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exercised the right, to reside in the original power delegated to the Company by the Legislature, to raise and maintain an army; which would seem of itself to infer, that all the necessary means, calculated to insure the objects of the grant, were at the same time intended, and by implication given. This would have been more clear to common capacities, if there had not been any laws or rules prescribed by the Legislature and his Majesty to the Company, for the maintenance and discipline of their armies, which appear some sort to repel the implication, more especially as the signa superioritatis are reserved to his Majesty, in the privilege declared by the act, of framing the articles of war, to be established for the government of the Company's forces. Some jealousy might have been reasonably entertained as to the grant of so vast a power to a private body of men, and as it might by possibility be abused, and become detrimental to the King's subjects, this reservation probably was introduced. It is a power, it is to be observed, to be exercised by one description of his Majesty's subjects over another, without any communion with, or reference to, the Executive organ, or the

common laws of the realin. That it should, therefore, be subjected to some controul, or superintendance, and that it was meant to be so subjected, by the act of Geo. II. and the articles of war, is no very irrational supposition. It is true, that in the act and articles there is no provision for the dismissal of an officer, but by the sentence of a courtmartial. So often as cashiering is mentioned in the articles of war, as often is it declared, that it is to be effected by the sentence of a court-martial, which would favour an inference, that so penal an act could not be carried into execution, on whatsoever account, unless under the sanction prescribed by the articles of war, in a like case. Yet cases might occur, where it would be desirable to use more immediate means for the discharge of a most dangerous individual. Such a prompt and sudden remedy is vested in his Majesty, in relation to his supreme command of the national force; and it has been therefore argued, by analogy, that the right of dismissal is inseparable from the supreme command of an army. But is there no difference in the two cases? The power vested in his Majesty is of the essence of the constitution, whereas that of the Company depends on particular

reproach to a secondary or derivative Government to have profited by the example.

At the time to which we now allude, no circumstance of much acerbity had arisen to prevent an early and an easy accommodation of differences. The commandants of corps, it will be recollected, did not object, nor could they reasonably have objected, to the act of Government, that deprived them of their tent allowances, nor did they remonstrate on the manner, which was not very gracious, by which that measure was effected. Their complaint, so

far as it had the most distant relation to the tent-contract, was bottomed on a part of the report of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, which was thought to be unfounded and calumnious, and which was regarded and treated as that gentleman's sole and undivided act. It is fit that this fact should be rightly and distinctly understood, as much misconception has been entertained of the origin of the discontents of the army, from want of information on this particular point. The abolition of the contract, it may be confidently said, formed no ingredient in the causes of the temporary disaffection towards the Government. The report alone was

supposed to be injurious and adverse to the interests of the army, and it was on that account resented. Whether a just or erroneous opinion was conceived of it, we are not now disposed to enquire. It is to be lamented, that the merits, or demerits of this paper, and the matters connected with it, were not submitted to the determination of a forum, peculiarly fitted to decide on the subject; and when such decision, most probably, would have been the means of averting all the unfortunate occurrences that subsequently happened.

But the complaints of the Commandants of Corps were treated with disregard, and the right of constitutional appeal to the Court of Directors, was denied by the Government, by a positive refusal to transmit their Memorial, complaining of grievances, through the customary channel. This extraordinary proceeding was followed by the orders of the 31st of January and 1st of February. The suspension of the Adjutant and Deputy Adjutant General greatly increased the discontent, as the principle, asserted in the act, was not partial but universal, and might be extended, at will, to every component part of the army.

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What was the fate of these officers to-day, might be the fate of others on the morrow. It is not to be wondered, therefore, that a common party should be made, in a sense of common danger, with the officers newly suspended from the service. The suspension of an officer at any time, even under the most flagrant appearances, without affording him an opportunity of excusing or explaining his conduct, cannot but be regarded as a harsh and severe measure. It is an act of extreme Authority, and ought not therefore to be resorted to, but in seasons of peculiar danger, or in instances of rare and extraordinary offence. To condemn, and afterwards to hear, is the practice not of a defined and limited Government, but of unbounded and tyrannic power. But the exercise of such a right, in so remote a quarter of the world, admitting that such a right lawfully exists, as by analogy it is contended, and that it is wisely and politically exercised in the particular instance, is attended with aggravated circumstances, incident to local situation. It leaves the party suspended at a distance from his home, possibly without the means of support, or conveyance thither, or, if his means be small,