On the second question, as to ineligibility, &c., to state offices, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, ay, 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8.

The fifth resolution, "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was agreed to, nem con.146 Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, June 27.

In Convention. Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to postpone the sixth resolution, defining the powers of Congress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth, which involved the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches; which was agreed to, nem con.

A question being proposed on the seventh resolution, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch should be according to an equitable ratio,

Mr. L. MARTIN contended, at great length, and with great eagerness, that the general government was meant merely to preserve the state governments, not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits: that if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed that individuals, as such, have little to do but with their own states: that the general government has no more to apprehend from the states composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a government over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects: that to resort to the citizens at large, for their sanction to a new government, will be throwing them back into a state of nature that the dissolution of the state governments is involved in the nature of the process that the people have no right to do this, without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for state purposes: through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears only they can hear: that the states have shown a good disposition to comply with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak, as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief causes of this inability that he did not conceive the instances mentioned, by Mr. Madison, of compacts between Virginia and Maryland, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of troops raised by Massachusetts for defence against the rebels, to be violations of the Articles of Confederation that an equal vote in each state was essential to the federal idea, and was founded in justice and freedom, not merely in policy that though the states may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not that the states, like individuals, were, in a state of nature, equally sovereign and free. In order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally free and independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with states, till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke, and Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the states, being equal, cannot treat of

confederate so as to give up an equality of votes, without giving up their liberty that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for ten states: that as Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pernsylvania, have forty two ninetieths of the votes, they can do as they please, without a miraculous union of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do but to gain over one of the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest: that they can then appoint an executive, and judiciary, and legislature for them, as they please: that there was, and would continue, a natural predilection and partiality in men for their own states: that the states, particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no state, in ratifying the Confederation, had objected to the equality of votes: that the complaints at present ran not against this equality, but the want of power: that sixteen members from Virginia would be more likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from different states: that, instead of a junction of the small states as a remedy, he thought a division of the large states would be more eligible. This was the substance of a speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he said, to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should to-morrow resume them. Adjourned.

THURSDAY, June 28.

In Convention. . Mr. L. MARTIN resumed his discourse, contending that the general government ought to be formed for the states, not for individuals: that if the states were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by the legislatures or the people; the smaller states would be equally enslaved: that if the large states have the same interest with the smaller, as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal vote: they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the large ones, on that supposition, without injuring themselves; and if the interests were not the same, the inequality of suffrage would be dangerous to the smaller states: that it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the states, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large states were weak at present in proportion to their extent, and could only be made formidable to the small ones by the weight of their votes: that, in case a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small states would have nothing to fear from their power: that if, in such a case, the three great states should league themselves together, the other ten could do so too; and that he had rather see partial confederacies ake place than the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his discourse, which was delivered with much diffuseness, and considerable vehemence. 147

Mr. LANSING and Mr. DAYTON moved to strike out "not,” so that the seventh article might read, "that the right of suffrage in

the first branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation."

Mr. DAYTON expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till to-morrow, Governor Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of New Jersey thereby suspended.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought that, if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was, that if the states were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller states would be injured in the case, and wished some gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small states, if they had a plurality of votes, would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new states from the westward might be taken into view. They would be small states; they would be poor states; they would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers, their distance from market rendering the produce of their labor less valuable; they would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on commerce and consumption, which would fall with greater weight on the old states.

Mr. MADISON said, he was much disposed to concur in any expedient, not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor that it was necessary for the safety of the small states against the large states. That it was not just, had been conceded by Mr. Brearley and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the United States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of sovereign states, in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere treat ies, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be re ciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, and making laws for the government of them. If France, England, and Spain, were to enter into a treaty for the regulation of commerce, &c., with the Prince of Monacho, and four or five other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal. Would the case be the same, if a council were to be formed of deputies from each, with authority and discretion to raise money, levy troops, determine the value of coin, &c.? Would thirty or forty millions of people submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they did, it would. only prove that they expected more from the terror of their superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble associates. Why are counties of the same states represented in proportion t^

their numbers? Is it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the national legislature. Is it because the larger have more at stake than the smaller? The case will be the same with the larger and smalle states. Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons and properties? The same is the case, in some degree, as the Articles of Confederation stand; the same will be the case, in a far greater degree, under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property and persons of individuals depend on the laws of Congress. By the plan proposed, a complete power of taxation-the highest prerogative of supremacy-is proposed to be vested in the national government. Many other powers are added, which assimilate it to the government of individual states. The negative proposed on the state laws will make it an essential branch of the state legislatures, and of course will require that it should be exercised by a body established on like principles with the branches of those legislatures. That it is not necessary to secure the small states against the large ones, he conceived to be equally obvious. Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either from some interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, and distinguishing them from the other states; or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did any such common interest exist? In point of situation, they could not have been more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous citizen of the most jealous states. In point of manners, religion, and the other circumstances. which sometimes beget affection between different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other states. In point of the staple productions, they were as dissimilar as any three other states in the Union. The staple of Massachusetts was fish, of Pennsylvania flour, of Virginia tobacco. Was a combination to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. The Journals of Congress did not present any peculiar association of these states in the votes recorded. It had never been seen that different counties in the same state, conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of superior eminence and weight in society, rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent nations, preeminent over their neighbors, the same remark was verified. Carthage and Rome tore one another to pieces, instead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker nations of the earth. The houses of Austria and France were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe. England and France have succeeded to the preeminence and to the enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers would have been fatal to us. Among the principal members ol ancient and modern confederacies, we find the same effect from

the same cause. The contentions, not the coalitions, of Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphictyonic confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations, of Russia and Austria, have distracted and oppressed the German Empire. Were the large states formidable, singly, to their smaller neighbors? On this supposition, the latter ought to wish for such a general government as will operate with equal energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their superior force. Here, again, experience was an instructive monitor. What is the situation of the weak, compared with the strong, in those stages of civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controlled by an efficient government? The heroic period of ancient Greece, the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of the American savages, answer this question. What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more powerful are under no control but the nominal authority of the law of nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their weakness? But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of the weaker members of the Amphictyonic confederacy? Plutarch (see Life of Themistocles) will inform us, that it happened but too often, that the strongest cities corrupted and awed the weaker, and that judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser states in the German confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly trampled upon, and that they owe their safety, as far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves under the rival banners of the preeminent members, partly to alliances with neighboring princes, which the constitution of the empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of the Dutch confederacy? Holland contains about half the people, supplies about half the money, and by her influence silently and indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word, the two extremes before us are, a perfect separation, and a perfect incorporation of the thirteen states. In the first case, they would be independent nations, subject to no law but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law. In the first case, the smaller states would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the last, they would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the small states, therefore, lies in promoting those principles, and that form of government, which will most approximate the states to the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added. If the general government be feeble, the larger states, distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance and security may depend on their own size and strength, will never submit to a partition. Give to the general government sufficient energy and permanency, and you remove the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, and junctions of the small states, will be facilitated, and