of him, or what he is prohibited from doing, his only safe course would be to comply with every request made; for should he fail or refuse to comply, if counsel are correct, it might be decided that he refused to perform an implied duty, which is one of the conditions of section 1. Suppose we had this statute in substance: SECTION 1. Every county assessor, before making an assessment shall be entitled to the privilege of examining the books of all firms, corporations and individuals selling merchandise within his county. SEC. 2. Any person having charge of such business, whether principal, agent or superintendent, who shall fail or refuse to comply with the conditions of section 1, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished, etc. Under that statute, the assessor goes to a Chinese corporation selling merchandise, and demands of the person in charge the privilege of examining the books. duced, but are kept in the Chinese language. The assessor, being unable to understand the Chinese method of bookkeeping, demands an interpreter, upon the ground that it is an implied duty on the part of the corporation to furnish one. They are pro Even admitting that implied duties or prohibitions, within reasonable limits, may be considered in relation to penal statutes, in my opinion it is not such duty to furnish a guide in the one place or an interpreter in the other. But other judges might think otherwise, and thus we see some of the evils liable to arise from an equitable rather than a strict construction of penal statutes-some of the evils so vividly portrayed by Beccaria; thus we see that superintendents would be in continual doubt as to their duties, and, consequently, would not know with certainty when they could with impunity refuse a stock. holder's request. The legislature may have intended to require of the superintendent all that is claimed by counsel for the State; but if such was the intention, they failed to use any fit words expressing the same. In their absence I am unable to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner committed any of fense in refusing to admit the complainant to the Hale & Norcross mine and works. It follows that he is detained without authority of law and must be discharged. I am permitted to add, that in the above construction of the statutes referred to, my associates fully concur. The petitioner is discharged. 1. For instance of inspection and view, with excavation, at a cost and to a degree amounting to oppression, see Stockbridge Co. v. Cone Works, 6 M. R. 317. 2. New trial granted on account of jury, on inspection, being treated by the successful party: Sacramento Co. v. Showers, 6 Nev. 291. See Schissler v. Chesshire, 5 M. R. 309. 3. Each associate has the right to inspect the partnership books: Bute v. Stuart, 12 L. J., Ch. 140; Maden v. Veevers, 7 Beav. 489. 4. The court may order inspection of mines: Ennor v. Barwell, 1 DeG. F. & J. 523; Post PLEADING: And a survey and plat: Att'y Gen. v. Chambers, 12 Beav. 129. 5. Inspection, with injunction, and cost of searching out the holes which caused flooding: Plant v. Stott, 6 M. R. 175. 6. Surface owners allowed to inspect mines, for protection of building: Dugdale v. Robertson, 3 Kay & J. 695. Post SURFACE SUPPORT. WHALLEY V. RAMAGE. (10 Weekly Reporter, 315. Superior Court of Equity, 1862.) Mode of working mine. In the absence of express contract, the lessee of a mine is entitled to work the minerals by "instroke.' In this case, which involved various complicated questions as to the working of certain mines, held under an agreement for a lease to be granted by the plaintiff, the, following point was decided, the importance of which arose from the mode of working carried on by the lessees, who had thus been enabled to escape payment of tolls for carriage of minerals over a railway of the plaintiff. DANIEL, Q, C., and G. OSBORNE MORGAN, for the plaintiff. ROLT, Q. C., and COTTON, for the defendant. WOOD, V. C., held, that in the absence of express contract, the lessee of a mine has a right to work the minerals by "instroke," that is, by or through pits sunk upon adjoining lands held by the lessee under a different lessor.' 1 See "Bainbridge on Mines," p. 90 (2d Ed.), where the terms "instroke" and "outstroke" are explained: also Rogers, 403. 1. Lessees may rightfully work by instroke: Lewis v. Fothergill, L. R. 5, Ch. App. 103; Post WORKINGS; Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6, Ch. App. 742; Post LEASE. 2. Instroke is a workmanlike means of mining: Jegon v. Vivian, supra. THE LYCOMING FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY V. (95 Pennsylvania State, 89; 40 Am. Rep. 629. Supreme Court, 1880.). Policy avoided by riot. A policy of insurance provided that the company should not be liable for any loss or damage by fire caused by means of an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion or military usurped power." Held, that where a breaker at a coal mine was set on fire at night by a party of men who fired a number of shots, drove the watchman away and then burned the breaker, there was a riot within the meaning of the policy. Arson defined into a riot. The burning of a coal breaker by a band of men who discharge fire-arms and drive away the watchman is a riot, although the element of a turbulent disturbance of the public peace may be wanting. June 7, 1880. Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, of May term, 1880. No. 135. Covenant by William Schwenk and Jacob Geise, trading as William Schwenk & Co., for the use of Henry Saylor, against the Lycoming Fire Insurance Company, upon a policy of insurance upon a coal breaker and machinery near Mount Carmel, in Northumberland county. The defendant pleaded: 1. That the property alleged in the declaration to have been burned and destroyed by fire "was burnt and destroyed. by rioters in the perpetration of a riot, and not in any other manner;" 2. That the burning and destruction of the said property "was caused by means of a riot and not in any other manner;" 3. That the burning and destruction of the said. property" was caused by means of a civil commotion, and not in any other manner." The defendant pleaded further " non est factum, covenants performed absque hoc and nil debet." It was provided by the policy that the defendant should. not be liable by virtue of this policy "for any loss or damage by fire caused by means of an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion, or military or usurped power," and also that "persons sustaining loss by fire or lightning, under a policy, shall give notice thereof forthwith to the secretary, and within thirty days of said loss deliver to the secretary a particnlar account and proof thereof, signed and sworn to by them, setting forth among other things: "sixth, the date of the loss and the amount thereof; seventh, how the fire originated, so far as said persons know or believe." A fire occurred on the third of June, 1875, and a statement of the loss, sworn to by William Schwenk, on the 22d of June, 1875, purporting to give a particular account of the loss and the origin of the fire was sent to the secretary of the company, in which among other things was the following: "A fire occurred on the third of June, 1875, at about the hour of ten o'clock, P. M., an originated as follows, viz.: Of my own personal knowledge I do not know, but the two watchmen who were in charge of the premises say that about seventy-five men came to the breaker, an 1 while some stationed themselves as pickets, others carried wood for kindling to the boiler-house and after saturating the wood and parts of the building with coal oil, set fire to it, and then remained and guarded the premises until they were satisfied that destruction to the breaker was certain." No notice of any other canse of the fire was ever given to the company, and on the trial the defendant contended that this was notice that the property was burned and destroyed by means of a riot, and also proved by the watchmen and others that the property was set on fire and destroyed in the manner stated in the notice. The sixth and seventh points of the defendant with the answers of the court thereto were as follows: 6. That if the jury believed that the breaker was destroyed by fire in the manner testified by Timothy Adams, their verdict ought to be in favor of the defendant. Ans. "I can not charge you as requested as a matter of law, but say to you that I have already in the general charge defined the offense of riot, and have just told you, in answer to the foregoing points of the defendant, what circumstances would be deemed a riot so as to constitute a defense to the plaintiff's claim, and I now submit the tes |