the following ques-
tions: "Do you think you are in bodily
danger, and in fear of death ? " "You

are not expecting to recover; are you aware
that you will die ?" "Do you fully and
clearly understand what I am saying to
you ?
and the use of the expression "I
am sure I am going to die " do not indicate
such a state of mind. (Reg. v. William
Osman. Oct., 1881. Lush, L.J.) 1.
Extreme necessity of hunger-Justification-
Homicide by necessity-Special verdict-
Formal addition to special verdict-Cer-
tiorari-36 & 37 Vict. c. 36, s. 16.-The two
prisoners were indicted for wilful murder,
and on the trial the jury returned a special
verdict, stating the facts, and referred the
matter to the court. The facts stated in
the special verdict were substantially as
follows: The prisoners, able-bodied English
seamen, and the deceased, an English boy
between seventeen and eighteen years of
age, the crew of an English yacht, were
cast away in a storm on the high seas 1600
miles from land, and were compelled to put
into an open boat. The food they took
with them was all consumed in twelve days,
and having been for eight days without food,
and for six days without water, the prisoners
killed the boy. The boy when killed was
lying at the bottom of the boat quite help-
less and weak, and unable to make any re-

sistance, and did not assent to his being
killed. The prisoners and another man
who was with them fed upon the body and
blood of the boy for four days, when they
were picked up by a passing vessel. The
verdict went on thus: That if the men had
not fed upon the body of the boy, they
would probably not have survived to be so
picked up and rescued, but would within
the four days have died of famine; that
the boy, being in a much weaker condition,
was likely to have died before them; that
at the time of the act in question there
was no sail in sight nor any reasonable
prospect of relief: that, under the circum-
stances, there appeared to the prisoners
every probability that unless they then fed,
or very soon fed, upon the boy or one of
themselves, they would die of starvation;
that there was no appreciable chance of
saving life except by killing someone for
the others to eat; that, assuming any
necessity to kill anybody, there was no
greater necessity for killing the boy than
any of the other three men." On the
argument of the special verdict, the
following objections (among others) were
taken by the prisoner's counsel: "That the
formal ending of the special verdict, as
entered upon the record, was not found by
the jury, but subsequently added, and
therefore invalidated the record, rendering
the trial abortive; also, that the record
ought to have been brought up into the
Queen's Bench Division by certiorari, and
not by mere order of the court. Held,
that the facts as found afforded no justifi-
cation for the killing of the boy, and that
the prisoners were guilty of wilful murder.
Held, also, that the addition of the formal
ending of the special verdict was matter
of mere form, and did not invalidate the
record. Held, further, that the record was
rightly brought up by order, and not by
certiorari, since by the Judicature Act the
courts of oyer and terminer and gaol
delivery were made part of the High
Court of Justice. (Reg. v. Dudley and
Stephens. Dec., 1884. Q. B. Div.) 624.

Parricide in defence of mother-Reasonable
belief of necessity.-Under circumstances
which might have induced the belief that
a man was cutting the throat of his wife,
their son shot and killed his father. On
the trial of the son for murder: Held, that
if the accused had reasonable grounds for
believing and honestly believed that his act
was necessary for the defence of his
mother, the homicide was excusable. (Reg.
v. Rose. Oct., 1884. Lopes, J.) 540.

Poison-Accident or design-Evidence of
other deaths with same symptoms-Motive
-Admissibility of Fresh evidence.-F.
and H. were jointly charged, on indict-
ment for the murder of the husband of H.,
with causing his death by the administra-
tion of arsenic. Evidence having been
given that the deceased had died from
arsenic, and had been attended by the
prisoners. Held, by Butt, J., that it was
competent for the prosecution to tender
evidence of other cases of persons who had
died from arsenic, and to whom the pri-
soners had access, exhibiting exactly similar
symptoms before death to those of the case
under consideration, for the purpose
of
showing that this particular death arose
from arsenical poisoning-not accidentally
taken, but designedly administered by some-
one. Such evidence, however, is not ad-
missible for the purpose of establishing
motives; though the fact that the evidence
offered may tend indirectly to that end is
no ground for its exclusion. The true
principle on which the admissibility of all
such evidence rests is that laid down in
Reg. v. Geering (18 L. J. 215, M. C.).
Reg. v. Winslow (8 Cox C. C. 397) com-
mented on and disapproved. The pro-
duction of fresh evidence on behalf of the
prosecution (not known or forthcoming at
the preliminary investigation, and not,
previously to the trial, communicated to
the other side), may be ground for a post-
ponement of the trial if it appears neces-
sary to justice. (Reg. v. Flanagan and
Higgins. Feb., 1884. Butt, J.) 403.

NEGLECT TO SUPPLY MEDICAL
AID.

(See Manslaughter.)

NEWSPAPER LIBEL ACT.
(See Libel.)

NUISANCE.

Chimney sending forth black smoke-Fur-

consume smoke -

nace constructed to
Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict.
c. 55), s. 91.-An information was laid
against the proprietor of a brewery under
the 7th sub-section of the 91st section of
the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict.
c. 55) for that black smoke was from time
to time sent forth from the chimney of his
brewery in such quantities as to be a
nuisance, and he was convicted and fined
thereon. Held, on a case stated, that the
defendant was not entitled to call evidence
as to the construction of the furnace.

(Weekes (app.) v. King (resp.). May,
1885. Q. B. Div.) 733.

Exposing the dead body of a child on a high-
way-Common Law misdemeanour.-The
prisoner was indicted for unlawfully ex-
posing the dead body of her infant child
near a public highway. The jury found
that the body was exposed by the prisoner
in a public highway; that the place was
one where many people were certain to
pass and repass; and that the exposure was
calculated to shock and disgust passers-by,
and outrage public decency: Held, that
the prisoner was guilty of a nuisance at
common law. (Reg. v. Jane Clark. Jan.,
1883. Denman, J.) 171.

(See also Cremation.)

NUISANCE TO HIGHWAY.
(See Highway.)

PASSENGER STEAMSHIP.
Passenger-Certificate necessary for carry-
ing passengers-17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss.
303 and 318-39 & 40 Viet. c. 80, s. 16.—
G. J. Kidston, who did not live in Dublin,
was the owner of a tug-steamer called the
Flying Hawk. He was summoned before
the Divisional Justices of Dublin by the
Board of Trade, who complained that the
Flying Hawk went to sea from Dublin on
the 21st day of July, 1882, with more than
twelve passengers on board, without any
Board of Trade certificate, and without
having a duplicate of such certificate put
up in some conspicuous part of the ship,
contrary to the provisions of the 17 & 18
Vict. c. 104, s. 318, and the 39 & 40 Vict.
c. 80, s. 16. The people on board on the
occasion in question, other than the master
and crew, were the Dublin manager for the
owner, his wife, the Dublin staff, and some
friends and their wives who had been
invited by the Dublin manager for a
pleasure trip to see the fireworks at Kings-
town; none of them paid anything for the
trip. The magistrate having dismissed the
summons, and the case having been brought
before the Queen's Bench Division on a
case stated: Held, per Lawson and John-
son, JJ. (dissentiente O'Brien, J.) that the
magistrate was wrong, and that, if he
believed the evidence, he should have
convicted the defendant. (Reg. v. The
Divisional Justices of Dublin and G.
Kidston. Jan., 1884. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 379.

PLEADING.

(See Practice.)

POACHING PREVENTION ACT.
Person seen by constable with rabbits in
possession on highway-Flight of accused
and pursuit by constable-Search of
accused and seizure of rabbits 200 yards
from highway-Accused and rabbits never
out of constable's sight-Validity of in-
formation and conviction-25 & 26 Vict.
c. 114, s. 2.-Where a constable sees a man
on a highway having rabbits in his posses-
sion which the constable has good cause to
suspect have been unlawfully searched for
or pursued by such man, who, on catching
sight of the constable, runs away across an
adjoining field, and on being pursued by
the constable throws down the rabbits in
the field some 200 yards from the highway,
and neither the man nor the rabbits have
been lost sight of by the constable, the latter
may then and there search the man and
seize the rabbits under sect. 2 of the
Poaching Prevention Act (25 & 26 Vict.
c. 114), and a conviction of the man under
that section before justices is good and
will be upheld. So held by Mathew and
Smith, JJ., distinguishing the cases of
Clarke v. Crowder (L. Rep. 4 C. P. 638;
38 L. J. 118, M. C., and Turner v. Morgan
33 L. T. Rep. N. S. 173; 44 L. J. 161,
M. C.; L. Rep. 10 C. P. 587). (Lloyd v.
Lloyd. March, 1885. Q. B. Div.) 767.

PRACTICE.

Certiorari-Conviction in Superior Court-
Removal of record-Jurisdiction.-Where
judgment has been entered up in the
Superior Court, upon a conviction in such
court, the right to a certiorari to remove
the record does not exist. Poole's case
(14 L. Rep. Ir. 14) explained. (Nally and
others v. The Queen, June, 1884. Q. B.
Div. Ir.) 638.

CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS BY

WITNESSES.
(See Rape.)

FRESH EVIDENCE PRODUCED WITHOUT
NOTICE TO PRISONER.
(See Murder.)

Plea of autrefois acquit-Indictment for
felony-Acquittal-Subsequent indict-
ment for misdemeanour upon same facts
-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, ss. 35, 36, and 24 &
25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 32, 34.-By 24 & 25
Vict. c. 97, s. 35, and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100,
s. 32, it is enacted that any person who
unlawfully and maliciously throws upon or
across any railway any wood, stone, or

other matter with intent to endanger the
safety of any passenger travelling or being
upon such railway, or with intent to
obstruct or injure any engine, shall be
guilty of felony, and being convicted
thereof shall be liable to penal servitude
for life or to be imprisoned for any time
not exceeding two years. By sects. 36
and 34 of the same statutes respectively
it is provided that a person who by any
unlawful act shall endanger the safety of
any person conveyed or being upon a
railway, or shall obstruct any engine or
carriage using any railway shall be guilty
of a misdemeanour and shall be liable to
be imprisoned for any term not exceeding
two years, Held, that an acquittal upon
an indictment charging the prisoner with
a felony was no bar to a subsequent indict-
ment being preferred upon the same facts
for a misdemeanour under the provisions
of the above statutes. (Reg. (on the Prose-
cution of the Great Western Railway
Company) v. Gilmore. April, 1882. Hud-
dleston, B.) 85.

Pleading-Counts for stealing at common
law and under statute-Autrefois acquit.
-In one indictment the prisoners were
charged with larceny at common law, and
for feloniously receiving "the goods afore-
said." They were acquitted on the ground
that the alleged goods were a fixture in a
building. They were then charged upon
a second indictment under the 24 & 25
Vict. c. 96, s. 31, for stealing the fixture,
to which charge they pleaded autrefois
acquit. The presiding chairman at sessions
held that plea not to be proved, and the
prisoners then pleaded not guilty, but were
convicted. Held, that the ruling of the
chairman was right, and that the prisoners
had not been in peril on the count for
receiving in the first indictment. (Reg. v.
O'Brien and another. March, 1882.
C. C. R.) 29
Pleading-Indictment-Non-use of statut-
able word-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 18.-
The 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 18, enacts that
whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously
by any means cause any grievous bodily
harm to any person, &c., shall be guilty of
felony. An indictment framed upon this
section alleged that "A. unlawfully and
maliciously did 'inflict' grievous bodily
harm," not using the statutable term
66 cause."
Held, that the indictment was
sufficient. (Reg. v. James Bray, March,
1883. C. C. R.) 197.

66

Postponement of case-Danger to public-
Infectious witnesses.-Postponement of