OL. XXVII: No. 20.] LONDON, SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1815. [Price 1s. Of all the classes of people in this country you appear to me to have been, and still to be, the most misguided, as to all questions of politics, and especially as to the important question of peace or war. I will now do my best to enable you to judge correctly upon this subject, as far, at least, as your interests are more immediately connected with it. Your great characteristic is anxiety for the safety of your property; but, though self-preservation is the first of nature's laws, and though, in general, men who are alive to little else, are extremely alive, and even very skilful, in cases where their own interests are at stake, you do not appear to me to perceive how your interests have been, or how they will be, effected by tour. You entertain a sort of vague apprehension, that, unless Napojeon be destroyed, you shall have your property taken away. You look up to the government, that is, in your sense of the word, to the Minister for the time being, as the guardian of your property. Hence you are always found on their side on the question of war, or peace. If they say war, you are for war: if they say peace, you are for peace On the subject of the Corn Bill, you were against the Ministers; because that was a question, as you thought, involving no danger to your property. But, in fact, you were more interested in the passing the Corn Bill than any other class of 49 community; and, in explaining this being paradox to you, I shall, in the easiest way, introduce the remarks which I propose to make with regard to the effect, which war has upon the quality of your property, and upon your chances of security, or insecurity. What you most desire is, to have the interest of your stock regularly paid in full, and to prevent any insecurity to your capital. Your interest is paid almost wholly, and, indeed, entirely, by the land. [610 You will start and swell here, and ask trades and professions, pay nothing? Yes, whether commerce and manufactures, and they do; but, they pay precisely in proportion to the prosperity of agriculture. That is to say, in proportion to the height of prices. If the land, out of which all the great receive their increase, and all the farmers and all the labourers receive their profits and their wages, yield little, little can all these pay to tradesmen and manufacturers, little will be the profits of commerce and of professions. When wheat was 20s. a bushel, the landlord and the farmer had three times as much money to lay out as they have now. Hence the present universal out-cry about the dulness of trade; hence the numerous bankruptcies; hence the stagnation of commerce and manufactures. Though, therefore, I agreed most cordially with you in your opposition to the Corn Bill, the grounds of our opposition were very different indeed. I knew, that a Corn Bill was necessary to enable the land to pay the sum of taxes, demanded by the government; but I wished the sum of taxes to be diminished. You wished to have Corn Cheap, aud the sum of taxes not to be diminished. These two together were impossible. They could not, and they cannot, co-exist. If you are asked, at any time, what security you have for your property, do you not always answer, that your security is on the lund of the nation? Do you not say, that the estates of all the land-owners are mortgaged to you? This is a great mistake; for, it is only the revenues which are mortgaged to you; but, to obviate all difficulty upon this score, take it for granted that you have a bona fide mortgage upon all the land in England. Can it, then, be your interest, that the land should be unable to pay you your annual demands? The land, upon your own principle is partly yours. Can you, then, be gainers by its produce being depreciated? A certain farm, for instance, pays a hundred pounds a year towards your annual demands. If produce fall so low as to disable this farm from U paying you more than fifty pounds a year, how are you to be paid your dividends in full? Hence, it is clear, that the Corn Bill was more for your protection than for the protection of the farmers, who really eats and drinks of his own produce. Your expences of living would keep pace with the price of the produce of the land. In the end, the thing might be the same; but, if one half of your dividends was deducted, on account of the fall in the price of produce, you would soon discover, that a Corn Bill, or any other such measure, was more for your security than for that of the farmer. But, what is it, which has rendered high prices necessary to your security? WAR. War, which has augmented the taxes on the land, and which land, to be able to pay those taxes, must now have a high price for its produce. War, therefore, has been your great enemy, and not the landlords and farmers, as you have been taught to suppose. To go no further, therefore, you, above all people, ought to regret the renewal of war. You cry out against those who are opposed to war; you accuse them of seditious, and almost, of treasonable motives. You call them enemies of law and of social order. And for what? Because you look upon war against Napoleon as necessary to the security of your property; when the fact is, as I will now proceed to show, that war has been, and must be, ruinous to that property, which, though no part has been violently seized on, which, though you have still continued to receive your dividends to the full nominal amount, has imperceptibly passed away from you to the amount of more than one half of what you really possessed in the year 1792. Your property has passed from your possession in two ways first in point of credit, or the value of the capital; and next, as to the currency in which the interest is paid. This will clearly appear from the following statement of the price, the settled peace price, of three per cent. stock during the peace, previous to the first war against the Republicans of France, and of the subsequent peace prices. In 1792, before the war against France, the `stcudy peace pice of the Three per Cents. This statement exhibits the fall in, the In 1792, you could have sold a In May, 1815, you cannot sell 90. 40 10 19 Is there any one of you, who can deny these facts? And, if you cannot, do you still look upon those as the enemies of your property, who wish for peace? Can you deny, that it is war, which has had this alarming effect upon your property? And, yet, do you blame those, who are against more war? That vile and prostituted news-paper, the TIMES, which you all read, sometimes, in drawing a comparison between the situation of France and England, talks about the comparative price of the funds in the two countries; and takes this as a criterion of national prosperity, and of the solidity of the government. Nothing can be more false than this principle; but, suppose it to be true. There is no such great difference in the price of e funds in the two countries at this moment. The French funds are five per cents. Our five per cents are at 88 in paper; in real money, they are wort pounds. And, we see, that the French five per cents are worth, even now, 62 pounds in real money; for, in France, it is gold, with which funds are purchased. So that, if you are to weigh public opinion, popular confidence, and the solidity of governments in this scale, we have, on our side of the water, but little to boast of in the comparison, though France is, at this moment, surrounded by hostile 66 armies, though she is menaced with an 77 HREEP invasion by a million of men in arms, and though millions of money are employed, in all probability, to excite dissions in her cities and provinces. Have you ever seen the matter in this light before? Is it not time, then, for you to begin to think? Such is the state, to which you have been reduced by the "great statesman now no more" and his successors of both factions. Such is the price that you have paid for your support of those men and their measures. Such is the fruit of those wars, which you were told were to secure you in the enjoyment of your property; wars, which ended in placing the Bourbons, for eleven months, upon the throne of France; in restoring the Pope, the Jesuits, and the Inquisition, and in erecting Holland and Hanover into kingdoms; wars, the success of which you have joined in celebrating! But, now; if such have been the effects of war upon your property; if, in fact, you, who had estates in the funds in 1792, have lost more than the half of those estates, what are you ALL to expect as the consequences, to you, of another war? I shall lay out of account all the possible dangers from a stoppage of the sinking fund, or any other measure, to which necessity might drive the minister for the time being; I shall suppose that no danger can ever arise to you from internal commotions, produced by the pressure of war; but, I must assume, and I think, you will allow the assumption to be correct, that the thing will, at least, go on as it has done; and, of course, that your estates in the funds will daily grow of less and less value, in proportion as the mass of debt is augmented. You are quite sure, that war will augment this mass; and, yet, you raise not your voices against war, but on the contrary, appear to be disappointed, that blood has not yet been drawn. The certainty that your estates will continue to melt away as they have melted, is, one would think, quite sufficient to make you deprecate the renewal of war. Having lost 50 guineas out of every 90 guineas that you possessed in 1792, in the first restoration of the Bourbons, one would think, that you would dread a second"success" of the kind as you would dread the hour of death. The late wars lasted 20 years, exclusive of the peace of Amiens. Another 16 years of war, at the same rate, would take away the remaining 40 guineas. So that, even in case of a second " success," you would be without a penny. But, it is not thus, that the thing would travel. The stone that rolls down a hill, even if the surface be smooth, goes swifter and swifter as it approaches the bottom; and, if it meet with rubs in its way, its bounds add to its velocity, till, at last, it comes, at a single jump, like a ball from the cannon's mouth. So it will be, because, so, from the nature of things, it must be with funded property, if we now enter on a war of any considerable duration. To be satisfied of the truth of this, you have only to look at what has taken place in other countries, where there have been funding systems, and at the increasing force of the Debt in England. Since the funding system began, we have had seven wars. The debt created by each war is as follows: 1st War, which ended in 1697 £21,000,000 33,000,000 Ditto 1739 48,000,000 Ditto 1756 72,000,000 Ditto 1775 108,000,000 Ditto 1993 297,000,000 Ditto 1803 -413,000,000 £992,000,000 There are perhaps, 30 or 40 millions of floating Debt, besides the amount of the arrears of the last war; so that, about eight years of war would, in all human probability, bring the Debt to 1600 millions, at which point it would render the funds possessed in 1792 worth nothing at all. But, the thing would hardly proceed; it would hardly get along, at any rate, to this length. An addition of three or four hundred millions, is, probably, as much as it would bear, before the whole thing would be blown up; for,by that time, the price of the guinea would be so high, and the alarm would become so great, on your part, that you would sell your stock at any price, till, at last, there would be nobody to purchase. Is not this the natural march of your property? Is there any one of you, who will set his face against the facts, which I have stated? If wars have gone on adding to the Debt in the above manner, why should not the same take place again? If the value of your estates has fallen in the proportion of from 90 to 40, during the creation of 700 millions of Debt, will not another 5 or 600 millions take away the whole of your estates? If you cannot find any answer to these statements; if they be true, and you are obliged to acknowledge them to be true, why should you shut your eyes to your danger? Is it the part of wise men; is it the part of men of common sense, to act thus ? The calamity of which I have been speaking, I mean your total ruin, is to be prevented; but, it is to be prevented solely by peace and economy; that is, by getting rid of all the heavy expences, except that of the National Debt. If all the other expences were reduced to the standard of 1792; if the Army, the Navy, the Civil List, were brought down to the state of that year, the interest of the Debt might still be paid, and that, too, without a Corn Bill. It is, therefore, for peace and economy that you ought to petition, instead of joining in the cry of war, and in the abuse of those who have endeavoured, and are still endeavouring, to prevent that cala 6 passed the Legislature, appointing a Navy Board. Commodores Hull, Bainbridge, and Rodgers, it is expected, will be appointed Admirals, and put in esmission. A very powerful force, under 'the command of Commodore Bainbridge, is now fitting out for Algiers: it will consist of two new 74-gun ships, five frigates, and ten sloops of war. If I am not mistaken, the Algerines will rue the day when they provoked the vengeance of our tars. The Guerriere, under the command of Morgan, sailed from this port yesterday for New York, where she is to be joined by the Constellation and Java frigates, from the Chesapeake, and the United States and Macedonian from Long Island Sound: these frigates, with six sloops of war, form the first division against Algiers, and it is said that 2,000 of Brown's rifle veterans will go with the squadron. The whole nation is decided for a navy: the Pennsylvania, a 74-gun ship, will be launched at this place in the month of May. Large quantities of timber are daily brought down the Dela 6 mity, a great one to us all, but to you aware and Schuylkill for ship building. thousand times greater than to any other class of the community. Botley, 16th May, 1815. LETTER VIII. TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL. On the Naval Force of the United States of America. It is no more extraordinary than true, WM. COBBETT.with what dispatch they build ships of war in this country. The Peacock, of 18 guns, was built at Newbury Port in 18 working days! The Wasp was built at New York in 20 days! The Superior, Commodore Chauncy's flag-ship, of 64 < guns, on Lake Ontario, took up only 30 days from the laying of her keel until she had all her guns on board, and was MY LORD,--From the beginning, and ready for a cruize. It is said Congress. before the beginning, of the late war with intend to have the frames of the Lake America, I thought it my duty to warn 'squadron removed to the Atlantic.— you, that, one of the consequences of that Now, what does your Lordship think of war would be the creating of a great Na- this? Do you think, that it indicates any val Force in that country. I endeavoured thing of that desire, of which you were to describe to you the immense means of pleased to speak some time ago, on the America for such a purpose. Her fine part of the American people to put themrivers, bays, and harbours; her excellent selves under the protection of his Majesty's ship-builders, her hemp, iron, pitch, and government? Or, do you now begin to timber, all of her own produce; and, above think with me, that it indicates the speedy all, her matchless seamen. Of the truth appearance of an American Fleet of 20 of this account you and your colleagues ships of the line and as many frigates on must, by this time, be pretty well con- the Ocean? Really, my Lord, this is of vinced; but, I cannot help quoting, and far greater consequence to us, and to the addressing to you, a paragraph from the world, than the erecting of Hanover and Times newspaper of the 16th instant, in Holland into kingdoms. The " regular the following words:" Extract of a let-government" of Algiers will now find, I "ter from Philadelphia, dated the 17th "of March: Congress have at length determined to have a navy-a Bill has 4 dare say, that it must change its course; but, the American Navy will not be employed solely against this very "regular government." It will, and it must, make awhile, to make conquests. But, as Proa figure in the world. It must act a great vidence has permitted him to come back to part. Four years will swell it to a re- France, and even to put out the Bourbons, ectable size. Before the end of that why may not Providence permit him, in ime, if we have war with France, I pre-case France is attacked, first to defend dict, that we shall see an American fleet | her, and then to sally forth in pursuit of of great force, carrying its "bits of striped her assailants? bunting" across the Atlantic. It is for you, my Lord, who are a statesman and a prime minister, and for your bright colleague, who has recently returned from Vienna; it is for you, aud not for me, to say precisely what will be the consequences of this very important change in the naval power of the world; but, as it is a Yankey subject, I will venture to guess, that the friendship of Jonathan will soon begin to be courted by every nation who has either ships or commerce; and, that, even already, some of them has their eye upon alliances to be formed with him, in order to deprive us of the power of exercising a mastership on the high seas. At present the main use that I would make of the above information, is, to urge it on you as a reason for remaining at peace with France. I do not want to see an American newspaper to know what the people in that country will think of the threatened war in Europe. I know they will not have patience to read one single article in the Times newspaper without throwing it down, and crying out for more ships to be built and manned. The war ended in a way to provoke and at the same time to encourage them. The past, the future, resentment, glory; every thing will concur in favouring wishes for a new contest; and, though they build ships very quickly in peace, they would do it more quickly in war. If this should be the case, I think we may rely upon seeing the American Admirals in our seas; and, therefore, this should come in as an item in our estimates of the consequences of war, if now made against France. With a stout American fleet at sea, our West India Colonies, and the Azores, belonging to our ally, Portugal, would be in any thing but a satisfactory state. In short, it would require fifty ships of the line and fifty frigates to defend them all. The Slave Trade would soon be at an end, and the whole face of the naval and commercial world would be changed. The fleets of France would revive. Example, emulation, have powerful effects. I beg you to think well, and in time, of these things. I beg you to take your eyes, for a little, from Hanover and Belgium, and to cast them on the other side of the Atlautic, where you will see what is much more dangerous to England than is the army of Napoleon, numerous and brave as that army may be. I am, &c. Botley, 17th May, 1815. WM. COBBETT. P. S. On looking over a file of American papers, which have just reached me, I find the following official letter from the Secretary of the Navy, to the Committee of ways and means of the House of Representatives. It clearly shews, that "the encouragement and gradual increase Some will say, that, seeing this danger," of the navy (as observed by the National we ought, without delay, to fall upon Na- " Intelligencer) is now a national sentipoleon, and to destroy him, conquer "ment:"France, and burn or capture all her fleet, before the Americans have time to build a large fleet. Yes, if you could be sure of doing all this in the course of this summer. But, if you should fail. Failure is possible. It is sufficient for us to know, that it is possible. We may, indeed, do all that is wished; but, we may be obliged to come to a peace without doing any part of it; nay, we may, as in the war of 1793, draw the French armies out of France to over-run our allies. Louis le Desiré ascribes the former successes of Napoleon 40 Providence, who permitted him, for Navy Department, Feb. 28th, 1815. SIR-In compliance with your request, I' have the honour to transmit an estimate of the expences of the navy, reduced to the demands of an establishment, accommodated to all the effects of the peace with Great Britain, but at the same time to provide for the protection of our commerce against the actual hostility of the Dey of Algiers. An act that proposes the reduction of any part of the naval force, is naturally accompanied with a grateful recollection of the service which that force has rendered to the nation. In the first movements of |