and L. consider they have performed their contract with you so far as it has gone, and are ready to complete the remainder; and, unless the flour is paid for at the expiration of one month; proceedings will be taken for the amount." Held, that the jury were warranted in concluding that the contract mentioned in the vendors' answer was the same as that particularized in the purchaser's letter, and that, therefore, the two writings constituted a sufficient memorandum of the contract under the 17th section of the statute of frauds. And see Fyson v. Kitton, Q. B. 1855, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 374. So in Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. & E. 355, the purchaser of lands by auction signed a memorandum of the contract, indorsed on the particulars and conditions of the sale, and referring to them. Afterwards he wrote to the vendor, complaining of a defect in the title, referring to the contract expressly, and renouncing it. The vendor wrote and signed several letters, mentioning the property sold, the names of the parties, and some of the conditions of sale, insisting on one of them as curing the defect, and demanding the execution of the contract. Held, that these letters might be connected with the particulars and conditions of sale, so as to constitute a memorandum in writing, binding the vendor under the statute of frauds, although neither the original conditions and particulars, nor the memorandum signed by the purchaser, mentioned, or were signed by, the vendor. In Boydell v. Drummond, 2 Camp. 157, 11 East, 142, the paper containing the signature was held not to refer with sufficient certainty to the paper containing the terms of the contract.- Where there is a prior insufficient or unsigned written contract, the plaintiff cannot avail himself of a subsequent letter from the defendant, in which, though the order for goods be recognized, the terms of the contract are renounced and disaffirmed.

(d) Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770; Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2; Hubert v. Moreau, 12 J. B. Moore, 216; Anderson v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399; Hubert v. Turner, 4 Scott, N. R. 486; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399. And a fortiori, a mere alteration of the instrument in the handwriting of the party sought to be charged, will not

Thus, in Cooper v. Smith, 15 East, 103, there was a defective memorandum of a bargain for the sale of goods; but the defendant wrote a letter, in which, though he admitted the order, he insisted that the goods had not been delivered in time; and it was held, that the letter did not sup. ply the defects of the memorandum, and that it was not competent for the plaintiff to prove, by parol testimony, that it was not stipulated that the goods should be delivered within a given time. And this case was recognized in Richards v. Porter, 6 B. & C. 437. There A sent to B, on the 25th of January, an invoice of five pockets of hops, and delivered the hops to a carrier to be conveyed to B. In the invoice, A was described as the seller, and B as the purchaser of the hops. B afterwards wrote to A as follows: "The hops I bought of A on the 23d January are not yet arrived. I received the invoice; the last were longer on the road than they ought to have been; however, if they do not arrive in a few days, I must get some elsewhere." Held, that the invoice and this letter, taken together, did not constitute a note in writing of the contract to satisfy the statute of frauds. To the same effect is Archer v. Baynes, 5 Exch. 625. There the defendant verbally agreed to purchase of the plaintiff certain barrels of flour. The defendant afterwards wrote to the plaintiff, stating that he had received some barrels, which were not so fine as the sample, and were not the barrels he had bought, and that he would not have them. In answer the plaintiff wrote as follows: "Annexed you have invoice of the flour sold you last Friday. I am very much astonished at your finding fault with the flour. It was sold to you subject to your examining the bulk; and it was not until after you had examined it, and satisfied yourself both of the quality and condition, that you confirmed the purchase. What was forwarded you was the same you saw. Under these cir be sufficient. It has been held, that in. dorsements of payments are independent writings, and must be proved to be signed by the party sought to be charged, or by his consent. Turrell v. Morgan, 7 Minn 368; Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770.

cumstances, you cannot, therefore, object to fulfil your agreement." The defendant replied as follows: "I beg to say, the barrels I have received is not the same I saw. I took a sample with me from the sample I have, and the barrels I saw was quite as fine as I compared them with, nor was they lumpy. Now the barrels I have received is all very lumpy, and none of them so fine as the same. If you will take them back and pay charges, I will with pleasure send them. There must be some mistake about them." Held, that the letters did not constitute a sufficient note or memorandam, in writing, of the contract, within the 17th section of the statute of frauds. Alderson, B., said: "No doubt if the letter of the plaintiff of the third of October, and of the defendant in answer, taken together, contained a sufficient contract, namely, one that would express all its terms, they would constitute a memorandum in writing with in the statute. We have no difficulty, therefore, in coming to the conclusion, that these letters may be looked at for the purpose of seeing whether or not they contain a sufficient contract, to take the case out of the statute; but looking at them, we do not think they do. They do not express all the terms of the contract: and the case is in truth gov. erned by Richards v. Porter, which was cited in the course of the argument, and in which Lord Tenderden gave a similar decision as to a document of a similar nature which was then before him. There is a distinct refusal on the part of the defendant to accept the flour which he had bought of the plaintiff. It is clear from the letters that he had bought the flour from the plaintiff upon some contract or other; but whether he bought it on a contract to take the particular barrels of flour which he had seen at the warehouse, or whether he had bought them on a particular sample which had been delivered to him, on the condition that they should agree with that sample, does not appear; and that which is in truth the dispute between the parties is not settled by the contract in writing." See also, Kent v. Huskinson, 3 B. & P. 233; Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561; Blair v. Snodgrass, .1 Sueed, 1. The letter, it seems, must be

sent, and the memorandum completed before the action is brought. Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36. In that case, Martin, arguendo, contended, that a memorandum written after the commencement of the action was sufficient. But Parke, B., said: "With regard to the point which has been made by Mr. Martin, that a memorandum in writing after action brought is sufficient, it is certainly quite a new point, but I am clearly of opinion that it is untenable. There must, in order to sustain the action, be a good contract in existence at the time of action brought; and to make it a good contract under the statute, there must be one of the three requisites therein mentioned." But see Fricker v. Thomlinson, 1 Man. & G. 772

(e) Thus, in Propert v. Parker, 1 Russ. & M. 625, it was held, that if the defend. ant himself write the agreement for the purchase of a leasehold house, and states his own name in the third person, as "Mr. A. B. has agreed;" this is a good contract within the statute of frauds, though he does not otherwise sign the agreement; the Master of the Rolls observing that "what the statute of frauds requires is, that the party who is sought to be charged shall, by writing his own name, have attested that he has entered into the contract. So in Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653, where the defendant wrote in his own book a memorandum of the contract, and requested the other's signature, this was held to be a sufficient acknowledgment of the contract, and his name was considered as signed, though not appearing at the end, but in the body of the memorandum. And Lord Abinger said: "The statute of frauds requires that there should be a note or memorandum of the contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged. And the cases have decided that, although the sig nature be in the beginning or middle of the instrument, it is as binding as if at the foot of it; the question being always open to the jury, whether the party, not having signed it regularly at the foot, meant to be bound by it as it stood, or whether it was left so unsigned because he refused to complete it. But when it is ascertained that he meant to be bound by it as a complete contract, the statute is satisfied, there

but not otherwise. (f)

being a note in writing showing the terms of the contract, and recognized by him. I think in this case the requisitions of the statute are fully complied with." Again, in Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102; s. e. nom. Clason v. Bailey, 14 id. 484, it was held, that a memorandum of a contract for the purchase of goods, written by a broker employed to make the purchase, in his book, in the presence of the vendor, the names of the vendor and vendee and the terms of the purchase being in the body of the memorandum, but not subscribed by the parties, is a sufficient memorandum within the statute of frauds. See also, Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Meriv, 53; Penniman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87; Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp. 190; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238. And it is not necessary that the name should be written after the writing of the agreement. One may write the contract on a piece of paper on which his name has been previously placed. The delivery of the memorandum shows the intention that the name should operate as a signature. And therefore, where the defendant had written, signed, and delivered a "complete memorandum, and afterwards, at the plaintiff's request, made an alteration on the paper, for the purpose of correcting a mistake, and redelivered the paper to the plaintiff, it was held, that a signature to this alteration was unnecessary, because authenticated by the signature already on the paper. Bluck v. Gompertz, 7 Exch. 862. And Pollock, C. B. said: "We think that words introduced into a paper signed by a party, or an alteration in it, may be considered as authenticated, by a signature already on the paper, if it is plain that they were meant to be so authenticated. The act of signing after the introduction of the words is not absolutely necessary."

(f) Thus, in Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219, where an agreement was made for the renewal of a lease by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the defendant wrote instructions to an attorney, from whence the same was to be prepared, in the words following: "The lease renewed, Mrs. Stokes to pay the king's tax, also to pay Moore £24 a year, half yearly;" it was held, that this was not a memorandum signed within the statute. And Skyner, C. B., said: "The question in this case is, whether the written note stated in the

pleadings is such an agreement as is within the meaning of the statute of frauds. These are instructions to the attorney for the preparation of the lease. This is no formal signature of the defendant's name, but one term of the instructions is, that the rent is to be paid to Moore; and the question is, whether the name so inserted and written by the defendant is a sufficient signing. The purport of the statute is manifest, to avoid all parol agreements, and that none should have effect but those signed in the manner therein specified. It is argued, that the name being inserted in any part of the writing is a sufficient signature. The meaning of the statute is, that it should amount to an acknowledgement by the party that it is his agreement, and if the name does not give such authenticity to the instrument, it does not amount to what the statute requires. Here the insertion of the name has not this effect. This memorandum might be drawn subject to additions or alterations, and does not appear to be the final agreement of the parties, and indeed, as far as we can admit parol evidence, it is proved not to be so, for the subject of repairs is not mentioned in the instructions; which shows that the ends of the statute are not to be obtained, if so informal a paper is to be admitted as a written agreement. No case has been adduced in point, but it has been compared to the case of wills, where a name written in the introduction has been considered as a signature, but that seems to me a very different case. cases on wills have been where the instrument, importing to be the final instrument of the party, has been formally attested, and it is in its nature complete, and the only question has been, whether the form of the statute has been complied with. In the present case I think it is by no means so, and it would be of very dangerous tendency to admit the memorandum to be an agreement within the statute." Eyre, B. "I think this cannot be considered such a signature as the statute requires. The signature is to have the effect of giving authenticity to the whole instrument, and if the name is inserted so as to have that effect, I do not think it signifies much in what part of the instrument it is to be found: it is perhaps difficult, except in the case of a letter with a postscript, to find an instance where a nam.

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