perous than before his temptation. Koheleth states the difficulty very broadly :

For I laid all this to heart, even to investigate all this, that the righteous and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God, yet men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them. All is alike to all: there is one lot to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good and to the pure, and to him that is defiled, and to him who sacrificeth, and to whom who sacrificeth not as is the good man, so is the sinner; he who sweareth, as he who feareth an oath (ix. 1, 2).

The difficulty could not easily be removed by the suggestion that the rule was uniformly observed in the very early times of the theocracy, though subsequently it had not been regarded, for it was reiterated by the prophets, and declared about as emphatically as ever, even after the captivity (see Haggai i. 6-11; ii. 16—19). Malachi stated it apparently with some reserve, looking forward to a day of retribution, possibly beyond the range of earthly life (Mal. iii. 16-18).* Koheleth, in viii. 12, 13, gives substantially the old explanation, that, notwithstanding present appearances, “it will be well with those who fear God," but that "it will not be well with the wicked man," who will not prolong his earthly life to the extreme limit. But this explanation does not seem to be given in Ecclesiastes as having greater authority than the dicta of Stoics and Epicureans. Indeed, in relation to this subject we are advancing on ground occupied, also, more or less by the Greek philosophers. The injunction. "Fear God and keep His commandments," will thus stand opposed to all speculations about the moral government of God, the course of Providence, and the distribution of earthly good and evil. The utterances of the Law and Prophets on the subject were probably to be regarded as hidden mysteries, which should not interfere with practical obedience. But it would appear from xii. 14 that a future

* Comp. Kuenen, Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, p. 355, seq.

judgment was to be looked for, when everything hidden as to the work of God in the world is to be reviewed, in order to its justification, though the manner in which this final adjustment and rectification is to be made is not stated.

In bringing to a conclusion the discussion of our third question, it may be affirmed that there appears no valid reason whatever for cutting off the Epilogue, or attributing it to a later hand. On this matter Dr. Ginsburg has said, "As to the assertion that verses 9-14 are not genuine, and have been added by a later hand (Döderlein, Schmidt, Berthold, Umbreit, Knobel, &c.), it is most arbitrary, and to be repudiated. Nothing can be more weak than the arguments brought to support this allegation.'

To Dr. Plumptre's exegetical notes we may possibly have an opportunity of referring hereafter in connection with M. Renan's work on Ecclesiastes, which is understood to have been now some time in the hands of the printer.

THOMAS TYLER.

The anticipatory publication of M. Renan's Introduction in the Revue des Deux Mondes enables us to append his answers to the three questions discussed above. (1) He is inclined to place the origin of the Book at about a hundred years before Christ. (2) The name Koheleth, which he regards as an unsolved enigma, he represents by the four letters QHLT. These letters, he suggests, may be the initials of four words now unknown. This suggestion scarcely needs refutation, since M. Renan admits that the letters in question form in the text of Ecclesiastes a veritable name, and that the ordinary pronunciation, as represented by the vowel-points, is probably that intended by the author himself. (3) With regard to the Epilogue M. Renan acts in a very arbitrary manner, cutting it in two between xii. 10 and 11, and allowing only the ninth and tenth verses to be genuine.

M. Renan traces the genesis of Ecclesiastes to a supposed fundamental Semitic Monotheism, which required that the Deity should reward the good and punish the bad. But this theory came directly into collision

Ginsburg's Coheleth, p. 470.

with the hard facts of Nature and human society. Nature is but injustice (La nature est l'injustice même); and Society is very little better than a reflection of Nature. Faith in a compensating immortality had not yet emerged in Israel. This faith it was to be the function of Christianity to evolve. Ecclesiastes marks a pause in the struggle and evolution. Its author knows nothing of Messianic hopes, nothing really of a life beyond the grave. Though not an atheist, he may be regarded as a fatalist, a materialist, and, above all, a pessimist far superior to Schopenhauer. He is resigned to fate, and teaches a moderate Epicureanism; but it is by no means certain that this Epicureanism had any connection, either] direct or indirect, with Greece. A complete explanation of everything in the book may be derived from the logical development of the Jewish thought with regard to the Deity and retribution, though the attempt has often been made to prove that the philosophy of Ecclesiastes bears a trace of the philosophy of Greece (On a souvent cherché à prouver, &c.)—a remark, by the way, fitted to convey a very false impression.

M. Renan's theory, however "logically developed," is, in several respects, a good deal out of harmony with facts. Will M. Renan reply, D'autant pis pour les faits?

T. T.

MATERIALISM.*

ATERIALISM is a system of thought which regards

MAT

the universe, including man and the mind of man, as solely consisting of or produced by matter, or what is called "material force." The importance of such a doctrine cannot be over-estimated, since it apparently implies disbelief in the existence of God and in the moral freedom of man. God disappears in this system of thought as a needless hypothesis, whilst man is reduced to a mere effect of the powers of Nature. Such, at least, appear to me the logical results of the doctrine.

Yet it is certain that Materialism has been the philosophic creed of men, both in ancient and in modern times, whose aspirations were lofty, and whose lives were temperate, laborious, and serepe; and to some of its professors it has seemed to be consistent, not only with a high morality, but even, strange to say, with strong religious feeling. A lively sense of the inadequacy of Materialism as a theory of the universe, and of its present mischievous tendencies, need not interfere with our appreciation of it as a necessary and often useful element in the historical development of philosophical opinion, and of science and the practical arts.

The great achievements of our time in the field of physical research, and more especially the brilliant induction connected with the name of Darwin, have, without doubt, largely contributed to the revival in the latter half of this

A Lecture delivered before the Union Debating Society, Wellington, New Zealand.

century of materialistic habits of thought. What is called scientific explanation has penetrated to groups of phenomena hitherto enveloped in a mysterious darkness, more particularly in the department now called "Biology," which concerns itself with the development, structure, and functions of living organisms. Darwin's data are few, seemingly simple, and, for the most part, well established on the solid basis of experience; so that one is apt to forget that he postulates any force of which the origin is unknown. We learn how the eye has been developed from mere spots of pigment, and the honey-bee educated by circumstance to attain the perfect symmetry of her hexagonal cells; how monkeys have obtained prehensile tails, and giraffes have been provided, in the same organ, with special fly-flappers; why the orchid Coryanthes entraps the humble-bee, visiting its gigantic flowers, to a plunge-bath in its great water bucket; why the argus pheasant and peacock spread such glorious fans whilst their hens are soberly attired; why the glow-worm carries a light in her tail; how the torpedo came by his galvanic battery; with an endless list of like "whys" and "hows" we read and are delighted-almost spellbound; not only by the variety of Nature, but by the force and ingenuity of the human mind; and are prone to believe that the plummet of science has really touched bottom, and that the origin of all things in mere physical adjustments is at last on the point of demonstration.

Persons unused to philosophical inquiry may not be aware that the question of original causation is not even approached by the physical researches to which I have alluded. To many such it seems simple to say-" We take our stand upon experience; we believe what we know; we know what we can see, hear, touch, taste, smell. To us the world seems to go of itself. If any one will explain the origin of things without going beyond the limits of what we perceive through the senses, to him we will listen as proposing a