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martial law, for disobedience of any military order, which is not manifestly illegal, and is now declared to be liable to the loss of his commission for obedience, if his immediate superior shall chance to be unpopular with power. The only compensation for which is an ex-post-facto opinion, that the order was illegal, in the judgment of Lieutenant Colonel Leith, who, as has been fully seen, can, with equal ease, support at the same time a proposition and its inverse, not only by sophistry and argument, but by authorities deduced from the laws of the Romans.

Lieutenant Colonel Leith has proved the legality, beyond all appeal, of Lieutenant Colonel Munro having, under orders from Sir John Cradock, falsely traduced the character of a considerable number of respectable officers in the service to which Lieutenant Colonel Munro belongs; although Sir J. Cradock was not exercising the function of command, at the time the circumstance came to the knowledge of those officers. And the same Colonel Leith has also proved the illegality of Colonel Capper, or Major Boles, having, under the orders of Lieutenant General Macdowall, signed

a reprimand to an individual officer, who had insulted his Commander in Chief, although Lieutenant General Macdowall was at that time exercising all the functions of command, and consequently, by the orders of Marquis Cornwallis, (as well as by the laws of the Romans, quoted by Colonel Leith) neither Colonel Capper, nor Major Boles, could appeal, nor hold any communication with the Civil Government, except through the Commander in Chief; certainly such an undertaking on the part of Colonel Leith merits high reward from those whose purpose it is calculated to answer, but its effect on the officers of the army is deplorable. It effectually annihilates the idea of right or claim to the possession of a commission, and destroys the foundation of equity and justice, upon which military discipline and subordination depend.

The offences, with which Colonel Capper and Major Boles are charged, being expressed in definite terms, every reasonable man can form a judgment respecting them. A passage of the Judge Advocate's opinion on the charges against Colonel Munro, tends strongly to corroborate the

sentiments of Earl Cornwallis, respecting the duty of the general staff of a Commander in Chief; and as Colonel Leith justly observes, "It is to be considered in "what capacity the words were spoken;

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they were given as a general principle, "&c." The following are Colonel Leith's words: "The great principle of military "law, as handed down from the most "ancient times, is, let there be no appeal "in military cases; let the order of the General, who commanded, be taken for just, "and ratified. Such was the rule of the "Romans, who best understood military

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discipline, and this principle we see

adopted in courts of common law." Every person, acquainted with the English language, must, upon reading this quotation, form the same opinion of its meaning. There is no equivoque, no abstract reasoning; the order of the General, who commands, is final, and not liable to appeal by any to whom the execution may be entrusted. Therefore, the sole responsibility rests with the General, in the Judge Advocate General's able opinion. This principle is applied in justification of Lieutenant Colonel Munro; and an inference is drawn,

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purporting, that the order of Sir John Cradock to prepare a certain report, relieves the person, to whom the order was given, from all responsibility with regard to the matter be contained in the report. However inconsistent this may be with justice, it may be presumed that, coming from Colonel Leith, it is good law; and as the principle upon which it is founded is general, and therefore applicable to other cases, similar in their nature and relations to Colonel Munro's, it will serve as a rule by which to examine the conduct of Major Boles and Colonel Capper. Those officers received from Lieutenant General Macdowall, the Commander in Chief, a general order in his own hand writing, accompanied by a letter, directing that the said general order might be circulated in the usual manner, with as little delay as possible, and assigning the prospect of his early departure as his motive for wishing that expedition should be used. This letter, also, was written and signed by the Commander in Chief. The order of the General who commanded, being, according to Colonel Leith, just and ratified," " and without appeal," Colonel Capper and Major Boles, a fortiorì, were

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relieved from all responsibility with regard to the matter that was contained in the order; or, supposing that Major Boles and Colonel Capper had refused a compliance with an order of the Commander in Chief, thus peremptory in its nature, that they had been placed under arrest, and brought to trial for such disobedience, Colonel Leith, being the Judge Advocate, can there be any doubt that in such a case, the Judge Advocate would, by the application of the Justinian Code, the articles of war, and the orders of Marquis Cornwallis, have attached to those officers the guilt of one of the highest crimes an officer can be accused of? and that their punishment would have been, perhaps, more severe than that which, at a former stage of this unhappy dissension, was intended for Colonels Sentleger, Martin, and Rumley? Assuredly not.

Yet has Colonel Leith, Judge Advocate General, given a professional opinion (expost-facto) purporting, that the compliance of Major Boles and Colonel Capper, with the peremptory orders of General Macdowall, was illegal, although General Macdowall was at the time present, and actually exercising all the functions of Commander in

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