[References are to pages.] Wiley v. National Wall Paper Co., 70 Ill. App. 543 (1896), 395. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270; 21 Supm. 128; 45 L. Ed. 186 Willis v. Muscogee Manuf. Co., 120 (Ct. App. Md., 1909), 9, 94. Wills v. Central Ice & Cold Storage Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 483; 88 S. W. 265 (1905), 39, 40. Willson v. Morse, 117 Iowa, 581; 91 N. W. 823 (1902), 398. Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. Wil mington & B. S. Ry. Co., 8 Del. Ch. 468; 46 Atl. 12 (1900), 204, 258. Wilson v. Carter Oil Co., 46 W. Va. 469; 33 S. E. 249 (1899), 297. Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389; 83 N. E. 928; 16 L. R. A. N. S. 85; 122 Am. St. Rep. 119 (1908), 54, 139. Windisch-Muhlhauser Brewing Co. v. Bacon, 53 S. W. 520 (Ky. Ct. App., 1899), 46. Winslow v. Building Trades Council (Case & Comment, Aug., 1899), 172, 196. Wisewall, see The Charles E. Wisewall. Wiswall, see The Charles E. Wise wall. Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 60 Neb. 583; 83 N. W. 842 (1900), 258, 331. W. K. Niver Coal Co. v. Cheronea Pants Co., 113 La. 388; 37 So. Wolff v. Hirschfeld, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 670; 57 S. W. 572 (1900), 440. Wood v. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. 1; 62 Pac. 135; 52 L. R. A. 369 (1900), 451. Woodberry v. McClurg, 78 Miss. 831; 29 So. 514 (1901), 412. Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617; 86 Pac. 1063; 8 L. R. A. N. S. 783; 117 Am. St. Rep. 1079 (1906), 45, 46. Woodruff v. Hughes, 58 S. E. 551 (Ct. App. Ga., 1907), 32. Woods v. Hart, 50 Neb. 497; 70 N. W. 53 (1897), 278. Woodward v. Boston, 32 Am. Law Rev. 624 (Super. Ct. Mass., 1898), 42. Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421; 32 N. E. 744; 20 L. R. A. 342; 34 Am. St. Rep. 294 (1892), 197. W. P. Davis Machine Co. v. Robin son. See Davis Machine Co. v. Robin son. Wright v. Crabbs, 78 Ind. 487 (1881), 277, 326. Wright v. Cudahy, 168 Ill. 86; 48 N. E. 39 (1897), 199, 277. Wunch v. Shankland, 59 App. D. 482; 69 N. Y. Suppl. 349 (1901), 128. Wyeman v. Deady, 79 Conn. 414; 65 Atl. 129; 118 Am. St. Rep. 152 (1906), 6, 31, 151. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Searles, 85 Miss. 520; 37 So. 939; 68 L. R. A. 715 (1905), 343, 411, 413. Ex parte Young, 6 Bissell, 53; Fed. Cas. No. 18145 (1874), 277. Zumpfe v. Gentry, 153 Ind. 219; 54 N. E. 805 (1899), 209. THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS, MONOPOLIES AND LABOR UNIONS PART I. COMBINATIONS PRODUCING PRIVATE INJURY. CHAPTER I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS § 1. General liability for injury to another. 2. Injury from words, as distinguished from acts. 6. Announcement of intention to do lawful act; enforcement of rule of labor union. 7. Injury to business. 8. Interference with interstate commerce and transportation of mails. § 1. General liability for injury to another.-The existence in this world of numerous human beings, most of them in close proximity to one another, gives rise to the eternal and universal conflict between the interests of one's self and those of others. Law, both human and divine, is concerned with the establishment of rules to harmonize these conflicting interests. In this treatise we are specially concerned with this conflict as it is produced in the course of strictly trade or commercial relations. But there seem to be no legal burdens or restrictions placed upon a trader, merely by reason of his being a trader. Not merely to trade relations, but to all the other relations in life wherein exists the possibility of conflict between the interests of one's self and those of others,' applies the doctrine long since established, that, "in all cases where a man has a temporal loss or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an action upon the case to be repaired in damages.' § 2. Injury from words, as distinguished from acts.-So far as injury results from words, spoken or written, the rule determining liability therefor is closely related to the law of libel and slander. But in many instances, at least, it will suffice to base the liability for injury resulting from words, upon the broad doctrine above stated, without determining whether the liability is technically for libel or slander." 1 See remarks of Bowen, J., in Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598, 614 (1889); and article in 21 Am. Law Rev. 521 (1887), by J. H. Wigmore. 21 Comyn's Digest, Action upon the Case, p. 278, cited in Walker V. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562 (1871); Transportation Co. V. Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 623; 40 S. E. 591, 596; 56 L. R. A. 804, 811; 88 Am. St. Rep. 895 (1902). As to criminal liability, see § 89. 3 It might, perhaps, have SO sufficed in the following instances, where technical actions for libel wer held maintainable: Chiatovich v. Hanchett, 88 Fed. 873 (C. C. Nev., 1898); 96 Fed. 681 (C. C. Nev., 1899; publication of notice addressed to employees of defendant requesting them not to deal with plaintiff); affirmed as Hanchett v. Chiatovich, 101 Fed. 742; 41 C. C. A. 648 (9th C., 1900); McIntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. St. 52; 45 Atl. 666 (1900; falsely alleging indebtedness of plaintiff to defendant "with the intention of injuring the plaintiff, destroying his business, and undermining his credit "); Hartnett V. Plumbers' Supply Assoc., 169 Mass. 229; 47 N. E. 1002; 38 L. R. A. 194 (1897). Compare Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454; 56 N. E. 619; 49 L. R. A. 612 (1900). In Reynolds v. Plumbers' Protective Assoc., 30 Misc. 709; 63 N. Y. Suppl. 303 (Supm. Ct., Tr. T., 1900), acts were sustained by an application of the doctrine of privileged communication, instead of being, as they well might have been, regarded as the natural incident or outgrowth of the relation among members of an association arising from their common interest. In Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105 Iowa, 488; 75 N. W. 355; 67 Am. St. Rep. 306 (1898), it was held actionable to write a letter to the plaintiff's employer resulting in his discharge from employment, even on the assumption that the letter was not defamatory, so as to sustain a technical action for libel. § 3. Acts of violence.-As to liability for injury resulting from acts of direct violence to person or tangible property, little need be said, as they are so universally regarded as creating a civil or criminal liability, or both.* For statements by a labor union concerning employers who had refused to become parties to an "early closing movement," and held not libelous, see Watters V. Retail Clerks' Union, 120 Ga. 424; 47 S. E. 911 (1904). As to effect of statement that a person has been placed on an "unfair list" by a labor union, see Labor Review Pub. Co. v. Galliher, 45 So. 188 (Supm. Ct. Ala., 1907). See Rice v. Albee, 164 Mass. $3; 41 N. E. 122 (1895); May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11; 51 N. E. 191 (1898); American Ins. Co. v. France, 111 Ill. App. 382 (1903). As to remedy by injunction, see §§ 92, 93. 4 For instances, see c. X. See also Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 324; 11 C. C. A. 209, 223; 25 L. R. A. 414, 430 (7th C., 1894); modifying Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 60 Fed. 803; 25 L. R. A. 414 (C. C. Wis., 1894); U. S. v. Elliott, 62 Fed. 801 (C. C. Mo., 1894); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 515; 77 N. W. 13, 20; 42 L. R. A. 407, 414; 74 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1898); Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49; 46 Atl. 208 (1899; see as to effect of N. J. statute of 1883). See on the general subject article in 16 Harv. Law Rev: 236 (1902-3) by E. F. McClennen. As to whether legislation authorizing such acts would be constitutional, see Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49 (C. C. Tenn., 1901). Statutory declarations of liability for injuring or interfering with, or preventing or hindering the pursuit of, a business or occupation, or, in particular, against interfering with, etc., in obtaining, continuing in or leaving employment, frequently expressly prohibit acts of violence. See, for instance, Ala. Crim. Code (1907), §§ 6397, 6856; Colo. R. S. (1908), § 400; Ga. Penal Code (1895), § 124; Jones v. E. Van Winkle Co. Gin & Machine Works, 62 S. E. 236; 17 L. R. A. N. S. 848 (Supm. Ct. Ga., 1908); Ky. Stat. (1903); c. 32, §§ 802, 803; Me. R. S. (1903), c. 127, § 21; Mass. R. L. (1902), c. 106, § 11; Minn. R. L. (1905), § 5140; Mo. R. S. (1906), § 2155; Carter v. Oster, 112 S. W. 995 (Ct. App. Mo., 1908); N. Y. Penal Code, § 653; N.D. Penal Code (1905), §§ 9434-6; Okla. Stat. (1903), §§ 2642-3; Oreg. Crim. Code (1902), § 1971; R. I. Gen. Laws (1896), c. 278, § 8; S. D. Penal Code (1903), §§ 757-9; Tex. Penal Code (1895), § 600; Vt. Pub. Stat. (1906), § 5867; Wis. Stat. (1898), § 4466c. Thus of injury to railroad property in furtherance of a strike: Del. R. S. (1893), p. 928; Me. R. S. (1903), c. 124, §§ 6, 7; N. J. L. 1903, c. 257, § 63; Pa. 2 P. & L. Dig., pp. 3949, 3955. By the English Conspiracy & Protection of Property Act (1875). "every person who with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which |