order of the Commander in Chief, which, according to Colonel Leith, was to be considered "just and ratified, and without appeal." But if it should appear that the insinuation against the officers commanding native corps did not tend, in any way, to corroborate the arguments which have been used to recommend the abolition of the contract, and that therefore Lieutenant Colonel Munro had wantonly vilified the character of a body of respectable officers, for purposes which no man can avow, it is probable that the court martial, being composed of men, influenced by feelings of honourable pride, would have marked their sense of his conduct in the most decisive manner; and this could have been accomplished, without any allusion whatsoever to the general merits of the report, for which alone any responsibility can rest on the authorities who have severally approved the work. It would be, in the highest degree, absurd to suppose, that a superior authority, by approving a treatise, composed by an inferior, became responsible for the substance of any particular passage, although the purport of that passage were totally irrelevant to the main question, and although the total omission of the passage

Yet such

would not have weakened the reasoning, or rendered the inference less direct. hypothesis is necessary, in order to reconcile the position laid down in the G. O. 6th Feb. namely, that an enquiry, respecting a given passage in Colonel Munro's report, would have extended to the measures of the authorities, who had approved the general tenor of the report, although this particular passage had not any relation or bearing towards the general result.

One passage in the order of Government deserves to be particularly noticed, from the illustration which it affords of the avowed principles of Governnient. The passage is as follows:-" In these circumstances, the "Quarter-master General could no longer be "considered responsible for proceedings so "sanctioned; and it would have been in"consistent with the evident principles of justice, that a public officer should have "been liable to the obloquy of a trial for an "act not his, but that of his superiors.". The doctrine is certainly praiseworthy; and every one must acknowledge great liberality in the principle, which attaches to the superiors all responsibility for the act of an inferior; but which becomes theirs by adoption

even, supposing the operation of the principle to be general, and equally applicable to all persons similarly situated. But if, on the contrary, the spirit and letter of this doctrine be directly violated, in the case of Colonel Capper and Major Boles, and that those officers are punished without the oblo

quy

of a court martial, as being responsible for the positive act of their superior, the sincerity of the authors of the above-mentioned order will appear doubtful, at least; and men of plain understanding will imagine that their principles, as illustrated by their conduct, do not appear so praiseworthy as they do when publicly proclaimed in orders.

The Order concludes with an injunction, that the question must now be considered as concluded, and the circumstances connected with it consigned to oblivion. It was not, however, possible that a subject, which had engaged the attention of all, and had excited general irritation throughout the army, could be obliterated by the dash of a pen; and in fact, the G. O. 6th Feb. served to add fuel to the flame already spread. For, without any explanation or discussion of the real causes of complaint, it attempts to identify, with the Government itself, the cause of an individual,

who was shunned by every officer who possessed pride or feeling for the character of his profession; while Colonels Capper and Martin, and Major Boles, officers of great repute, and universally respected, were punished, to the greatest extent that the Government could accomplish, for acts which are considered to be not only justifiable but praiseworthy.

On the 8th of February, the public were surprised by the annunciation of a resolution, passed in Council on that day, ordering the removal of Captain Marshall from the situations of Secretary to the Military Board and Secretary to the Military Fund; the removal of Mr. Roebuck from the situations of the Paymaster General and Mint Master; and Mr. R. A. Maitland from the situation of Justice of the Petty Court. The two former were directed to quit the Presidency, without delay, and proceed to Vizagapatam, which is about 500 miles distant. This circumstance, totally unexpected and unaccountable as it at first appeared to be, became more surprising, from the difficulty of forming even a conjecture respecting the cause which might reasonably be assigned for inflicting so severe a punishment, at once, on three

individuals, whose professions, pursuits, and situations were so different; one being a subordinate military officer, who had not hitherto been conspicuous in any way; another, one of the oldest Company's civil servants; and the third, a gentleman not in the service, but residing at Madras, under the protection of the Company; and his conduct had been uniformly such, as to gain him universal esteem in the Settlement, as well as constant attention and respect from the members of all preceding Governments.

A deliberate consideration of the various discussions, then pending at Madras, suggested the causes which had rendered these men obnoxious to the rulers of the day.Captain Marshall, though in a subordinate situation, had frequent occasion to meet Colonel Munro on duty. However, no unofficial intercourse had, for a long period, taken place between those officers, owing to the incongruity of their dispositions, their principles, and their conduct. The subjects recently agitated at Madras had not tended, in any way, to reconcile the difference of sentiment that existed; and, in fact, Captain Marshall adopted the same principles which prevailed amongst the great majority of his