written statements affecting B, which are false to A's knowledge, and are intended to injure B. This is not a libel. (4.) A being the military superior of D, and being as such under a military duty to make a report on B's conduct to C, their common superior, makes a report which he knows to be false in order to injure B. The report is not a libel. ARTICLE 277. FAIR REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS OF COURTS. 2 The publication of a fair report of the proceedings of a Court of justice is not a libel, merely because it defames the character of any private person; but such a publication may be an offence under Articles 91, 99, 161, or 172. A report is said to be fair when it is substantially accurate, and when it is either complete or condensed in such a manner as to give a just impression of what took place, but this Article does not extend to comments made by the reporter, or to reports of observations made by persons not entitled to take part in the proceedings. Reports of ex parte proceedings are within this Article if they are of a judicial nature, and proceedings before a magistrate under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, held with open doors, and with a view to the committal for trial of a suspected person, are judicial. 3 Provided in all the cases aforesaid that the publisher is not actuated in making the publication by any indirect motive. Illustrations. (1.) A publishes in a newspaper a fair report of the examination of a debtor before the registrar of a Bankruptcy Court. The examination contains irrelevant statements defaming B, who is a stranger to the proceedings. This is not a libel on B. (2.) A having been convicted of publishing a blasphemous libel, B pub 1 Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94. Dissentiente Cockburn, C.J. I should doubt whether this law would be extended beyond the case of military duty. 2 Curry v. Walter, 1 B. & P. 525; Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20; Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 553. 3 Stevens v. Sampson, L. R. 5 Ex. Div. 53. Regalis v. Leader, L. R. 1 Ex. 296, 300. lishes the trial, the blasphemous matter being given in full. B publishes a blasphemous libel. (3.) 1A publishes a report of proceedings for perjury against B, and omits certain parts of the cross-examination of the witnesses. This raises a question for the jury whether the effect of the omission is to make the report partial and inaccurate. (4.) 2 A, in the last illustration, begins his report with an account of the proceedings out of which the charge of perjury against B arose, and observes, "Evidence was given by C and D which entirely negatived B's story." This statement is not within the Article. (5.) A publishes in a newspaper an account of proceedings before a magistrate against B. The report contains a statement by the magistrate's clerk that B's alleged conduct was exceedingly improper under any circumstances. This observation is not within this Article. (6.) A publishes a fair report in a newspaper of a proceeding against B for perjury at a police court, which proceedings ended in the dismissal of the charge against B. This publication is not a libel. (7.) A publishes in a newspaper a fair report of statements of a defamatory kind, made before a magistrate extra-judically, with a view to asking This publication may be a libel, as there is no judicial his advice. proceeding. ARTICLE 278. PUNISHMENT FOR LIBEL. Every one is liable to a maximum punishment of three years imprisonment and hard labour who (a.) publishes, or threatens to publish, any libel; or (b.) directly or indirectly proposes to abstain from, or offers to prevent the printing or publishing of publishing of any matter or thing touching any other person, with intent (i.) To extort any money, or security for money, or any valuable thing from such or any other person; or (ii.) to induce any person to confer or procure for any person any appointment or office of profit or trust. Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 551. 2 Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 539. 3 Delegal v. Highley, 3 Bing. N. C. 960, 961. 4 Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 537; see, on the other hand, Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556. 5 McGregor v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 24. 66 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 3. 1Every one is liable to a maximum punishment of two years imprisonment, and to pay such fine as the Court directs, who maliciously publishes any defamatory libel knowing it to be false, 2 or [if he does not know it to be false], to a maximum punishment of one year's imprisonment, and to pay such a fine as the Court may direct. 1 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 4. 2 Ibid. s. 5. The words bracketed are not in the Act, but are required to complete the sense. *PART VI. 1 OFFENCES AGAINST RIGHTS OF PROPERTY AND RIGHTS ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTS. CHAP. XXXIII.-PROPERTY-POSSES-CHAP. XLI.-FRAUDS BY AGENTS, SION-ASPORTATION-BAILMENT. CHAP. XXXIV.-THINGS CAPABLE OR NOT OF BEING STOLEN. CHAP. XXXVII.-ROBBERY AND EX- TRUSTEES, AND OFFICERS OF PUBLIC CHAP. XLII. RECEIVING. CHAP. XLIII.-FORGERY IN GENERAL. CHAP. XLV. PERSONATION. CHAP. XXXVIII.-BURGLARY, HOUSE- CHAP. XLVI.-OFFENCES RELATING BREAKING, ETC. CHAP. XXXIX.-PUNISHMENTS FOR STEALING PARTICULAR THINGS AND OBTAINED. CHAP. XL.-OBTAINING PROPERTY TO THE COIN. CHAP. XLVII.-MALICIOUS INJURIES CHAP. XLVIII.-OFFENCES RELATING CHAP. XLIX.-OFFENCES CONNECTED 1 CHAPTER XXXIII. PROPERTY-POSSESSION-ASPORTATION—BAILMENT. ARTICLE 279. OFFENCES AGAINST RIGHTS OF PROPERTY AND RIGHTS ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTS. THE violation of rights of property, and rights arising from contracts, is a crime in the cases specified in this part. *3 Hist. Cr. Law, ch. xxviii. 121-176. 1 This and the following chapter have I fear a somewhat abstract appearance, but it is impossible to understand the provisions of the Larceny Act without a knowledge of the doctrines which it presupposes-that is to say, the doctrine as to the definition of theft, and as to things capable of being stolen. The definition of Р Such violation may be : (1.) By taking away property from the owner without his consent (a.) by violence to his person or habitation; (b.) without such violence. (2.) By persuading the owner by fraud to transfer his rights of property. (3.) By the misappropriation of property entrusted by the owner to the offender. (4.) By acts calculated to defraud, whether they actually defraud or not; that is to say (a.) Forgery. (b.) Personation. (c.) Coining and uttering bad money. (5.) By wilful and malicious mischief done to property. (6.) By breaches of certain kinds of contract and interference in certain cases with freedom of trade. ARTICLE 280. PROPERTY IN MOVEABLE THINGS. 1 A person who has a right as against the world at large to do with or to any moveable thing anything which the law does not specifically forbid him to do with or to it, and the right to prevent all other persons from doing therewith or thereto anything whatever which they are not specifically authorized to do, either by law or by his consent, is said to be the general owner of that thing, and that thing is said to be his property, although he may have limited the above-mentioned rights respecting it as regards particular persons by contract. 2 ARTICLE 281. POSSESSION. A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a per theft, turns on the doctrine of possession (see Note XVII.), and this is unintelligible except in relation to the doctrine of property. 12 Austin, Jurispruden ce, 876, 965. 2 See Note X. |