duty of the employer to see to it that immediate medical and surgical services are rendered, and transportation to hospital provided, and all charges therefor shall be audited and paid and be payable only by the department out of the First Aid Fund."

§ 126. Constitutionality of the act.-We give in full in the succeeding section the opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Clausen, 117 Pac. 1101, which sustains the constitutionality of the Washington Act against the objection that it authorized the taking of property without due process of law, that it operated as a denial of the equal protection of the laws, that it amounted to an inequality of taxation and that it denied the right of trial by jury.

The court sustained the constitutionality of the act as against the first three objections, but did not pass upon the fourth.

This opinion is of great value, both on account of the court's discussion of many important historical, sociological and economic questions in connection with the legal principles involved in the enactment of a compulsory workmen's insurance law, and because up to the time of the rendering of this decision, in September, 1911, no Supreme Court of any of the States had sustained the right of a State legislature to enact a law that would create a fund by taxing employers of specified classes and making it obligatory upon the workmen employed by the said employers to accept specified compensations for personal injuries received in the due course of their employment. For the right of an injured workman to sue his employer is almost wholly eliminated, excepting the very restricted cases retained in sections 6 and 8 of the act.

§ 127. Opinion of the court.-The case of State v. Clausen1 was before the Supreme Court on the refu1 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101.

sal of the State auditor to issue a warrant on the State treasurer for the payment of furniture purchased by the industrial insurance department for its office. The contention of the auditor was that the law creating the department was not constitutional, and that he had therefore no power to expend moneys of the State in its behalf. This contention the Supreme Court rejected, and after a discussion of the various points of objection raised to the law sustained it in all points. Owing to the importance of the decision, it is given in full, together with the concurring opinion of Judge Chadwick, expressing his views as to the finality of the decision under the circumstances.

Having made a statement of the conditions under which the case was before the court, and after presenting a summary of the law, Judge Fullerton, speaking for the court, said:

The foregoing summary makes clear the theory and purpose of the act. It is founded on the basic principle that certain defined industries, called in the act extra hazardous, should be made to bear the financial losses sustained by the workmen engaged therein through personal injuries, and its purpose is to furnish a remedy that will reach every injury sustained by a workman engaged in any of such industries, and make a sure and certain award therefor, bearing a just proportion to the loss sustained, regardless of the manner in which the injury was received. With the economic questions thus suggested, the auditor's learned counsel object only to the wisdom of the scheme formulated. They conced that the evil is one calling for a remedy, and direct thei arguments solely against this particular act. In our discussion we shall confine ourselves to the questions thus suggested, noticing the ecenomic questions only in cidentally.

The act is challenged as unconstitutional on four distinct grounds: (1) That it violates section 3, of

article 1, of the State constitution, and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; (2) that it violates section 12, of article 1, of the State constitution, which provides that no law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporations, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations; and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the equal protection of the laws; (3) that it violates sections 1 and 2, of article 7, of the State constitution, which provide that property shall be taxed according to its value in money and that all taxation shall be equal and uniform; and (4) that it violates section 21, of article 1, of the State constitution which provides that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. But while we shall discuss the questions suggested under the several divisions as here set out, it is obvious that no very logical segregation of the argument can be thus made, as many of the reasons advanced for or against the act under one particular division are equally applicable to one or more of the others. Any different arrangement, however, seems to be at the sacrifice of clearness, and we pass therefore directly to the first objection stated.

It is with regret that we are unable to set forth at length counsel's argument on this branch of the case, as any abbreviation of it is at the expense of its cogency and force. To do so, however, would unduly lengthen this opinion. The argument is based on two fundamental ideas: The one, that the act creates a liability without fault; and the other, that it takes the property of one employer to pay the obligations of another. It must be conceded that these contentions have a basis in fact, and that they, on first impression, constitute a persuasive argument against the validity of the act.

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Since there is exacted from every employer of labor engaged in one or more of the industries termed hazardous a certain fixed sum based upon his payroll, which is to be used to compensate employés working in such hazardous employments who receive personal injuries, regardless of the question whether the injury was because of the fault of the employer or of the negligence of the employé, it can be said that some part of the sum so collected will be paid out on injuries in which the employer is without fault; and, furthermore, since every such employer is liable to make the payments whether or not any of his own workmen are injured, and since an employer is liable under the common law for an injury to his own workmen only, it can also be said that by this act one employer is held liable for the obligations of another.

But these conditions do not furnish an absolute test of the validity of the act. In the statute books of the several States are many statutes held constitutional by the courts where liability is created without fault, and where the property of one person is taken to pay the obligations of another, and this where no compensation is made to the person who is thus made liable or whose property is thus taken, other than perhaps the bestowal upon him of some privilege. The test of the validity of such a law is not found in the inquiry, Does it do the objectionable things? but is found rather in the inquiry, Is there no reasonable ground to believe that the public safety, health or general welfare is promoted thereby? The legislature can not, of course, without violating this clause of the Constitution, declare a particular industry, commonly engaged in by the people, to be unlawful which, under all circumstances, must necessarily be harmless and innocent; but it can regulate and control and prohibit any industry, however innocent it may have been in its inception, whenever it becomes a menace to the employés engaged in it, the people surround

ing it, or to any considerable number of the people at large, no matter from whatsoever cause the menace may arise. This it does under the police power: "the power inherent in every sovereignty the power to

govern men and things."

It is unnecessary to discuss the origin, nature or extent of this power. It is sufficient to say that, by means of it, the legislature exercises a supervision over matters affecting the common weal and enforces the observance by each individual member of society of duties which he owes to others and the community at large. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to this power. Under it the State may "prescribe regulations promoting the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its welfare and prosperity." In fine, when reduced to its ultimate and final analysis, the police power is the power to govern. It is not meant here to be asserted that this power is above the Constitution, or that everything done in the name of the police power is lawfully done. It is meant only to be asserted that a law which interferes with personal and property rights is valid only when it tends reasonably to correct some existing evil or promote some interest of the State, and is not in violation of any direct and positive mandate of the Constitution. The clause of the Constitution now under consideration was intended to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power, or undue, unjust, and capricious interference with personal rights; not to prevent those reasonable regulations that all must submit to as a condition of remaining a member of society. In other words, the test of a police regulation, when measured by this clause of the Constitution, is reasonableness, as contradistinguished from arbitrary or capricious action.

The authorities, as we view them, abundantly support the foregoing principles. Of statutes upheld by