have called the doctrine of "solidarity of interest" would justify a boycott by others not employees of such employer, but engaged in the same general occupation with his employees, or members of the same organization. Thus far it would seem that the judicial mind has not, as a rule, risen to the point of regarding this solidarity of interest as sufficient to justify a boycott by employees. Likewise has been developed a tendency to hold without justification a "secondary," as distinguished from a "primary" boycott, that is, a boycott directed against, not the immediate employer, but a third person, dealing with him. In the view herein taken there is no basis for such a distinction.45 § 64. Inducing breach of contract.-In determining the legality of the act of inducing another to break his contract, there has already been indicated, as a test applicable, whether such violence or threat of violence." But it was held that the decree should be so modified as to include the distribution of circulars by the defendant unions. The boycott was instituted because of the refusal of the plaintiffs, who were employers, to sign a contract regulating the conditions of employment of teamsters, The question whether the relation of the defendants was such as to justify the boycott was not discussed in the opinion, though elaborate in other points. To somewhat similar effect is My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238; 59 Atl. 721; 68 L. R. A. 752 (1905), where the injunction against the boycott and incident acts (see § 25) was allowed, notwithstanding that such boycott, as well as the strike to which it was incident, was for the purpose of securing an increase of wages. See 45 See Parkinson V. Building Trades Council, 98 Pac. 1027, 1038 (Supm. Ct. Cal., 1908), where what also National Tel. Co. v. Kent, 156 Fed. 173 (C. C. W. Va., 1907). An injunction against a boycott of an employer by employees was also allowed in Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389; 83 N. E. 928; 16 L. R. A. N. S. 85; 122 Am. St. Rep. 119 (1908; see as to effect of putting on "unfair list"). As to relief under Federal antitrust act against boycott instituted for the purpose of compelling unionization of shops, see § 191. As to boycott being illegal under Ohio anti-trust act, see § 227. As to proceedings to punish for contempt for violation of injunction against boycott by employees, see § 95. See, on the general subject, articles in 20 Harv. Law Rev. 253, 345, 428 (1907) by Jeremiah Smith; 42 Am. Law Rev. 200 (1908) by C. R. Darling. seems to have been a secondary boycott was sustained, but see to the contrary decision cited in § 62. act was the natural incident or outgrowth of some lawful relacion.46 On principle the relation of employee would, like that of trade competitor,47 seem sufficient for this purpose. But the propriety of the application of this test has yet to obtain general recognition.48 46 See § 28. 47 See § 35. 48 In Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q. B. D. (1893), 715, the defendants, though not employees, stood in the relation already considered, of members of a labor organization, having a dispute with the plaintiff, thus furnishing an opportunity for raising the question whether the "solidarity of interest" did not furnish a sufficient basis to sustain the legality of the act. But the court paid no attention to the existence of such relation. The action was by a master mason and builder against officers and members of a joint comImittee of three labor unions (of bricklayers, "builders' laborers" and plasterers, respectively) for inducing persons who had contracted to furnish materials to the plaintiff to break their contracts, and for conspiring to induce them not to enter into contracts with him. The grievance of the unions was that the plaintiff continued to supply building materials to a firm of builders that had refused to obey certain rules laid down by the unions with regard to building operations. Compare, however, Allen v. Flood, App. Cas. (1898), 1. The difficulties incident to applying the doctrine without qualification to acts supported by the relation of employee, were appreciated by Smith, J. (in Temperton v. Russell), who, in answer to the objection that those inducing a strike would be liable in case of the employees being under con tract, said: "The present is a very different case to that suggested, viz., the merely calling out men on strike, though it does appear to me that, if a strike were used for the purpose and with the intent above mentioned, an action would lie." A similar situation was presented in Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 98 Pac. 1027, 1035 (Supm. Ct. Cal., 1908), it being, however, regarded as unnecessary to decide the point. See also Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation (under §§ 28, 67); editorial note in 18 Law Quart. Rev. 1 (1902). In Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208; 80 N. E. 478; 120 Am. St. Rep. 542 (1907), relief was allowed against a conspiracy to compel the exclusive employment of members of unions, in pursuance of which the conspirators caused a breach of contract be tween the employer and a third person. In Beattie v. Callanan, 82 App. D. 7; 81 N. Y. Suppl. 413 (1903), a labor union and its members were held liable for inducing breach of a contract by means of causing a strike; this because of refusal to formally recognize the union or for an affront to its walking delegate. In Chesapeake & O. Coal Agency Co. v. Fire Creek Coal, etc., Co., 119 Fed. 942 (C. C. W. Va., 1902); affirmed in Carroll v. Chesapeake & O. Coal Agency Co., 124 Fed. 305; 61 C. C. A. 49 (4th C., 1903), § 65. Inducing to refuse to continue in employment, i. e., to quit employment.-In the view already taken there is nothing inherently or necessarily illegal in inducing one person to refuse to deal or continue to deal with another.19 On principle it would seem clear that the same doctrine should cover and apply to the case of inducing one person to refuse to continue to deal with another, as employee with employer; in other words, to quit his employment. But the accepted doctrine is otherwise, and we find the prevailing rule to be that "any person who knowingly entices away the servant of another, and thereby induces him to violate his contract with his master, or who thereby deprives the master of the services of one then actually in his service, whether under a contract to serve or not,5o is liable to the master for his actual loss therefrom." 51 We understand the origin of this anomalous doctrine on learning that strikers and members of the organization conducting and controlling the strike were held liable for preventing by intimidation persons from entering the employment of one who was thereby prevented from fulfilling contracts with the plaintiff. In Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, 2 K. B. (1902) 732, it was held actionable for members of a union and its officers to induce the employers of an apprentice to break the contract of apprenticeship, notwithstanding the claim that the employment of the apprentice was in violation of the rules of the union, which rules had been agreed to and signed by the employers. So in Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th C., 1908), it was held unlawful to induce apprentices or others to break their contracts to serve for definite times. For a further consideration of the same topic, with special reference to the case of inducing to quit em ployment in violation of a contract to serve, see § 67. 49 See c. IV. 50 See § 67. 51 So stated in Wood on Master and Servant (2d ed.), § 230. See by way of illustration, Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48 (C. C. N. Y., 1887); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903); Sailors' Union v. Hammond Lumber Co., 156 Fed. 450; 85 C. C. A. 16 (9th C., 1907). Another conspicuous instance is Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803, 816 (C. C. Ohio, 1894), where punishment was allowed for contempt for inducing the employees of a railroad receiver to leave his employ. This on the ground that any unlawful interference with the operation of a road in the hands of a receiver is a contempt, and that, if the receiver had been a private corporation, he could have recovered damages for the injury thus in at the time of such origin servants were in effect, if not in a strict legal sense, serfs or slaves, so that an inducement to leave one's employment was not a mere inducement to refuse to continue to deal, but was an interference with a chattel be flicted on the business of the road. See § 62; Dixon v. Dixon, 1 Ch. (1904) 161. Compare, however, Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 60 Fed. 803, 823; 25 L. R. A. 414, 429 (C. C. Wis., 1894). See Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563, 565 (C. C. Mo., 1903). In Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 13; 8 Am. Rep. 287, 294 (1870), an action was sustained for the recovery back of money paid in response to a demand made in pursuance of a conspiracy to induce the employee so paying to quit his employment and deter others from entering it. See Burke v. Fay, 128 Mo. App. 690; 107 S. W. 408 (1908). As to entering upon premises of employer for purpose of so inducing, as constituting trespass, see Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 98 Pac. 1027, 1035 (Supm. Ct. Cal., 1908). In Reinecke Coal Mining Co. v. Wood, 112 Fed. 477 (C. Ct. Ky., 1901), where acts or threatened acts of violence seem a sufficient ground for the relief granted, the decision might, in accordance with this doctrine, have rested on the ground that the acts held illegal included inducing certain employees to join a certain labor organization and thereafter to strike if a certain scale of wages were not adopted by the employers. As to effect of offering pecuniary inducement to quit or not to enter employment, see Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188; 53 S. E. 273; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 792 (1906); George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 66 Atl. 953 (Ct. Ch. N. J., 1907); Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1891). See, on the general subject, articles in 16 Harv. Law Rev. 236 (1902-3) by E. F. McClennen; 18 Id. 423 (1905) by E. W. Huffcut; 44 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 465 (1905) by W. D. Lewis. In several instances a civil or criminal liability, or both, has been declared by statute for so inducing to quit, or, as it is sometimes expressed, "enticing away." See Ala. Crim. Code (1907), § 6849; Ga. Penal Code (1895), §§ 121, 122; Broughton v. State, 114 Ga. 34; 39 S. E. 866 (1901); McAllister v. State, 122 Ga. 744; 50 S. E. 921 (1905); Hudgins v. State, 126 Ga. 639; S. E. 492 (1906); Ill. R. S. (Starr & Curtis' Ed., 1896), c. 9, § 19; La. L. 1906, c. 54; Nev. Comp. Laws (1900), § 624; N. J. G. S. (1895), p. 66, § 6; N. C. Revisal (1905), § 3365; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601; 16 Am. Rep. 780 (1874); Sears v. Whitaker, 136 N. C. 37; 48 S. E. 517 (1904). See also Del. R. S. (1893), c. 79, § 18. So in case of "unlawful doings" causing a person to leave his employment, Ill. R. S. (Starr & Curtis' Ed., 1896), c. 38, § 296. So by Del. R. S. (1893), p. 9z8; N. J. L. 1903, c. 257, § 63, to, in furtherance of a strike, by offer of recompense, induce an employee of longing to the employer, being thus tantamount to trespass or larceny.52 There is doubtless a growing consciousness in the judicial mind that a doctrine so anomalous, and originating in conceptions of social relations that are utterly repugnant to those now prevailing, is ill adapted to present conditions.53 Even long ago it was settled that an exception should be made of cases of ignorance by the inducing party of the relationship of employee and employer.54 But inasmuch as the doctrine is so deeply imbedded in the law, it is better to obtain relief against it by means of legislation,55 than by the slow process of judicial modification. The practical mischief produced by a railroad company to leave his service "while in transit." See also Me. R. S. (1903), c. 124, § 9. Besides are numerous instances of what probably are now obsolete statutory provisions having special reference to "enticing away" apprentices. So in some instances such provisions have had reference to special classes of persons, such as seamen, or immigrants or miners. For statutes having reference to inducing to quit in violation of contract to serve, see § 67. 52 It seems clear that the doctrine can be traced to the English Statute of Laborers of the fourteenth century. See the elaborate dissenting opinion of Coleridge, J., in Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 253 (1853); also Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388; 37 So. 2; 67 L. R. A. 65 (1904); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 559; 69 Atl. 405, 406; 16 L. R. A. N. S. 746, 752 (1908). 53 For instance, in Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1891), the court questioned the soundness of the doc trine, and refused an injunction against acts within such doctrine, on the ground that the case was one of doubtful right. See, however, Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903). In Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188; 53 S. E. 273; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 792 (1906), an injunction was refused against inducing by striking employees to quit or not to enter employment, the means employed not being unlawful. See also Karges Furniture Co. V. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind. 421; 75 N. E. 877; 2 L. R. A. N. S. 788 (1905); Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 242; 33 So. 211 (1902). 54 Clark v. Clark, 63 N. J. Law, 1; 42 Atl. 770 (1899). 55 Thus, by N. J. Revision (1895), p. 2344, § 23, "it shall not be unlawful for any two or more persons to unite, combine or bind themselves by oath, covenant, agreement, alliance or otherwise, to persuade, advise or encourage, by peaceable means, any person or persons to enter into any combination for or against leaving or entering into the employment of any person, persons or corporation." To similar effect, Colo. R. S. (1908), § 3924. In |