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my grounds where the seed I might pluck could be sown. The end of my life, I said, should be a happy village, through which I would travel home, when I had gleaned enough afield.

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Happy St. Francis of Sales!' was my constant exclamation to the hills and valleys, to the forests and the streams, as I trudged. 'Shall I make my village full of joy before my bones fail me: and will it grow to be a kingdom ?'"

"The name of your village, Venerable Brother?" the Lady of Charity asked.

"Its ancient name is well forgot. I called it the village of Clotilda. Felix and myself loved the name."

(To be continued.)

OUR IRON-CLAD SHIPS.

OR more than ten years we have been hard at work on the reconstruction of our navy, and during that time have spent at least ten millions sterling on iron-clad ships, besides enormous sums on experiments made at Shoeburyness and elsewhere. We have had discussions, loud and long, on the principles of iron-clad construction, on the comparative merits of broadside ships and turret ships, of long ships and short ships, of wood hulls and iron hulls, of single screws and twin screws, and Heaven knows what beside. In the meantime the work of building iron-clads has been steadily progressing, and as successive ships have been laid down they have been fitted with stronger armour as well as supplied with more powerful guns, so that results scarcely dreamt of ten years ago are now regarded as only natural. We have now reached a position, in fact, when the novelty of ironclads has worn away, and it is possible to take stock, as it were, of our armoured fleet, as well as to estimate its standing relatively to the fleets of France and America. This we propose to do briefly, availing ourselves of the valuable work recently published by Mr. Reeda for the principal facts connected with our iron-clads, and of the best accessible sources for the corresponding facts respecting foreign ships.

The Emperor of the French, by suggesting the adoption of armour plated floating batteries for service during the Crimean War, laid the foundation for the construction of iron-clad ships, the first of which, La Gloire, was also built under his auspices, having been commenced in 1858. Our first iron-clad frigate, the Warrior, was not commenced until a year later, by which time La Gloire was well advanced, and three other iron-clads were on the stocks in the French dockyards. The French, by this prompt action, got the lead of us-thanks to the hesitation of the Admiralty-and this lead they continued to increase rapidly, spurred on by the hope that the change in war-ships would be fatal to the naval supremacy of "perfidious Albion." At first it seemed likely, indeed, that their hope would be fulfilled; for

• "Our Iron-clad Ships," by E. J. Reed, C.B. London: John Murray; 1869.

after taking the first step our naval authorities lingered for months before taking the second, and ordering more iron-clads to be commenced. The position was doubtless a difficult one, but it must always remain a matter of serious regret that in the early period of the iron-clad reconstruction such delays should have occurred; especially as there was obviously only one course to follow-to build ships that should surpass the French vessels then being constructed. The construction of an armoured ship is necessarily a work requiring considerable time, even when all haste is made; and had war broken out between this country and France in 1861 or 1862 we should probably have found it impossible, even with the help of private shipbuilders, to produce iron-clads in the numbers required in order to compete with the French vessels then existing.

A few facts may render this clearer. At the end of 1859 we had altogether four iron-clads in process of construction; the French had ten. In 1861 the Admiralty made a vigorous effort to overtake the French, and commenced no less than eleven new iron-clads; but the French were not to be beaten, and they laid down ten. Throughout the period 1862-64 we gained upon the French, and at the end had twenty-eight vessels built and building against twenty-nine French ships, but of the latter a considerably greater proportion were ready for service. Our neighbours, however, did not seem to have been pleased with our gain in numbers, and in 1865 they added eleven new ships to their fleet while we only laid down four vessels. At the end of 1869 we find our number somewhat closer to theirs than it was in 1865, for they have fifty-one iron-clads against forty-seven of ours-reckoning on both sides only those vessels which are capable of serving, at least, in the Channel. Although still behind the French in numbers, we stand before them in other respects; and should war now break out we need not fear the fate which might have overtaken our naval power seven or eight years ago, since in armour, armament, and speed, our recent iron-clads are unrivalled. According to the policy laid down in Mr. Childers' recent speech on the navy estimates, our iron-clad fleet is to be gradually increased to between fifty and sixty in number, and to be maintained at that force.

It was not until the close of the year 1861 that the Americans

This excludes eleven weakly armoured batteries built for river services, and four other batteries built during the Crimean War, from the French iron-clads; while on our side we have not reckoned five floating batteries built at the same time, and three monitors intended for the defence of Melbourne and Bombay.

began to build iron-clads. Pressed on by the exigencies of the Civil War they laid down three vessels at first. One of these, the New Ironsides, was a broadside frigate which did good service at Charleston, but has since been burnt. A second, the Galena, was a smaller broadside vessel; she proved a failure, and her armour has been removed. The third was the now famous Monitor, which has given her name to a type of iron-clads, eminently adapted for coast services such as had to be performed during the war. On this account the greater number of the American ships were built on the plan, and from the circumstances under which they were constructed, we should naturally expect the rate of production to have been greater than it was for the French and English iron-clads. This was actually the case, and without tracing the various steps of progress we may state that at the end of last year the American ships numbered fifty-two, against fifty-one for the French and forty-seven for ourselves. If numbers constituted the standard of power, therefore, we should occupy the lowest position; fortunately they do not, and we may fairly claim the highest place.

In order to justify this opinion we must look more closely into the qualities of these three iron-clad fleets. The first thing that must strike every observer is the similarity in many respects existing between our ships and their French rivals, and the great contrast between the European and the American ships. In reconstructing our navy we have naturally been guided by the consideration that English war-ships must be capable of protecting English commerce, and of proceeding to all parts of the world. Hence the greater number of our iron-clads are equipped with masts and sails, and are capable of proceeding under sail alone on the most distant voyages. In proof of their sea-going and cruising capabilities it may be stated that, at present, we have iron-clads on the Pacific, Atlantic, and China stations, some of which have been on these stations for years ; and if further proof were needed, reference might be made to the performances under sail of our Mediterranean and Channel Squadrons. The French have adopted a similar course with most of their ironclads, but as a rule they rig their ships more lightly than ours, thus reducing the sailing capability. One of their vessels, the Belliqueuse, has been round the world, and others have performed long voyages, so that there can be no doubt of their sea-going capabilities. The Americans have no ships to compare with these; for, in spite of all that has been said about the sea-going powers of the monitors, it is now generally admitted that they are by no means fitted for ocean voyages. In September last a notice of the merits and

demerits of this class of war-ships appeared in our pages, and it is not necessary again to go over the ground then trodden. Suffice it to say that since then, the opinions expressed respecting the lack of sea-going qualities in American monitors have been explicitly confirmed by the Report of the Secretary of the United States Navy for the year 1869. As the subject has, at various times, attracted much attention, we may be pardoned for quoting one or two passages.

....

Speaking of monitors, the Secretary says:-"They are steam batteries, not sea-going cruisers. Some of them have illustrated, by successful experiments, their capacity for a sea-voyage under favourable circumstances. . . . but they could not be used as cruisers on foreign stations. They require several vessels to accompany them; and, being entirely without sailing power, must be towed as soon as their coal is exhausted. They would always be dangerous to health in tropical seas, and with broken or disordered machinery would be helpless in mid-ocean. They are valuable for auxiliary defence of our own shores, but should not be relied upon beyond them." In another place he alludes to the fact that all their present sea-going ships are unarmoured; and expresses the opinion that, “in the event of war, they would be uselessly sacrificed, or obliged to find safety in neutral ports; or, abandoning the sea and leaving our commerce to its fate, to seek on our shores the protection of our monitors and forts." Mr. Robeson thus frankly confesses the want of sea-going iron-clads, and the consequent unprotectedness of the American commercial marine: but he goes further, and advises an entire change of policy-thus furnishing a most potent argument for the superiority of the policy we have followed. "France and England," he says, "rivalling each other in ingenuity, energy, and liberality . . . . have both succeeded in constructing some beautiful specimens of iron-clad sailing vessels with auxiliary steam-power, effective for every warlike purpose, and able to keep the sea under all circumstances. . . In the meantime we have built no ships of the kind, but we have watched with interest all the naval experiments of Europe; and, familiar with their details and results, we know their strength and their weakness. . . . The time has come, I think, when we should begin to use the knowledge we have been seeking and I, therefore, earnestly urge the propriety of commencing at once the building of sea-going iron-clads, suitable to cruise on foreign stations, and able to protect our commerce and vindicate our principles, in any emergency." It will scarcely be asserted that the Secretary desires to depreciate the monitors in the

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