influence must "be made to appear to said circuit court," the affidavit for removal must set forth facts and circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court of the existence of the prejudice and local influence; and an affidavit stating merely affiant's belief or opinion that prejudice or local influence exists is not sufficient. Amy v. Manning, 38 Fed. Rep. 868. An application for removal from a State court on the ground of local influence and prejudice must be made, and the question of fact tried, in the federal court. Kaitel v. Wylie, 38 Fed. Rep. 865. A petition for the removal of a cause under the local prejudice clause, which alleges that petitioner cannot obtain justice in the trial court, nor any other in the State to which the case could be removed, is insufficient in not alleging prejudice against the party seeking removal, or influence exerted by the adverse party, and the affidavit accompanying it should state the facts supporting such averments. Goldworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769. Complainants, some of whom were citizens of Pennsylvania, and the remainder aliens, on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of the E. Co., filed a bill in a Tennessee court against the E. Co., a corporation of Tennessee, the R. & D. Co., and the R. & W. Co., both corporations of Virginia, and the directors of the three corporations, citizens of New York, Virginia and Tennessee, for an injunction. The injunction was granted, and, after service thereof, S, a citizen of Tennessee, without the knowledge or consent of complainant's solicitors, obtained an order making him a co-complainant. The R. & D. Co., having filed its answer, removed the suit to the circuit court on the ground that it was a suit pending between I, a citizen of Tennessee, and petitioner, a citizen of Virginia; that the amount of $2,000 was involved; and that by reason of local influence or prejudice petitioner could not obtain justice in the State court. Held, that the cause was improperly removed. Under the act of 1867, as re-enacted in Rev. Stat., § 639, subd. 3, removal on the ground of prejudice or local influence can only be had when all the parties on one side are citizens of different States from those on the other. Thouron v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 673. As there was no right of removal on the part of defendants or either of them while the original complainants were the only parties plaintiff, the joinder of S. as co-complainant in a representative suit so brought, in no way changed the character, object, or purpose of the suit, and did not confer on the R. & D. Co. the right to remove the suit. Thouron v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co, 38 Fed. Rep. 673. The right to a removal of a cause under the local prejudice clause of the act of August 13th, 1888, § 2, is not dependent on the amount involved, there being no provision in relation thereto in such clause. McDermott v. Chicago & N. W. Ry Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 529. Under the act of March 3rd, 1887, providing for a removal when it shall be made to appear to the circuit court that from prejudice or local influence defendant will not be able to obtain justice in the State court, the question whether there is prejudice, etc., is open to enquiry, and may be determined from the evidence produced by both parties on motion to remand. Dennison v. Brown, 38 Fed. Rep. 535. An affidavit that defendant has no acquaintance in the county in which the trial in the State court will be had; that plaintiff is well known there as a lawyer and politician, having lived and practiced law at the county seat many years, and having been a candidate for the office of attorney general of the State-does not make a case for re moval. Dennison v. Brown, 38 Fed. Rep. 535. Under act of congress, March 3rd, 1887, providing for the removal of controversies between citizens of different States on the application of a defendant and when it shall be "made to appear" that a fair trial cannot be had in the State court wherein the action is pending, or in any other to which it may be removed under the State law, it is not sufficient that defendant swears positively that such prejudice, etc., exists so as to render a fair trial in any State court impossible, without showing the facts on which the averment is based, as the act mentioned is a substitute for the act of 1867, which only required the belief of the applicant in such preju dice to be shown. Amy v. Manning, 38 Fed. Rep. 536. Act of congress March 3rd, 1887, providing that where there is a controversy in a State court between a citizen of the State wherein the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any de LOCALITY.-See note I. LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS.-See IMPROVEMENTS, vol. 10, p. 270; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. fendant, a citizen of such other State, may remove the same to the United States circuit court for prejudice or local influence in such State court, or in any other State court to which it may be removed under the laws of said State, -repeals, by implication, act 1867 (Rev. Stat. U. S., § 639), which provides for such removal at the instance of either party. Following Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 275,6 Supr. Ct. 730. Local Disease.-A tubercular affection of the lungs, or tubercles upon the lungs, or tubercles on the brain, or consumption, either of them constitute a local disease, as a matter of law, within the meaning of the word "local" when used by a life insurance company to an applicant for insurance, by asking if he has a local disease. Scoles v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 42 Cal. 523. Local Freight.-See FREIGHT, vol. 8, p. 900. The clause "not exceed ing fifty per cent. more than the rate charge for the same transportation of freight over the whole line of its road," found in the act of 1873, does not mean the pro rata allowance which may fall to this road under the distribution of the products of transportation of through freight proper; those freights which in their transit pass over more than one railroad, and merely traverse this road, as a stage in a more extended shipment. We know that much of the freight falling within this description travels the entire length or greater part of its journey without change of cars, and in this way much labor and expense are avoided in the matter of loading and unloading cars. We know, too, that it is the policy of railroad corporations to so connect their lines as to effect a long, continuous, connected line of transportation; and that under such arrangement, the saving of labor, and increase of business resulting from such connection, enable each road to accept, as its share of the sum realized from this branch of its business, a sum which would fall much below fair remuneration for receiving, loading, transporting, unloading and delivering the same quantity and description of freight, whose departure and destination were each within the limit of one road. Hence we hold that the words "over the whole line of the road" mean, and only mean, freight which is taken on at one terminus and discharged at the other. Thus construed, they furnish an equitable standard by which to graduate the charge for transporting local freight; for it, like the other, involves the labor of receiving, loading, transporting, discharging and delivering. It results that all the testimony of rates on what may be called through freight, that is, freight brought from or carried to a point beyond the termini of appellant's road, was improperly received. Mobile & Montgomery R. R. v. Steiner et al., 61 Ala. 597. 1. Where a statute provided "that no common carrier, subject to the provisions of the act, shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback or other devise, charge, demand, collect or receive from any person or persons a greater compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property than it charges, demands, collects or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions; and the third section declared it to be unlawful for any such common carrier to give any preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or (on) any particular description of traffic in any respect whatever, or subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or “locality," or any particular description of traffic to any prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatever, and also declared that a railway connecting with other lines should not discriminate in their rates and charges between connecting lines: Here it was said: "The court has no authority to limit the board in any respect in that regard. Such board is to determine, in the first instance at least, what are reasonable and just charges, what unreasonable and unjust, and when any person, firm, corporation or locality is unjustly discriminated against. There can be no restriction of the word 'locality.' It may refer to a village, city, county, or portion of the LOCAL OPTION-(See INTOXICATING LIQUORS, vol. 11, p. 614). 1. Definition. The use of the words "local option law" is generally restricted to its popular application to local option liquor laws, but it seems that a local option law may be more correctly defined as any legislative act applicable to the State generally, or to some political division thereof which leaves the question of its adoption or practical enforcement to be decided by a vote of the electors of the State or political division to which it applies. 2. Constitutionality.--The question of the constitutionality of local option laws is one on which there is great difference of opinion. Objection to the validity of such laws is made on the ground that they are a delegation of legislative power, that they are special laws, and, in the case of municipal aid bonds, that they violate constitutional provisions relating to taxation. 1. Delegation of Legislative Power. The objection that local option laws are invalid because they delegate legislative power rests upon the claim that such statutes actually become laws only upon a popular vote in their favor; that what the legislature does is to submit a plan or project to the people who in fact give it force or declare that it shall not become law.1 State, the meaning in each case to be determined by the territory which the board shall find to be unjustly discriminated against. State v. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. (Neb.), 35 N. W. Rep. 125. 1. A leading case on this branch of the subject is Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483. RUGGLES, C. J., said: "The act of 1849 does not, on its face, purport to be a law, as it came from the hands of the legislature, for any other purpose than to submit to the people the question whether its provisions in relation to free schools should or should not be come a law' (section 10); and by section 14 the act was to become law only in case it should have a majority of the votes of the people in its favor. With out contradicting the express terms of the tenth and fourteenth sections, it cannot be said that the propositions contained in it in relation to free schools were enacted as law by the legislature. They were not law, or to become law, until they had received a majority of the votes of the people at the general election in their favor, nor that unless they received such majority. It On the other hand, it has been held that such enactments by the legislature are not a delegation of its legislative power, but that it is simply the delegation of a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law making body makes or intends to make its own action depend.1 delegate or commit to any other man or men to be exercised. They have no more authority to refer such a question to the whole people than to an individual. The people are sovereign, but their sovereignty must be exercised in the mode which they have pointed out in the constitution." See also Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 425; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479; Maize v. State, Ind. 342; State v. Wier, 33 Iowa 134; s. C., II Am. Rep. 115; State V. Beneke, 9 Iowa 203; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165; s. c., 63 Am. Dec. 487; State v. Geebrick, 5 Iowa 491; Weir v. Cram, 37 Iowa 649; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; s. c., 18 Am. Rep. 119; State v. Dist. Ct. of Hennepin Co., 33 Minn. 235; Lammert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo. 188; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 411; Bradley v. Baxter, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 122; People v. Stout, Barb. (N. Y.) 349; Thorne υ. Cramer, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 112; Parker v. Com., & Pa. St. 507. [This case is overruled in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, but it has been extensively cited and relied upon in other States, and is for that reason cited here.] State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33. 23 1. Cooley on Const. Lim. (5th ed.), p. 146. "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend, which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of enquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation. Hence the necessity of the municipal divisions of the State into counties, townships, cities, wards, boroughs, and districts, to which is committed the power of determining many matters necessary, or merely useful to the local welfare. Can anyone distinguish between committing the determining power to the authorities of the district and to the people of the district? If the power to determine the expediency or necessity of granting licences to sell liquors in a municipal division can be committed to a commission, a council, or a court, which no one can dispute, why cannot the people themselves be authorized to determine the same thing? If a determining power cannot be delegated, then there can be no power delegated to city councils, commissioners, and the like, to pass ordinances, by-laws and resolutions in the nature of laws, binding and affecting both the persons and property of the citizens. If a determining power cannot be conferred by law, there can be no law that is not absolute, unconditional and peremptory; and nothing which is unknown, uncertain and contingent can be the subject of law." Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491. See also Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; s. c., 37 Am. Řep. 6; Úpham v. Supervisors of Sutter Co., 8 Cal. 379; People v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. 1; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587; s. c., 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 40; Meshmeier v. State, II Ind. 482; Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 526; Slack v. Maysville etc. R. Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1; Com. v. Weller, 14 Bush (Ky.) 218; Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; City etc. St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 411; Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; State v. Weatherby, 45 Mo. 17; Paterson v. Society etc., 4 Zab. (N. J.) 385; State v. Gloucester Co., 50 N. J. L. 585; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 161; State v. Board of Chosen Freeholders etc. (N. J.), 18 Atl. Rep. 117; State V'. Hoagland (N. J.), 16 Atl. Rep. 166; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Gould v. Town of Sterling, 23 N. Y. 439; Starin v. Town of Geneva, 23 N. Y. 439; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Savage's Case, 84 Va. 619; Weil v. Calhoun (U. S.), 25 Fed. Rep. 865. Location of County Buildings.-An act of assembly, directing the county a. Law Complete when Enacted-Depending Only on a Contingency. Many local option laws have been sustained on the ground that as they came from the legislature they were complete statutes whose operation and effect depended upon a condition, a vote of the people. Such a condition the courts hold is not distinguishable in principle from many other contingencies whose propriety have never been questioned.1 commissioners to determine the exact site for, and to erect the public buildings in, the new county town, if a majority of the voters of the county shall vote in favor of the change, was held constitutional, and in the opinion, COULTER, J., said: "A strong illustration of the faculty of the legislative power in this respect may be found in the act of congress of the 9th of July, 1846, submitting the question of the retrocession of the county of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, to the State of Virginia, to a vote of the qualified electors of that county. Virginia had previously enacted a law signifying her willingness to take back the county, whenever the same should be receded by the congress of the United States. Congress enacted the law of the 9th of July, 1846, submitting the question to the qualified electors and providing the machinery for the elec tion, and enacting that, if a majority of the electors shall be against accepting the provisions of the act, it shall be void and of no effect; but if a majority of votes shall be in favor of accepting, then it shall be in full force. And in that event, it shall be the duty of the President to inform the Governor of Virginia of the result of the election, and that the law is consequently in force. Many of the most profound constitutional lawyers in the Union were in congress at that time, and the State of Virginia never hesitated to accept the retrocession, because the congress of the United States delegated to the people the decision of the question. Com. v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214. "The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.” Cincinnati etc. R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St. 77. 1. Issue of County Bonds.-"It is in geniously urged that this language '. Bel |