We have had some experience with that type of thing, and that is why our emphasis has been on the need for substantive content, both in the preparation for, and in the actual conduct of the conference. I think another danger-and it would be related to this first dangerwould be a conclusion by the Western alliance that the mere conference itself provided sufficient reasons for dismantling of the Western defensive system, and for premature disengagement of the United States from Europe.

It seems to me, if that kind of belief were to result from a conference, this would be a danger.

There are, of course, dangers, also, that divisive tendencies in the West could be accentuated by this conference as the more eager members of the alliance move ahead more rapidly than the ones less eager, and those who are more realistic.

But, having said all these things, I don't want to leave the impression that the dangers are so great or so uncontainable that they, therefore, outweigh the positive aspects of the conference.

Our position is that we have to be aware of these dangers. We have to guard against them. But, nevertheless, we are prepared under the conditions we have stipulated to move toward the conference.

A SENSE OF GERMAN INSECURITY

Mr. FINDLEY. Each time I have been in Germany, I have noted a sense of insecurity on the part of many people. It does not seem to change much with the years. It is my feeling that this insecurity may arise over uncertainty as to its future relationship with the United States.

A feeling is held by some that the Atlantic alliance is a fading institution, that over the years it will simply go out of style and cease to function. Is our Government doing anything to put new spirit and new life and new direction into NATO in order to overcome this insecure feeling?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. There are a number of things that we have been trying to do as a government. You will recall at the very beginning of the present administration, at the 20th anniversary meeting of NATO which took place in Washington, the President proposed three broad initiatives for NATO. First, the enhancement of political consultation through regular meetings of deputy foreign ministers and, generally, a revitalization of the process of political consultation in NATO.

I think that has gone on with some success. In fact, the preparations that have taken place and will take place in NATO on the European conference on security and cooperation are a very good example of the intensified political consultation that NATO is engaged in.

NEW FUNCTIONS FOR NATO

A second initiative which he proposed at that time had to do with the finding of new functions for NATO as we moved toward an era of consultation and negotiation and away from the era of confrontation.

One that he proposed, at that point, was that NATO as an organization should interest itself in the environmental field. This was met with some skepticism at the outset, but, nevertheless, NATO did or

ganize itself to deal with this problem, and has had, I think, remarkable success. In fact, this has caught on as a new idea, and has given NATO a meaningful new function in an area which 10 years ago would have seemed totally unrelated to the primary purpose of NATO.

In addition, of course, the basically defensive function of NATO as the core of the defense of Western Europe has continued to be emphasized, and the improvements that have taken place in the quality in both equipment and manpower are a constant goal of NATO.

But, I think, the overriding consideration which has motivated the approach of the present administration to NATO has been that this is an organization which has continuing viability and it has a continuing purpose to serve, and that it should not be thought of as something which can fade away once the cold war ends, as it has ended, I believe, in its most acute form, and therefore, should be replaced by other institutions.

Mr. FINDLEY. Is it conceivable that the European security conference could result in the dismantling of NATO?

NATO DISMANTLING NOT ANTICIPATED

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I would not think that that would be a result of such a conference. It was, of course, one of the dangers to which I alluded; if a false sense of security were created not based upon the realities, and NATO were to be dismantled as a result of this, this would obviously be an undesirable result.

But I think all of the countries engaged in this enterprise on the Western side are sufficiently realistic to know that a conference of this kind is not going to change the basic nature of East-West problems overnight. While it can make a positive contribution toward a long-range solution of those problems, it is not going to work miracles; and, therefore, the Western alliance needs to be maintained in being a much longer period than is going to be covered by this conference on security and cooperation.

I do not believe there is much tendency to question this. The problem, I think, is likely to be a psychological one, if it arises at all, and that is, if this conference is a success, you will have a period of euphoria after it, and the feeling that all of the problems of relations between states in Europe have been solved and, therefore, we can relax and go home. That, of course, would be, I think, an illusion because some of those problems are going to continue and will require constant attention from both Eastern and Western European governments, if they are to be involved over the long run.

I think that is the general philosophy we approach this conference with.

EXISTENCE OF NATO NOT NEGOTIABLE

Mr. FINDLEY. I would like to add just this comment that I hope that if the European security conference occurs, and the United States has any part in it, that the United States will insist that the existence of NATO to be a nonnegotiable item.

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I don't believe that subject is likely even to come up in this sense, because I do not believe that the Warsaw Pact countries would envisage that the future of the Warsaw Pact were a negotiable item. I think that is the kind of subject which is hardly likely to be on the agenda as such.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How do you see the Common Market and its development, both economically and, thereafter, politically as a new unit in this chess game?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. The position which is being evolved in NATO envisages a certain role for the Common Market in the negotiations of the conference on security and cooperation, because, obviously, to the degree that the Common Market as an integrated segment of European economic life, representing with the enlarged Common Market, 10 countries, speaks on behalf of those 10 countries in this segment of activity, then it will be logically necessary that at the conference someone be able to speak for the Common Market which embodies the allocated authority which the 10 governments will have given to the Common Market.

PRECISE ROLE OF COMMON MARKET UNCLEAR

Precisely how this will work in practice remains to be seen. But, certainly, there has to be an acceptance of the fact of the Common Market as a part of the European scene. As you know, in recent statements by Soviet leaders not bearing directly on the role of the Common Market in the European conference on security and cooperation, they have indicated, for the first time, an acceptance of the fact of the Common Market and, presumably, a willingness to deal with that fact in those matters which concern the relations between the Soviet Union and the Common Market.

The position of the Soviet Union is evolving in this respect. It is not fully clear yet, but I think it is evolving in the essential direction. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Secretary, what kind of a time schedule are we on for this conference?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. Well, there is no agreed time schedule. One can only hypothesize. If one assumes that the Moscow treaty is ratified in the next 2 months or so, depending on how the Bundesrat procedure moves ahead, but allowing for the necessity of a third reading in June, after action by the Bundestag, then presumably the signing of the Berlin Agreement could take place any time thereafter.

Now, one phenomenon that also occurs in Europe is the dedication to the August vacation season by governments and individuals, and it seems unlikely that the Western or the Eastern Europeans would be ready to move immediately towards the multilateral discussion which is the next phase envisaged.

FALL 1972 PREPARATIONS POSSIBLE

Then, I suppose, one has to allow for other events in the autumn and so on, but let us say that by some time in the autumn of 1972 one might envisage this multilateral preparatory process starting in Helsinki. That would mean, if the preparatory process moves ahead in an orderly and constructive way, and an agreement is reached in it as to the modalities and sufficient substance for the conference to warrant the convening of the conference, this could then be convened sometime in 1973.

I would not want to define with more precision precisely when that would be, because you are dealing with the end event of a process that is still underway.

Mr. HAMILTON. Just as a factual matter, I am not clear as to the position of the Christian Democrats [CDU-CSU] in Germany on these treaties.

Is their position one of opposition to the treaties and, if so, what don't they like about them?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. I take it you are referring, Mr. Congressman, to the Moscow treaty?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

CDU-CSU CONDITIONS LISTED

Mr. HILLENBRAND. It is a matter of public fact, I might say, the way the position of the CDU-CSU has evolved. I think they have said that the treaties would be acceptable if three broad categories of conditions were met. One of these categories is the preservation of the right of self-determination, which means, of course, the right, eventually, to have a unified Germany as a part of this system.

Secondly, that the existence of the Common Market, and the implications of that be accepted by the Soviet Union, and thirdly, that there be improvement in the life of the population of East Germany.

Now, what that means in practice is not entirely clear. The Soviet Union has made certain gestures in recent weeks and months which are obviously related to some of these conditions in certain ways.

But, that is essentially the way the position of the CDU-CSU has evolved up to the present time.

Mr. HAMILTON. I don't want to have you comment on things that you don't want to get into, recognizing the sensitivity of it, but my understanding is that if the Christian Democrats prevail in this crucial vote, then this treaty, as presently drawn, would be rejected?

Mr. HILLENBRAND. That would seem to be implicit. I might say, of course, this vote to which you referred is not on the issue of the Moscow treaty.

Mr. HAMILTON. But it is a no-confidence vote.

Mr. HILLENBRAND. Yes; on the economic position.

Mr. HAMILTON. Arising out of the budget; is that not correct?

OPPOSITION DEVICE EXPLAINED

Mr. HILLENBRAND. That is right. I don't want to deviate, but perhaps I ought to explain that the device which the opposition is using is a device peculiar to the German Constitution, which does not exist in other countries, a so-called constructive vote of no confidence.

In most parliamentary systems, where you have the cabinet system of government-Great Britain is a good example of this-when there is a vote of confidence, and the majority votes against the government, the government automatically falls and new elections are called. Under the German system, if the opposition can, in the process of voting against the government, obtain a majority in favor of its chancellor candidate, then the new government can be constructed by this constructive vote of no confidence without any resort to general elections.

That is the procedure to which the CDU-CSU is resorting at the

present time. It has never been used in the post-World War II history of Germany, and is a unique constitutional device.

I might say that it is undoubtedly an element of the German Constitution that has provided the kind of stability in government which has been characteristic of the Bundesrepublik since its inception.

RELATION OF TREATIES TO CES

Mr. HAMILTON. You may not want to respond to this, but again it strikes me, if the treaties are rejected, for whatever reason, then you have a substantial setback to the calling of a European security conference of any kind.

Mr. HILLENBRAND. Well, I would prefer, for the reasons I have indicated, not really to speculate about the effect it would have on the future at this point.

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the things that strikes me about your statement is your emphasis on modest expectations. You talk about a conference being a modest step forward, and you have no allusions about how many problems are going to be solved and I take it, it is a matter of strategy for the United States to emphasize the modest accomplishments that might come to the conference. However, at the same time. I am impressed by the rather grand agenda that the Secretary has laid out, when he speaks about the conference going to the questions of the underlying causes of tension, dealing with the security issue, and the basic principles that govern relations among the states, and the issues of cooperation between East and West.

Now, you could not possibly draft a broader or grander agenda than the Secretary has done. It seems to me the very nature of that agenda is going to arouse among the people very great expectations, and no amount of disclaimer by the United States about small steps forward, and modest improvements will be able to dispel that.

AN EXTENDED PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. HILLENBRAND. Well, if one expected that out of this one-time conference you would have solutions to all of the problems encompassed by these various agenda items, then, obviously, one's hopes would not be described as modest. On the other hand, I think, as the Secretary said in his speech-and certainly, this is the way we look at it-we regard this as sort of the beginning of an extended process, and not a conference out of which will emerge full blown a new order in Europe with agreement on all of these various types of cooperation and exchange, but rather a meeting which, at best, would lay the foundation for something which will work out through the 1970's.

For example, cooperation even in the field of environment is not something you can engineer overnight. This will take years to work out because strong and vested national interests are at stake here. Likewise, in the field of freedom of movement of ideas and of peoples and so on, it would be unrealistic to assume that the barriers that now exist will be dismantled as a result of a conference.

Mr. HAMILTON. As a matter of strategy, Mr. Secretary, it seems to me, in approaching the conference, one way to go at it would be to set