Individual states, it must remain a passive spectator of its own subversion.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The resolution has two objects, first, to secure a republican government; secondly, to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the necessity of both these provisions.

Mr. MADISON moved to substitute, "that the constitutional authority of the states shall be guarantied to them respectively against domestic as well as foreign violence."

Dr. M CLURG seconded the motion.

Mr. HOUSTON was afraid of perpetuating the existing constitutions of the states. That of Georgia was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised and amended. It may also be difficult for the general government to decide between contending parties, each of which claim the sanction of the constitution.

Mr. L. MARTIN was for leaving the states to suppress rebellions themselves.

Mr. GORHAM thought it strange that a rebellion should be known to exist in the empire, and the general government should be restrained from interposing to subdue it. At this rate, an enterprising citizen might erect the standard of monarchy in a particular state; might gather together partisans from all quarters; might extend his views from state to state, and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole, — and the general government be compelled to remain an inactive wit ness of its own destruction. With regard to different parties in a state, as long as they confine their disputes to words, they will be harmless to the general government and to each other. If they ap peal to the sword, it will then be necessary for the general govern ment, however difficult it may be to decide on the merits of their contest, to interpose, and put an end to it.

Mr. CARROLL. Some such provision is essential. Every state ought to wish for it. It has been doubted whether it is a casus fœderis at present; and no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to add, as an amendment to the motion, "and that no state be at liberty to form any other than a republican government."

Mr. MADISON seconded the motion.

Mr. RUTLEDGE thought it unnecessary to insert any guaranty. No doubt could be entertained but that Congress had the authority, if they had the means, to coöperate with any state in subduing a rebellion. It was and would be involved in the nature of the thing.

Mr. WILSON moved, as a better expression of the idea, “that a republican form of government shall be guarantied to each state; and that each state shall be protected against foreign and domestic violence."

This seeming to be well received, Mr. MADISON and Mr. RANDOLPH withdrew their propositions, and, on the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's motion, it passed, nem. con.

Adjourned.

THURSDAY, July 19.

In Convention. On reconsideration of the vote rendering the executive reëligible a second time, Mr. MARTIN moved to reinstate the words, "to be ineligible a second time."

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the executive, on the due formation of which must depend the efficacy and utility of the union among the present and future states. It has been a maxim in political science, that republican government is not adapted to a large extent of country, because the energy of the executive magistracy cannot reach the extreme parts of it. Our country is an extensive one. We must either, then, renounce the blessings of the union, or provide an executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so much importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of the executive is, to control the legislature. The legislature will continually seek to aggrandize and perpetuate themselves, and will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion, or convulsion, for that purpose. It is necessary, then, that the executive magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, against legislative tyranny; against the great and the wealthy, who, in the course of things, will necessarily compose the legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind; to nourish its love of power; and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of the opulent. The check provided in the second branch was not meant as a check on legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity of the first branch to legislate too much, to run into projects of paper money, and similar expedients. It is no check on legislative tyranny. On the contrary, it may favor it, and, if the first branch. can be seduced, may find the means of success. The executive, therefore, ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the mass of the people. It is the duty of the executive to appoint the officers, and to command the forces, of the republic- to appoint, first, ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs; secondly, officers for the dispensation of justice. Who will be the best judges whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who will know, will see, will feel, the effects of them. Again, who can judge so well of the discharge of military duties, for the tection and security of the people, as the people themselves, who are to be protected and secured? He finds, too, that the execu tive is not to be reëligible. What effect will this have? In the first place, it will destroy the great incitement to merit, public esteem, by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The love of fame is the great spring to noble and illustrious actions. Shut the civil road to glory, and he may be com pelled to seek it by the sword. In the second place, it will temp him to make the most of the short space of time allotted him. tɔ ac

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cumulate wealth and provide for his friends. In the third place, n will produce violations of the very Constitution it is meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger, the tried abilities and established character of a favorite magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution. The executive is also to be impeachable. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It will hold him in such dependence, that he will be no check on the legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the people and of the public interest. He will be the tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the legislature. These, then, are the faults of the executive establishment, as now proposed. Can no better establishment be devised? If he is to be the guardian of the people, let him be appointed by the people. If he is to be a check on the legislature, let him not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration, that he may with propriety be reëligible. It has been said that the candidates for this office will not be known to the people. If they be known to the legislature, they must have such a notoriety and eminence of character, that they cannot possibly be unknown to the people at large. It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently distinguished himself to merit this high trust, without having his character proclaimed by fame throughout the empire. As to the danger from an unimpeachable magistrate, he could not regard it as formidable. There must be certain great officers of state, a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs, &c. These, he presumes, will exercise their functions in subordination to the executive, and will be amenable, by impeachment, to the public justice. Without these ministers, the executive can do nothing of consequence. He suggested a biennial election of the executive, at the time of electing the first branch; and the executive to hold over, so as to prevent any interregnum in the administration. An election by the people at large, throughout so great an extent of country, could not be influenced by those little combinations and those momentary lies, which often decide popular elections within a narrow sphere. It will probably be objected, that the election will be influenced by the members of the legislature, particularly of the first branch; and that it will be nearly the same thing with an election by the legislature itself. It could not be denied that such an influence would exist. But it might be answered, that, as the legislature or the candidates for it would be divided, the enmity of one part would counteract the friendship of another; that if the administration of the executive were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his reëlection; if bad, it ought to be opposed, and a reappointment prevented; and, lastly, that, in every view, this indirect dependence on the favor of the egislature could not be so mischievous as a direct dependence for his appointment. He saw no alternative for making the executive independent of the legislature, but either to give him his office for life, or make him eligible by the people. Again, it might be objected, that two years would be too short a duration. But he believes that as long as he should behave himself well he would be continued in

his place. The extent of the country would secure his reelection against the factions and discontents of particular states. It deserved consideration, also, that such an ingredient in the plan would render it extremely palatable to the people. These were the general ideas which occurred to him on the subject, and which led him to wish and move that the whole constitution of the executive might undergo reconsideration.

Mr. RANDOLPH urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin for restoring the words making the executive ineligible a second time. If he ought to be independent, he should not be left under a temptation to court a reappointment. If he should be reappointable by the legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary power will be of no avail He had always thought and contended, as he still did, that the dan ger apprehended by the little states was chimerical; but those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious for the motion. If the executive be appointed, as has been determined, by the legislature, he will probably be appointed, either by joint ballot of both houses, or be nominated by the first and appointed by the second branch. In either case, the large states will preponderate. If he is to court the same influence for his reappointment, will he not make his revisionary power, and all the other functions of his administration, subservient to the views of the large states? Besides, is there not great reason to apprehend that, in case he should be reëligible, a false complaisance in the legislature might lead them to continue an unfit man in office, in preference to a fit one? It has been said, that a constitutional bar to reappointment will inspire unconstitutional endeavors to perpetuate himself. It may be answered, that his endeavors can have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render all precautions hopeless; to which may be added, that this argument supposes him to be more powerful and dangerous than other arguments which have been used admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on his authority. He thought an election by the legislature, with an incapacity to be elected a second time, would be more acceptable to the people than the plan suggested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris.

Mr. KING did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman, that he who has proved himself most fit for an office ought not to be excluded by the Constitution from holding it. He would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was much dis posed to think, that in such cases the people at large would choose wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one man. On the whole, he was of opinion that an appointment by electors chosen by the people for the purpose would be liable to fewest objections.

Mr. PATTERSON'S ideas nearly coincided, he said, with those of Mr. King. He proposed that the executive should be appointed by

electors, to be chosen by the states in a ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest, and three to the largest, states.

Mr. WILSON. It seems to be the unanimous sense that the executive should not be appointed by the legislature, unless he be rendered ineligible a second time. He perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground of an election, mediately or immediately. by the people.

Mr. MADISON. If it be a fundamental principle of free govern ment, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is the same, and perhaps greater, reason why the executive should be independent of the legislature, than why the judiciary should. A coalition of the two former powers would be more immediately and certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential, then, that the appointment of the executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the legislature. This could not be, if he was to be appointable, from time to time, by the legislature. It was not clear that an appointment in the first instance, even with an ineligibility afterwards, would not establish an improper connection between the two departments. Certain it was, that the appointment would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed, for these reasons, to refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large was, in his opinion, the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce an executive magistrate of distinguished character. The people generally could only know and vote for some citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention and esteem. There was one difficulty, however, of a serious nature, attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election, on the score of the negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty, and seemed, on the whole, to be liable to fewest objections. Mr. GERRY. If the executive is to be elected by the legislature, he certainly ought not to be reëligible. This would make him absolutely dependent. He was against a popular election. The people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of the executive by electors to be chosen by the state executives. The people of the states will then choose the first branch, the legislatures of the states the second branch, of the national legislature; and the executives of the states. the national executive. This, he thought, would form a strong attachment in the states to the national system. The popular mode of electing the chief magistrate would certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so elected, and should do his duty, he will be turned out for it, like Governor Bowdoin in Massachusetts, and President Sullivan. i New Hampshire.