Acknowledging your favor of December 13th with

reference to the Aldrich plan, we note that you class the bank note and the greenback together. We believe that you will see cure a broader view of the subject from an address recently delivered in Racine by Kr. Joseph T. Talbert. While this address does not cover all the questions raised with reference to the. greenback, still it so clearly differentiates the position and function of the greenback and the bank note that we believe it will be useful in clearing up doubts which you seem to have with reference to this subject.

we take pleasure in forwarding, under separate cover,

a copy of this address, which we hope will reach you promptly.

doubts which you seem to have with reference to this subject.

We take pleasure in forwarding, under separate cover, a copy of this address, which we hope will reach you promptly. Yours very truly,

(Signed) THOS. A. REYNOLDS, Assistant Cashier."

Evidently the bank could not find or give any explanation that would aid the Aldrich plan, of the historic fact it could not controvert, that the first $50,000,000 of legal tender greenbacks never depreciated while the $450,000,000 of limited legal tender greenbacks had depreciated. So the bank in its reply makes no answer to writer's letter on that vital matter, the most important question in the impending struggle, but refers him to the speech of Banker Talbert (vice-president of National City Bank and director of Continental and Commercial National Bank of Chicago) which on examination was found to say nothing whatever on that subject.

Thus we find the biggest and greatest bank in the United States, that commands the greatest expert financial minds in the country, and has upon its directing board representatives of all of the powerful Wall Street interests that dominate the entire national banking system, the mammoth insurance companies, the railroads and the trusts of the United States, actually unable or unwilling to attempt to explain why legal tender money did not depreciate while limited legal tender currency badly depreciated.

This is not criticism. It is evidence of good sense, the sudden retreat of the bank when it found the water getting too deep and it could not swim.

The Aldrich bill does not invest the proposed corporate currency with half the legal tender power enjoyed even by the $450,000,000 of limited legal tender greenbacks that depreciated. It is not to be made "lawful money" at all. It will not be a tender for the payment of ordinary debts between individuals.

The commission's Aldrich bill reads:

"Sec. 53-The circulating notes of the National Reserve Association shall be received at par in payment of all taxes, excises, and other dues to the United States, and for all salaries and other debts and demands owing by the United States to individuals, firms, corporations or associations,

except obligations of the Government which are by their terms specifically payable in gold, and for all debts due from or by one bank or trust company to another, and for all obligations due to any bank or trust company.'

This is all there is on this subject in the bill. The corporate currency would not be a tender between individuals, or between any individual and any corporation other than banks and trust companies. It will be optional currency, not "lawful money." Corporate currency should not be legal tender "lawful money," because that would be forcing the people by law to accept the corporation currency for the exclusive profit and benefit of the corporation. That would be a wrongful use of law. The foundation is to be laid by the Aldrich bill to work off on the people another billion dollars of currency not lawful money, and it is said not to be guaranteed by the Government, but be merely an obligation of a private corporation, the obligation or debts of which will aggregate ultimately more than ten times its entire cash capital.

No wonder the National City Bank hastily dropped the subject. In its letter of November 29, 1911, the bank itself cited the fact that greenbacks even with the whole credit of the Federal Government behind them, and only $450,000,000 outstanding, depreciated more than 50 per cent. How then can it be expected that the National Reserve Association, with only $100,000,000 of cash capital and perhaps a billion dollars of liabilities, can, without any Government guarantee or assistance, keep its billion dollar issue of currency from depreciation, and at par? Especially so, when it is not even made "lawful money," or as much a legal tender as the Government greenbacks that depreciated in spite of the support of the Government, solely because they were not made full legal-tender? It is a wildcat scheme and it will be a wildcat corporate paper currency like that emitted by the banks and worked off on the people in vast quantities before the Civil War by confidence game methods. It is a reckless, dangerous experiment.

The only possible reply is the proposed gold reserve of 333 per cent "required," but with no provision or penalty to enforce it. But if such a gold reserve will make safe and sound a vast issue of corporate paper currency that is not full legal-tender and is only the obligation of a private corporation and not of the Government, then why would not the same size gold reserve make safe and sound the same

size issue of Government currency that is a full legal-tender for all debts public and private, and is backed by the entire faith, credit, taxing and bonding power of the Government of the greatest nation on earth?

There! That's the conundrum. That is the one big question in all this controversy. The bank could feel it coming, so it "flew the coop" and escaped.

But the people can and will answer the question that the bank dodged, for the reasoning is simple and plain and the evidence is official, convincing and conclusive.

While they did not dare openly to propose it at first, either before the Aldrich bill becomes law or by an amendment in after years the Government will be made liable for all currency issued by this corporation, will be made an accommodation indorser on the corporation's notes for a billion dollars, even if it would not be obligated from the beginning under the statute heretofore cited. Absence of any provision in the pending bill expressly stating that in no way shall the Government be liable, is significant. And the remarkable and conflicting letters from various members of the Monetary Commission and the big banks printed in preceding chapters give the whole thing a sinister appear

ance.

CHAPTER XX.

REORGANIZING THE MONEY SUPPLY.

New System, Government Money Secured by Gold, Instead of Unlimited Optional Corporate Currency.

On June 30, 1911, there was in circulation $930,367,929 of gold certificates and $698,532,060 of bank-note currency, total $1,628,899,989. This is over half of the $3,214,002,595 that comprised the entire stock of all kinds of money of the United States on that date, in circulation, in the banks and in the Treasury. Yet not one dollar of those vast issues of gold certificates and bank-note currency is legal-tender "lawful money." It is all mere optional currency that anybody can legally refuse when it is tendered in payment of an ordinary debt. There are cases where this has worked great wrong and hardship. One reported instance may be cited to illustrate. Some western men had discovered and developed a valuable mine to a point where there was ore enough in sight to show to a certainty that the property was sound and of great value. They needed money to build a large plant and operate the property. They went to Wall Street. After careful investigation the New York "bankers" agreed to furnish the money. Instead of joining in the deal they put their money in as a "loan" secured by mortgage on the mine. It was made a shortterm mortgage. It came due before the plant could be finished and operated to make the mine yield enough to pay the debt. Payment was demanded and the mortgage for about $150,000 foreclosed. The western men finally raised the money elsewhere and on the last day of redemption tendered it to the sheriff in settlement. The eastern lawyer representing the Wall Street people found that considerable of the $150,000 was gold certificates and some bank-note currency. These not being "lawful money" he refused the tender and demanded payment in "lawful money." There was then no time to go from the distant county to a bank in a large city to get the necessary gold or greenbacks,