of and dispense with the requirement for statutory steps in the making of a municipal contract or in the levying of assessments does not dispense with the constitutional requirement that the act by which it is to be done shall fairly indicate the existence of the purpose. Dean v. Bell et al (1920), 230 N. Y. 1, 128 N. E. 897, revg. 191 App. Div. 809, 181 N. Y. Supp. 835.

Private or local bill.-The act, described in the title as one "to authorize and empower the board of trustees of the village of Wilson to borrow money for discharging certain debts," is a "private or local bill" within the meaning of section 16 of article 3 of the State Constitution, and if construed to deal with claims utterly lacking in any feature of legal obligation and which at most constitute equitable claims which might be made the basis for remedial legislation, the subject and purpose of the bill were not fairly "expressed in the title." Dean v. Bell et al (1920), 230 N. Y. 1, 128 N. E. 897, revg. 191 App. Div. 809, 191 N. Y. Supp. 835.

Laws of 1865, chap. 505, is a local act providing for the improvement of the Oswegatchie River and complies with the constitutional provision as to its title. Opinion of Attorney-General (1920), 22 State Dept. Rep. 463.

L. 1901, chap. 164 embraces but one subject in its title. Waterford Electric Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State of New York (1921), 117 Misc. 480, 191 N. Y. Supp. 657.

When purpose of statute to grant cause of action against village for delay does not appear from title, act to that extent fails to create cause of action; when cause of action for additional work authorized by statute.—Where a statute purports to make loss sustained by delay a legal and binding obligation of a village, but the title does not advise the reader of the purpose of the draftsman to include in the act a distinct cause of action for damages for delay, it comes within the condemnation visited on deceptive and misleading titles and the act, to that extent, fails in its purpose to create a cause of action. A cause of action, however, for additional work, labor and services in connection with the work covered by the terms of the contract is well pleaded where not only is reasonable compensation for such services declared by the statute to be a legal and binding obligation of the village, but such services are mentioned in the title and embraced in the general subject of the act. The subject is single; the title is sufficiently explicit and the act to this extent is constitutional. Gaynor v. Village of Port Chester (1921), 231 N. Y. 451, 132 N. E. 45, modfg. 179 App. Div. 122, 160 N. Y. Supp. 978.

Art. III, § 17. Existing laws made applicable to be inserted.

The Rehabilitation Law (L. 1920, chap. 760) is valid. Watkinson v. Hotel Pennsylvania (1921), 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N. Y. Supp. 278, affd. 231 N Y. 562, 132 N. E. 889.

Farms and Markets Law, sections 20 and 100 are not in conflict with this section. People v. Buffalo Cold Storage Co. (1920), 113 Misc. 479, 185 N. Y. Supp. 790.

Art. III, § 18. Cases in which private and local bills shall not be passed; restrictions as to laws authorizing street railroads.

L. 1921, chap. 134, as amended by chapter 335, creating transit commission and defining its jurisdiction, powers and duties is constitutional and valid. Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, etc. (1922), 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E. 187, affg. 198 App. Div. 205, 190 N. Y. Supp. 92.

"Street railroads."-The New York, Westchester & Boston Railway Company is not a "street railroad" within the meaning of this section. People ex rel. New York, Westchester & Boston Railway Co. v. Public Service Comm., First

Art. III, § 19.

Private claims not to be audited.

Dist. (1921), 230 N. Y. 604, 130 N. E. 911, affg. 193 App. Div. 445, 183 N. Y. Supp. 473.

Company held not to be street railroad within the meaning of this section. Opinion of Public Service Commission, First Dist. (1920), 23 State Dept. Rep. 167. A railroad is not a street railroad where it was organized under the General Railroad Law, and where it uses no part of the surface of any street or highway but operates on its own private right of way, and does not take on or discharge passengers on streets or at street crossings, but only at its own stations on its private right of way. People ex rel. N. Y. W. & B. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission (1920), 193 App. Div. 445, 183 N. Y. Supp. 473, affd. 230 N. Y. 604, 130 N. E 911.

The public roads and highways throughout the State are held for the use and benefit of the public, and there being no constitutional limitation on the power of the Legislature to authorize the incorporation, construction and operation of railroads, other than street railroads, except that they must be authorized by general laws, it is competent for the Legislature to authorize a railroad, other than a street railroad, to be constructed upon, along or across any public highway or street in the State without obtaining the consent of the local authorities therefor. People ex rel. N. Y. W. & B. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission (1920), 193 App. Div. 445, 183 N. Y. Supp. 473, affd. 230 N. Y. 604, 130 N. E. 911.

It was the constitutional right of a village to grant or withold a franchise to a street railroad company to construct and operate a street railway in the village, and it, therefore, had the right to grant a defeasible franchise and make the condition of defeasance a non-compliance with the prescribed rates whether for urban or interurban service. People ex rel. Village of Brownville v. Public Service Commission (1921), 198 App. Div. 391, 191 N. Y. Supp. 293.

The constitution does not in any way prescribe or limit the fare to be charged by a street railway company nor does it delegate any power in relation thereto to the municipality. Matter of Fleming (1921), 117 Misc. 373, 191 N. Y. Supp. 586. Legislature has constitutional power to modify rates fixed by local franchise. The state, acting through the legislature, has by virtue of its police power the right to regulate the fare to be charged by a street railroad corporation and the constitutional right to modify rates fixed in a local franchise. Contracts cannot be made which in any way limit this power. The Constitution gives to a municipality the right to say whether a railroad shall be built in its public streets and may attach to its consent such conditions as it deems necessary and proper so far as it and the railroad are concerned. But if in the exercise of police power the fare is found to be excessive and more than reasonable compensation for the service performed, it may be lowered, or raised, if found to be so low as not to be fair, just and reasonable to the corporation. Matter of City of Niagara Falls v. Public Service Commission (1920), 229 N. Y. 333, 128 N. E. 247, affg. 190 App. Div. 890, 178 N. Y. Supp. 822.

L. 1910, chap. 279, amending section 23 of the County Law and substituting annual salaries for the per diem compensation previously established is not in violation of this section because it was adopted by the commissioners of statutory revision within the meaning of section 23 of this article of the Constitution. Statler v. McFarlane (1921), 230 N. Y. 400, 130 N. E. 591, revg. 181 App. Div. 957, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1131.

L. 1920, ch 949, adding to Tax Law § 4 b is not "a private or local bill." Hermitage Co. v. Goldfogle (1923), 204 App. Div. 710, 199 N. Y. Supp. 382.

Art. III, § 19. Private claims not to be audited by Legislature.

An appropriation by the Legislature is not an audit of bills or a direction to pay

them and this is prohibited by this section. Carr v. State of New York (1921), 231 N. Y. 164, 131 N. E. 877, affg. 189 App. Div. 881, 177 N. Y. Supp. 912.

Claims under war contracts.-L. 1919, chapter 549, conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine claims arising under "war contracts" is in contravention of this section. Dale Engineering Co. v. State of New York (1921), 114 Misc. 233, 186 N. Y. Supp. 490.

Claims for negligence by members of national guard.-The statute (Laws of 1919, chapter 579) conferring jurisdiction upon this court to hear and determine a certain claim against the state for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of certain members of the National Guard of the state, who had been ordered out to preserve order while a strike was in progress, and authorizing an award of damages if the same was justified by the evidence, is neither an audit nor an allowance of the claim. Lorich v. State (1920), 113 Misc. 409, 184 N. Y. Supp. 818.

Art. III, § 20. Two-thirds bills.

An act ratifying the employment by village authorities of certified public accountants to make audit of receipts of taxes is not in violation of this section. Gaynor v. Village of Port Chester (1920), 230 N. Y. 210, 129 N. E. 657, revg. 188 App. Div. 975, 176 N. Y. Supp. 900.

Art. III, § 21. Appropriation bills.

Refund of fines after reversal of conviction.-Where fines for violations of the Conservation Law have been paid over by the Conservation Commission to the State Treasurer, they may not be refunded to the person paying such fines upon the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction, except by appropriation of the Legislature. Opinion of Attorney-General (1921), 26 State Dept. Rep. 335. Section cited.-Matter of Brooklyn Public Library v. Craig (1922), 201 App. Div. 722, 194 N. Y. Supp. 715.

Art. III, § 23. Certain sections not to apply to commission bills.

Amendment of section 23 of the County Law by L. 1910, chap. 279, substituting annual salaries for the per diem compensation previously established by virtue of this section not in violation of section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution. Statler v. McFarlane (1921), 230 N. Y. 400, 130 N. E. 591, revg. 181 App. Div. 957, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1131.

Art. III, § 24. Tax bills to state tax distinctly.

Quaere whether the general reimposition of the tax as stated in section 351-a of the Tax Law is a violation of this section of the Constitution. People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis (1921), 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109, revg. 195 App. Div. 635, 187 N. Y. Supp. 311.

L. 1921, chap. 396 imposing a direct state tax is not rendered unconstitutional as a whole because it includes a tax to pay the interest on soldiers' and sailors' bonds, which cannot be issued because the referendum act was declared unconstitutional. The statute is divisible and the mill rate for the general fund and for the common schools remains unaffected. Opinion of Attorney-General (1921), 26 State Dept. Rep. 396.

Art. III, § 26. Board of supervisors.-There shall be in each county, except in a county wholly included in a city, a board of supervisors, to be composed of such members and elected in such manner and for such period

as is or may be provided by law. The legislature may provide by law for forms of government for the counties of Westchester and Nassau, or either, subject to adoption and approval by the electors of any such county at a general election in an odd-numbered year. Any such form of government may include the transfer to the county or to county officers of any functions now exercised by towns or town officers. The law providing for such form of government shall also prescribe the manner in which the county. affected may subsequently abandon it, and revert to its former form of government. The adoption of such form of government by the county shall not preclude the legislature from amending or modifying such plan. If under such form of government the board of supervisors be abolished, the powers and duties of the board of supervisors, as prescribed by the constitution, or by statute if not provided for by such form of government, shall devolve upon the governing elective body in such county. In a city which includes an entire county, or two or more entire counties, the powers and duties of a board of supervisors may be devolved upon the municipal assembly, common council, board of aldermen or other legislative body of the city. (Amended, 1921.)

L. 1907, ch. 594, as amd. by L. 1922, ch. 604, relating to the Bronx parkway, is valid. Matter of Bronx Parkway Commission (1922), 119 Misc. 785.

Art. III, § 27. Local legislative powers.-The legislature shall, by general laws, confer upon the boards of supervisors, or other governing elective bodies, of the several counties of the state such further powers of local legislation and administration as the legislature may, from time to time, deem expedient. In counties which now have, or hereafter have, county auditors or other fiscal officers, authorized to audit bills, accounts, charges, claims or demands against the county, the legislature may confer such powers upon such auditors, or fiscal officers, as the legislature may, from time to time, deem expedient. (Amended, 1921.)

Art. III, § 28. Extra compensation prohibited.

Effect of section.-By this section the legislature is inhibited from appropriating any money based upon gratitude and charity so far as its officers, servants, agents and contractors are concerned. The legislature, thus prohibited from recognizing claims founded on gratitude and charity, is powerless to indirectly provide a means of determining such claims, provide for the entry of judgment thereon against the state and to subsequently appropriate moneys to pay the judgment. Gordon v. State of New York (1922), 233 N. Y. 1, 134 N. E. 698, revg. 196 App. Div. 589, 190 N. Y. Supp. 107.

When dealing with a restraint imposed by the Constitution itself upon the agencies of government, its prohibitions are to be interpreted, not narrowly and grudgingly like those of a penal statute, but broadly and liberally to promote the policy behind them. A payment to a contractor does not cease to be extra compensation because some fragment of consideration, sufficient, it may be, to sustain a contract between private parties, may give to the transaction the aspect of an exchange of values. McGovern v. City of New York (1923), 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26, modfg. 202 App. Div. 317, 195 N. Y. Supp. 925.

Constitutional prohibition of grant of extra compensation by city to contractor; when agreement that city would pay increased cost of labor and materials to contractors in consideration of their settling strike by paying increased wages demanded by workmen invalid.-A contract made by the public service commission and the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York whereby they expressly, jointly and severally, promised and agreed that if plaintiffs would settle a strike by paying increased wages to workmen employed by them in the performance of a subway contract, previously entered into with the city of New York, the city would pay the increased cost of labor and material due to the war from April 6, 1917, as well as any future increase due to the same cause, is condemned by section 28 of article 3 of the State Constitution and a demurrer to the complaint in an action for the breach thereof will be sustained where it clearly appears from the complaint that the wages demanded by the workmen were not unreasonable and that other workmen could not be obtained unless at increased wages. Nor is the promise authorized or ratified by chapter 586 of the Laws of 1918 giving, or assuming to give, to the city the privilege, at its election, to cancel existing contracts and remake them on new terms, or by chapter 911 of the Laws of 1921, conferring a right of action upon contractors who have fulfilled their contracts in reliance upon a promise to pay the increased cost resulting from a state of war. If the first statute can be sustained, the city did not attempt to comply with its provisions, and if the promise is invalid under the Constitution the second cannot make it valid. McGovern v. City of New York (1923), 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26, modfg. 202 App. Div. 317, 195 N. Y. Supp. 925.

L. 1920, chap. 319, increasing compensation for State printing done during war is unconstitutional as being an attempt to grant extra compensation to contractors. J. B. Lyon Co. v. State (1922), 118 Misc. 301, 193 N. Y. Supp. 230.

Contracts for public works.-Chapter 711 of the Laws of 1921, providing in effect that as to contracts for the construction of public works made prior to April 6, 1917, other than a war contract, which have been proceeded with or completed during the period of the war, at an increased cost due to the existence of the war, any damage occasioned by such increased cost in the performance of the work shall be a valid and legal claim against and an obligation of the State, county, municipality or political division of the State with or for which said contract was made, is unconstitutional and void as a violation of section 28 of article 3 of the State Constitution. McGovern v. City of New York (1922), 202 App. Div. 361, 196 N. Y. Supp. 162.

Invalidity of L. 1919, ch. 459, authorizing Court of Claims to hear and determine claims of highway contractors and make awards for increased costs of highways constructed since beginning of late war.-Chapter 459 of the Laws of 1919 which authorizes the termination of certain contracts for the construction of state highways, called "war contracts," entered into before April 6, 1917, the date of the declaration of war between the United States of America and the Imperial German Government, and confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine claims and make awards for increased costs incurred in the completion of such contracts, is invalid in its entirety for the reason that its purpose and effect is to grant to contractors extra compensation and is, therefore, within the prohibition of the Constitution. The fact that the Court of Claims is authorized to hear and determine such claims does not render the statute valid. Payment of judgments rendered by that court are provided for by appropriation of the funds of the state and a judgment in favor of a claimant for increased cost of labor and material in excess of the amount to be paid in such a contract would clearly fall within the term "extra compensation." Gordon v. State of New York (1922), 233 N. Y. 1, 134 N. E. 698, revg. 196 App. Div. 589, 190 N. Y. Supp. 107.