Mr. NEWHOUSE. I am sure when I was in college I would have opposed it, but I feel differently now.

It seems to me that all the governments of Europe certainly want them there, even the French; at no point, even when relations with France were at a low ebb, did the Government favor U.S. troop withdrawals.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I know they want them. Do you think it is a crutch they want?

AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS

Mr. NEWHOUSE. I think they feel they need them, and this Government certainly feels it needs a large portion of its security forces available or earmarked for European contingencies in Europe. As I said before, the larger part of them are here. So governments are certainly of one mind about this.

As to whether we should revise these security arrangements and change them dramatically, or withdraw U.S. forces in large numbers, if anybody could make a convincing case for an alternative arrangement or the absence of need, then I think we should look very seriously at this, and do something about it.

But I, at least, have not been impressed by adequate or feasible alternate arrangements, or, indeed, by any significant change in the political equation that would make it desirable to do this.

BUT SOME SCHOLARS DISAGREE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Are there any scholars in the foreign policy establishment or scholars of Soviet-American relations, who take a view that we should withdraw substantial numbers of troops?

Mr. NEWHOUSE. There are some. My feeling is they are a minority. Mr. Stanley may feel differently about this.

Mr. STANLEY. Oh, yes; I think there are some, apart from revisionist historians who reject the whole theory.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Like Prof. William Appleman Williams or somebody like that?

Mr. STANLEY. Like Williams; but I had a colleague at Johns Hopkins, David Calleo, who has written a book called "Atlantic Fantasy." in which he adopts this point of view that our forces are a crutch, and the way to get the Europeans moving is to take away the crutch. But I think that is a minority view.

But to get to your question of whether this shocks me, the answer is "No," because in my relatively short lifetime we have been through three major patterns of world affairs. There is the pre-World War II pattern, World War II, and there was the postwar cold war; and we are now emerging into the fourth pattern, which is different from the postwar, and, as I said earlier, we are trying gradually to liquidate that phase.

It does not seem to me, as long as these forces are in Europe pursuant to a common undertaking, by common desire, that it is an anachronism at all. It is simply a way of making this transition come about with as few risks as possible.

If you ask, looking ahead past that fourth phase, whether that is in the middle or late 1970's or early 1980's, do I still see these forces there, I say, "No." I think that becomes an anachronism because then they would not relate even to this transitional phase that we are in.

A FAMILIAR THEME

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You know what bothers me about that? I am convinced of your sincerity, but I have read the record of those who testified in 1948, 1949, and 1950, 1951, 1952, supporting the maintenance of American troops in Europe. Every single one of them, without exception, testified that they did not see the need beyond a few years. So the issue is subject to a credibility inquiry. That is what bothers me. Mr. STANLEY. I think they gave wrong answers then.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I, myself, am deeply troubled about where the truth really lies.

Mr. NEWHOUSE. History does not reveal alternatives.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We will not be around to exercise those.

Thank you very, very much for a very significant and meaningful contribution to a very difficult question. We are deeply grateful to you. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

79-621-72-10

APPENDIX

NATO, WARSAW PACT AND OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE SECURITY CONFERENCE

On 2nd October 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. The Governments of the Czechoslovak Republic and the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to this zone. The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded on the assumption that the establishment of the proposed denuclearised zone might improve the international atmosphere and promote broader talks on disarmament and the solution of other outstanding international problems, whereas the further growth of nuclear armaments and their extension to other countries would further perpetuate Europe's division into opposing blocs and aggravate the situation, particularly in Central Europe.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic repeated its proposal through diplomatic channels in December 1957.

In view of the broad repercussions caused by the Polish initiative, and also the conclusions drawn from the debate on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed statement of its proposals, which may facilitate the opening of negotiations and agreement on this subject.

I

The proposed zone should embrace the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. No nuclear weapons would be produced or stored and no equipment or plant for their delivery installed in this territory; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone would be prohibited.

II

The commitments arising from the establishment of a denuclearised zone would be based on the following principles:

1. The States of this zone would undertake not to produce, stockpile, import for their own use, or allow the deployment in their territories of any types of nuclear weapons, and also not to install, or allow to be installed, in their territories equipment or installations for delivering nuclear weapons, including rocket launching ramps.

2. The four powers-France, the United States, Britain and the USSR-would undertake:

(a) not to maintain nuclear weapons among the armaments of their forces in the territory of the States comprising the zone; not to have or install in the territory of these States equipment or installations for the delivery of nuclear weapons, including rocket launching ramps;

(b) not to provide, in any way or in any circumstances, the governments or any other agencies in this territory with nuclear weapons, or their associated equipment or installations.

1Text of the memorandum handed by the Polish Government on 14th February 1958 to the representatives in Warsaw of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Czechoslovakia, the Eastern German Democratic Republic and the USSR, and to the representative of Sweden for transmission to the Federal Republic of Germany these recipient countries being those to be included in the proposed denuclearised zone and those with forces stationed therein. The memorandum was accompanied in each case by a note to the recipient government.

3. The powers possessing nuclear weapons should undertake that these weapons would not be used against the territory of the zone or any targets within it. Thus these powers would undertake to honour the status of the zone as a denuclearised territory against which no atomic weapons would be used.

4. Other States whose forces are stationed in the territory of any of the States comprising the zone would also undertake not to maintain nuclear weapons with the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or other agencies within this territory. Nor would they install any associated equipment or installations, including rocket launching ramps, in the territory of the States belonging to the zone, or transfer them to governments or other agencies within this territory.

Detailed agreements could be mutually agreed for the method and procedure for carrying out these commitments.

III

1. To ensure the effectiveness and implementation of commitments set forth in paragraph II, items 1, 2 and 4, the countries concerned would undertake to establish a system of extensive and effective control in the territory of the proposed zone and would submit to it.

This system could comprise ground as well as air control. Control posts with rights and facilities for action ensuring effective inspection could also be established.

The details and forms of exercising control could be mutually agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired in this field and the proposals submitted by various States in the course of disarmament talks held heretofore, in the form and to the extent applicable to the territory of the zone.

The system of control established for the denuclearised zone might serve as a useful experiment for putting into effect broader agreements on questions of disarmament.

2. An appropriate control machinery should be established to supervise the implementation of the proposed commitments. It might include, for instance, representatives appointed (possibly by name) by bodies of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. It might also include citizens or representatives of States which do not belong to either of the military groupings in Europe. The procedure for the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs could be the subject of further agreements.

IV

The simplest method of establishing the commitments by States belonging to the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty. However, to avoid complications which some States might discern in such a solution it would be possible:

1. to embody these commitments in the form of four unilateral declarations in the nature of an international undertaking deposited with a country chosen by agreement;

2. to embody the commitments undertaken by the great powers in a joint document or in unilateral declarations, as indicated above;

3. to embody the commitments by other States, whose armed forces are present on the territory of the zone, in the form of unilateral declarations, as indicated above.

On the basis of the above proposals, the Government of the Polish People's Republic suggests negotiations to elaborate in detail a plan for the establishment of a denuclearised zone, the documents and guarantees connected with it, and the methods of putting the commitments into effect.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic is convinced that acceptance of the proposals for the establishment of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe would facilitate agreement on the restriction of conventional armaments and reduction of the foreign troops stationed in the territories of States belonging to the zone.