been to work with your enemy's enemies, as the Chinese Communist leaders had done with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang against the Japanese invaders. Attacks against religion and reactionary governments had also proven disastrous for the Communists in Indonesia, who were slaughtered. Unity of ranks, as well as unity of purpose against Israel, was what the Palestinians needed most, the Chinese are said to have warned.

Through the first months of 1971 Peking continually gave public warnings to the Palestinians that Hussein's "lackey regime, with the support of American imperialism," was plotting their total liquidation, a prediction that came true in Jordan in July with the expulsion of the guerrillas from their last Jordanian bases. Sniping continued at the Soviets' position in the Middle East. In April 1971, only a week after an American table tennis team had entered China and begun a process climaxed by President Nixon's scheduled visit in 1972, and during a worldwide Jewish campaign on behalf of Jewish emigration from Russia, Peking-inspired media took up this question. The Albanian Telegraph Agency charged that Soviet opposition to the emigration of Soviet Jews was "only apparent." The Kremlin, said the Tirana release, "is itself inciting the Jews to leave the USSR in order to go and populate the occupied Arab territories. The Brezhnev-Kosygin clique is pretending to take a position in favour of the Arab countries. But in reality, it is only helping the Zionists to preserve their domination of the occupied Arab territories. This is why the Soviet revisionists are following a policy of inciting the Jews to emigrate to Israel." The number of emigrants, Tirana pointed out, was rising every year; the majority of them were aged 30 to 40 years and certain among them were "military experts."

9932

BASIC ELEMENTS OF CHINESE POLICY

One feature of past Chinese foreign policy is that China has not been consistent in supporting all "liberation" movements when to do so has seemed to conflict with its national interest. Though it has shown interest in the Eritrea Liberation Front, it has also steadily improved relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who visited Peking in 1971. China did not side with the abortive Sudanese Communist coup of July 1971, and immediately after Major General Jaafar al-Numeiry crushed it, with assistance from Egypt and Libya, Peking and Khartoum announced new commercial and aid agreements. More recently, Chinese national interest led Peking to cold-shoulder the Bengla Desh fighters of East Pakistan and to offer support, short of war, to the West Pakistani military regime.

Are the Palestinians different? Can China be expected to continue refusing all contact or relations with Israel? Will the disgrace and apparent death of Lin Piao, former Chinese War Minister, one-time heir apparent of Mao, and the theoretician of revolution, have any effect on Peking's Palestinian policy? Most of all, will the Sino-American rapprochement reach a stage where it might weaken Chinese support for the Palestine cause?

Here and there, it is true, Chinese leaders have cast some admonitory straws of caution into the revolutionary winds they are popularly supposed to fan everywhere. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi warned in 1963:

"The question of world revolution is one for the countries concerned. If countries are not ripe for revolution, then China can't do anything about it. However, China will support revolutions against imperialism and oppression. This is not to say that we are behind all revolutions. Castro in 1959 had no relationship with us . . . China is not the arch-criminal behind all revolutions. China cannot pour revolutions on or off when she wants to. China can only manage her own affairs. But China will support foreign revolutions both morally and politically. We are Marxists. We must support them. . . But, it must be noted, Chinese troops will not cross our borders to advance revolutions."

To try to determine China's future policy toward the Palestinians, it may be a useful exercise to try to see the Arab world through Chinese eyes. A reading of Chinese policy statements suggests that Peking classifies the Arab governments into three main groups. First is the "socialist" group: Egypt, Syria. Algeria, North and South Yemen and Iraq, and, in terms of activism if not

32 AFP from Tirana, quoting the ATA, Apr. 20, 1971.

33 Transcript of an interview by Chen Yi with John Dixon, Australian film producer. quoted in Arthur Huck, The Security of China (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 52.

socialist doctrine, the non-governmental Palestine Liberation Organization. All of these have had diplomatic relations with Peking since the 1950's or 1960's as well as growing trade with China. All, however, are not necessarily on the best of political terms with Peking at all times.

Second is a group with which Peking also has growingly fruitful commercial relations and which it seems to regard as "neutrals"; Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauretania, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Lebanon, all of which now have diplomatic relations with Peking, or are in the process of acquiring them. Libya, outside this category until the Libyan revolution of September 1969, might have been placed in this category too. However, Colonel Kazzafi's mistrust of Communism and his Islamic puritanism have held him back from rapidly forming ties with China. At the same time Kazzafi and his associates have repeatedly said they would determine their relations with all foreign countries in terms of how they stand on the Palestine question. If Libya went to war against Israel with Egypt and the Palestinians, in Peking's eyes it would become a militant. In the third category have been the "reactionary" states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which before 1972 refused contacts with China though they had some trade. At time of writing, Peking seemed unlikely to violate pledges which some Palestinian leaders believed it had made not to accept any Jordanian feelers as long as King Hussein persisted in his policy of rejecting the Palestinian organizations and relying on U.S. support.

The twin bases of China's action in the world outside are ideology and national interest. The two are often interdependent, but sometimes they seem to clash. A China acting on purely ideological motives alone, for example, would never have opened relations with regimes like those in Yemen in 1957 or Morocco in 1958; or, for that matter, the Gulf States in 1971, though the three are not fully comparable. But neither would a China which acted only according to selfish economic or military interest continue to avoid all contact with Israel.

For the first wellspring of Chinese action, which is ideology, the basic documents and charts have long been public knowledge. A map, for example, published by the Peking Review in 1968 and lettered with commentaries, shows "excellent revolutionary situations" in twelve areas: Palestine, Angola, Yemen, India, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia and Latin America. Palestine is classed as one of the twelve "revolutionary" zones of interest to China despite the fact that it lies outside China's direct geographical sphere of influence, and even beyond what the map calls the "outer Asian Zone" including Iran, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan.

Chinese theory, as developed by the now-disgraced but not yet refuted Lin Piao, has been that the future of the world lies in the "rural areas of the world," among the landless workers and poor peasants. In this sense, Israel is one of the "cities of the world," to be encircled like those of Europe and North America. Lin Piao's "four principles" are: first, to give priority to the struggle against imperialism and revisionism; second, to construct a broad anti-imperialist front; third, to establish revolutionary bases in the "new rural areas" of Asia, Africa and Latin America; and fourth, to use the people's war, as taught by Mao, General Giap and Che Guevara, as the essential ingredient of the anti-imperialist struggle, because "in the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. . . ." 35

Translated into Middle Eastern terms this means: first, undermining the positions of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France in the region; second, setting up a united anti-imperialist front which has proven extremely difficult because of Soviet, Egyptian and other influence, and because of the area's poltically fragmented nature; third, the implantation of revolutionary bases in the Palestinian and South Arabian areas to encircle imperialist and Soviet ones, break them down and finally to invest them through people's wars. These are some of the ideological and theoretical principles involved. They are all manifest in Chinese policy. But there is yet another motive in Chinese support for the Palestinians, and one that comes more clearly under the heading of "national interest." This is oil.

24 Map reproduced in Morton Ginsberg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in Tang Tsou (ed.), China in Crisis, vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 77. Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Peking Review, 36, Septemebr 3, 1965.

Through the last three decades, mainland China has industrialized mainly with coal and electric power rather than with oil. Its own limited developed oilfields in Manchuria and Sinkiang, vulnerable to Soviet attack because they are mostly near the frontiers, apparently work to capacity, but this capacity may be no more than 15 million tons of crude oil a year for a country of 700 million people, nearly one-quarter of the world's population. Peking's main outside oil sources, both largely independent of Western oil companies, have been Burma and Indonesia. But the oil reserves of both are small, and both have had poor political relations with China. If, as part of her policy for economic development, China is to follow the example of other coal-oriented countries such as Britain and convert to the generally cleaner and more efficient means of oil, it must assure some major outside source of crude oil. In April 1971 it concluded an oil deal with Iraq which is reported to include future deliveries of Iraqi crude to China. A month earlier, through the opening of Kuwaiti-Chinese diplomatic relations, Peking had already placed large orders for Kuwaiti petrochemicals." In September 1971, the head of state of one of the largest West Asian countries told this writer he was convinced the Chinese would want to purchase large amounts of oil in the Arab Gulf region within the decade to come, and the best course was to make this commercially available, one reason being that this would discourage China from supporting guerrilla movements like the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf.

The Gulf and Arabian zones produce around 500 million tons of oil annually in 1972. If the People's Front or other revolutionary organizations could carry out their proclaimed goal of establishing a "People's Republic of the Gulf”something the leftist Palestinian organizations, which have liaison with the Arabian revolutionaries, say they approve such a regime might be inclined to sell oil to China as it does now to Japan and its Western markets, without losing these markets. The area between Kuwait and Oman today is the only major world oil region within practical distance of China, about 5,000 sea miles from Canton and a bit more from Shanghai. This is half the distance which tankers, with the Suez Canal closed, must travel around Africa in order to reach their European markets.

If it could raise the foreign currency required, China might charter tankers: this writer heard of at least one Greek operator who had made an offer to Peking by October 1971. But there are land routes too. Pakistan already has a gas pipeline running halfway from Karachi to the Kashmir border. Since January 1971, a new all-weather truck road, a modern version of the ancient silk caravan route, has been handling convoys of up to 150 trucks a day in China's growing Middle East trade. This is a four-lane road entering West Pakistan at Gilgit. China thus beat Russia in the race for a southern outlet to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. To keep this lifeline, which could prove to be of vital importance in China's relationships with the Arabs, Peking must stay on good terms with Pakistan: if she does, the future advantages may be political and strategic as well as commercial.

In China's support to the Palestinians, therefore, there is a singular mixture of ideology, principle and enlightend self-interest. Though the Chinese are far away and their assistance alone might never tip the scales in favour of the Palestinians, any analytical effort which ignored or belittled it might prove to be, in the words of an old Chinese folk saying quoted by Mao, "lifting a rock off the ground, only to drop it on your own feet."

Cf. Petroleum Press Service (New York), October 1971, which takes a cautious view of China's future oil requirements.

APPENDIX B

[From the New York Times, Jan. 23, 1972]

"AID FROM CHINESE POPULAR IN YEMEN"

SANA, Yemen, Jan. 22 (Reutters)-Western countries establishing aid and trade relations with Yemen are finding that they have to face tough comparisons with the already well-established Chinese.

The Chinese have been involved here for about 20 years, when Yemen was still a kingdom. This was before the overthrow of the ruling Imam, or King, Mohammad-al-Badr, in 1962 and the bitter civil war in the republic that ended two years ago.

There is no doubt the Chinese are popular. In contrast with the Russians, who helped the republicans win the civil war against the royalists, China seems to have kept aloof from politics. "There have been several instances of pro-Soviet conspiracies among young army officers here," one senior Yemeni official said, "but never a trace of Chinese interference or subversion."

"The Chinese just get on with their work," he said. "When they undertake a project they make the initial arrangements with us and the next we hear from them is an invitation for a minister to preside at the inauguration."

Chinese projects include such contributions to the economy as new roads, a textile factory and a technical high school. Chinese foremen work side by side with Yemeni laborers.

SOVIET INFLUENCE WANING

The result is that the Chinese are generally respected here, while Soviet influence is waning, despite Moscow's help during the war.

Western aid ventures, largely interrupted by the war, also suffer by comparison. West Germany has an assistance program exceeding $26-million in easy long-term loans and involving free technical help. West German experts have been provided, at Yemeni request, to advise on organizing postal services, farming, the national airline, public works and sports training in schools.

A consortium of two West German concerns and one British company is due to begin work shortly, under a Bonn loan, on extending the Sana airport runway and on putting a tar surface on a 100-mile road that the United States built from Sana to Taiz in the 1960's.

Despite the usefulness of these projects, some Yemeni officials make an unfavorable comparison between them and the Chinese undertakings. "All this aid from Germany was arranged and signed 18 months ago but the work is only just about beginning," one Government official complained.

CRITICISM TERMED UNFAIR

Western diplomats regard the criticism as unfair. "How can the West Germans, or any other country with a slow democratic system, compete with the Chinese who can sign a contract and then order a ship to load up and sail for Yemen within a few weeks?" one diplomat asked.

A similar difficulty applies to the resumption of relations between Yemen and the United States, which Sana broke in June, 1967, at the time of the Arab-Israeli war. Some Yemeni officials say that they would like to reestablish relations but that they want a commitment of American aid in advance.

This is politically impossible, according to American diplomats who still work in the former United States Embassy building here with the flag of Italy, which is officially responsible for Washington's interests, flying from the roof.

Apart from the present restrictions on United States foreign aid, the Americans explain, Congress will not even consider requests for assistance unless there are diplomatic relations with the receiving country. There the matter rests, officially under consideration by the Yemeni Government.

Meanwhile, Chinese engineers and foremen are pushing on with a new road from Sana northward to the town of Sada, close to the Saudi Arabian border. This project, financed by a $26-million loan, was agreed on in 1964 but delayed by the Yemeni civil war. About one-third of the 140-mile route has been completed so far.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1972]

"CHINA RESURGING IN AFRICA"

(By Larry Heinzerling)

LAGOS, NIGERIA. The crimson flag that flies over China's new embassy compound on Ahmadou Bello Road droops in the sultry air of this West African capital.

But for diplomats and China watchers alike, it is alive with meaning in a continent divided on Peking's growing activity and involvement.

After maintaining a low profile for more than five years, China has reemerged with a new face, new poise and renewed vigor on the African scene. The recognition of China last year by Nigeria, the most populous nation in black Africa, marked a major victory in a recent series of diplomatic successes that has red flags going up from Senegal to Ethiopia.

For some Africans, the flags represent the banners of a new ally against "neocolonialism," a friendly superpower to help Africans defend their interests at the United Nations and a new source of aid.

For others, they represent the old threat of subversion and takeover, which some African leaders maintain the Chinese have abandoned in rhetoric but not in spirit.

Whatever China's motives it is busy.

The past 18 months have seen a flurry of activity across this continent-new diplomatic ties, cultural accords, military pacts bilateral aid and agreements. In just over a year, Peking has won diplomatic recognition from nine new African friends-Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Rwanda, Senegal and, most recently, Ghana.

Together with other countries that recognize Peking, this leaves 13 major holdouts who still have ties with Taiwan-Gambia, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Zaire, Madagascar, Malawi and South Africa.

There are other examples of China's "quiet leap forward" in Africa in recent months:

A six-day state visit to Peking by Ethiopia's influential Emperor Haile Selassie, who went home with an $84-million loan for agricultural development. Continued progress on the $400-million Peking-financed Tanzam railway linking landlocked Zambia's copper mines to the Indian Ocean at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

A growing presence in Mauritania, in northwest Africa, where a large Chinese force is expected to build a deep-water port at Naouakchott, the capital.

Deeper involvement in the Congo-Brazzaville, where the Chinese have agreed to "increase the potential of the Congolese army, both in equipment and its personnel."

Chinese tactics seem to have changed from a decade ago, when they first came to Africa armed with revolutionary rhetoric and instructors in subversion. Then, the Chinese were arming Bamilike rebels in Cameroon and backing the Eritrean secessionists in Ethiopia, the Congo rebels, dissidents in Rwanda, the Sawaba opposition in Niger and, later, antigovernment movements in Senegal. In Ghana, the Chinese ran a secret camp for guerrillas ostensibly being trained as "freedom fighters" against Africa's white minority governments.

But some of the graduates turned up in Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Upper Volta, where they sought to overthrow established African leaders.

In late 1963, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, on a 10-nation tour of the continent, proclaimed: "An excellent revolutionary situation exists in Africa."

In three years, that all seemed to come to an end when Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown by the army while visiting Peking, and diplomats from China and Eastern-bloc nations were expelled.

Other nations began ousting the Chinese for various reasons and, with the coming of the Cultural Revolution, many of Peking's emissaries were withdrawn from Africa.