shed in the long run. In other words. India was being encumbered with an enormous flow of refugees and they would apparently continue to be the cause of warfare and killing inside of East Pakistan. At least from India's point of view this might have been a justified action. But under the course of the general rules in the world community, you don't send national armies across national boundaries.

I am wondering if you think that the rules under which the United Nations operated-the general rules delineating the proper conduct. of nations were adequate for the situation.

Mr. HOFFMANN. I think there is a danger that we too often think in terms of an international organization having a police force to maintain the status quo, whatever it is, and I don't think we should think solely in those terms. I think we have to think in terms of building the institutions to resolve conflicts.

I think what was lacking here was not just a police force to carry out a political resolution of the General Assembly, but what was lacking was a method of resolving the dispute that had arisen; namely. the International Court of Justice should have been presented with a lawsuit.

India could have brought suit in the International Court of Justice on charges of genocide, if genocide were in fact charged and that were a part of the Human Rights Covenant that had been agreed to by all sides. There should have been a method short of war to resolve the legal disputes involved. There should have been a method in terms of arbitration, where the parties appoint one arbitrator, and they, in turn, pick a third, or various methods of arbitration by a panel, and so on.

We have to build these institutions so that disputes can be resolved. and you also need a police force to back up the decision if it is resolved.

I think there should have been a way for India to litigate its charges rather than just present them to the General Assembly and then nothing happen.

Mr. FRASER. You suggest that there is a lot of machinery which needs to be established that can be used effectively.

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. So that the parties will have confidence.

Mr. HOFFMANN. Right.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How do you feel about some kind of weighted voting procedure?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I think that the larger nations should have more votes in the General Assembly. One proposal is the Greenville Clark proposal the largest have 30 and the smallest have one.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Does he base those four nations-India, China, the U.S.S.R.. and the United States-on population or prestige or gross national product or what?

Mr. HOFFMANN. He bases it on population categories. I think everybody over 150 million he gives 30 votes, and then the next eight I think have 15 votes, and then scaled on down.

Of course, there have been a lot of proposals, and I don't mean that we have to have this particular one. There have been proposals based on gross national product and so on. But I think the important thing

here is that if you are going to relinquish the veto there has to be a different voting system in the General Assembly. I think the important thing is to get the nations of the world to start discussing it în a charter review conference.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did you mention that in your paper anywhere? Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes, on the bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6. What I said is that the one-nation-one-vote principle could also be reexamined by such a conference and there are several proposals available. I didn't go into it in detail.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. This is one U.N. problem I find many Americans have trouble with, the one-nation-one-vote principle. They don't have confidence in the United Nations, particularly since the number of U.N. members has doubled since it started.

Mr. HOFFMANN. Right.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That seems to me the lowest common denominator among U.N. critics if you are going to have any changes.

Mr. HOFFMANN. There is another deterrent that the one-nation-onevote has. The United States in particular and maybe other countries, too, are reluctant to give the United Nations any real power if we only have one vote in the General Assembly. I think that people are reluctant to give it any force.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Particularly the nations who feel that their security interest requires them to maintain the kind of forces they have in order to preserve their national interests. They are the ones who are most reluctant to give away anything. You have to give them something in return.

Many people who are most offended by the one-nation-one-vote principle, say they cannot even pronounce the names of the countries that have an equal vote in the General Assembly with their own country. What is the position of the State Department on this?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I just read the letter today, but as I recall, I think what they are saying is that they know of no specific amendments on which everybody agrees, and therefore they are reluctant to have a charter review conference for fear it may be fruitless.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It is my impression that the European nations have given more significance to their European Court of Justice than to the International Court of Justice. It may be a good example to follow. We were impressed on a recent study mission in Europe that a number of European nations have given significant chunks of jurisdiction to this court and were willing to abide by it. Many Americans are not aware of that concept. That might be a selling point in this thing. Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you.

We are going to ask the Department of State to appear. I think one of the questions we need to have answered is: If Congress does not act, what will the Department do in response to the Secretary General's request? In other words, will they have their own ideas which they will offer even in the absence of this more formal study that we are considering?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Of course, there is the Lodge Commission report, which we feel does not go far enough, but it does discuss some aspects of strengthening the United Nations.

Mr. FRASER. A certain number of proposals.

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes; and then, of course, the Katzenbach report, too. Mr. FRASER. Right.

Mr. HOFFMANN. So it seems to me this is a beginning; that they could build up from.

Mr. FRASER. I have just one last question and then we will get on to our final witness.

In your view, if we have a charter review conference, what level of officials should represent the member governments? In other words, should it be the Secretaries of State of the nations or would the U.N. regular Ambassadors be sufficient? Perhaps you have not prepared yourself on this subject.

Mr. HOFFMANN. No; I have not prepared myself, but it is an interesting question. I would think that it should involve, of course, the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to the United Nations, but I should think in addition to that there should be specific delegates named whose sole function would be to work on this and who may spend months on it in terms of working on nothing else but.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, there would be somebody delegated from each delegation that would make it their sole, principal interest? Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. The reason I raise the question is that we are likely to be faced with the argument that if it is going to be at the U.N. Ambassador level, how would the Charter Review Conference really differ from a meeting of the General Assembly, other than that its focus would be on charter review, as distinguished from the regular range of problems with which the General Assembly deals each year.

Mr. HOFFMANN. That is why I think it is necessary to have persons in addition to the ambassador, to have persons delegated just to be delegates to this, and they would sit there throughout the sessions. I would think that that would be necessary.

Mr. FRASER. That is something we will consider.

Mr. HOFFMANN. May I just submit to you-I think these have been submitted at the table "The World Association of World Federalists Proposals for United Nations Reform?" They include three categories: Proposals which require a charter change, proposals for which charter change is desirable, and proposals not requiring charter change. I thought if you wanted to make this part of the record, you could do so.

Mr. FRASER. Yes; without objection, we will insert it in the record at this point.

(The document referred to follows:)

THE WORLD ASSOCIATION OF WORLD FEDERALISTS, PROPOSALS FOR UNITED

NATIONS REFORM, PARIS, FRANCE-JANUARY 15, 1972

The United Nations, as a political structure, is evolving with the passage of time and by the light of its experience in dealing with the problems of human society. Some substantial possibilities for further evolution, moreover, exist in the present Charter. History and experience show the need for continuing reform of the United Nations to meet the needs of a shrinking, dangerous and rapidly changing world.

Since 1945 the advent of nuclear power, the spreading of armaments, numerous wars, the wasting of resources, a deteriorating environment, rising human expectations in collision with poverty and over-population, a sharp increase in United Nations membership and major shifts in international relationships, and

the demonstrated shortcomings of the United Nations in peacekeeping and as a creator of world law, together with even other factors, combine to show the urgency of review and reform of the Charter and of the functioning of the United Nations.

Proposals for the development of the United Nations must have the guiding purpose of promoting the well-being and dignity of the human person. The longer term aims of the suggestions we offer are:

1. To strengthen the capacity of the United Nations as a means of international decision-making, as a system of justice and as a source of enforceable law, so that it may replace a war system based on the destructive use of national power;

2. To re-enforce human rights and to enable the United Nations to meet needs which nation-states or lower levels of government cannot effectively serve, and

3. To redirect the use of human and natural resources from war and arms into an improvement of the quality of life.

The World Association of World Federalists suggests to the Member Nations of the United Nations some important areas for reform of its structure and operation. We recommend such proposals as these to the Member Nations as a response to the request of the Secretary-General, acting for the General Assembly, that Member Nations present their views on review of the United Nations Charter at the 27th General Assembly.

We believe that the challenges of our present world environment demand a quantum jump toward world order and that world leadership must move quickly to prepare an adequate response. We urge the 27th General Assembly to establish a United Nations committee for the consideration of suggestions and proposals from Member Nations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, in preparation for holding a United Nations Charter review conference at the earliest practical date.

Some of the recommended proposals would require, at least in part, changes in the present wording of the United Nations Charter. For other proposals, Charter changes would be preferred, but are not absolutely essential. Finally, we offer several suggestions concerning the development of the United Nations system which do not involve the Charter.

I. PROPOSALS REQUIRING CHARTER CHANGE

1. Membership.-The function of the United Nations is to represent the peoples of humanity. Full implementation of the principle of universal membership will greatly strengthen the United Nations. The seating of the Peoples' Republic of China is a major advance toward the principle of universality. This development provides a basis from which to press forward for the admission of the other States not now Members of the United Nations. Amendment of the Charter is long overdue to remove from its language all reference to the "enemy states" of World War II.

2. Peaceful settlement of disputes.-The provisions of the Charter for dealing with peaceful settlement of disputes need improvement. Experience indicates that the existing wording is too imprecise and too permissive, often leading to delay and the failure to deal with disputes at the optimum time for their settlement. There has been a tendency, moreover, for the United Nations to immobilize disputes, rather than to settle them.

The redrafting of Article 33 is therefore advisable in order to provide a specific mode of progression, when necessary, from two-party negotiations to increasingly higher levels of third-party involvement in stubborn disputes. Such provisions would commit the parties to a dispute, in advance, to accept arbitration or judicial settlement, in the event that negotiation, inquiry, mediation or conciliation may prove insufficient.

While, under Article 29, the Security Council may establish subsidiary organs as it deems them necessary for the performance of its functions, there is in fact no permanent standing machinery to function in pacific settlement of political disputes. Therefore the wording of Article 37 should be amended to include provisions for a standing Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. Such a Commission should consist of a small group of persons universally respected, such as past Presidents of the General Assembly; the Commission should determine its own procedures and methods, and its work should normally be confidential.

3. The International Court of Justice.-It is desirable to relate the Court much more closely and effectively to the maintenance of international peace and security. No single act would be of greater aid to this aim than for States to declare that they recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes.

In addition, the following amendments, among others, are worth consideration at any general review of the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice:

(a) There should be a provision for referring automatically to the International Court of Justice for judicial settlement the justiciable legal elements of any dispute which has proved intractable under a revised Article 33 on Peaceful Settlement.

(b) Broader provisions for the use of the Court for advisory opinions are necessary. At present the Security Council, the General Assembly, and any United Nations organ or agency so authorized by the Assembly may request an opinion. In addition, regional organizations, individual States, and the Secretary-General should have such rights before the Court.

(c) The United Nations as a legal entity should also have authorization to bring cases before the Court.

(d) There should be provisions to establish international regional Courts under the supervision of the International Court of Justice, and for the right of litigants to appeal from a regional court to the International Court of Justice. 4. Human rights.-At the present time the United Nations deals with most human rights matters at as many as five different stages: in a sub-committee or ad hoc committee or by a special rapporteur, then in the Commission on Human Rights, in ECOSOC, next in the Third Committee, and finally in the Plenary of the General Assembly. The United Nations should create a new Human Rights Council to integrate these steps and to report directly to the General Assembly. Such a Council would be on the level of the Economic and Social Council, and would relieve ECOSOC of its human rights responsibilities, thus freeing it to concentrate on economic and social developments.

It is desirable that the United Nations should implement the proposal for creating a new post of High Commissioner for Human Rights. The establishment of a World Court of Human Rights to supplement existing and planned regional Courts of Human Rights deserves study. Such a World Court of Human Rights would have responsibilities analogous to the European Court of Human Rights.

5. Strengthening the ECOSOC.-The United Nations Economic and Social Council needs the means to fulfill the functions for which it is responsible. Moreover, the authorization in the Charter for ECOSOC to "co-ordinate the activities of the Specialized Agencies through consultation" is inadequate. The expected success of present moves to enlarge the membership of ECOSOC will enhance its ability to make broadly based policy decisions. It is important that ECOSOC reflect the kind of concerns about the terms of trade, commodity price levels and related matters which are central interests of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

For truly effective co-ordination of the economic and social work of the United Nations system, ECOSOC should have the authority to review all questions relating to economic and social matters before their submission to the General Assembly and to pass on the policies, plans and budgets of the concerned Specialized Agencies before their adoption by those bodies. Authority well beyond that specified in the Charter is necessary to enable the Economic and Social Council to carry out its job effectively.

II. PROPOSALS FOR WHICH CHARTER CHANGE IS DESIRABLE

6. Peacekeeping.-The Charter has spelled out the procedure for taking enforcement action against aggressors in Chapter VII. These provisions should, of course, be implemented. In addition, however, the framers of the Charter did not adequately foresee the evolution of international peacekeeping by interposition in order to arrest conflict and prevent violence without prejudice to the matter at issue. Consequently a new paragraph under Article 40 is desirable to spell out the generally agreed principles of observation and of peacekeeping by interposition. A draft of this new section should include points such as the following: