poration. The corresponding words 'reside,' or 'dwells,' as applied to a corporation, have always been construed as referring to the place where the head office of the corporation is held, where the seal is kept, the board of directors meet, and the principa! business of the corporation is carried on; in fact, the same construction as is given to the words 'carry on their business,' in reference to the place where they do carry on business." Westover v. Turner, 26 U. C. C. P. 510.

1. Live Together.-In a libel for divorce, from the bond of matrimony, for the cause of adultery, filed by a resident of Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1869, it appeared that the parties were married at San Francisco, in 1867, and soon afterwards separated. The libellant returned to Massachusetts, where he continued to reside up to the time of filing_the_libel. The respondent also came to Massachusetts, and resided in different places in that State, making a visit, or visits, to Charlestown; but it appeared that "the parties never cohabited, or had any communication with each other in the commonwealth" (that is, Massachusetts). The court declined to receive proofs of the acts of adultery, and dismissed the libel, AMES, J., saying: "The parties never having lived together as husband and wife' in this commonwealth, and the libellant not having lived here for five consecutive years next preceding the time of filing the libel, this court has no jurisdiction of the cause. Gen. Stat., ch. 107, §§ Their having lived in the State separately is not sufficient." Schrow v. Schrow, 103 Mass. 574.

II, 12.

The

family of a relative of the libellant, her husband intending, if possible, to find employment there, in which case he proposed to reside permanently in that place. Failing to find any work he returned to New Jersey, leaving the libellant in Medford, for the reason that he had no means to pay her travelling expenses and to maintain her. adultery charged against him was shown to have been committed during his stay in Massachusetts. Upon these facts the libel was dismissed, the court, CHAPMAN, C. J., saying: "It is provided by Gen. Stat., ch. 107, § 12, that with certain exceptions, not applicable to this case, no divorce shall be decreed for any cause, if the parties have never 'lived together as husband and wife' in this State. We think the true interpretation of this provision is, that they must have had a domicil here, and not merely lived together as travellers passing through the State, or as visitors for a purpose that is merely temporary, or not with intent to acquire a domicil. The remedy is intended to be for the benefit of our own citizens, and not to enable the court to dissolve marital relations existing between citizens of other States, neither of whom has ever had a domicil here While these parties were in this State, they did not acquire a domicil here; and the intention of the husband to acquire one depended upon a contingency that never happened. Ross v. Ross, 103 Mass. 575.

13 C. of L.-59

means of living.2

suggestion that this language merely refers to the main parcel of one hundred acres on which the buildings are located, and where he therefore resides, even if we restrict the meaning of the word 'lives' and consider it as only equivalent to 'dwells,' or 'resides,' because each of the lots is a part of the farm; and when the occupant is referred to as living, or dwelling or residing on the farm, they are all necessarily included and referred to under that designation. But I apprehend that the word 'lives' was really used by the testator in the more general sense of 'subsisting,' or obtaining a livelihood,' on the farm; and while a more restricted meaning would not be inconsistent with, this extended signification would serve to strengthen, the view or construction already adopted, as John Fox, in fact, occupied and obtained his livelihood from all the lots, as one farm." Kendall v. Miller, 47 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 446.

1. Joint Lives. Where, by a decree in equity, a husband and wife were to receive certain proportions of a fund arising from the sale of land belonging to the wife, during their “joint lives," it was held that that period is, in contemplation of law, reached when the wife has secured a divorce, as completely as if the husband had died, the court, BAKEWELL, J., saying: "At the date of the agreement between Margaret and Nathaniel Highley, and the decree entered in pursuance thereof, they sustained to each other the relation of husband and wife-a relation which must exist during the joint lives of those entering into the marriage contract, unless one of the parties remaining faithful to all the solemn obligations of the marriage state, those obligations are gravely violated by the other. The joint lives of the parties to this compromise must, therefore, have meant, in the mouth of each party to it, the time of their coverture; no more and no less. It could never be susceptible of any other meaning excet by the fault of one party alone; and it cannot be supposed that either party to the compromise intended at the time it was made, by his or her own fault, to make it possible that their married life should

come to an end before death. It cer

tainly does not lie in the mouth of the guilty party or his legal representatives to say, after a divorce obtained for his fault, that the joint lives of the parties to this agreement did not mean, at the time it was made, their lives as husband and wife. The language of the agree ment, and of the decree by which it was sought to give it effect, must be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words as used. This was an arrangement between husband and wife, by which the wife waived her claim to an equity to have the whole of her separate income set apart to herself, and consented that her husband might have a certain fixed proportion of it to himself. It was as her husband, and only as her husband, that he could have any claim whatever to any portion of this income. It was not to be presumed that he would ever forfeit his marital rights; and it was unnecessary, as it would have been indecent, to provide expressly for such a contingency. It was enough that, in the event of a termination of the marital relations by his fault, all his rights of every description, to her property as well person, would be wholly at Highley v. Allen, 3 Mo. App-_521.. 2. In England it has been held, that where an estate is given to a husband for the livelihood of the wife, he is to be considered a trustee for her separate use; the court, HARDWICKE, Ld. Ch., saying: "There question in relation to an given to a husband for the liz-elihood of the wife, whether this ought to be considered as a separate trust for the use of the wife. I am of opinion that, where an estate is given to a husband for the use of the wife, he may be considered as a trustee for her use. Technical words are not necessary to make a separate trust, for the word livelihood is sufficient to show the intention of the giver that it should be to her sole and separate use. v. Darby, 3 Atkyns 399.

is

as

to her

an end."

another

estate

separate

Darby

This ruling was cited and commented on in a Pennsylvania case, in which a testator devised to his daughter the use, issue and profits of certain lands, during her natural life, and subsequently by a codicil "on further consideration," devised the same lands in trust, for the

use, benefit and behoof of my daughter, for and during her natural life, they (the trustees) or the survivor of

them to rent out in the best manner they can... she, my said daughter, to have all the rents, issues and profits arising from the aforesaid plantation, for and during her natural life." The husband of the testator's daughter having claimed the rents and profits in the right of his wife, it was contended on behalf of the trustees that "when the testator, 'on further consideration,' determined to make his codicil, he must have intended some material and substantial alteration in his will. The idea suggested that he meant to create trustees, and put the lands under their management, is far from being satisfactory, unless he had more in contemplation. He must have meant to secure a support and livelihood to his daughter, independent of her husband's control, or his codicil could be of but little avail. No certain terms are necessary to vest a separate use of chattels to a feme covert. (Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atkyns 393.) Technical words are not necessary to make a separate trust for the wife. The words "livelihood of the wife' are sufficient to show the intention of the giver that it should be for her sole use.' The court gave judgment for the husband, MCKEAN, C. J., saying: "We may, with LORD TALBOT (Forrest 242), 'privately think' that the devise to Mrs. Torbert was for her separate use; but 'we are not at liberty, by private opinion, to make a construction against the plain words of a will.' No technical or other expressions whatever, such as 'for the livelihood of the wife,' etc., are inserted in the will, from which we can collect, or necessarily infer, that this was meant as an independent provision for the daughter. Judging on the face of the will and codicil, I can discover no clear intent disclosed by the testator, that the rents and profits of the plantation should not be subject to the control or intermeddling of the husband of Beulah; and unless such intent appear, the law gives him the whole, in right of his wife." Torbert v. Twining, I Yeates (Pa.) 432.

shall be lawful for any person, etc., whether residing within the city of London or elsewhere, who shall have any debt due to them, not exceeding £5, from any person or persons whatsoever, residing or inhabiting within the city of London, etc., or keeping any house, warehouse, shop, etc., or seeking a livelihood, or trading or dealing as aforesaid, to cause such debtor, etc., to be warned or summoned by personal service

within the jurisdiction of

the court of requests, to appear before the commissioners at Guildhall, etc." The act further provided that if said debt was recovered in any other court, the plaintiff should not be entitled to costs. Under this act, where the defendant was an underwriter at Lloyd's coffeehouse, while his dwelling was out of the city of London, but he had a seat at Lloyd's, and there followed the business of an underwriter, by underwriting policies of insurance in the usual way, the court held that the defendant did not come under the description of a person trading, dealing and seeking a livelihood within the city of London, according to the meaning and terms of the act, LORD ELLENBOROUGH saying: "That he thought that, by possibility, a person carrying on business as the defendant did, as an underwriter, might be subject to the jurisdiction of the court of conscience, if he followed it as his trade, or mode of gaining a livelihood; but that must depend upon the quantity of business which he did, and the mode in which he followed it. He should therefore expect evidence to be given to that effect. A person occa. sionally underwriting a policy could be said to be thereby trading or seeking a livelihood." It appearing, however, that the defendant had paid part of the amount due into court, and so acknowledged the jurisdiction, the objection that suit should have been brought in the court of requests was not sustained. Miller. Williams, 5 Espin

asse 19.

Upon the same statute, it was moved to restrain the plaintiff's costs, who upon the trial of the cause at Westminster, had recovered £4 5s. only, because the defendant was a freeman of London, and although he slept at a lodging in Finsbury, in Middlesex, he was liable to be sued in the London court of requests, inasmuch as he "sought his livelihood" in London within the meaning of the act, being an auctioneer's porter, and

Seeking a Livelihood.-The several statutes giving jurisdiction to the court of requests in various parts of England, in actions upon debts of £5 and under, have led to frequent construction of this phrase. Thus the statute of 39 and 40 Geo. III, ch. 104, provided: "That it

plying at two public houses in the city, where he was always to be found, as the plaintiff well knew; for he had himself addressed letters to the defendant there. But the court observed that the words "seeking a livelihood" certainly were of very general import; yet must they be restrained to the seeking it by some means, which are local, and which show where the defendant is to be found, so that he may be served with a summons. He may change his public house every day, and the plaintiff's knowledge of his resort is merely a

casual circumstance. So the rule was refused. Skinner v. Davis, 2 Taunton 196. See also Gray v. Cook, 8 East 336; Holden v. Newman, 13 East 161.

In another case it appeared from the defendant's affidavit, that at the time the debt was contracted he was employed as clerk to and boarded with a Mr. Hughes, who had apartments in the plaintiff's house within the city. That at the commencement of the action the plaintiff resided, as he still does, within the city, and the defendant was and still is employed as a clerk by certain solicitors, with whom he resides, within the city, by which he obtains his livelihood. By the plaintiff's affidavit it appeared that the debt was contracted for clothes, which were delivered in the city, but that before, and at the time, and for six months afterwards, the defendant lodged with his wife in the county of Middlesex,

first at Blackhill and then at Penton

ville, where they now reside, and where

the wife carries on the business of a mantua maker, and that they have no property within the city of London. Upon these facts the court sustained the judgment for the plaintiff, LE BLANC, J., saying: "The question is brought before the court for the first time for the construction of the words 'seeking his livelihood,' in the act; the court, therefore, should put such a construction as will fall in with the views of the legislature, and yet avoid the inconvenience which would ensue from too extended an interpretation of these general words. The question is whether this man was residing or seeking his livelihood at the time, within the city of London. It is not pretended that the place of domicil was not else

where; and as to seeking his liveli

hood, that must mean seeking the whole

of his livelihood within the city; it is the only sensible construction which can be put upon those words in the act.

For

How else can we interpret what is a seeking of his livelihood there? otherwise, if a person went his round only occasionally in the city to seek for employment, though his general resi dence were elsewhere, he must always be sued in London; as may happen to be the case of porters, newspaper car riers and the like; which never could have been within the contemplation of the legislature. Now this person may fairly be said to seek his livelihood where he resides with his wife in Middlesex; for the trade carried on by her agency is his trade; he able for the debts contracted and entitled to the profits; but were to put the construction act now contended for every tradesman who supplied her with goods in Middlesex would be obliged to sue her husband in London." Stevens v. Derry, 16 East 147.

is liin it,

if we on the

But where a person rented a counting house in the city of London jointly with another person and received or ders there for his business, it was held that he was within the jurisdiction of the court of requests for the city of London, although he sleep and reside in Southwark, the court, GIBBS, C.J., saying: "It has been enacted 14 Geo. II, ch. 10) that a person renting a shop or stall shall be within the jurisdiction, and I cannot distinguish between the case of a man renting by himself and with another person. In the present case the defendant's interest always re

Croft

mains; it is, therefore, distinguishable from the case of Gray v. Cook" v. Pitman, 1 Marshall 269. In this latter case the court of King's Bench held that a market gardener, who Fleet rented in a stand and shed Market, which he occupied three times week only, was not within the meaning of the act. Gray 8 East 336.

a

2.

Cook,

a coal

On the other hand, where merchant resided at Lambeth, in Surrey, and carried on his business there, but kept a counting house in the city of London for the purpose of receiving orders, he was held not entitled to the privilege of being sued only London court of requests as seeking his livelihood in the court, ABBOTT, C. J., saying =

a

in the person city, the **I am of

opinion, on the authority of Stephens must be discharged. That case decides v. Derry (16 East 147), that this rule that where the party claims the privi lege of being sued in the London court