Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 560, 46 L. ed. 679, 690, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. 183 U. S. 79, 87, 46 L. ed. 92, 100, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154, 155, 41 L. ed. 666, 668, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369, 30 L. ed. 220, 226, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Niagara | F. Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. 816; Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co. 71 Fed. 931; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109, 25 S. W. 75; Re Eight-Hour Law, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 77 Am. St. Rep. 269, 58 Pac. 1071; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 47 L. R. A. 369, 59 Pac. 340; Bessette v. People, 193 I. 334, 56 L. R. A. 558, 62 N. E. 215; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315, 40 N. E. 454; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206, 35 N. E. 62; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 N. E. 631; Gastineau v. Com. 108 Ky. 473, 49 L. R. A. 111, 56 S. W. 705; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 31 Am. St. Rep. 533, 28 N. E. 1126; Templar v. State Board of Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W. 362; tract by which he was to receive a certain sum. That his claim was duly proved, and a resolution adopted by the proper board allowing the amount against the general funds of the city; but the defendant, as auditor, refused to draw a warrant for the amount on the ground that the petitioner had permitted a number of laborers and mechanics to work upon the contract more than eight hours per day, and had thereby incurred penalties to a certain amount, under an act limiting the number of hours of daily service of laborers and mechanics, etc., upon public works of the state or any political subdivision thereof; and a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the defendant's answer to that effect was affirmed. The grounds for sustaining the demurrer were: First, that the answer should have shown that there were penalties stipulated in the contract, in order to authorize anyone to withhold any amount of the contract price; second, that in such case the penalties could only be withheld by the officer or person whose duty it was to pay the money due under the contract; and it was no part of the duty of the auditor to pay such money; neither had he any authority to refuse to draw his warrant.

In State v. Wilson, 65 Kan. 235, 69 Pac. 172, a judgment of the district court quashing an information against the defendant for a violation of the eight-hour law, on the ground that a school district was not a municipality within the meaning of that law, was reversed.

State ex rel. Bramley v. Norton, 5 Ohio N. P. 183; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; State v. Cadigan, 73 Vt. 245, 57 L. R. A. 666, 87 Am. St. Rep. 714, 50 Atl. 1079; Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Wash. 327, 79 Am. St. Rep. 939, 60 Pac. 1120; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 25 Am. St. Rep. 891, 10 S. E. 288; State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 58 L. R. A. 748, 91 Am. St. Rep. 934, 90 N. W. 1098.

Although counties and other municipal corporations are public, as distinguished from strictly private, corporations, and, in political and governmental matters, are the representatives and auxiliaries of the state, nevertheless, in all other matters, they are separate, distinct entities, independent of the state, with property rights which are protected by the Constitution, and of which they cannot be deprived without due process of law and just compensation.

4

Dartmouth College V. Woodward, Wheat. 518, 694, 4 L. ed. 629, 673; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178; People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367, 32 L. R. A. 344, 44 N. E. 146; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515, 33 N. E. 695; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124, 11 Am. Rep. 185; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226; State ex rel. Wheeler v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 15 N.

By the provisions of what is known as the shop hours act of 1892, § 3, "no young person shall be employed in or about a shop for a longer period than seventy-four hours, including mealtimes, in any one week." It was held that the employment of one who was a "young person" within the meaning of the act, whose work was done partly inside the shop and partly away from it in fetching newspapers and delivering them to customers for more than the prescribed number of hours, was a violation of the act; the court saying that it must consider what was the object of the act and the mischief which it was intended to prevent, and that that object was to protect the health of young persons employed in shops, and not to insure sanitary conditions. Collman v. Roberts [1896] 1 Q. B. 457, 65 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 63, 74 L. T. N. S. 198, 44 Week. Rep. 445, 18 Cox C. C. 273, 60 J. P. 184.

By the factory and workshop act of 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. chap. 16), § 17, subsec. 2, “a child, young person, or woman, shall not, during any part of the times allowed for meals in the factory or workshop, be employed in the factory or workshop." In Prior v. Slaithwaite Spinning Co. [1898] 1 Q. B. 881, 67 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 615, 78 L. T. N. S. 532, 46 Week. Rep. 488, 62 J. P. 358, 19 Cox C. C. 54, it appeared that the respondents, in accordance with the requirements of the act, had fixed and specified in a notice affixed to their factory the period of employment and times allowed for meals,

W. 375; Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153: Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590. The discretion of the legislature in respect to the use and disposition of state funds and the funds and property of municipal corporations is not absolute, but is restrained by the Constitution.

Re Mahon, 171 N. Y. 263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 810, 63 N. E. 1107; Chapman v. New York, 168 N. Y. 80, 56 L. R. A. 846, 85 Am. St. Rep. 665, 61 N. E. 108; Re Greene, 166 N. Y. 485, 60 N. E. 183; Bush v. Orange County, 159 N. Y. 212, 45 L. R. A. 556, 70 Am. St. Rep. 538, 53 N. E. 1121.

So far as the act in question operates to bestow extra compensation upon the employees of public contractors, and, without consideration, to increase the amount payable to contractors, it is clearly a giving of the money of the state to and in aid of private undertakings.

Re Mahon, 171 N. Y. 263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 810, 63 N. E. 1107; Fox v. Mohawk & H. River Humane Soc. 165 N. Y. 517, 51 L. R. A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767, 59 N. E. 353; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678.

Messrs. L. Laflin Kellogg and William Vanamee, also for appellant:

If the legislature has no right to prescribe the rate of wages, neither has it, in the absence of some good reason for the public welfare, the right to prescribe the hours of labor. Both are matters for agreement between employer and employee. The

one of the times for meals being from 12:30 to 1 P. M.; that one of the employees who came within the description of "young person" had his dinner in the mill because it was warmer than outside. He had finished his dinner, and, because he had nothing else to do to pass the time away, he got hold of the oilcan and was oiling the spindles. It was no part of his duty to oil the spindles, and no one told him to do so; nor did any of the managers know that he was oiling them. He would not receive any extra pay for oiling them. What he did was contrary to orders, and done of his own accord. The court held that the mere fact that this boy did this to please himself and without orders from anyone did not make it any the less work, and that, therefore, he was working; that the policy of the act in regard to this question of working at mealtimes was that persons who were regarded by the legislature as comparatively defenseless should have their mealtimes reserved intact, and for that purpose the legislation was rigorous. In response to the suggestion that there were cases of hardship in which the moral offense could not be brought home to anybody, and therefore the employer was liable although he really was not responsible for what was done, the court said that the true answer to that was. the absolute and unfettered discretion which was vested in the justices, both of moderating the fine and in dealing with the

same rule as to freedom of contract applies to both.

Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co. 67 Ohio St. 197, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 65 N. E. 885; State ex rel. Bramley v. Norton, 5 Ohio N. P. 183; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 378, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465, 17 N. E. 343; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188, 60 Am. St. Rep. 609, 47 N. E. 302; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1, 42 L. R. A. 490, 68 Am. St. Rep. 736, 51 N. E. 257; People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of City Prison, 157 N. Y. 116, 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. 763, 51 N. E. 1006; People ex rel. Treat v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 144, 59 N. E. 776; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 25 Am. St. Rep. 891, 10 S. E. 288; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; Frorer v. People, Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315, 40 N. E. 454; Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 52 L. R. A. 283, 80 Am. St. Rep. 176, 58 N. E. 1007; Re Preston, 63 Ohio St. 428, 52 L. R. A. 523, 81 Am. St. Rep. 642, 59 N. E. 109; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W.

costs; and that the case must be remitted to the justices to convict.

A statute entitled "An Act to Regulate the Manufacture of Clothing, Wearing Apparel, and Other Articles, etc.," and providing in the body that no female shall be employed in any factory or workshop more than eight hours a day, will embrace only employment in the manufacture of articles of the same kind as those expressly enumerated. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315, 40 N. E. 457.

The act of Massachusetts which provides that no minor under eighteen years of age, and no woman over that age, shall be employed more than ten hours in any one day in any manufacturing establishment, also provides that any person, firm, or corporation employing such persons in such establishment shall post a printed notice in a conspicuous place in every room where such help is employed, which notice shall state the number of hours' work required of such person on each day of the week; and in Com. v. Osborn Mill, 130 Mass. 33, it was decided that a complaint which alleged that a manufacturing corporation employed a woman in its manufacturing company without having posted a printed notice in a conspicuous place in the room where she was employed, to wit, the clothing room, stating the number of hours' work required of such persons on each day of the week, as required by the statute, is insufficient in not alleging that the woman was em

The statute might, and should, therefore, be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state over a business affected with a public interest. People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 Am. St. Rep. 460, 22 N. E. 670.

States. While the field for the exercise of the police power, subject to which all pronerty is possessed by the citizen, and all his callings or vocations must be pursued, is very broad,

so broad that no court has sought to define accurately its extent,-still it is subject to recognized limitations. In the interest of public health, of public

-court:

is taken.

It seems to me to be entirely clear that the statute cannot be upheld as an exercise of the police power vested in the legislature. I should think the proposition too plain for debate. But if this assertion be considered dogmatic, then I say that the question is settled by the decisions both of this court could not be considered on appeal from a judgment of sale for nonpayment of a special assessment.

The freedom of contract guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution is not infringed by the provisions of Kan. Gen. Stat. 1901. §§ 3827-3829, making it a criminal offense for a contractor for a public work to permit or require an employee to perform labor upon that work in excess of eight hours each day. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207. 48 L. ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124.

The exemption of existing written contracts from the operation of a statute limiting the hours of labor of employees of a public-service corporation (a street railway company) is not on its face so arbitrary, partial, or oppressive as to render it unconstitutional. Re Ten-Hour Law, 24 R. I. 603, 61 L. R. A. 612, 54 Atl. 602.

In People v. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 145, 69 N. E. 373, the court of appeals of New York was called upon to decide upon the validity of § 110 of art. 8 of the labor law (Laws 1897, chap. 415), which provides that no employee shall be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery, or confectionary establishment, more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in any one week than will make an average of ten hours per day for the number of days during such week during which such

restrain and forbid what would otherwise be the right of a private citizen. It may enact laws to regulate the extent of the labor which women and children, or persons of immature years shall be allowed to perform, and prohibit altogether their employment in dangerous occupations. Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. 120 Mass. 383; Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 85. It may limit the hours of employment of adults in unhealthy work (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383) and it may be that it could prohibit the performance of excessive physical labor in all callings. But, as said in Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636, and People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465, 17 N. E. 343, while it is generally for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health and serve the public comfort and safety, such measures must have some relation to these ends. In Re Jacobs, a law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars or preparations of tobacco in tenement houses was held unconstitutional because it bore no relation to the health of

| employee shall work. The court held that the section violated no provision of either the state or the Federal Constitution, but was wholly within the police power of the legislature relating to public health. The chief judge cited the case of People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195, 31 L. R. A. 689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707, 43 N. E. 541, which sustained the constitutionality of what is known as the Sunday barber law, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person to carry on the business or work of a barber on the first day of the week except in the city of New York and the village of Saratoga, where it is permitted until 1 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. Another judge, writing one of the prevailing opinions, stated that in the law under consideration, which restricted the working hours of employees in bakery and confectionary establishments, there might be perceived a statutory regulation, reasonably promotive of the public health because compelling the master of such an establishment to conduct it in a manner the least capable of affecting his product prejudicially. Another of the majority judges, in his claim for the constitutionality of the act, said vital statistics show that those vocations which require persons to remain for long periods of time in a confined and heated atmosphere filled with some foreign substance, which is inhaled into the lungs, are injurious to health, and tend to shorten life; and that bakers and confectioners, who, during working hours, constantly breathe air filled with the