§ 82. Strike as induced by acts of violence or acts producing fear of violence, or by announcement of intention to do lawful act.-According to what we have seen to be the accepted doctrine, 16 that it is unlawful to induce another to quit his employment, it follows that, so far, at least, as civil liability is concerned, the means of inducement are immaterial, that is to say, it is immaterial that a strike was induced by acts of violence or by acts producing a fear of violence, or by announcement of intention to do a lawful act, thus in enforcing regulations of a trade union as an inducement to strike or by way of penalty for refusal to strike. But the disposition already noticed to question or repudiate such doctrine 17 seems to have resulted in, or to be accompanied with a disposition to base the illegality of inducing to quit employment not so much on the bald act of inducing, as on accompanying acts of the kind just specified.1 18 In Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 496; 57 N. E. 1011, 1013; 51 L. R. A. 339, 342; 79 Am. St. Rep. 330 (1900), a case of inducing the discharge of employees, where an injunction was allowed against intimidating the employer by threats of "loss or trouble in business," it was said of a "threat to strike, taken in connection with the intimation that the employer may 'expect trouble in his business'": "It means more than that the strikers will cease to work. That is only the preliminary skirmish. It means that those who have ceased to work will by strong, persistent and organized persuasion and social pressure of every description, do all they can to prevent the employer from procuring workmen to take their places. It means much more. It means that, if these peaceful measures fail, the employer may reasonably expect that unlawful physical injury may be done to his prop erty; that attempts in all the ways 18 Thus, in Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527, 544; 38 Pac. 547, 552; 28 L. R. A. 464, 473; 46 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1894), the doctrine in question was ignored and the decision made to turn on the legality of the accompanying acts. § 83. Threat or announcement of intention to strike.-A strike not being illegal, neither is a mere announcement of in That is to say, the Oregon statute making it a misdemeanor to "by force, threats or intimidation, prevent or endeavor to prevent any person employed by another, from continuing or performing his work, or from accepting any new work or employment," was held to have no application to a case of officers of a labor union entering upon an employer's premises, and ordering members of the union then at work under contract with it, to cease work "under penalty of being dealt with according to the laws and regulations of said union," or to a resolution of such union ordering all union men working for such employer to cease working for it. The court said (26 Oreg. 546; 38 Pac. 553; 28 L. R. A. 473): "No intimidation is specifically alleged or shown, unless it can be inferred that, by a refusal to quit, the members of the union would subject themselves to the charge of insubordination to the order, and it does not appear that there was sufficient odium attached to this, to put the members in fear, or that compliance with the order and resolution was induced thereby." So held, notwithstanding allegations in the complaint here held bad on demurrer, that by the first order the employees "were intimidated and influenced and without delay immediately obeyed"; that, "being intimidated,” they obeyed the second order, and "ceased to fulfill their contracts with plaintiff." Furthermore, the rules of the union provided for suspension or expulsion for failure to comply with such an order. So, too, statutes making it a misdemeanor to "wil tort any pecuniary advantage or property from such other, or with intent to compel such other to do any act against his will," were held to have no application. In Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q. B. D. (1893) 715, 726, where an action against members of a joint committee of labor unions, for inducing breaking of a contract with the plaintiff, was sustained, the action of the committee in notifying members of the union to withdraw from the employment of the person with whom the plaintiff had contracted, was declared illegal. The court said: "These men had bound themselves to obey; and they knew that they had done so, and that if they did not obey, they would be fined or expelled from the union to which they belonged." In Coons v. Chrystie, 24 Misc. 296; 53 N. Y. Suppl. 668 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1898), where an injunction against calling out employees was granted in a case where there was no evidence of violence, or threat of violence, save as might be inferred from the mere act of calling out, the court said: "If, at the mere nod or word of the latter, the plaintiff's workmen were led immediately to abandon employment which they had been well content to accept, and which, but for the 'walking delegate's' appearance upon the scene, they were just as content to retain, the infer tention to strike,19 though, as in case of a boycott,20 in some instances this point seems to have been disregarded.21 § 84. Definition of picketing.-The legality of what has been termed "picketing" on the part of striking employees has frequently been presented for judicial consideration. Inherently the act of picketing seems to involve nothing more than ence is irresistible that they were coerced by the anticipation of some recognized penalty, and the absence of threats at the moment would signify merely that threats were gratuitous and unnecessary.” As to coercion involved in calling out or threatening to call out member of a labor union, see also Quinn v. Leathem, App. Cas. (1901) 495, 538. 19 See Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527, 543; 38 Pac. 547, 552; 28 L. R. A. 464, 472; 46 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1894). In Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 393 (1881), the prohibition of the Pennsylvania statute of 1876 against hindering persons from laboring, by "the use of force, threat, or menace of harm to persons or property," was held not to cover the case of persons who, on behalf of a labor organization, demanded of employers an increase of wages of certain employees, and notified them that a refusal would result in a strike of themselves, followed by notifying such employees that a strike was ordered. Compare with People v. Barondess, 133 N. Y. 649; 31 N. E. 240 (1892; see § 66). By the English Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875, it is forbidden to "wrongfully and without legal authority" do any of certain specified acts, "with a view to compel any other person to ab stain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing." One such class is "using violence to, or intimidating, such other person or his wife or children, or injuring his property." Held in Gibson v. Lawson, 2 Q. B. D. (1891) 557, not to apply to the action of a member of a labor union, in announcing to the complainant's employer that the union had resolved to strike unless the complainant joined the union. There was no violence or threat of violence to his person or property, but merely fear of loss of employment, produced by the action of the union. It seems that "intimidation," as the word is here used, is limited to "such intimidation as implies a threat of personal violence." See also Curran v. Treleaven, Id. 560. Compare Judge v. Bennett, 36 Weekly Rep. 103 (1887). Under a former statute, "threats or intimidation" had been held to cover the case of announcement of intention to leave employment in a body. Walsby v. Anley, 3 El. & El. 516 (1861). See Skinner v. Kitch, 2 Q. B. 393 (1867). See article in 42 Am. Law Rev. 200 (1908) by C. R. Darling. 20 See § 77. 21 Such "threats" by representatives of labor unions were considered illegal in O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354; 75 N. E. 108; 108 Am. St. Rep. 219 (1905). mere observation, and this view is justified by the sense in which the word is used in relation to military movements, a picket being defined as "a guard posted in front of an army to give notice of the approach of the enemy." 22 So in its application to striking employees picketing is defined as (placing) "relays of guards in front of a factory or the place of business of the employer, for the purpose of watching who should enter or leave the same," 23 or as "simply the active watch by workmen belonging to those lodges or associations or unions, of others, so that they may know what is going on and what is done," 24 or as "the establishment and maintenance of an organized espionage upon the works, and upon those going to and from them." 25 -- § 85. Picketing whether illegal. It is difficult to see any illegality in picketing as just defined, and the weight of authority seems to be to the effect that it is not illegal.26 Yet there 22 Century Dictionary. 23 Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49; 46 Atl. 208 (1899). See Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 609; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 187 (1904); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. Ohio, 1906). In Atkins v. Fletcher Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 658; 55 Atl. 1074 (1903), striking employees were refused an injunction against interference with pickets maintained by them near the premises of the employer. 24 Winslow v. Building Trades Council (Case & Comment, Aug., 1899), cited in Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., supra. 25 Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, 110 Fed. 698 (C. C. Ohio, 1901). See also definitions in Reg. v. Hibbert, 13 Cox C. C. 82 (1875). As to "watching" and "besetting" under English statute, see Reg. v. Bauld, Id. 282 (1876). 26 For instances of injunctions refused against picketing, unaccompanied with violence or threats of violence, see Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908); see previous decision in Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 172 (C. C. Wis., 1906); Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 62 S. E. 236; 17 L. R. A. N. S. 848 (Supm. Ct. Ga., 1908); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind. 421; 75 N. E. 877; 2 L. R. A. N. S. 788 (1905); Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 609; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 187 (1904); Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (1891); said in Mills v. U. S. Printing Co. to have been affirmed as Reynolds v. Everett, 67 Hun, 294; 22 N. Y. Suppl. 306 1893); affirmed in 144 N. Y. 189; 39 N. E. 72 (1894); Krebs v. Rosenstein, 31 Misc. 661; 66 N. Y. Suppl. 42 (1900); affirmed in Kerbs v. Rosenstein, 56 App. D. is observable a tendency to regard picketing as inherently illegal, such tendency being perhaps referable, not so much to the view that the picketing itself is illegal, as to the view that it is inseparably associated with acts that are indisputably illegal. Thus a picket has been defined as "a body of men belonging to a trades union sent to watch and annoy men working in a shop not belonging to the union, or against which a strike is in progress. With reference to such definition it has been said: "The word originally had no such meaning. This definition is the result of what has been done under it, and the common application that has been made of it." 28 The view that 99 27 619; 67 N. Y. Suppl. 630 (1900); Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 101 (1900); affirmed in 56 App. D. 618; 67 N. Y. Suppl. 630 (1900); Foster v. Retail Clerks' Protective Assoc., 39 Misc. 48, 57; 78 N. Y. Suppl. 860, 867 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1902); Butterick Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 6, 50 Misc. 1; 100 N. Y. Suppl. 292 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1906); Searle Manuf. Co. v. Terry, 56 Misc. 265; 106 N. Y. Suppl. 438 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1905); Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188; 53 S. E. 273; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 792 (1906). See also Reg. v. Hibbert, 13 Cox C. C. 82 (1875); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. Ohio, 1906); Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500, 521 (C. C. Nev., 1908); Christensen v. Kellogg Switchboard, etc., Co., 110 Ill. App. 61, 75 (1903); Perkins v. Rogg, 28 Weekly L. Bull. 32 (Cin. Super. Ct., 1892); Standard Tube, etc., Co. v. International Union of Bicycle Workers, 7 Ohio N. P. 87 (Lucas Com. Pl., 1899). As to effect of injunctional order as including peaceful picketing, see Vilter Manuf. Co. v. Humphrey, 132 In City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502; 109 S. W. 30; 15 L. R. A. N. S. 973 (1908), a municipal ordinance declaring it a misdemeanor to "lounge, stand or loaf around or about or at street corners or other public places" was held invalid as applied to mere picketing. For prohibition in Colo. R. S. (1908), § 398 of "picketing" and "patrolling," see § 25. See, on the general subject, articles in 40 Am. Law Rev. 196 (1906) by J. W. Bryan; 18 Harv. Law Rev. 423 (1905) by E. W. Huffcut. 27 Century Dictionary. 28 Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 520; 77 N. W. 13, 22; 42 L. R. A. 407, 416; 74 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1898), where, in allowing an injunction against acts of members of labor unions to include "picketing," it was said: "To picket complainants' premises in order to intercept their teamsters or persons going there to trade, is unlawful. It itself is an act of intimidation, and an unwarrantable interference with the right of free trade. The highways |