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is a spirit in man which giveth wisdom, and the inspiration of the Holy One which giveth understanding."

From hence we may learn, Secondly, a lesson of faith, of confidence in God. A full conviction of our own ignorance may teach us a full trust in his wisdom. It may teach us, (what is not always so easy as one would conceive it to be,) to trust the invisible God, farther than we can see him! It may assist us in learning that difficult lesson, to "cast down" our own "imaginations," (or reasonings rather, as the word properly signifies,) to "cast down every high thing, that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." There are, at present, two grand obstructions to our forming a right judgment of the dealings of God with respect to men. The one is, there are innumerable facts relating to every man, which we do not and cannot know. They are, at present, hid from us, and covered from our search by impenetrable darkness. The other is, we cannot see the thoughts of men, even when we know their actions. Still we know not their intentions; and without this, we can but ill judge of their outward actions. Conscious of this, "judge nothing before the time," concerning his providential dispensations: till he shall bring to light "the hidden things of darkness," and manifest "the thoughts and intents of the heart."

From a consciousness of our ignorance we may learn, Thirdly, a lesson of resignation. We may be instructed to say at all times and in all instances, "Father, not as I will; but as thou wilt." This was the last lesson which our blessed Lord, as man, learned while he was upon earth. He could go no higher than, "Not as I will, but as thou wilt," till he bowed his head and gave up the ghost. Let us also herein be made conformable to his death, that we may know the full power of his resurrection.

SERMON LXXV.

THE

CASE OF REASON IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED.

1 CORINTHIANS xiv. 20.

"Brethren, be not children in Understanding; in wickedness be ye children; but in Understanding be ye men.”

1. IT is the true remark of an eminent man, who had made many observations on human nature, "If reason be against a man, a man will always be against reason." This has been confirmed by the experience of all ages. Very many have been the instances of it in the Christian, as well as the Heathen world: yea, and that in the earliest times. Even then there were not wanting well-meaning men, who, not having much reason themselves, imagined that reason was of no use in religion: yea, rather that it was a hindrance to it. And there has not been wanting a succession of men, who have believed and asserted the same thing. But never was there a greater number of these in the Christian Church, at least in Britain, than at this day.

2. Among them that despise and vilify reason, you may always expect to find those Enthusiasts, who suppose the dreams of their own imagination to be revelations from

God. We cannot expect, that men of this turn will pay much regard to reason. Having an infallible guide, they are very little moved by the reasonings of fallible men. In the foremost of these we commonly find the whole herd of Antinomians; all that, however they may differ in other respects, agree in making void the law through faith. If you oppose reason to these, when they are asserting propositions ever so full of absurdity and blasphemy, they will probably think it a sufficient answer to say, "O, this is your reason!" or, "your carnal reason. So that all arguments are lost upon them they regard them no more than stubble or rotten wood.

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3. How natural is it for those who observe this extreme, to run into the contrary! While they are strongly impressed with the absurdity of undervaluing reason, how apt are they to overvalue it! So much easier it is to run from East to West, than to stop at the middle point! Accordingly we are surrounded with persons, (we find them on every side,) who lay it down as an undoubted principle, that reason is the highest gift of God. They paint it in the fairest colours: they extol it to the skies. They are fond of expatiating in its praise: they make it little less than divine. They are wont to describe it, as very near, if not quite infallible. They look upon it as the all-sufficient Director of all the children of men; able, by its native light, to guide them into all truth, and lead them into all virtue.

4. They that are prejudiced against the Christian Revelation, who do not receive the Scriptures as the Oracles of God, almost universally run into this extreme. I have scarcely known any exception: so do all, by whatever name they are called, who deny the Godhead of Christ. Indeed some of these say, they do not deny his Godhead; but only his supreme Godhead. Nay, this is the same thing; for in denying him to be the supreme God, they deny him to be any God at all: unless they will assert that there are two gods, a great one, and a little one! All these are vehement applauders of reason, as the great unerring guide. To these over-valuers of reason we may

generally add, men of eminently strong understanding; who, because they know more than most other men, suppose they can know all things. But we may, likewise, add many who are in the other extreme, men of eminently weak understanding: men in whom pride, (a very common case,) supplies the void of sense: who do not suspect themselves to be blind, because they were always so.

5. Is there, then, no medium between these extremes, under-valuing and over-valuing reason? Certainly there is. But who is there to point it out?-to mark down the middle way? That great Master of Reason, Mr. Locke, has done something of the kind, something applicable to it, in one chapter of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. But it is only remotely applicable to this: he does not come home to the point. The good and great Dr. Watts has written admirably well, both concerning reason and faith. But neither does any thing he has written, point out the medium between valuing it too little and too much.

6. I would gladly endeavour, in some degree, to supply this grand defect: to point out, first, to the undervaluers of it, what reason can do; and, then, to the overvaluers of it, what reason cannot do.

But before either the one or the other can be done, it is absolutely necessary to define the term, to fix the precise meaning of the word in question. Unless this is done, men may dispute to the end of the world, without coming to any good conclusion. This is one great cause of the numberless altercations which have been on the subject. Very few of the disputants thought of this; of defining the word they were disputing about. The natural consequence was, they were just as far from an agreement at the end, as at the beginning.

I. 1. First, then, reason is sometimes taken for argument. So, "Give me a reason for your assertion." So in Isaiah, "Bring forth your strong reasons;" that is, your strong arguments. We use the word nearly in the same sense when we say, "He has good reasons for what he does." It seems here to mean, He has sufficient motives, such as

ought to influence a wise man. But how is the word to be understood, in the celebrated question concerning the reasons of things? Particularly when it is asked, An Rationes rerum sint aterna? Whether the reasons of things are eternal ? Do not the reasons of things here mean, The relations of things to each other? But what are the eternal relations of temporal things? Of things which did not exist till yesterday? Could the relations of these things exist, before the things themselves had any existence? Is not, then, the talking of such relations, a flat contradiction? Yea, as palpable a one as can be put into words.

2. In another acceptation of the word, reason is much the same with understanding: it means a faculty of the human soul: that faculty which exerts itself in three ways, by simple apprehension, by judgment, and by discourse. Simple apprehension is barely conceiving a thing in the mind, the first and most simple act of the understanding. Judgment is, the determining that the things before conceived either agree with, or differ from each other. Discourse, strictly speaking, is the motion or progress of the mind, from one judgment to another. The faculty of the soul which includes these three operations, I here mean by the term reason.

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3. Taking the word in this sense, let us now, impartially, consider, first, What it is that reason can do? And who can deny that it can do much, very much, in the affairs of common life? To begin at the lowest point, it can direct servants how to perform the various works wherein they are employed; to discharge their duty either in the meanest offices, or in any of a higher nature. It can direct the husbandman at what time, and in what manner, to cultivate his ground; to plough, to sow, to reap, to bring in his corn, to breed and manage his cattle, and to act with prudence and propriety in every part of his employment. It can direct artificers how to prepare the various sorts of apparel, and a thousand necessaries and conveniences of life, not only for themselves and their households, but for their neighbours, whether nigh or afar off. It can direct those

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