a case on the ground that infection might
be conveyed to the public by the attendance
of the witnesses. (Reg. v. Taylor, Jan.,
1882. Baggallay, L.J.) 8.

Refusal to set aside a judgment in murder-
Venire de novo-Want of proper notice of
intention to try before a special jury-
Jury not properly summoned The Pre-
vention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882,
sect. 4.-P. was indicted at the commission
held in Green-street, in the city of Dublin,
in the month of November, 1883, before
Murphy, J., for the murder of K. in the
city of Dublin on the 4th day of July,
1882. Notice under the 4th section of the
Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882,
was served on behalf of the Attorney-
General for Ireland on P., requiring the
case to be tried by a special jury. P. was
tried on the 12th and 13th days of Novem-
ber, 1883, before a special jury who were
discharged without agreeing to a verdict.
The Crown, without serving a new notice
for a special jury, put P. upon his trial a
second time at the same commission on the
19th and 20th days of November, 1883,
before another special jury taken from
those summoned for the former trial, and
he was convicted. On motion by P. to set
aside the verdict, and to avoid the judg
ment, and for a venire de novo: Held,
that it was not necessary for the Attorney-
General to serve a new notice for a special
jury for the second trial at the same com-
mission, and that there had not been a
mistrial; and that P. was properly con-
victed.
Poole.
(Reg. v.
Dec. 1883.

Q. B. Div. Ir.) 368.
Right of appeal-Misdemeanour-Bill·
Jurisdiction-Judicature Act, 1873 (36 &
37 Vict. c. 66) ss. 19, 47.-A prisoner
indicted for misdemeanour applied to a
Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench
Division for bail, and on his application
being refused, appealed to the Court of
Appeal: Held, that the decision of the
Divisional Court was a judgment of the
High Court in a criminal matter, and there-
fore the Court of Appeal had no jurisdic-
tion to entertain the appeal. (Reg. v. Foote.
March, 1883. Ct. of App.) 240.

SPECIAL VERDICT, FORMAL ADDITION TO.

(See Murder.)

Trial-Prisoner's statement.-Upon the trial
of a prisoner who is defended by counsel
(in accordance with the opinion of the
majority of the judges) the prisoner after
his counsel's address to the jury will be

allowed to make a statement of facts to
the jury. But when it is proposed to call
witnesses for the prisoner it will not be
competent for him to make any statement
to the jury in addition to his counsel's
address. (Reg. v. Millhouse. Jan., 1885.
Lord Coleridge, C.J.) 622.

Trial-Prisoner's statement - Counsel —

Right of reply.-A prisoner on his trial
defended by counsel is not entitled to have
his explanation of the case to the jury
made through the mouth of his counsel,
but may, at the conclusion of his counsel's
address, himself address the jury and make
such statement, subject to this, that what
he says will be treated as additional facts
laid before the court, and entitling the
prosecution to the reply. (Reg. v. Šhim-
min. May, 1882. Cave, J.) 122.
Trial-Right of reply.-Upon the joint in-
dictment of several prisoners, the prosecu
tion has not a right to reply generally
where one of the prisoners calls witnesses
to prove an alibi, but the other prisoners
do not call any witnesses. The counsel
for the prosecuion should sum up the case
generally, and reply upon the evidence as
to the alibi, before the counsel for the pri-
soners who did not call witnesses address
the jury. (Reg. v. Kain and others.
Nov., 1883. Stephen, J.) 388.

Trial of several prisoners jointly-Witnesses
for defence-Limits of reply of counsel
for the prosecution. The prisoners were
indicted for obtaining goods by false pre-
tences and conspiracy to defraud. At the
close of the evidence for the prosecution
witnesses were called for the defendants
Welham and Schneider only, whose evi-
dence was applicable to their respective
cases only, and did not affect the cases of
the other defendants. Held, that the
counsel for the prosecution should confine
his reply to the cases of Welham and
Schneider. (Reg. v. Trevelli, Welham,
Kendrick, Tattersfield, Schneider. Hiller,
Erney, Garth, Jacobi, Lorenz, and Wright,
May, 1882. Hawkins, J.) 289.

PRISONS ACT, 1877.

Expenses of conveying prisoner to prison-
Meaning of "committal to prison
40 & 41 Vict. c. 21, ss. 4, 57, 61.-The
effect of sections 4, 57, and 61 of the
Prisons Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 21),
is to transfer the liability for the expenses
of conveying prisoners to prison from the
county treasurer to the Secretary of State.
"Committal to prison" means committal

-

by the magistrate's warrant, not reception
within the prison by the prison officials.
(Mullins v. The Treasurer of the County of
Surrey. Nov., 1881. H. L.) 9.
Superannuation Compensation -Appor-
tionment-Superannuation Act, 1859 (22
Vict. c. 26)-Special minute.-At the
time of the coming into operation of the
Prisons Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 21), C.
was the governor of a prison which had
been under the control of the justices of
M. as the local authority, but by the Act
it was transferred to the Secretary of State
for the Home Department. Shortly after-
wards C., who was not incapacitated in
any way, resigned his appointment in order
to facilitate some improvements in the
organisation of the prison, and the Com-
missioners of the Treasury granted him an
annuity pursuant to sect. 36 of the Act,
and apportioned it, in accordance with
paragraph 4 of that section, between the
county rates of M. and moneys to be pro-
vided by Parliament. No special minute
within the meaning of sect. 7 of the Super-
annuation Act, 1859 (22 Vict. c. 26), was
made or laid before Parliament with
office.
reference to C. or his
Held
(affirming the judgment of the Court
of Appeal, May, 1883, p. 347), that, upon
the true construction of the Act, the com-
missioners had power to apportion the
annuity as they had done, and that the
provisions of the Act of 1859 as to a
special minute were directory only, and
not a condition precedent to the grant-
ing of an annuity such as that in question.
(The Justices of Middlesex v. The Queen,
April, 1884. H. L.) 542.

(See also Criminal Lunatic and Criminal
Prisoner.)

PRISONER'S STATEMENT.
(See Practice.)

PRIVILEGE.

(See Evidence and Libel.)

PRIZE FIGHT.

Illegality-Spectators-Encouraging-Aid-
ing-Evidence.-B. and M. were stripped,
and fought for nearly an hour in a ring of
cord supported by four blue stakes; six
other persons were in the ring, three in
each combatant's corner. Bets were made
by persons in the crowd of from 130 to
150 persons around the ring. The pri-
soners were in the crowd, but were not
speaking or betting, or taking any part in

the fight, or doing anything. Coney was
hemmed in by the crowd, and could not
have got out if he had wanted. The three
prisoners were charged upon an indict-
ment for assaults upon B. and M., and the
chairman directed the jury "that they

were to determine whether or not this was
a prize fight; that there was no doubt that
prize fights were illegal, just as much so
as that persons should go out to fight with
deadly weapons, and that it was not
material which party struck the first blow;
and that all persons who go to a prize fight
to see the combatants strike each other,
and who are present when they do so, are
in point of law guilty of an assault. If
they were not casually passing by, but
stayed at the place, they encouraged it by
their presence, although they did not do
or say anything." The jury found the
three prisoners guilty, but added that it
was in consequence of the direction of law
of the chairman, as they found that the
three prisoners were not aiding or abetting.
Held that a prize fight is illegal, and that
all persons aiding and abetting therein are
guilty of an assault. Held (Lord Cole-
ridge, C.J., Pollock, B., and Mathew, J.
dissenting), that the conviction must be
quashed, as the direction of the chairman
amounted to this: That the mere presence
of persons at a prize fight unexplained is
conclusive proof of intending to encourage
the fight, although they are not seen to do
or say anything; and that the finding of
the jury was in obedience to that direction
without exercising any judgment of their
own upon the sufficiency of the evidence as
to encouraging, or aiding and abetting the
fight. (Reg. v. Coney, Gilliam, and Tully.
March, 1882. C. C. R.) 46.

an assembly of the public is collected.
(Reg. v. Wellard. Nov., 1884. C. C. R.)

559.

(See also Vagrancy Acts.)

RAPE.

Child between twelve and thirteen years old

-38 & 39 Vict. c. 94, s. 4.-The 38 & 39
Vict. c. 94, s. 4, which enacts that whoso-
ever shall unlawfully and carnally know
and abuse any girl being above the age of
twelve and under the age of thirteen years,
whether with or without her consent, shall
be guilty of misdemeanour, does not repeal
the old law which made the offence of
rape a felony. Reg. v. Dicken (14 Cox
C.C. 8) affirmed. (Reg. v. Josiah Ratcliffe.
Nov. 1882. C. C. R.) 127.

Contradictory statements by witnesses-
Admissibility of evidence-Complaints of
prosecutrix-28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 3.—
Where in an indictment for rape a witness
to whom the prosecutrix had made a state-
ment shortly after the commission of the
alleged offence, being asked on cross-
examination as to the particulars of such
statement, gave an answer which was
different from that which the prosecuting
counsel was instructed she had made:
Held, by Day, J. (after consulting Cave, J.),
that it was competent for the counsel for
the prosecution, in re-examination, to ask
the witness whether she had not at other
times made a different statement, and one
inconsistent with her present testimony, to
certain persons named; and also to call
such persons to give evidence of the state-
ments so made to them under 28 & 29 Vict.
c. 18, s. 3. (Reg. v. Little. 1883. Day, J.)
319.

Married woman-Carnal connection-Con-
sent obtained by fraud.-Where a married
woman consented to the prisoner having
connection with her under the impression
that he was her husband: Held, that the
prisoner was guilty of rape. Reg.v. Barrow
(11 Cox C. C. 191; L. Rep. 1 C. C. R.
156) not followed. (Reg. v. Dee.
1884. C. C. R. Ir.) 579.

Dec.,

RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.

GUILTY KNOWLEDGE.
(See Evidence.)

RESTITUTION OF STOLEN

PROPERTY.

(See Larceny.)

RINGING THE CHANGES.
(See Larceny.)

RIOT.

ATTEMPT TO EXCITE.

(See Boycotting.)

ROGUE AND VAGABOND.

(See Vagrancy Acts.)

SALE OF FOOD AND DRUGS ACTS.
Tradesman supplying different article from
that demanded by purchaser-38 & 39
Vict. c. 63, s. 6; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30, s. 2.—
Sect. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act,
1875, as interpreted by and read together
with sect. 2 of the Sale of Food and Drugs
Act Amendment Act, 1879, is not limited
to cases of mixing and adulterating only,
but applies also to cases where an article
entirely different from, and not being of
the nature or substance or quality of the
article demanded by the purchaser, is
supplied by the seller; and therefore a
tradesman, who in response to a request
for "saffron " supplies a customer with
"savin," comes within and is liable to the
penalty imposed by sect. 6 of the Act of
1875. (Knight v. Bowers. March, 1885.
Q. B. Div.) 728.

(See also Adulteration of Food.)

SALVATION ARMY.
(See Unlawful Assembly.)

SENTENCE, AMENDMENT OF,
(See False Pretences.)

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.
PRIVILEGE-COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO
COMMISSION OF CRIME.

(See Evidence.)

SPECIAL VERDICT.

(See Murder.)

STATEMENT BY PRISONER,
(See Practice.)

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879.
(See Criminal Prisoner.)

SURETIES FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

ASSEMBLY FOR LAWFUL PURPOSE.

(See Unlawful Assembly.)

was

Jurisdiction of Magistrates-Certiorari―
Evidence-Affidavit-34 Edw. 3, c. 1.-
H. R., at the execution of an habere to
enforce payment of rent, addressed a
number of persons, including the tenant
under eviction, as follows: "Pay no rent
to the landlord. We will make you right
about the land; we will build you a house
at any expense, and make you comfortable
during the winter." A summons
issued against H. R., calling on her to
show cause why she should not be bound
over to be of good behaviour, and at the
hearing of the summons H. R. was ordered
to find bail to be of good behaviour for six
months, and in default to be imprisoned
for one month. She refused to give bail
and was accordingly imprisoned for one
month. Held, on motion to show cause
against a conditional order for a writ of
certiorari, that the justice had jurisdic
tion to make the order. Held also that
the court would not allow the evidence
given in the court below to be supple-
mented by affidavit of other facts that
occurred at the execution of the habere.
(Reg. v. The Justices of the County of Cork.
Jan., 1882. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 78.

(See also Justices of the Peace.)

Original jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench
-34 Edw. 3, cap. 1-21 Jac. 1, cap. 8
(Eng.)-10 & 11 Car. 1, cap. 10 (Ir.).—
Notices were served on D. H. and Q. of
applications to the Queen's Bench Divi-
sion, requiring them to find sufficient
sureties to be of good behaviour towards
Her Majesty and all her Majesty's sub-
jects, or in default that they should be
committed to prison. Held, upon the
hearing of the applications, that the judges
of the Queen's Bench Division as con-
servators of the peace have original juris-
diction independently of the statute 34
Edw. 3, c. 1, to require sureties for
good behaviour from persons whose acts
or language are shown to be likely to
endanger the public peace. Held also
that these were proper cases in which to
exercise that jurisdiction. Reg. (Reynolds)
v. The Justices of Cork (10 L. Rep. Ir. 1;
and Reg. (Feehan) v. The Justices of the
Queen's County (10 L. Rep. Ir. 294; ante,
p. 149, under the name of Reg. v. Justices
of Cork) approved of. (Ex parte Charles
E. Seymour v. Michael Davitt; Ex parte
Patrick Bearns v. T. M. Healy, M.P.; Ex
parte Charles E. Seymour v. P.J. Quinn,
Jan., 1883. Q. B. Div. Ir.) 242.

THEFT-BOTE.

(See Compounding Felony.)

TRACTION ENGINE.
OBSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAY.
(See Highway.)

TREASON-FELONY.

The

11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, s. 3-Levying war against
the Queen to compel her by force to change
her counsels-Evidence-Overt act or deed
-Corroboration of accomplice.-Secret
clubs were formed in America, branches of
a society called the Fenian Brotherhood,
whose object was said to be to procure
"the freedom of Ireland by force alone."
The prisoners, members of these clubs,
came to England provided with funds,
their intent being to destroy public build-
ings by nitro-glycerine and other explo-
sives. One of the prisoners appeared to
be the director of the movements of the
others, another was detected in manufac-
turing nitro-glycerine in large quantities
at Birmingham, and others were employed
in the removal thereof, when manufactured,
to London under the director's superinten-
dence. There was evidence that the House
of Commons and Scotland Yard Office of
the detective police were pointed out as
places to be destroyed, as well as that the
nitro-glycerine was to be used for destroy-
ing other public public buildings.
prisoners were indicted under the 11 & 12
Vict. c. 12, s. 3 (Treason-Felony Act)
for compassing, devising, and intend-
ing to deprive and depose the Queen
from the style, honour, or royal name of the
Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom,
for levying war against her to compel her
to change her counsels, and to intimidate
and overawe the Houses of Parliament.
The jury were directed (1.) That if they
thought that one or more of the prisoners
did compass, devise, or intend to force the
Queen to change her counsels and to over-
awe the Houses of Parliament by violent
measures, directed against either the pro-
perty of the Queen, the public property,
or the lives of the Queen's subjects, and
not with the view of repaying any private
spite or enmity against any particular sub-
jects of the Queen, it would be a levying
of war against the Queen within the mean-
ing of the first count of the indictment;
that it was not the less compassing and
intending levying war, because by the
progress of science two or three men could
do now what could not have been done

years ago except by a large number of
persons; that the question was, was there
proof that the prisoners did what they did
with the intention of depriving and depos-
ing the Queen from the style of the
Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom
or with the intention of separating Ireland
from the Crown of England and establish-
ing an independent republic. (2.) That if
what the prisoners did was done to compel
Her Majesty, or her Ministers, by force to
change the present constitution, and to
alter the relations between England and
Ireland, or even to set up a separate Par-
liament in Ireland, it would be within the
second count of the indictment. (3.) That
if what the prisoners did was done for the
purpose of intimidating and overawing
both or either Houses of Parliament so as
to frighten them into doing what otherwise
they would not have done, it would be
within the third count. The evidence of
an approver may be acted on by the jury
if they think it true, but the practice is to
require some corroboration of his evidence.
It is not necessary that he should be cor-
roborated in every particular, for if so it
would not be necessary to call him as a
witness, but there must be a certain
amount of confirmation sufficient to satisfy
the jury. (Reg. v. Thomas Gallagher,
Whitehead, Wilson, Ansburgh, Curtin,
and Bernard Gallagher. June, 1883.
Lord Coleridge, C.J., the Master of the
Rolls, and Grove, J.) 291.

Purpose of instrument-Treasonable inten-
tion - Evidence-Burden of proof.-D.
and others were charged under the Treason-
Felony Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 12), sect. 3,
with being in the possession of certain
instruments and explosive materials,
with intent to use them for the pur-
pose of carrying out the objects of
certain treasonable combinations existing
in the United Kingdom and abroad. Held,
that, for the purpose of showing such
intent, evidence might be given showing
that the only known use hitherto made of
such instruments and explosive compounds
had been in causing destructive explosions
to property; and that the fact of some of
those explosions having happened out of
the jurisdiction of the court did not affect
the admissibility of the evidence. Held
also, that, for the purpose of showing a
treasonable object on the part of the pri-
soners, and negativing any private object,
evidence might be given of the existence,
down to a period nearly approaching the
date of the alleged acts, in the country

h

from which the instruments and explosive
materials were brought, of a treasonable
conspiracy having for its object the altera-
tion of the existing form of government by
violent means, although such evidence did
not establish that the prisoners were mem-
bers of, or directly connected with, such
conspiracy. Though the general rule is
that the prosecution must make out intent,
there may be circumstances under which
the burden of proof is shifted to the other
side. (Reg. v. Deasy and others. Aug.,
1883. Stephen. J.) 334.

TRIAL.
(See Practice.)

UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.
AUTHORITY TO DISPERSE.

(See Justice of the Peace.)

The "Salvation Army"-Assembly of per-
sons for lawful purpose-Knowledge by
them that such assembly would cause
others to commit a breach of the peace-
Liability for such breach-Sureties to
keep the peace. The appellants, with a
considerable number of other persons,
forming a body called the Salvation
Army," assembled together in the streets
of a town for a lawful object, and with
no intention of carrying out their object
unlawfully, or by the use of physical
force, but knowing that their assembly
would be opposed and resisted by other
persons in such a way as would in all pro-
bability tend to the committing of a breach
of the peace on the part of such opposing
persons. A disturbance of the peace
having been created by the forcible opposi-
tion of a number of persons to the assembly
and procession through the streets of the
appellants and the Salvation Army, who
themselves used no force or violence:--
Held, that the appellants had not been
guilty of "unlawfully and tumultuously
assembling," &c., and could not therefore
be convicted of that offence, nor be bound
over to keep the peace. Held also, that
knowledge by persons peaceably assembling
for a lawful object that their assembly
will be forcibly opposed by other persons,
under circumstances likely to lead to a
breach of the peace on the part of such
other persons, does not render such
assembly unlawful. (Beatty and others
(apps.) v. Gillbanks (resp.). June, 1882.
Q. B. Div.) 138.