mind of any particular perfon, alfo, they fuppofe not to be confined within the body of that perfon; but that though itself bears no relation whatever to fpace or place, its exertions and affections are, by the fovereign appointment of his Creator, confined to a particular fyftem of organized matter, wherever that happens to be, and continues fo limited in its operations as long as the organization fubfifts; but, that being diffolved, the immaterial principle has no more to do with the matter that had been thus organized, than with any other matter in the universe. It can neither affect it, nor be affected by it.

Others, however, I believe, confidering that, though mathematical points occupy no real portion of space, they are yet capable of bearing fome relation to it, by being fixed in this or that place, at certain diftances from each other, are willing to allow that spirits alfo may be faid to be in one place in preference to another; and confequently that they are capable of changing place, and of moving hither and thither, together with the body to which they belong. But this is not the opinion that seems to prevail in general; fince it fuppofes fpirit to have, at leaft, one property in common with matter, whereas a being frictly immaterial (which, in terms, implies a negation of all the properties of matter) ought not to have any thing in common with it. Befides

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Besides, a mathematical point is, in fact, no fubftance at all, being the mere limit, or termination of a body, or the place in void fpace where a body is terminated, or may be fuppofed to be fo. Mere points, mere lines, or mere surfaces are alike the mere boundaries of material fubftances, and may not improperly be called their properties, neceffarily entering into the definition of particular bodies, and confequently bear no fort of relation to what is immaterial. And therefore the confiftent immaterialift has juftly disclaimed this idea.

Indeed it is evident, that if nothing but immaterial fubftances, or pure intelligences, had exifted, the very idea of place, or space could not have occurred to us. And an idea that an immaterial being could never have acquired without having an idea of body, or matter, cannot belong to itself, but to matter only. Confequently, according to the ftrict and only confiftent fyftem of immateriality, a fpirit is properly no where, and altogether incapable of local motion, though it has an arbitrary connection with a body, that is confined to a particular place, and is capable of moving from one place to another. This, therefore, being the only confiftent notion of an immaterial fubftance, and every thing short of it being mere materialism, it is to the confideration of this idea, that I fhall here confine myself.

Appearances cannot be faid to favour the doctrine of these very abstract metaphysicians.

For

For, certainly, judging by what appears to us, we should naturally fay that the foul accompanies the body, and is contained in it, and therefore changes place together with the body. On this account, therefore, the most acute immaterialists have taken a good deal of pains to fhew that, notwithstanding thefe appearances, which at firft fight are acknowledged to be unfavourable to their fyftem, there is not properly any motion, or change of place, in the foul, let the body to which it belongs rove about ever fo much.

"For my part," fays Father Gerdil, as he is quoted by the author of La vraye Philofophie, p. 271, "if I had no other reafon to fa

tisfy me, I should content myself with fay"ing, with the most celebrated philofophers, "of ancient and modern fchools, that one

cannot doubt but that thought and volition

are incapable of moving with the body, be"cause they are evidently without extenfion. "But the foul, of which they are modifica

tions, is of the fame nature with them. "The foul, therefore, can no more move "than the thought or the will.”

To illuftrate this paradox, he fays, p. 272, that "the void space, in a carriage drawn by "horfes, does not move with the carriage, "because it is nothing; and though the foul

be a real fubftance, it bears no more rela"tion to place, than if it had been nothing " at all." He adds, p. 273, in order to explain how the foul can have an idea of ex

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tenfion

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tenfion and of space, when itself bears no relation to either, that "though the foul be incapable of motion, like the body, it "doth not fail to contain eminently within "itself that quality of matter, and therefore "is capable of transferring it upon matter, "and of fuppofing it to belong to mat66 ter."

Afterwards, p. 275, in explaining what is meant by the foul's willing and acting in its own body, he fays, that "thefe expreffions, "the foul is in the body, thinks in the body, "and goes out of the body, fignify nothing "but that the foul is united to the body, that "it thinks in a dependence upon that union, " and that, after a certain time, the foul will "be no longer united with that body; but "that the foul is not placed in the body as "the brain is in the fkull, or that it is in the

place where the body is. How unintellibly are perfons reduced to talk, when they quit the road of common sense, forming their fyftems not from facts and appearances, but from imagination.

The author of Letters on Materialism, addreffed to myself, feems to think that he has faid fomething to the purpose, with respect to this difficulty, arising from the place of Spirits, by confidering Space as nothing more than an ideal phenomenon arising from the extenfive order of co-exifting bodies. As this expreffion, I own, conveys no clear idea to me, I fhall lay before my readers the whole paragraph, be

caufe

caufe, though I am not able to get any light from it, it is poffible that another may. "To your fecond objection, that, properly fpeaking, your mind is no more in your body, "than it is in the moon; because it is incapable of bearing the leaft relation to fpace? I an"fwer, matter, indeed, occupies Space, to "which Spirit has no relation, that is, mat"ter, as a compounded fubftance, bears, in "its various parts, a relation to other bodies. "Space, in itself, is nothing real, it is only 66 an ideal phenomenon arifing from the ex"tenfive order of co-exifting bodies. Take "from the creation every body, or, which "amounts to the fame, every being capable "of viewing them, and space will no longer "fubfift."

Now it appears to me, that it is impoffible, even in idea, to fuppofe the annihilation of fpace. Let any perfon but for a moment suppose the annihilation of all matter, which is not difficult, and then confider whether the annihilation of Space will neceffarily follow. I do not mean in imagination, like the idea of things tending to fall downwards on the oppofite fide of the globe of the earth, but in the nature of things.

Afterwards this writer confiders the prefence of the mind with the body, as attefted by its action upon it, fo that fill the fpirit, properly fpeaking, is no where, and has no motion, notwithstanding its ftrict union with, and its conftant action upon, a body which is neceffarily

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