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county of, ["any picture, statue, monument, or painted glass in any church or chapel or other place of religious worship, or any statue or monument exposed to public view"]: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

Misdemeanor; imprisonment for not more than six months, and during that time the offender may be put to hard labour, or be once, twice, or thrice privately whipped, as the court shall direct. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 44, s. 1.

Evidence.

To maintain this indictment, it must be proved

1. That the defendant damaged the monument in question, in the manner mentioned in the indictment.

2. That the monument was at the time in the church mentioned in the indictment, and situated as there described.

8. Malicious Injuries to Animals.

Killing or Wounding Cattle or Sheep.

Indictment.

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The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their to wit. oath present, that A. B., on the day of in the year of our Lord unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously did kill, ["kill, maim, or wound"] a certain mare, ["any cattle,"] the property of C. D.: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. [It is not sufficient to say that the defendant killed"certain cattle," but the species of cattle killed or wounded must be mentioned. R. v. Chalkley, R. & Ry. 258.

Felony; 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 16; transportation for not more than fifteen years, nor less than ten ;-or imprisonment, [with or without hard labour, and solitary for not more than a month at a time, or three months in a year, s. 3], for not more than three years. 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 2.

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Evidence.

To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove-..

1. The killing of the mare by the prisoner, as stated in the indictment. The words in the statute are "kill, maim, or wound." A man is said to kill an animal, when he wilfully does that which causes the death of it. Where, upon an indictment for killing a cow, it appeared that the cow-house, in which the cow was, was set fire to, and the cow was thereby burnt to death: Taunton, J., held that if the prisoner set fire to the cow-house, he was guilty of the offence imputed to him. R. v. Haughton, 5 Car. & P. 559. Wounding must be by some instrument; and, therefore, where, upon an indictment for wounding a sheep, it appeared that the prisoner set a dog at the sheep, which bit and wounded it: Park, J., held that this was not a maiming or wounding of the sheep, by the prisoner, within the meaning of the Act. R. v. Hughes, 2 Car. & P. 420. And the wound may be either an incised wound by a cutting or stabbing instrument, or a contused wound by a bludgeon, or the like. See ante, p. 260. Maiming cattle, within the meaning of this Act, seems to have the same signification as the maiming of a human being, (see ante, p. 264), namely, the inflicting an injury upon such part of the ani mal's body, as may render it less able, in fighting, to defend itself, or to annoy its adversary. Upon an indictment for killing a mare, with a count for wounding, and another for maiming her, it appeared that the prisoner poured nitrous acid into the mare's ear, and some of it either fell or was poured into the eye, which blinded her; she lived in great agony for ten days, when her owner had her killed; the surgeon proved that the injury done to the ear was what is technically called an ulcer, not a wound: the prisoner, however, being convicted, the judges held the conviction to be right, being of opinion that blinding the mare by the means above stated, was a maiming within the meaning of the Act. R. v. Owens, Ry. & M. 205. But where a man, being incensed against a horse which had thrown him and dragged him some distance along the ground, caught hold of the horse's tongue, a part of which remained in his hand, which he threw away; it was not known how this was effected, but it was certainly not by means of any instrument; being indicted for this, one count stating it to be a wounding, and another a maiming, it was objected that this was not a wounding, not being effected by any instrument, nor a maiming because it was not a member necessary for the animal's defence; and Wightman, J., after conferring with Patteson, J., being of this opinion, the prisoner was acquitted. R. v. Jeans, 1 Car. & K. 539. To constitute a wounding, however, it is not necessary that the injury should be of a permanent nature; R. v. Haywood, R. & Ry. 16; but to constitute a maiming, it must.

As to the cattle within the meaning of the Act :-the words of the Act are "any cattle." This may be deemed to include

the several species of cattle mentioned in stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, §. 25, noticed ante, p. 398, as to the stealing of cattle,namely, "horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly,-bull, cow, ox, heifer, or calf,-ram, ewe, sheep, or lamb." Asses are also cattle, within the meaning of the Act; R. v. Whitney, Ry. &M. 3; so are pigs. R. v. Chapple, R. & Ry. 77.

2. That it was done maliciously. But it is immaterial whether the offence was committed from malice conceived against the owner of the animal, or otherwise. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 25. Where it was proved that the prisoner thrust a knife into the vagina of a mare, and cut her, whilst she was standing quietly in the stable, and it did not appear that he even knew to whom the mare belonged, or had any knowledge of her owner, nor was any evidence given of his motive for committing the offence: upon being indicted for wounding the mare, it was objected that the stat. 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 2, which recited this offence and altered the punishment, had the effect of rendering the twenty-fifth sect. of stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, inoperative; but the prisoner being found guilty, and the point being reserved for the opinion of the judges, they held the conviction to be right. R. v. Tivey, 1 Car. & K. 704. And generally, where the offence is proved to have been committed wilfully, the jury may fairly infer that it was done maliciously.

3. That the mare was at the time the property of C. D.

9. Malicious Injuries to Ships,

Setting fire to or Casting away Ships, whereby Life is endangered, &c.

Indictment.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their

day of

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to wit. oath present, that A. B., on the in the year of our Lord -, unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously did [upon the high sea] set fire to ["set fire to, cast away, or in anywise destroy"] a certain ship and vessel ["any ship or vessel "] called the, the property of C. D. [then being upon the high sea], with intent thereby then feloniously and of his malice aforethought to murder several persons who were then in and on board of the said ship and vessel, [or whereby the lives of several persons then in and on board of the said ship and vessel were endangered,—" with intent to murder any person, or whereby the life of any

person is endangered"]: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. Felony; death. 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 4.

Evidence.

To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove

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1. That the prisoner set fire to the ship or vessel in question. See ante, p. 486. As to what should be deemed a vessel," within the meaning of the former Act upon this subject, 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 9, has been in some cases doubted. Where it appeared to be a pleasure boat, about eighteen feet long, Patteson, J., inclined to think that it was a vessel within the meaning of the Act; but the prisoner being afterwards acquitted on the merits, it became unnecessary to give any decisive opinion upon the subject. R. v. Bowyer et al., 4 Car. & P. 559. On the other hand, where a prisoner was indicted for setting fire to a barge, Alderson, J., intimated that if the prisoner should be convicted, he would take the opinion of the judges as to whether a barge was a vessel" within the meaning of the Act; but the prisoner was acquitted. R. v. Smith, 4 Car. & P. 569.

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If it appear that the prisoner wilfully set fire to the vessel, the jury may fairly presume that he did it maliciously.

2. The ownership of the vessel. Acts of ownership would, it should seem, be sufficient evidence of this. But in general it is well to be prepared to prove the ownership by the regular evidence of it, such as the bill of sale, certificate of registry, &c. See R. v. Philip, Ry. & M. 263. If the name of the owner be unknown, the vessel must be described in the indictment as the property "of some person or persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown."

3. The intent to murder,-or the fact of the lives of the persons on board being endangered by the act of the prisoner, -as stated in the indictment.

Setting fire to or Destroying a Ship.

Indictment.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their

to wit.

oath present, that A. B., on the

in the year of our Lord

day of

unlawfully, maliciously, and

feloniously did set fire to ["set fire to or in any wise destroy,"] a certain ship and vessel, the property of C. D., the same being then in an unfinished state ["whether the same be complete or in an unfinished state"]: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

Felony; transportation for life, or not less than fifteen years;—or imprisonment [with or without hard labour, and solitary for not more than a month at a time, or three months in a year, s. 12] for not more than three years. 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 6.

An attempt to commit this offence of setting fire to a ship or vessel, where the offence itself is punishable with transportation for life, is now punishable with transportation for not more than fifteen years, or imprisonment [with or without hard labour, and solitary for not more than one month at a time, or three months in a year, s. 11], for not more than three years. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 25, s. 7.

Evidence.

To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove

1. The setting fire to the ship by the defendant, and that it was done maliciously, as in the last case.

2. The ownership, as in the last case.

3. And that the ship at the time was in an unfinished state, if such be the fact.

the

Setting fire to or Casting away a Ship, to Prejudice the
Owner or Underwriters.

Indictment.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their

to wit. Soath present, that A. B., on the day of in the year of our Lord -, unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously did [upon the high sea] set fire to ["set fire to, cast away, or in anywise destroy"] a ship and vessel called " the property of C. D., [then being on a certain voyage upon the high sea], with intent thereby then to prejudice [the said C. D. the owner (or a part owner) of the said ship and vessel as aforesaid,- -or one G. H., the owner of certain goods then laden and being on board of the said ship and vessel, or J. K. and L. M., who had before then severally underwritten a certain policy of insurance on the said ship and vessel for the said voyage, and on the freight thereof, and on

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