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Scene, which happened at Vellore, has heen every where dreaded. This, with other causes, and the expected arrival of Lord Minto, according to the proclamation of his Lordship at the end of July, induced the subsidiary force at Hydrabad, to send their submission to Madras, to be presented to Lord Minto, when he should arrive, and to express a readiness on the part of the officers, to sign the required test. This example operated on the minds of the officers of the garrison of Seringapatam, who have also surrendered at discretion, and are marched into the interior, though the Sepoys had loudly clamoured for revenge for their late suffering, and "demanded to die at their posts in the defence of their officers." The officers at Masulipatani have also submitted, having first prevailed on the men, though the task was not easy, to accept the amnesty proclaimed by Government.
Since these acts have occurred^ there has been an awful pause, and no one can conjecture what will be the ultimate event. This silence keeps many tender sentiments alive, jn respect to the parties involved in these melancholy transactions. It is happy, however, that Lord Minto is at the Presidency
of Madras, where he arrived about a fortnight ago; and it is hoped, that his presence may be serviceable in healing the wounds, which the unaccountable seventy of precedng acts had unfortunately opened. Heaven prosper so charitable an endeavour! t
Though the preceding letters afford a full and circumstantial account of many important events, of which the public hitherto were but imperfectly informed, it is a matter of regret that some particulars are yet wanting, to render the detail complete. We are still without accounts of the actual loss of officers and men in the unhappy occurrence at Seringapatam, except the short order, published by Government on the 18th of August, shall be considered in such a light. We are also but slightly advised of the immediate means that led to the surrender of the disaffected corps at the last-mentioned station; but the fact seems to be indisputable. What is even more to be lamented, we have no other than an accidental rumour of a general submission and amnesty, with an» exception, or extension, to three or four individuals, whose cases, it is said, are reserved for the decision of the proper authorities in this country. We shall be happy to have all these desirable particulars confirmed, and to learn, on credible authority, that the power of the East India Company over their armies, as demi-officially announced, is increased and established by the close, or consummation of the disastrous events that have occurred, beyond the reach of human assault, or the hazard of future fortune.
There may be many who may not chuse to assent to all the propositions and conclusions founded on, or deduced from the facts stated in the preceding letters. The writers of them, being on the spot, where the transactions, of which they speak, were passing immediately under their eyes, and which they describe as fraught with universal interest, might reasonably be deemed, in their relations, but more especially in their course of reasoning, to be subject to a bias—an involuntary leaning to the one side or the other. They exhibit not, indeed, any ostentation of neutrality. But though this circumstance might lead us to distrust the deductions they should draw from facts, it would seem to dispose us to credit the facts themselves, so far as they are detailed. For who are' so well qualified to give us authentic narratives of circumstances, as they who are themselves eye-witnesses of them? The marks of the foregoing correspondence are the intrinsic marks of authenticity and truth apparent on the face of it: the fault, if it be thought that there be any discoverable about it, is the leaning, or inclination, of the writers respectively to the claims of the army. If it be not a species of gallantry, it is a sign, at least, of generosity and independence to adhere to an unsuccessful cause.
But the sensible and able writers of the foregoing letters, notwithstanding they are influenced by a visible predilection for the success of the army, are not blind, as it should seem, to the inherent defects of its pretensions, nor of the mode by which the attempt was made to advance them. They record with grief and reluctance—but th(y do record—the unfortunate and fatal extremities, into which an originally well-intentioned, and most honorable body of men were gradually provoked, and imperceptibly involved. They express a concern for their errors, but they do not endeavour to throw over them a justification or defence.
We are not ashamed to feel and avow that we own somewhat of the.same sentiment with these writers, springing, as we confess, from the same cause—a long intercourse with the Indian army, and a firm and unshaken conviction of its worth. Sincerely and deeply do we deplore the melancholy events that have closed their recent struggle. But melancholy though they be, and though they may be hastily, and inconsiderately condemned by those who have neither interest nor patience to investigate the circumstances attending them, or the causes that gave them birth, there is not a thinking mind, we speak with confidence, or a feeling heart within the kingdom, that can contemplate them without suggesting a palliation of the error which produced them, or returning a responsive sigh for the consequences likely to result from it.
A general cry has gone forth against the malcontents of the Coast army, sounded in a variety of tones—from the whisper of private insinuation, to the fulminating- report of the Governor General in Council. The public ear has been stunned and wearied with never-ceasing accusations. It is now time that it should be opened to the