But it had not reached to the height of intervention. Such representations as had been made when Mr. Gladstone exposed the revolting cruelties of the Neapolitan prisons might have been repeated, and perhaps with as much or as little effect; but to go further would have been virtually to declare war against Austria, while to espouse the cause of the "national party," who, under the direction of Mazzini, were endeavouring to effect the liberation of Italy by a series of insurrections, would have been to oppose the only firm Italian government in existence-that of Piedmont, under our former ally. Victor Emmanuel had in fact continued sentence of death against the republican agitator; while Cavour, in order to counteract the "fatal influence" of the fervid patriot not only in Italy but in Piedmont itself, became the prime mover of the "national society" which assumed to have for its object war with Austria. The policy of Cavour was to wait a little longer. The moderate party in Italy was also ready to look for some future advantage and to delay action. Mazzini was for immediate effort. What Cavour wanted was a monarchical Italy under Victor Emmanuel, and Mazzini suspected that he was ready to pay a price for it when the time came. That price the republican averred was the cession of Savoy and Nice to France for becoming an ally of Italy. He had written months before the event that Napoleon sought "in Nizza and Savoy the price for Lombardy, the throne of Naples for Murat, and of the centre for his cousin," and that Cavour had agreed to it. "If Austria resist to the utmost the whole design will be completed. If after the first defeats she should offer to abandon Lombardy in order to have Venetia secured to her, they will accept, and only the conditions concerning the aggrandisement of the house of Savoy will be fulfilled; the rest of uprisen Italy will be abandoned to the vengeance of her masters." He also pointed out the probability of what he said would be a 66 sudden ruinous peace, fatal to the insurgents, before the war is half over. . . Louis Napoleon, fearing the action of the peoples, should the war be prolonged, will compel the Sardinian monarchy to desist, conceding to it a certain portion of

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territory according to circumstances, and abandoning the betrayed Venetian provinces, as well as a portion of Lombardy, to Austria."

This was a close representation of much that afterwards took place, and also of the whole of what would probably have been the result but for an uncomputed factor. That factor was Garibaldi. Mazzini and Garibaldi, equally pure in intention, both ready to sacrifice everything to a noble patriotism, were never at one. Mazzini was a visionary statesman with exalted ideas of what a republic should be. He exhausted himself and the very cause which he had at heart in the endeavour to attain national liberty by arousing public spirit to insurrection by means of a sentiment, and then uniting in one great effort. Garibaldi was a warrior, believing that when there was a good hope for insurrection in the name of liberty, and not before, -men needed only leaders who, with sword in hand, would help to fire them with immediate enthusiasm, and take them onward to battle. Mazzini would have had Garibaldi obey orders, and either fight, or stop fighting, on a sentimental principle of pure republicanism. Garibaldi refused to yield obedience against his own opinions, and cared less for subtle distinctions as to what kind of republic should alone claim the devotion of the nation, than for the actual achievement of national liberty and the destruction of the foreign yoke. Cavour-that rather commonplace-looking, stoutish, easygoing Italian, in spectacles, which gave him a still more ordinary appearance, and with a manner that, to superficial observers, suggested anything but subtle diplomacy worthy of the old Italian traditions-could outplot them both. He perhaps was not the equal of Mazzini for real insight, but he was far beneath him in scrupulousness, and this, added to the possession of power, gave him an advantage, which he used continually to check the effects of the fervid and unselfish appeals which so often seemed to be stirring a people to enthusiastic action, but which always fell short of achieving more than a partial outbreak. This is not the place to analyse or comment upon the character of Cavour. He succeeded in raising an Italian

monarchy, and he was able to counterplot Mazzini, who would have had a republic. He succeeded also in making an instrument of Garibaldi; but the man of action, who cut away superfine distinctions with his sword in the passion of battle, was an instrument that was near cutting his hand. But for Garabaldi, Italy might have been free only in name, and even the monarchy might have been a provincial rather than a national government. Garibaldi's simple enthusiasm, and the swift success that attended him when men flocked to his standard after the Franco-Sardinian war with Austria, would have forced a weaker or a less guarded hand than that of Cavour. But Cavour knew how to take quick and cunning advantage of the opportunity for making the Piedmontese rule Italian, and so to give to the world a more united Italy than even the insurrection had at first promised.

That, at the end of 1858, the Emperor of the French contemplated hostilities with Austria there was no room to doubt. In a letter to our queen he had announced the approaching marriage of Prince Napoleon with the daughter of the King of Sardinia; and a few weeks before, had actually discussed with Lord Palmerston (who, as we have seen, was at Compiegne), his plans for the expulsion of the Austrian troops from Italy, where a general rising had for some months been preparing in the north. At the diplomatic receptions on the 1st of January, 1859, he had said to M. Hubner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, "I regret that the relations between our two governments are not more satisfactory; but I beg you to assure the emperor that they in no respect alter my feelings for himself." It should be remembered, however, that Austria, declining always to recognize the right of France to interfere in Italian affairs, had more than once refused to combine with Napoleon in any efforts to bring about reforms in the governments of the Duchies or the Papal States, whose sovereigns she was, in fact, pledged by treaty to support. The necessity for keeping an army in Italy on a war footing, because of the attitude of Piedmont, galled her and put a strain on her

resources; but that army was believed to be splendidly organized and under the command of the best generals in Europe. The train was laid, it only required the match. The match was ready. On the opening of the Sardinian chambers on the 10th of January, King Victor Emmanuel had said:

"Our country, small in territory, has acquired credit in the councils of Europe, because it is great through the idea it represents and the sympathies it inspires. This position is not exempt from perils, since, while we respect treaties, we are not insensible to the cry of suffering which reaches us from so many parts of Italy."

The military preparations of Austria had been pushed forward. Large bodies of troops were arriving in the plains of Lombardy. It looked much as though Austria would be the aggressor. Her officers were talking of an advance on Turin as a stage on the way to Paris.

The Emperor of the French had probably thought that Russia would gladly join in the chastisement of Austria; it was said that he had asked the question of Schouvaloff, and had been immediately undeceived. On the other hand, he was under the impression, misled perhaps by his conversations with Palmerston, who seems to have rejoiced in the notion of the Austrians having a castigation, that war with Austria for the restoration of Italian freedom would consolidate his alliance with England. He had at last reluctantly given up the notion that England would become his ally in the cause.

English statesmen on both sides were too acute to be led into what might prove to be a European war for the interest of France, when it was strongly suspected, if not absolutely known, that Cavour held the cue of the arrangement and that the price of French intervention had been already settled.

The restoration of Italy, and even the expulsion of the Austrians, was dear perhaps to a large majority of the English people, but the attitude of the French emperor caused no little suspicion. We had not yet got over the threats of the French colonels because of the alleged protection of Italian refugees in Lon

don. Who could tell what might be the ultimate intention of France, or to what length the emperor might be driven? who knew whether we might not have to prepare against the contingencies of war in Europe?

The effect of the first note of hostility was to confirm the intention of increasing our armaments and to give a fresh impetus and completer organization to the Volunteer movement. But the note of war had not yet sounded, and before it was heard attempts were made at a pacific conclusion by means of a congress.

The Emperor of the French contended that he respected treaties, and had only agreed to interpose if Austria should commence hostilities, or invade Sardinian territory. He had already endeavoured to atone to the Austrian ambassador for his hasty words by using conciliatory expressions. In reply to a letter from the queen, in February, 1859, representing the anxiety in England for the maintenance of peace, he denied that there was any foundation for the alarms and suspicions which were constantly manifested with regard to his proceedings. He had received confidential communications from Italy that the state of affairs there would soon result in an insurrection, which was only prevented by the counsels of Piedmont, but that the Sardinians would not draw back from a war with Austria. He had replied that his first duty was to his country and its interests, that the traditional policy of France had always been opposed to the exclusive influence of Austria in Italy, but that his government could not encourage an aggressive line of conduct on the part of Piedmont, nor support her in a struggle in which right would not be on her side; but that, on the other hand, she might rely on being vigorously backed, either if attacked by Austria, or if she became involved with this power in a just and lawful war.

In the last phrase, which is here printed in italics, lay the key of Cavour's subsequent demands. What would be a war juste et légitime? It depended on any interpretation which might be put upon it.

"But," the letter went on to say, "these purparlers came to nothing; but towards

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November last, either because the unpopular measures taken by Austria in Italy had roused men's minds, or because indiscreet language had been held at Turin, or, finally, because a certain party had found its interest in disquieting public opinion, certain it is that all at once rumours of war were spread on every side, founded both upon the condition of people's minds in Italy and upon the state of our relations with Austria. In the hope of calming these apprehensions I caused

it to be announced in the Moniteur that there was nothing in our relations with foreign powers to justify such fears. Notwithstanding this, as if under the influence of a real panic, everything continued to be construed in a warlike sense. The conciliatory words to M. Hubner, the despatch to Marseilles of six batteries (without men or horses) destined for Algeria, the construction, as an experiment, of ten gunboats, carrying each one gun, the armament of two troop-ships for the Algerine service, the purchase of some thousands of artillery-horses to bring their number up to the peace footing-finally, the progress made with the reconstruction of our artillery equipment begun two years before -these were what were taken as so many warlike symptoms; and, although there was in fact nothing more, the persuasion to the contrary is so general, that it would be difficult for me to persuade the public in France and abroad, that I am not even now making immense preparations for war. And yet at this very time simple prudence seems to me to enjoin that I should do much more; for on the one side I cannot blind myself to the illwill that surrounds me, and on the other, for the last month I have been urgently appealed to by the King of Sardinia to mass 20,000 men upon the Alps, ready to come to his assistance, in case of his being attacked by the Austrians.

"I am, therefore, in no way responsible either for the apprehensions or for the agitation now on foot, and I can regard them with indifference. But . . . with complications beyond the Alps staring us in the face, people seem to deny to France by anticipation the influence to which she is entitled by her rank

among nations, as well as by her history. In presence of an imaginary intervention in the affairs of a country which touches our frontiers, all Germany seems of a mind to enter into a league against France, and to dispute even her most legitimate action. Did Germany intervene in our embroilment with Russia? Or did Europe intervene when Germany upheld the cause of Holstein against Denmark?

"I admit to your Majesty that this attitude of Germany sets me thinking deeply, and that I see in it great danger for the future, for I shall always respect the treaties."

There is much to read between the lines of this letter. It was evident enough from the position of affairs that the idea of a war in Italy would not be popular in France. The reception, or rather the want of a reception, of Prince Napoleon and his bride by the people of Paris indicated the coldness with which intervention on behalf of Sardinia would be regarded. The financial condition of Sardinia was such that Cavour could not negotiate a loan for any large amount. The French state debt had increased from £213,800,000 in 1851 to £336,880,000 in 1858. The emperor had been greatly mistaken as to the probable support of England and the general attitude of Europe in relation to a war in Italy. Prince Albert, writing to the King of Belgium, in January, 1859, said: "Louis Napoleon has manifestly calculated thus: 'Russia will be well pleased to avenge herself on Austria, and will, therefore, support me in my attack on Italy. England hates Austria, is mad for Italian freedom and nationality, so she, too, will give me her moral support. Prussia hates Austria, will be glad to see her humbled, and is to be won over by promises of advancement in Germany at the expense of Austria. Italy yearns for freedom, and will, therefore, receive me and my army with transport.'"

It was afterwards understood that when war had commenced, Russia had represented that no intervention from Prussia was probable while the war was confined to Italy, but a rumour afterwards reached Napoleon that Prussia was preparing for war, and this, it was said, eventually hastened determination

to conclude the Italian campaign with a treaty in which the declaration that the country was to be free to the Adriatic, was left to the category of hyperbolical expressions. The real anxiety of Prussia, and of England also, was the continued restlessness of the emperor and the evident desire to remodel treaties and readjust frontiers. Thus it was feared that success in Italy might eventually lead to some attempt on the Rhenish provinces. It was in the most friendly spirit that the queen and English statesmen, even Lord Palmerston, urged the preservation of peace, and their representations combined with the indifference of the French people had some temporary effect in delaying further demonstrations, though it was believed that Cavour wrought on the mind of the emperor, not only by keeping before him their secret understanding, but by referring with sinister emphasis to the poignards of Italian assassins. At the same time Prince Napoleon was sarcastically inquiring whether the agreement with Sardinia was to be observed, now that it had been, as it were, ratified by his own matrimonial alliance.

That the emperor had been placed in a false position partly by his own expectation, but also, in part, by the representations of Russian diplomacy and the determination of Cavour not to abate one of his claims, there can be no doubt, but the question was, Did he at that juncture deliberately attempt to trick Europe? The Queen and Prince Albert had begun to distrust him some time before, and Lord Palmerston, who on the whole liked him very well, and had seemed to support his views, said not long afterwards, "The emperor's mind seems as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits, and like rabbits his schemes go to the ground for the moment to avoid notice or antagonism." "Il recule bien pour le moment, mais il n'abandonne jamais," had been said of him before this, and it seemed about to be verified. At all events he contrived to convey to Lord Cowley that he was ready to accept the good offices of England to negotiate a basis of arrangement with Austria. This Lord Derby's government was ready to undertake if Austria was

willing to accept an attempt at mediation. The queen's address at the opening of parliament had, with some emphasis, dwelt on the hope that peace might be maintained, and this was considered to have been taken as a suggestion for an endeavour to be made for arriving at a definite understanding.

On the return of Lord Cowley it was announced that Austria was ready to consent to a withdrawal of her troops from the Papal States, to support a system of internal reforms in Italy, to pledge herself not to attack Sardinia, and to negotiate some new arrangement to take the place of her special treaties with the Duchies. When we read these concessions carefully they mean little or nothing except in connection with a long conference and the settlement of preliminary measures. Perhaps Napoleon distrusted Austria as much as Prussia, and even more than England distrusted him. At all events, when Lord Cowley got back to Paris, he found that another proposition had been brought forward. Instead of negotiations between the parties immediately interested, there was to be a congress of the European powers for the preservation of peace.

The proposal came from St. Petersburg, but it had first been sent thither from the Tuileries. Renewed suspicion was the consequence of the proposal. On learning of it from Lord Malmesbury the queen replied, "A congress has always been the alternative to war which the emperor has put forward; but a congress to rearrange the treaties of 1815. Russia may intend to act in such a congress the part against Austria regarding Lombardy, which Austria acted against her in the last congress regarding Bessarabia.

. . Austria will have enormous armaments to keep up while the congress lasts, for otherwise France might suddenly break off and fall upon her simultaneously with a rising of the Italian populations. She will, therefore, be very averse (and justly so) to a congress. Is it the emperor's object to

exhaust her?"

This curiously resembled the opinion of M. Thiers contained in a letter written at the same time, in which he said the aim

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of the emperor was to compass war while talking of peace. "His adversary being ready, while he is not, this delay serves admirably his purpose of employing against Austria a method of dissolution, by prolonging a critical and irritating state of things that will exhaust her. In truth, Austria cannot remain in arms for an indefinite period without being exhausted. Another result of this state of things might be, that the young emperor, weary of an intolerable burden, may end by preferring war to a position as enervating as it would be disastrous. Thus, having perforce become the aggressor, he would play into Napoleon's hands, who might then proclaim triumphantly that it is no fault of his if the empire is not peace."

It would seem, however, that neither side was sincere. Lord Cowley, who had perhaps the best opportunity of forming a judgment, came to the opinion that the emperor was really desirous of a congress, because the probabilities were that the decision arrived at would be against his entering on a war to support Sardinia; and that other proposals would be made, against which if Cavour should endeavour to exact fulfilment of a promise of French intervention, it might be answered that France could not be expected to oppose herself to the decision of all the great powers of Europe. But Austria, with "her bigotries, her hauteur, her insincerity, and her blundering statesmanship," as old Stockmar had just expressed it, soon made the decisions of a congress, or indeed any untrammeled and genuine negotiations for peace, difficult if not impossible. How much probability could there be that such a convention would succeed in settling questions which were keeping a great part of Italy in a state of insurrection? There was no certain basis to go upon. "I believe," said Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords, "that all my noble friend (Lord Malmesbury) knows is this: that one despotic power has proposed to another despotic power, that by means of a congress a third despotic power should pave the way for liberal institutions."

Austria had professedly as an evidence of her pacific intentions proposed as one of the