DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1972.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of April 25, 1972 requesting comments on H.J. Res. 1143 and 1144, "Establishing a Commission on United States Participation in the United Nations."

The Department of State shares the view expressed in the bill that the Lodge Commission made a fresh and distinctive contribution in appraising the prob lems and performance of the United Nations system and recommending constructive proposals for its modernization, as well as for improved participation by the United States.

At the direction of the President, we have been giving close and careful attention to the recommendations. Some have already been implemented. Others require action by one of the organs of the UN system, necessitating extensive and persistent efforts by our representatives to marshal the support of other delegations. Others are still under consideration, in some cases in coordination with other departments and agencies of the United States Government whose interests are involved.

We have already made an interim report to a Congressional committee on our progress in implementing the recommendations of the Lodge Commission and would be prepared to make further progress reports at the pleasure of Congress. In carrying forward the process of review and appraisal of the organization and operation of the UN system and the United States role therein, we anticipate valuable assistance and guidance from the Advisory Committee on International Organizations which will shortly be reconstituted. With a membership of over twenty private citizens appointed by the Secretary, the Committee's purpose is to provide a two-way channel between the Department and the publicadvising the Department on how best to assure a strong and responsive United Nations that has the confidence of the American people and the Congress, and helping to present to the people and the Congress the problems and opportunities deriving from American participation in the United Nations system. You will recall that the Lodge Commission recommended the establishment of such a body. We fully share the objectives of the sponsors of the resolutions; it is clearly in our national interest to help the United Nations improve its performance and realize its potential for building a better world. However, we have difficulty in envisaging a significant role for another Commission of a permanent nature. charged with reviewing generally the operation of the United Nations system and specifically the implementation of the Lodge Commission report. With limited staff available, we foresee difficulties in providing adequate support both to the Advisory Committee and to the proposed congressional-citizens commission. Moreover, we question whether a permanent commission however talented and prestigious could issue each six months a meaningful report which would commend the attention of the President, the Congress and the public.

The Department believes that it would be more practical and fruitful to constitute a Presidential commission on the United Nations at longer intervals, perhaps once in each administration as proposed in the Lodge report. Such a commission could conduct reviews in depth with sufficient intervening time to provide perspective on changing national priorities and changing conditions of the UN system.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report. Sincerely, DAVID M. ABSHIRE, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Mr. FRASER. Our first witness will be Congressman Hungate, who has demonstrated a long and constructive interest in the United Nations and represents a very positive force for effective congressional work.

We are glad to have you here this afternoon.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, permit me to express my deep appreciation and that of the sponsors to appear here today.

I would like to submit for the record my 22-page statement, and I will endeavor to be sure my summary is not longer than my statement and I will skim through here if I may.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, we will put your entire statement in the record.

(The prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM L. HUNGATE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today before this distinguished Subcommittee in support of my resolution (H. Con. Res. 258, etc.) urging review of the United Nations Charter.

In length my resolution is not very big, but its hopes are large-to bring about a renewed interest in invigorating the United Nations so that it may achieve the humanitarian purpose of serving as an instrument of world peace.

On line 14, Page 2, of the resolution, it sets a deadline for the President to report to the Congress on possible Charter revision before March 31, 1972. Of course, this date has passed; however, I believe when the Administration appears before this Subcommittee they might be able to offer a reasonable date so that the United States will be able to submit its views to the Secretary General prior to 1 July 1972, the deadline set in General Assembly Resolution 2697 (XXV). And, otherwise I would urge this Subcommittee to fix a date not later than June 15, 1972.

While the position of the United States appears to be that procedural changes and alterations such as those suggested in the report of the President's Commission on the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations take precedence over tackling the problem of possible Charter revision, I believe that we cannot afford to discount any means to revitalize the United Nations, including Charter review.

And, there are many of us who see Charter revision as a prerequisite of any productive reform of the United Nations.

One of the most crucial areas of Charter reform possibilities is in the voting procedures.

Some of the objections to the existing voting rules were emphasized in a report from Denmark:

On January 1, 1969, there were 45 member countries with less than 31⁄2 million total inhabitants. With a total membership (at that time) of 126 countries, 43 small countries numbering 70 million people could overthrow a vote in which a two-thirds majority was required, provided that countries with widely different points of view and "allegiances" voted alike.

It is, of course, possible for the smaller countries to pool their votes. The twothirds majority is required only of countries present and voting so that nonvoting countries are not reckoned, cf. par. 88 of the rules of procedures of the General Assembly. In practice, the smaller countries, although representing less than 2 percent of the world's population will be able to prevent a decision on an important issue.

It has been argued, with some weight, that the existing voting rules are neither just nor democratic; they give citizens of small countries far greater influence than those of larger countries. It is remarkable that the bulk of the North American Continent is represented by only two countries, the USA and Canada, each holding one vote, while the Continent of Africa is divided into some 35 independent states also holding one vote each—a state of affairs which derives from the colonization of areas outside Europe. The USA with its 200 million inhabitants, India with 471 million and the USSR with 234 million each have only

one vote (though the USSR holds two extra votes), while the African states with 235 million inhabitants hold 35 votes. This is definitely an anomaly in terms of democracy as well as equity.

Member states generally pay their contributions to the United Nations' normal budget in proportion to national per capita income. The one-country-one-vote system implies that countries paying less than 3 percent of the budget (23rd General Assembly 1968) can muster a simple majority while countries paying only 4.31 percent can muster a two-thirds majority and the ten largest contributors holding only 8 percent of the total vote paid 76 percent of the organization's expenses.

Hence, the smallest countries could make decisions imposing tasks on the organization to which they would contribute nothing or very little. This could in itself imply a dissipation of responsibility seeing countries imposing tasks on an international organization should be able to contribute to the realization of such tasks. In other words, there should be a realistic relationship between voting rights and effective capabilities.

It is interesting to compare the United Nations with other international organizations. The principle of one-country-one-vote is not applied to all such organizations, a number of them have adopted a weighted allocation of votes according to specified criteria.

International organizations with weighted voting may be divided into two groups: (1) organizations serving a defined purpose, and (2) political organizations.

Common to international organizations serving a limited practical purpose is that votes are allocated to member countries in relation to their interest in the organization's purpose. This system seems to function well, there is no evidence of any special difficulties.

For example, the International Sugar Council and the International Wheat Council both use weighted allocation of votes. In these two organizations votes are divided into two equal parts, one for importing and one for exporting countries. Each part is distributed in proportion with the imports or exports of the individual countries. Decisions are made by simple majority, but there must be a majority in both groups.

Much more relevant for an evaluation of weighted voting is the system adopted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. In both organizations 250 votes are allotted to each country plus one vote for every 100,000 US dollars subscribed. The amount of share in the IBRD and quotas in the IMF is based on national income, foreign trade, etc., of the member countries. In votes, account is also taken of the member's current position vis a vis the IBRD or IMF.

In these two organizations, influence is thus related to economic ability, etc. including drawings on the IBRD/IMF.

Examples of international political organizations are the Council of Europe and the European Economic Communities.

The Council of Europe has a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly. The Committee of Ministers is an intergovernmental body. Apart from its competence and its permanent status it is not different from traditional diplomatic conferences.

Each member country appoints one representative. Decisions, such as recommendations to governments, must be unanimous. Decisions of less significance may be taken by a two-thirds majority vote or, in certain cases, by simple majority.

The Consultative Assembly is the parliamentary organ of the Council of Europe. Its composition and working procedures are like those of a national parliament although it has no legislative authority. Each member country has been allotted a number of votes which is roughly proportional with its population, though with a certain preponderance for smaller countries. The votes are distributed as follows:

Decisions of the Consultative Assembly consist of recommendations, resolutions, statements and directives. A recommendation or statement addressed to the Committee of Ministers requires a two-thirds majority of the votes cast (by roll call). Hence, the four largest countries, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Great Britain cannot decide a vote alone. Resolutions and directives require only a simple majority. A resolution is an expression of the Assembly's opinion and is transmitted only to the organization it concerns. A statement is adopted in response to a request from the Committee of Ministers. Directives contain instructions for the President of the Assembly or its committees or for the Secretary-General.

Votes are cast by individuals on their own behalf-not, as in the United Nations, in accordance with government instructions.

The provisions governing institutions of the European Economic Communities are contained in Articles 137-198 of the Treaty of Rome.

The governing body is the Council of Ministers on which each of the six member countries has a representative. The Council adopts the rules which, together with the Community treaties, constitute the foundation of the legal system of the Communities. The Council can make five different kinds of decisions: regulations, directives, decisions and recommendations and opinions. Regulations are binding and directly applicable to member states. Directives bind any member state to which they are addressed as to the result to be achieved while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means. Decisions are binding for the addressees named in them. Recommendations and opinions are not binding.

Conclusions of the Council may be reached according to the nature of the matter involved, unanimously, by qualified majority or simple majority. Article 148 allocates weights to the votes of the individual representatives in matters requiring a qualified majority. Germany, France and Italy have 4 votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands 2 each and Luxemburg 1. The small countries thus hold a proportionately greater voting strength than the big countries do. The distribution of votes is not in exact conformity with the relationship between population figures and national products because consideration has been given to the principle of international law concerning equal treatment of sovereign states regardless of size. The main object of this distribution of votes was to bar any one of the larger states, alone or together, from preventing qualified majority vote. The disproportionate voting weight of smaller states is also motivated by their role as mediators between the big member states. The strong influence of the Benelux states is also manifest in the composition of the Commission and that of the European Court of Justice.

Twelve votes are required for a qualified majority in the Council, but these shall be composed of the votes of at least four countries except for decisions to be made on a proposal from the Commission. In practice, the big countries have never outvoted the small countries because the Council refrains from going against the votes of one or more member states on important issues.

The Commission has 14 members appointed jointly by the governments. Unlike the Council, the Commission is an independent Community institution. Its members do not represent their respective home countries and are not allowed to accept instructions from the governments of the member countries. The Commission thus looks after the interests of the whole Community on the basis of voted in favor. All other decisions of the Parliament are made by simple majority. In important matters, however, the Commission will endeavor to obtain unanimity as far as possible. The Commission is the Community's initiating body, being responsible for submitting proposals for new rules to the Council.

The European Parliament (the Assembly) has controlling and deliberating authority. It has 142 members divided according to the size of the member states (France, Germany and Italy 36 members each, the Netherlands and Belgium have 14 and Luxemburg 6 members). These are appointed by the national parliaments. In one respect only the parliament can make decisions with binding effect: if it adopts a vote to censure by a two-thirds majority the Commission must resign as a body; in such votes at least one half of the representatives must have voted in favor. All other decisions of the Parliament are made by simple majority. There are still no direct elections to the European Parliament, but Article 138 requires the Parliament to draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage with a uniform procedure in all member states.

Of timely interest is an event that took place in France this past Sunday, April 23, when a major European Community policy question was placed before the voting public for the first time. The fact that this occurred indicates an important nation permitting its citizens to make an international decision by referendum. This could constitute an important precedent.

Since the establishment of the United Nations a number of proposals have been made for amendment of Articles 18 and 19 which deal with voting.

In a book entitled, War or Peace, published in 1950, Mr. John Foster Dulles proposed a voting system similar to that which is used in the U.S. Congress. Dulles proposed two votes in the General Assembly: once according to the onecountry-one-vote principle and the second vote weighted by the population figures of the voting countries.

In 1950 New Zealand proposed a similar double voting, though with a weighting of votes being related to national contributions to the budget of the United Nations.

In 1961 Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, in the Oliver Wendell Holmes' Lectures at Harvard University, prosed that an enlarged Security Council and the Genera! Assembly should act as two chambers, so that decisions should be carried only by a majority in both chambers. For financial issues, Mr. Cohen proposed the same system of voting as in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In 1962 Mr. Hermod Lannung proposed a combination of the present system and a system of weighting based primarily on population figures, providing. however, for factors such as cultural, economic and social development to be taken into consideration as well and assuming that votes would be weighted according to individual "estimates" (as in the Council of Europe). Lannung's proposal, like that of Mr. Dulles, implies "double voting" on each item. With an electric voting system this should cause no extra trouble, because voting under both systems is registered simultaneously by a simple pressure on the voting button. However, determining the appropriate weight to each nation for cultural, economic and social development would seem at first glance impossible.

In a proposal from 1948, the "Committee to Frame a World Constitution" proposed that each member country should elect one representative for each million inhabitants. These representatives would meet in regional election assemblies to elect delegates to the General Assembly.

Under the system The World would be divided into nine regions according to geographic, economic and political criteria.

In the book, World Peace Through World Law, Mr. Grenville Clark and Mr. Louis B. Sohn (pointing out that under the present system the bigger nations cannot be expected to consent to wider powers for the United Nations) propose a voting system which is based on:

(1) Each member, however small, is entitled to representation by one vote.

(2) A reasonable upper limit to influence (votes),

(3) Subject to these rules, votes are to be distributed according to population figures.

Assuming a membership of 99 countries it is proposed that:

The four largest countries are to have 30 votes each; the eight next largest countries are to have 15 votes each; the 20 next largest countries are to have six votes each; the 30 next largest countries are to have four votes each; the 34 next largest countries are to have two votes each; and the three smallest countries are to have one vote each.

The authors say the allocation of votes is based on the further assumption that the USA, the USSR, Mainland China and India would have equal representation. France, Italy, Great Britain and West Germany (which is not yet a member of the United Nations), Brazil, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan would rank as the eight next-largest countries.

The authors visualize voting only by simple or by qualified majority.

The delegates of the individual countries—after an initial period during which they would be appointed by the governments-would be elected by direct election in the countries concerned.

A consistent and democratic proposal, based solely on population without the General Assembly becoming unwieldy, is one elaborated by Mr. Aage Heyman of Denmark in "An Attempt to Define Laws and Regulations for a Commonwealth of Nations" from 1949.