CHAPTER VII. THE PROHIBITION OF STATE BILLS OF CREDIT. 84. Bills of credit defined. 85. What are, and what are not, bills of credit. emit bills of credit." 84. Section 10 of article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall Bills of credit within the meaning of this constitutional provision are promissory notes issued by a state government on its credit "intended to circulate throughout the community for its ordinary purposes as money," and redeemable on demand, or at a day certain in the future.1 85. A state, therefore, may not issue interest-bearing certificates in denominations "not exceeding ten dollars, nor less than fifty cents" receivable by the state in payment of taxes, and of debts due to the state, and payable to officers of the state in discharge of salaries and fees of office, and redeemable by the state under an arrangement that there shall be withdrawn "annually from circulation one-tenth part of the certificates."2 Nevertheless, a state may incorporate a bank, of which that state shall be the sole shareholder, and it may authorize that bank to issue notes as circulation, without contravening the constitutional prohibition, the distinction being that such notes are issued, not on the credit of the state, but on the credit of the capital and 1 Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 411; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 id. 40; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 id. 257. 2 Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 id. 40. assets of the bank. Coupons of state bonds, though negotiable and receivable for taxes due to the state, are not bills of credit, for they are not intended to circulate as money.2 1 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Darrington v. The Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12. Virginia Coupons Case, 119 U. S. 269, 284. CHAPTER VIII. STATE COMPACTS. 86. What compacts are permitted, and what are forbidden. 86. Section 10 of article I of the Constitution declares, that "no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. . . . No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another state." This constitutional prohibition forbids compacts between a state and foreign nations, and also compacts between states of the United States, to which the assent of Congress has not been given. It is, therefore, decisive against the validity of the confederation entered into by the insurgent states in 1861.1 It also forbids a governor of a state to enter into an agreement with a foreign government for the extradition of a prisoner.2 But states may, with the consent of Congress, enter into agreements touching conflicting boundaries, and, in such cases, the consent of Congress does not necessarily have to be given by congressional legislation expressly assenting to each of the stipulations of the agreement between the states, but that consent may be inferred from the legislation of Congress touching the subject-matter of the agreement.1 1 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Sprott v. U. S., 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594; U. S. v. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83. 2 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540. 3 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 724; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia, 17 id. 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 id. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185. * Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall, 39. CHAPTER IX. FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE. 87. The constitutional provision. 88. The concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts. 87. Section 2 of article IV of the Constitution declares, that "a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." The words "treason, felony, or other crime," as Taney, C. J., said in Kentucky v. Dennison,1 "in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their legal and technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the state. The word 'crime' of itself includes every offense, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called 'misdemeanors,' as well as treason and felony." "2 This constitutional provision imposes on the executive of the state in which the fugitive has taken refuge the duty of surrendering the fugitive upon demand made by the executive of the state from which the fugitive has fled, and upon proof made that he has been legally charged with crime, and this duty has been recognized by the act of Congress of 12 February, 1793, but if the governor of the state to which the 1 24 How. 99. 2 See also Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642. fugitive has fled refuses to deliver him up to justice, "there is no power delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him." The Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, will not issue a mandamus to compel the performance by a governor of a state of his constitutional duty of surrendering to another state a fugitive from the justice of that state.2 88. An alleged fugitive from justice may petition a court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of his detention, but as the responsibility of determining whether or not the alleged fugitive from justice be in fact a fugitive from justice, rests upon the executive of the state to which the fugitive has fled, a court of the United States will not discharge the fugitive upon the hearing of the writ of habeas corpus, because, in its judgment the proof that the prisoner is a fugitive from justice is, though satisfactory to the executive, not as complete as might have been required. The alleged fugitive may also apply, by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to a court of the state within which he is detained in custody for the purpose of being delivered to the justice. of another state, for the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over such petitions for writs of habeas corpus is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of the courts of the states in such cases, and the agent of the state demanding the surrender of the alleged fugitive is in no sense an officer of the United States, nor otherwise exempt from the process of the courts of the states.* 1 per Taney, C. J., in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 109. 2 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. 3 Ex parte Reggel. 114 U. S. 642. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624. |