gress of July 1st, 1862, ch. 120, incorporating the Union Pacific R. Co. (12 Stat. 489), constitutes a contract between the United States and the company, whereunder the latter, for its service in transporting upon its road, from January 1st, 1876, to October 1st, 1877, the mails, and the agents and clerks employed in connection therewith, is entitled to compensation at fair and reasonable rates, not to exceed those paid by private parties for the same kind of service. The contract is not affected by the sections of the revised statutes declaring that the postmaster general may fix the rate for such service when performed by railroad companies to which congress granted aid, and he had no authority to insist that it was not binding upon the United States. The company, having been required to perform the contract, lost no rights by a compliance therewith, as it protested against and rejected all illegal conditions attached to the requirement. Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 104 U. S. 662; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 54 A railroad company, in aid of which congress granted land, entered September, 1875, into a contract with the United States to transport for four years the mails over its road at a price which conformed to the statute then in force. It received from the postmaster general due notice of his orders, reducing the rates of compensation, pursuant to the act of July 12th, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78, and the act of July 17th, 1878, ch. 259. 20 Id. 140. The company protested against the order, but performed the stipulated service. Held, that it is entitled to recover the contract price therefor. Those acts apply only to contracts thereafter made, or to such as did not require the performance of the service for a specific period. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. U. S., 104 U. S. 680; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 616; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. U. S., 104 U. S. 687; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 621. A railroad company, in the execution of its contract with the government, carried the mails from P to F, the route being partly over its own road and partly over a portion of the road of company B, which also had a contract for carrying the mails over its entire line. After the passage of the act of March 3rd, 1873, ch. 231, the post office department made frequent adjustments of the amount due to the respective companies, which was from time to time received without protest or objection. B having received the amount due for conveying all the mails over its road, although over a part of it a portion of them had been carried by A under its contract, the latter brought suit against the United States to recover compensation for the portion so carried. Held, that A's acquiescence in the adjustments precluded the maintenance of the suit. Railroad Co. v. U. S., 103 U. S. 703; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 592. A railroad company, in aid of whose road congress grants land upon condition that it shall transport mails at such price as congress may direct, and that until the price be thus fixed the postmaster general shall have power to determine the same, is (in the absence of contracts with the department for special service with unusual facilities, or for determined periods) bound to transport mails (until congress directs the rates) at such reasonable compensation as the postmaster general may from time to time prescribe; and the continuance by such company to transport mails after the expiration of the term of a written contract neither implies that it is, after the postmaster general has otherwise directed, to be paid the same rates for transportation which it was paid under the written contract, nor that the contract is renewed for any specific term for which contracts of the postoffice department may usually be made. Jacksonville P. & M. R. Co. v. U. S., 118 U. S. 626; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 82. Section 5 of the act of 1879 does not repeal section 3962 of the U. S. Rev. Stat., which gives to the postmaster general authority to deduct from the pay of contractors, whether they be private persons or corporations, the price of the trip in all cases where the trip is not made, and not to exceed three times the price of the trip, if the failure be caused by the fault of the contractor or carrier. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. U. S., 127 U. S. 406; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 508. An appeal from a judgment of the court of claims, in an action brought by a railroad company agreeably to section 5261 of the Revised Statutes, to recover compensation for mail carriage, etc., withheld by the government, brings up for review only the decisions of that court upon questions of law arising in the course of the trial, or in the application of the law to the facts III. Railway Mail Agents.-A mail agent riding on a railroad train is not, strictly speaking, a passenger,1 but he may recover damages for an injury occasioned by the company's negligence, on the ground of a breach of the company's duty towards him.2 as finally found. Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 116 U. S. 154. A decree in a suit in equity by the United States against a railroad corporation in Tennessee, appearing upon its face to have been by consent of parties, and confirming a compromise of all claims between them before June 1st, 1871, including any claim of the corporation against the United States for mail service, is a bar to a suit by the corporation in the court of claims for mail service performed before the war of the rebellion, although, at the time of the decree, payment to it of any claim was prohibited by law, because of its having aided the rebellion. Nashville etc. R. Čo. v. U. S., 113 U. S. 261. 1. In Pennsylvania, these mail agents are placed upon the footing of employees; but this is by virtue of an act of the legislature of that State. In the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. St. 256; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234, a mail agent on a train was killed in a collision, and suit was brought against the company by his widow. It was held that she could not recover. The court rested its decision upon the statute, saying: "The effect of the act of congress is to make his position on the car a lawful one. Being lawfully on the train, a recovery might possibly have been had for his death, upon the duty to carry safely. Collett v. Railroad Co., 16 Q. B. 984; and Nolton v. W. R., 15 N. Y. 444, goes to this extent. But here the act of 1868 comes in and declares that persons so employed upon the road shall have only the rights of employees of the company." In the case of Seybolt v. Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 562; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 162, however, it was held that a railroad corporation owes the same degree of care to mail agents riding in postal cars, in charge of the mails as they do to other passengers. The court, in commenting upon the case of Price, quoted above, use this language: "The opinion in the case of Railroad v. Price, not only does not conflict with the doctrine of these cases, but cites with approval the Noltor. case. The question In that case was upon the construction to be given to the word passenger, as used in the act of April 4th, 1868, of the laws of Pennsylvania, and it was held, from the act, that the legislature intended to exclude postal agents from the class therein designated as passengers." 2. Collett v. London etc. R. Co., 20 L. J., Q. B. 411; Hammond v. Northeastern R. Co., 6 Rich. (S. Car.) 130. A mail agent or his heirs are entitled to recover of the company for injuries resulting from the negligence of its employees. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 427; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 291. In Nolton v. Western R. Co., 15 N. Y. 444, a railway mail agent was injured, and it was held that where a railroad corporation voluntarily undertakes to carry a passenger upon its road, whether with or without compensation, if such passenger be injured by the culpable negligence, or want of skill of the agents of the company, the latter is liable. Contributory Negligence.-In Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 427; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 291, which was an action for damages against a railroad company for killing a mail agent, it was held that the court correctly submitted to the jury the question, whether such agent believed it to be necessary to put his head out of the car door when approaching a station, and was led thus to believe by the conduct of employees of the railroad company. A mail agent brought an action against a railroad company to recover damages for illness alleged to have been caused by the insufficient heating of the mail car in which he was travelling. Held, that if the plaintiff contributed to the injury by the want of proper care and attention, such as a prudent man ought to take for his safety under such circumstances, he was not entitled to recover. Turrentine v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 92 N. Car. 638; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 460. Limiting Liability.- A mail agent was killed by an accident on defendant's road. Upon the pass issued for its use by defendant was an indorse. ment by which it stipulated for an exemption from liability for damages on account of injuries occurring through its negligence. Held, that, as the authority of the government agents to contract for the transportation of mails is limited by the provisions of the United States statutes, and as no power is given them to contract for exemption to a railroad corporation from liability for such a cause of action, it was not to be assumed that the contract under which defendant carried the mails contained any such provision; that if the contract between the government and defendant contained such a provision it was unauthorized and void; that, assuming the decedent received the pass and was chargeable with knowledge of its contents, it did not constitute a contract between him and defendant; that, as the absolute duty of carrying the agent in charge of the mail is imposed by said statutes upon the railroad corporation accepting the public mail for transportation, the defendant had no right to impose the condition; the agent's acceptance of the pass did not indicate his intention to assent to its provisions, and even if it might be so construed, and if the exemption clause was to be considered as a contract, it was void for want of consideration. Seybolt v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 562; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 162. 1205 Demonstrative legacies, 10 Devises and bequests upon condi- General legacies, 10 Gifts to a class, 60 Lapsed and void legacies, 28 Life tenants, relative rights of, 190 Particular purpose, given for, 62 Payment and delivery of legacies, 150 Personal estate, bequests of general, Portions, satisfaction by legacy, 87 Residuary bequests and devises, 45 Specific legacies, Stocks, 19 10 Vested and contingent legacies, 62 Letter of attorney, 237 Letter of credit, 237 Bills of exchange distinguished from, Guarantor, 240 How construed, 250 Kinds of, 238 Liability of writer, 239 Letter of recommendation, 251 Address, 263 Conspiracies, 264 Contracts made by, 254 Husband and wife, 265 [239 Injunction against publishing or Insane persons, 264 Letters of marque and reprisal, 265 Property in, 251 Property of receiver in, 254 Unanswered letters, 263 Wrongful detention, 258 Letters patent, 266 Lewd and lascivious cohabitation and What constitutes the offence, 278 Lex Fori, 286 Lex Loci, 286 Lex Loci Contractus, 286 Lex Loci Rei Sitæ, 287 Libel (in practice), 504 Libel and slander, 292 |