letting them; he found his own materials, superintended the building, &c.; the erection in question was of wood with a slate roof and glass windows, called the "workshop," in which the seasoned wood was kept and worked up, and it was also a place of deposit for the tools: the judges of the criminal appeal court seemed to think that the prosecutor carried on the trade of a builder, and the erection in question was properly described as a building used for carrying on the trade of a builder, within this statute, 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 3; but they were clearly of opinion that it was a shed, within the meaning of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 62, s. 1, post, p. 491. v. Amos, 20 Law J. 103, m. R. 3. The situation and ownership of the house as stated in the indictment. This is proved in the same manner as in burglary. See ante, pp. 336, 339. It is immaterial whether it be the house of a third person, or of the prisoner himself, except with reference to the intent with which the offence was committed. Where the house was in some counts described as the dwelling-house of John Fearn, and in others as the dwelling-house of the prisoner, and it appeared that Fearn, although he lived in part of the house, and let the other rooms to the prisoner and other lodgers, had some time before taken the benefit of the insolvent Act, and had assigned the house to the provisional assignee, but that assignee had never taken possession of it: the judges held that as Fearn had possession of the house, (the possession of his tenants being his possession), it was properly described in the indictment as his; and if not, the prisoner's own room, to which the fire was confined, might be described as his house. R. v. Ball, Ry. & M. 30. Where a farmer, named Wright, provided a cottage for one of his labourers named Wallis, in part of his wages, and being dissatisfied with him, discharged him, but allowed him to remain a month longer in the cottage, that he might have time to procure another dwelling; a few days after the month expired, Wright went to take possession, when Wallis's wife set fire to the cottage, with intent to burn it: being indicted for setting fire to a house in the possession of Wallis, with intent to injure Wright, the judges held the description to be correct, for as Wallis had not actually quitted the cottage, it was properly described as being in his possession. R. v. Margaret Wallis, Ry. & M. 344. 4. The intent with which the offence was committed, as laid in the indictment. Where the prisoner is charged with setting fire to the house of a third person, the very fact of his having wilfully done so, is strong presumptive evidence that he did it maliciously, and with intent to injure the owner or occupier. Even where a man set fire to a house, merely for the purpose of obtaining the reward for giving the first infor mation of it at the engine station, and the indictment alleged the intent to be to injure the occupier, this was holden to be correct, for it was the natural effect of the act, R. v, Regan, 14 Shaw's J. P. 467. Upon an indictment for setting fire to a cotton mill, with intent to injure the occupiers, it appeared that the prisoner, who was a workman in the employ of the occupiers, had confessed that he had set fire to it, and being asked "how he came to do it," he said "he did not know, except that the Devil put it into his head;" the witnesses for the prosecution also said that the prisoner was a harmless inoffensive man, that there never had been any quarrel between him and his masters, or the clerks, and that they were not aware of any motive which could induce him to do the act. the judges held that as the prisoner had set fire to the mill wilfully, he must be deemed to have intended that which must necessarily be the consequence of his act, namely, an injury to the occupiers of the mill; and the prisoner had judgment accordingly. R. v. Farrington, R. & Ry. 207. But where a man is charged with setting fire to a house in his own occupation, the intention cannot be inferred merely from the act itself, but must be proved by giving in evidence other circumstances, from which the jury may fairly presume it. Upon an indictment for setting fire to a house, with intent to defraud an insurance company, the policy offered in evidence appeared to have been altered, to make it applicable to another house, to which the goods insured had been removed, and had not been restamped after the alteration: six of the judges held that the policy ought not to be received in evidence, and that, as the insurance could not otherwise be proved, the prisoner ought to be acquitted; five of the judges were of a different opinion. R. v. Gilson, R. § Ry, 138. Setting fire to a House, any Person being therein. Indictment. The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their to wit. oath present, that A. B., on the day of in the year of our Lord, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously did set fire to a certain dwelling-house of C. D., in the parish of - in the county of one E. F. being then in the said dwelling-house: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. [If there be any doubt as to there being any person in the house at the time, add a count according to the last form, ante, p. 485; for, otherwise, if upon the above indictment you failed in proving E. F. to have been in the house, the defendant could not be found guilty of setting fire to the house with intent, &c., there being no intent to injure or defraud laid in the above count. R. v. Paice, 1 Car. & K. 73. R. v. Fletcher, 2 Car. & K. 215. Felony; death. 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 2. Accessories before the fact, the same punishment; accessories after the fact, imprisonment [with or without hard labour, and solitary for not more than one month at a time, or three months in the year, s. 12], for not more than two years. Id. s. 11. Evidence. To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove 1. The setting fire to the house ;-that it was a dwellinghouse, as stated in the indictment;-and the situation and ownership of it:-as in the last case. As to what shall be deemed a dwelling-house, see under the title Burglary," ante, p. 333; and as to the ownership, see also ante, p. 336. 2. That the person mentioned in the indictment, was in the house at the time. Where it appeared that the prisoner set fire to an out-house adjoining to, and under the same roof with the dwelling-house, and at that time the prosecutrix was in the dwelling-house; the fire afterwards communicated to the dwelling-house, but at that time the prosecutrix had left it: Patteson, J., held that the capital part of the charge had not been made out, as the prosecutrix was not in the dwelling-house at the time the fire reached it; and as there was no allegation in the indictment of an intent to injure any one, the prisoner could not be found guilty of setting fire to the house merely. R. v. Ann Fletcher, 2 Car. & K. 215. So, where the indictment stated that the prosecutor and his wife were in the house at the time, but there was no satisfactory evidence of that, Wightman, J., held that the defendant could not on that indictment be convicted of setting fire to the house merely, as there was no allegation in it of an intent to injure or defraud. R. v. Paice, 1 Car. & K. 73. Whether in such a case, upon failure of proving that the person mentioned in the indictment was in the house, the indictment may now be amended by stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1, ante, p. 100, by substituting the name of some other person who can be proved to have been in the house at the time, may be worthy of consideration. Setting fire to Farm Buildings, &c. Indictment. The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their day of and to wit. oath present, that A. B., on the in the year of our Lord -, unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously did set fire to a certain shed ["hovel, shed, or fold, or any farm building, or any building or erection used in farming land,"] in the parish of —, in the county of in the possession of C. D., [or of him the said A. B.,] with intent thereby then to injure the said C. D., [or to defraud a certain insurance office called ]: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. [You may add a count according to the next form, if necessary. Felony; transportation for life or not less than fifteen years; or imprisonment for not more than three years; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 62, s. 1; and if a male under the age of eighteen, he may be publicly or privately whipped, not exceeding thrice, if the court so direct. Id. s. 3. Nothing is mentioned in the Act as to hard labour; but, as by the 4th section, this Act is to be deemed a part of stat. 1 Vict. c. 89, it should seem that the imprisonment may be, as directed by that Act. See ante, p. 485. As to costs, see ante, p. 186; costs of apprehension, Id. p. 189. Evidence. To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove 1. A setting fire to the shed, &c., in question, as ante, p. 486. 2. That the building set fire to, was of the description mentioned in the indictment. We have seen the difficulty which arose in indicting for setting fire to such places, as outhouses, on the stat. 1 Vict. c. 89. See R. v. Ellison and Vines, R. v. England et al., R. v. Haughton, and R. v. Parrot, ante, p. 487. And this Act was made to provide for the omis sion of such buildings in the former Act. Still a farm building, if within the curtilage of a dwelling-house, may in most cases come within the former Act, either as a stable, outhouse, barn, granary, &c.; and in such case, the indictment may be framed on either Act, the punishment by both being the same. The statute, however, is not confined to farm buildings, but the words "hovel, shed, or fold" are applicable to a hovel, shed, or fold used for any other purpose; and a temporary building used as a workshop by the workmen engaged in building some houses, and for keeping the tools and timber, &c., has been holden to be well described as a "shed," and the setting it on fire to be an offence within the above statute. R. v. Amos, 20 Law J. 103 m. Ante, p. 488. 3. The situation and ownership of the shed or building, as mentioned in the indictment. The proof of this is the same as in the last case, ante, p. 488. 4. The intent to injure or defraud, as in the last case, ante, p. 488. Setting fire to Hay, Straw, &c., in a Farm Building, with intent to set fire to the Building. Indictment. The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their to wit. Soath present, that A. B., on the day of in the year of our Lord unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously did set fire to a large quantity of straw [“hay, straw, wood, or other vegetable produce, being in any farm house or farm building,—or any implement of husbandry, being in any farm house or building,"] then being in a certain farm building, to wit, a barn, of C. D., [or of him the said A. B.,] in the parish of, in the county of intent thereby then feloniously to set fire to the said farm building, and to injure the said C. D., [or to defraud a certain insurance company called -]: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. with Same punishment as in the last case. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 62, s. 2. Evidence. To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove 1. The setting fire to the straw, &c., as ante, p. 486. 2. That it was at the time in the farm building mentioned in the indictment; and the situation and ownership. 3. The intent thereby to set fire to the building itself. This may be proved from the expressions or acts of the defendant; |