ried on between man and man in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states ;" that, both as to foreign and interstate commerce," the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states," but may be exercised within the territory of a state wherever that which is at the time the subject of foreign or interstate commerce may be; that the power of regulating foreign and interstate commerce is exclusively vested in Congress, and no part of that power can be concurrently or to any extent, exercised by the states; that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce includes as an integral part thereof the regulation of the navigation of waters within the jurisdiction of any state in the prosecution of such commerce by the transportation of either passengers or goods in vessels propelled by any sort of motive power; that the grant to the United States of that power forbids the states to create monopolies to interfere with the free navigation of their waters in the prosecution of foreign or interstate commerce; and that, for these reasons, the statutes of New York granting to Fulton and his successors the exclusive rights under which they claimed were void for repugnancy to the Constitution. In The Daniel Ball,1 a legitimate corollary of the main point established in Gibbons v. Ogden, was enunciated. The facts were, that the Acts of Congress of 7 July, 1838,2 and 30 August, 1852, having required, under a penalty, all steam vessels engaged in the transportation of passengers and goods upon "the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of the United States, to be inspected and licensed," the Daniel Ball, a steamer engaged in navigating Grand river in the state of Michigan between the cities of Grand Rapids and Grand Haven was libeled

1 10 Wall. 557.

25 Stat. 304.

3 10 Stat. 61.

by the United States in the court of the proper district for violation of the statutes, it being admitted by stipulation that some of the goods she carried came from, or were destined for, places out of the state of Michigan. A decree of condemnation was made in the court below, and affirmed in the Supreme Court, on the ground that the vessel, though plying exclusively within the limits of a state, was engaged in interstate commerce, for as to each article of merchandise transported from a point without the state to a point within the state, or vice versa, interstate commerce began whenever the article. commenced to move in trade from one state to another, and continued until the article reached its destination, and the vessel was, by reason of its participation in that transportation, subject to the regulating power of Congress.1 The judgments in Sinnot v. Davenport, and in Foster v. Davenport, were the necessary result of the principles upon which the judgment in Gibbons v. Ogden was based. These cases raised the question of the constitutionality of a statute of Alabama requiring the owners of steamboats navigating the waters of that state to file with the local authorities a statement in writing setting forth the name of the vessel, the name of its owners, their places of residence, and the amount of their respective interests in the vessel, as regulations of commerce affecting in Sinnot's case, vessels licensed

1 22 How. 227.

3

2 22 How. 244.

3 Field, J., said very forcibly, p. 566, "we are unable to draw any clear and distinct line between the authority of Congress to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the states, when that agency extends through two or more states, and when it is confined in its action entirely within the limits of a single state. If its authority does not extend to an agency in such commerce, when that agency is confined within the limits of a state, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of a state, and leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted, and the constitutional provision would become a dead letter."

under the Act of Congress to carry on the coasting trade and plying between a port in Alabama and ports in other states, and, in Foster's case, steamboats licensed by the United States and employed as lighters and towboats in the port and harbour of Mobile in aid of vessels engaged in commerce, either foreign or coastwise, with other states. In each case the court held the statute of Mobile to be void as an attempted regulation of commerce. The case of Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Company v. Pennsylvania2 follows in the same line, for it was therein held, that a state cannot tax the gross receipts of a steamship company incorporated by it and engaged in the transportation of persons and of goods in the prosecution of both foreign and interstate commerce. The principle established by Gibbons v. Ogden is further exemplified by Hall v. DeCuir, in which the question was as to the validity of a Civil-Rights statute of Louisiana, which had been so construed by the Supreme Court of the state as to require "those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the states to give to all persons traveling within that state, upon vessels employed in such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the vessel, without distinction on account of race or colour," and to subject "to an action for damages the owner of such a vessel, who excludes coloured passengers, on account of their colour, from the cabin set apart by him for the use of whites during the passage." The Court held the statute to be void as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, on the ground that the statute did not "act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the

1 The case of New York v. Miln, 11 upon at the argument, was not noticed in 2 122 U. S. 326.

Pet. 102, though cited and relied the judgment of the court. 3 95 U. S. 485.

state, but directly upon the business as it comes into the state from without or goes out from within." Waite, C. J., said, "while it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the state, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the state, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the state must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such coloured persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. If the public good requires such legislation, it must come from Congress, and not from the states." The case of Veazie v. Moor1 presents the converse of the main proposition enunciated in Gibbons v. Ogden and in The Daniel Ball. The facts were, that the river Penobscot being entirely within the state of Maine from its source to its mouth, the last eight miles from its source not being navigable by reason of dams, but there being higher up the stream an imperfect navigation, without outlet, or connection with any other waterway, the state of Maine, in consideration of improvements to be made to that navigation, granted to Moor and his associates an exclusive right of navigating by steamboats such portions of the stream as they should improve, and Veazie, having built and attempted to oper

3 Clifford, J., delivered an elaborate concurring judgment.

4 14 How. 568.

ate within the limits of the grant to Moor a steamboat for which he had obtained an United States enrollment and license, was enjoined by a state court at the suit of Moor, and the decree of the state court was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of the United States. The ground of decision was, that any commerce that could by possibility be conducted upon the upper Penobscot was of necessity purely internal, and in no sense interstate, commerce, and that as internal commerce it was properly a subject of state, and not of federal, regulation, and that a coasting license issued by the United States is "a warrant to traverse the waters washing or bounding the coast of the United States," but conveys no privileges to use the internal waters of a state in the prosecution of that which is not interstate commerce. Daniel, J., said, p. 574, 66 nor can it be properly concluded, that, because the products of domestic enterprise in agriculture or manufactures or in the arts may ultimately become the subject of foreign commerce, that the control of the means, or the encouragements, by which enterprise is fostered and protected, is legitimately within the import of the phrase foreign commerce, or fairly implied in any investiture of the power to regulate such commerce.

Such a pretension would effectually prevent or paralyze every effort at internal improvement by the several states; for it cannot be supposed that the states would exhaust their capital and their credit in the construction of turnpikes, canals, and railroads, the remuneration derivable from which and all control over which might be immediately wrested from them, because such public works would be facilities for a commerce which, whilst availing itself of these facilities, was unquestionably internal, although intermediately or ultimately it might become foreign." The case of Lord