persuading, or otherwise preventing persons from working for them. So in a subsequent decision in 78 L. T. N. S. 618 (1898), an appeal from which was dismissed in 1 Ch. (1899) 255, against watching or besetting the premises of a person for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing him from working for such employer. See also Charnock v. Court, 2 Ch. (1899) 35; Walters v. Green, 2 Ch. (1899) 696; Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin Union, 5 Ont. Law Rep. 463 (1903). That, in view of the statute involved, Lyons v. Wilkins "is not a precedent in this country," see AllisChalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 181 (C. C. Wis., 1906). By Ala. Crim. Code (1907), § 6395, it is made a criminal act to "go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any person, firm or corporation engaged in a lawful business, for the purpose of influencing or inducing others not to trade with, buy from, sell to, or have business dealings with such person, firm or corporation, or to picket the works or place of business of such other person, firm or corporation, for the purpose of interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise." But "nothing herein shall prevent any person from soliciting trade or business for a competitive business." 94. Words producing injury or fear of injury, and libelous words. 95. Injunction against boycott. 96. Injunction against inducing breach of contract. 97. Injunction against quitting employment. 98. Injunction against strike. 99. Injunction against inducing to quit employment. 100. Injunction against inducing not to enter employment. 101. Injunction against preventing from securing or continuing in employment. 102. Injunction against interference with receiver. 103. Injunction against unlawful acts of striking employees or those in sympathy with them. 104. Injunction against picketing or acts incident thereto. 105. Injunction against blacklisting. § 88. Civil action at law.-Generally speaking, for any of the injuries thus far discussed, an action at law for damages is an available remedy.1 § 89. Indictment.-Sometimes, as in case of murder, rob 1 Thus, for so-called injury to business, see § 7. So for discharge from employment. Miller v. Warner, 42 App. D. 208; 59 N. Y. Suppl. 956 (1899). See article in 34 Am. Law Reg. & Rev. 102 (1895) by S. B. Stanton, on "Mandamus as a Means of Settling Strikes." In Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912; 28 C. C. A. 99 (8th C., 1897), was applied the rule that, As to sufficiency of pleading, see 2 bery or violent assault, the remedy by indictment exists, either concurrently or exclusively. So, too, in case of conspiracy.3 § 90. Injunction.-The questions of greatest difficulty that arise with reference to the application of remedies for such injuries are as to the availability of the remedy by injunction in particular cases. The circumstance that the injuries in question are frequently the acts of considerable numbers of persons, and cover a considerable extent of territory, besides being frequently repeated, has within a comparatively recent period led to the extensive use of injunctions in the case of strikes and boycotts, and acts accompanying the same. The rules applicable to injunctions generally are applicable here. As to liability for aiding and abetting overt acts of others, see George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 66 Atl. 953 (Ct. Ch. N. J., 1907). 2 For statutes imposing criminal liability for acts of violence or producing fear of violence, see §§ 3, 4. 3 See § 13. 4 In Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. 811, 827 (C. C. Ohio, 1897), it was said, citing Stimson's hand-book of the "Labor Law of the United States," that the remedy by injunction, as applied to labor disputes, is traced back to Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, 6 L. R. Eq. Cas. 551 (1868). See also U. S. v. Sweeney, 95 Fed. 434, 447 (C. C. Ark., 1899). And in so recent a decision as Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assoc., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 527; 20 Atl. 492, 495 (1890), it was said with reference to "the effort to control employment and wages, by labor organizations," that "the industry, research and learning of the distinguished counsel of the complainants has furnished but one reported case where a court of equity has interfered to The free prevent or control the action of such organizations. All of the reported cases save three, referred to by counsel, were proceedings of a criminal nature, either by information or indictment." Bearing in mind that the word "boycott" was not used in any American decision prior to 1887 (see § 24), there seems to be but a limited scope for the application of the following statement in Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135, 143; 12 L. R. A. 193, 199 (C. C. Ohio, 1891): "No case has been cited where, upon a proper showing of facts, an unsuccessful appeal has been made to a court of chancery to restrain a boycott." For prohibition of injunctions in case of trade disputes, see Okla. L. 1907, c. 53, art. 2, § 2. As to the existence of the remedy being based on the general ground of the inadequacy of other remedies, see Proctor & Collier Co. v. Mahin, 93 Fed. 875 (C. C. Ill., 1899); Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49, 52 (C. C. Tenn., 1901); Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246 (C. C. Mo., 1903); Miller v. War application of this remedy to labor disputes, producing what has been characterized as "government by injunction," has been ner, 42 App. D. 208; 59 N. Y. Suppl. 956 (1899); Atkins V. Fletcher Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 658; 55 Atl. 1074 (1903); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 589; 78 N. E. 753, 760; 6 L. R. A. N. S. 1067, 1081; 116 Am. St. Rep. 272 (1906). As to requisites of complaint, see Badger Brass. Manuf. Co. v. Daly, 119 N. W. 328 (Supm. Ct. Wis., 1909). As to necessity that applicant come into court with clean hands, see Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 452; 41 S. E. 553, 563; 57 L. R. A. 547, 558; 90 Am. St. Rep. 126 (1902). In Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 116 (C. C. Neb., 1902), was deprecated the practice of allowing an injunction against those as to whom "the evidence is meager or wholly lacking." As to application of injunction to one not party, see Employers' Teaming Co. v. Teamsters' Joint Council, 141 Fed. 679 (C. C. Ill., 1905); reversed in Garrigan v. U. S., 163 Fed. 16 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908); Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363 (C. C. Mo., 1906); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. Ohio, 1906); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 184 (C. C. Wis., 1906); Christensen v. People, 114 Ill. App. 40, 59 (1904); affirmed as O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354; 75 N. E. 108; 108 Am. St. Rep. 219 (1905); Anderson V. Indianapolis Drop Forging Co., 34 Ind. App. 100; 72 N. E. 277 (1904); People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, infra. Compare American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers', etc., Unions, 90 Fed. 598, 604 (C. C. Ohio, 1898), discussing effect of Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' International Union, 72 Fed. 695 (C. C. Kan., 1896). In Ideal Manuf. Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 139 Mich. 92; 102 N. W. 372 (1905), where an employer sought relief against unlawful acts of members of a labor union, it was held improper to refuse a preliminary injunction until the defendants had been brought in on an order to show cause. Mandamus was allowed requiring such an injunction to be issued. An injunction was allowed against a part only of the defendants, in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 116 (C. C. Neb., 1902); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. Ohio, 1906); Perkins v. Rogg, 28 Weekly Law Bull. 32 (Cin. Super. Ct., 1892). As to proceedings to punish for contempt for disobedience to injunction, see U. S. v. Sweeney, 95 Fed. 434, 446 (C. C. Ark., 1899); Castner V. Pocahontas Collieries Co., 117 Fed. 184 (C. C. Va., 1902); Ex parte Haggerty, 124 Fed. 441 (C. C. W. Va., 1902); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. Iowa, 1905); Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363 (C. C. Mo., 1906); AllisChalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155 (C. C. Wis., 1906); Garrigan v. U. S., 163 Fed. 16 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908); reversing Employers' Teaming Co. V. Teamsters' Joint Council, 141 Fed. 679 (C. C. Ill., 1905); O'Brien subjected to fierce criticism, involving a controversy that we consider it needless to here enter upon. v. People, supra; Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355; 77 N. E. 176; 4 L. R. A. N. S. 1001; 110 Am. St. Rep. 248 (1906); Flannery v. People, 225 Ill. 62; 80 N. E. 60 (1907); affirming 127 Ill. App. 526 (1906); Hake v. People, 230 Ill. 174; 82 N. E. 561 (1907); Barnes v. Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 402; 83 N. E. 932; 14 L. R. A. N. S. 1150; 122 Am. St. Rep. 129 (1908); Anderson v. Indianapolis Drop Forging Co., supra; Casson v. McIntosh, 199 Mass. 443; 85 N. E. (1908); Enterprise Foundry Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 149 Mich. 31; 112 N. W. 685; 13 L. R. A. N. S. 598 (1907); George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 53 Atl. 138 (1902); 64 N. J. Eq. 640; 54 Atl. 565 (1903); People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 181 N. Y. 463; 74 N. E. 431; 106 Am. St. Rep. 562 (1905); affirming 88 App. D. 422; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 965 (1903); Vilter Manuf. Co. v. Humphrey, 132 Wis. 587; 112 N. W. 1095; 13 L. R. A. N. S. 591 (1907); Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 36 Wash. Law Rep. 822 (Supm. Ct. D. C., 1908). As to objection to jurisdiction in proceeding to punish for contempt, see Franklin Union v. People, supra. As to sufficiency of moving papers and effect of answer, see Employers' Teaming Co. v. Teamsters' Joint Council, supra. In McBride v. People, 225 Ill. 315; 80 N. E. 306 (1907), in a proceeding to punish for contempt for violation of injunction against interference with employer involved in strike with employees. O'Brien 6 v. People, supra, was followed as holding that in such a proceeding "the evidence need not remove all reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, but it is very clear that the guilt should be established by a preponderance of the evidence." That the violator is not entitled to a jury trial, see U. S. v. Sweeney, supra. For a vigorous statement of objections arising under constitutional provisions securing the right of trial by jury, see dissenting opinion of Caldwell, J., in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912, 925; 28 C. C. A. 99, 112 (8th C., 1897), with which see Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 112 (C. C. Neb., 1902). See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, supra, citing Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 594; 15 Supm. 900, 910; 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1895). That the right to an injunction is "precisely the same" in the Federal as in the State courts, see Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 105 (C. C. Neb., 1902). As to punishment of eorporation for contempt, see Franklin Union v. People, supra. As to practice on dissolution of injunction in case of strike, see August Gast Bank Note, etc., Co. v. Fennimore Assoc., 79 Mo. App. 612 (1899). See articles in 28 Am. Law Rev. 828 (1894); 50 Alb. Law Jour. 140 (1894) by C. C. Allen; 32 Am. Law Rev. 669 (1898) by J. W. Akin; 40 Id. 42, 196 (1906) by J. W. Bryan; 11 Harv. Law Rev. 487 (1898) by C. N. Gregory; 16 Id. 289 (1902-3) by E. S. Mack; 37 |