§ 96. Injunction against inducing breach of contract.15 § 97. Injunction against quitting employment.-It being as a Ct., Sp. T., 1898). So in Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135; 12 L. R. A. 193 (C. C. Ohio, 1891), it being held no defense that the representations of fact were true. On the other hand, in Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527; 38 Pac. 547; 28 L. R. A. 464; 46 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1894), an injunction against a boycott by members of labor unions, of the business of "litho graphing, engraving, printing and publishing journals, newspapers, etc.," was refused on the ground that there did not appear such threatened and imminent injuries to the plaintiff's business and property, as would result in its ir reparable detriment and loss, while conceding that the defendant might be liable in an action at law or criminally. There were allegations of a conspiracy between the officers and members of the union to compel the plaintiff to submit to its dictation, upon pain of being boycotted; of entry on the plaintiff's premises and ordering union men to cease work under penalty of being dealt with according to the regulations of the union; that the plaintiff lost, and apprehended loss 15 Injunctions against inducing breach of contract were allowed in, for instance, Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205; 80 N. E. 817; 11 L. R. A. N. S. 201; 122 Am. St. Rep. 232 (1907); Beattie v. Callanan, 82 App. D. 7; 81 N. Y. Suppl. 413 (1903); Lytle v. Galveston, H. & 8. A. Ry. Co., 100 Tex. 292; 99 S. W. 396; 10 L. R. A. N. S. 437 (1907); Iron Molders' Union v. of, important business through the rule lawful, apart from contractual relations, to quit one's employment, an injunction against so quitting will not be granted. (1894; see § 62); but see decision below in 5 Misc. 448; 26 N. Y. Suppl. 152 (1893). It was refused in Sweeny v. Torrence, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 497 (1892); Manufacturer's Outlet Co. v. Longley, 20 R. I. 86; 37 Atl. 535 (1897), on the ground that the acts complained of were past acts. In Van der Plaat v. Undertakers', etc., Assoc., 70 N. J. Eq. 116; 62 Atl. 453 (1905), an injunction was denied, it not appearing that the complainant had any "established business to be subjected to a boycott." As to necessity that injunction proceed against individual members of boycotting combination, see Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 453; 41 S. E. 553, 564; 57 L. R. A. 547, 559; 90 Am. St. Rep. 126 (1902). See also, as to injunctions against boycotts, Lewin v. Welsbach Light Co., 81 Fed. 904 (C. C. Pa., 1897). For form of order, see Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 183; 97 N. W. 663, 667; 63 L. R. A. 753, 759; 103 Am. St. Rep. 477 (1903), where the injunction allowed was against "interfering with the business of the Nashville, Chattanooga, etc., Ry. Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65, 71 (C. C. Tenn., 1897), an injunction was granted on the application of a railroad company, against the action of ticket-brokers in procuring the use by third persons of special contract tickets issued by the company, such use being in violation of the contract under which the tickets were issued, which confined such use to plaintiffs by means of threats or intimidation of any kind or nature directed against the customers or prospective customers of said plaintiffs"; also against "interfering with the customers or prospective customers of plaintiffs by threats of any kind or nature." See also form of order in Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. 71 (C. C. Cal., 1905), which was applied in Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C. C. Cal., 1905). See also Buck's Stove and Range Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 36 Wash. Law Rep. 822, 833 (Supm. Ct. D. C., 1908). In Foster v. Retail Clerks' Protective Assoc., 39 Misc. 48; 78 N. Y. Suppl. 860 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1902), the injunction was allowed merely against illegal acts incident to the boycott. See, on the general subject, articles in 33 Am. Law Rev. 885 (1899); 34 Id. 161, 468 (1900) by S. D. Thompson; 40 Am. Law Rev. 196 (1906) by J. W. Bryan. For objection to injunction against boycott, based on constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech, see § 92. the original purchasers. To like effect other decisions cited in § 27. See also, as to injunction against inducing breach of contract, Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208; 80 N. E. 478; 120 Am. St. Rep. 542 (1907); Fleckenstein v. Fleckenstein, 66 N. J. Eq. 252; 57 Atl. 1025 (1904); Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Central News Co., 2 Ch. (1897) 48; Sperry, And so, it would seem, even where such quitting is in violation of agreement. 16 § 98. Injunction against strike.-There being as a rule nothing unlawful in a mere strike, an injunction will not ordinarily be allowed against it,17 though it may be otherwise of a strike etc., Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 128 Fed. 800 (C. C. R. I., 1904); Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 98 Pac. 1027, 1036 (Supm. Ct. Cal., 1908). 16 See Miller v. Warner, 42 App. D. 208; 59 N. Y. Suppl. 956 (1899); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 110 (C. C. Neb., 1902); Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. Minn., 1903). 17 This doctrine was declared with great emphasis in Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 318; 11 C. C. A. 209, 218; 25 L. R. A. 414, 425 (7th C., 1894); modifying Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 60 Fed. 803; 25 L. R. A. 414 (C. C. Wis., 1894). Here an injunction against employees of the receiver of a railroad restraining them from "so quitting the service of said receivers, with or without notice, as to cripple the property, or prevent or hinder the operation of said railroad," was refused, on the general ground that a court of equity will not by injunction prevent one individual from quitting the personal service of another. And this was held applicable though the employees were those of a railroad. The court said: "Undoubtedly the simultaneous cessation of work by any considerable number of the employees of a railroad corporation, without previous notice, will have an injurious effect, and for a time inconvenience the public. But these evils, great as they are, and although arising in many cases from the inconsiderate conduct of employees and employers, both equally indifferent to the general welfare, are to be met and remedied by legislation restraining alike employees and employers, so far as necessary adequately to guard the rights of the public as involved in the existence, maintenance and safe management of public highways. In the absence of legislation to the contrary, the right of one in the service of a quasi-public corporation to withdraw therefrom at such time as he sees fit, and the right of the managers of such a corporation to discharge an employee from service whenever they see fit, must be deemed so far absolute that no court of equity will compel him against his will to remain in such service, or actually to perform the personal acts required in such employments, or compel such managers against their will to keep a particular employee in their service." See also Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563, 571 (C. C. Mo., 1903); Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 608; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 187 (1904). In Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189; 39 N. E. 72 (1894), the discretion of the court below was held properly exercised in refusing an injunction in favor of an employer against a strike, in the absence of elements of intimidation, especially as the acts complained of had been discontinued. As to practical effect of prelimi that is in violation of an agreement.18 As already seen, however, a mere strike is, according to the prevailing view, not necessarily legal, and in this view an injunction against a strike may be allowable. 19 20 § 99. Injunction against inducing to quit employment.-As we have seen, it is the generally accepted doctrine that it is illegal to induce one to quit his employment.2 Although it seems clear enough that such illegality does not of itself furnish sufficient ground for granting an injunction, injunctions against so inducing to quit have been rather freely granted.21 nary injunction in ending strike, see American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers', etc., Unions, 90 Fed. 598, 603 (C. C. Ohio, 1898). 18 Thus, proceeding on the theory of an implied agreement not to quit employment under certain conditions (see § 48), in Toledo, Ann Arbor, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746; 19 L. R. A. 395 (C. C. Ohio, 1893), an injunction restraining railroad companies and their employees from refusing to extend to another railroad facilities for interchange of freight, was held violated by an engineer in the employ of one of the companies, in quitting his train on a main track ten miles from its destination. This is carrying the remedy to an extreme length, and goes far toward justifying the complaints against "government by injunction." 19 See § 57. Thus, in Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294; 84 N. E. 457; 17 L. R. A. N. S. 162 (1908), an injunction was allowed to employers against "combining together to further" a strike against the open shop "and from doing any acts whatever, peaceful or otherwise, in furtherance thereof, including the payment of strike benefits and putting the plaintiffs on an unfair list." See article in 42 Am. Law Rev. 200 (1908) by C. R. Darling. 20 See § 65. 21 Such injunctions were allowed in Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49 (C. C. Tenn., 1901); U. S. v. Weber, 114 Fed. 950 (C. C. W. Va., 1902); U. S. v. Haggerty, 116 Fed. 510 (C. C. W. Va., 1902), and see U. S. v. Gehr, 116 Fed. 520 (C. C. W. Va., 1902). So in Coons v. Chrystie, 24 Misc. 296; 53 N. Y. Suppl. 668 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1898); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903). So in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; 44 N. E. 1077; 35 L. R. A. 722; 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896); Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509; 50 S. E. 353; 69 L. R. A. 90; 106 Am. St. Rep. 137 (1905), the acts enjoined included inducing to quit employment. See also decisions cited in §§ 65 et seq. In Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443; 52 Atl. 152 (1902), such an injunction was allowed under conditions, however, that were regarded as "infringing upon the private rights of the operatives and thereby preventing them against their § 100. Injunction against inducing not to enter employment. -As we have seen, there is authority for the doctrine that it is. illegal, at least under certain conditions, to induce one not to enter the employment of another. And injunctions against so inducing have been granted.2 22 real wishes from continuing to work." In Toledo, Ann Arbor, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 744; 19 L. R. A. 387, 395 (C. C. Ohio, 1893), though the injunction was granted on the theory that the acts complained of constituted a boycott, rather than a strike or a quitting of employment (for facts, see § 60), yet the court said that an injunction might have been granted against "directing the engineers to quit work, for the purpose of coercing the defendant companies to violate the law and complainant's rights." An injunction in this form, however, was not asked for. In Reinecke Coal Mining Co. v. Wood, 112 Fed. 477 (C. C. Ky., 1901), an injunction was allowed against acts including the maintenance of an armed camp near the place of employment, for the purpose of inducing the employees to join a certain labor organization and thereafter strike if a certain scale of wages were not adopted by the employers. The occupants of such camp "occasionally sallied forth to threaten and sometimes to do much worse to persons who refused to join their organization, and to those who refused to employ laborers who did join it." In Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759; 53 Atl. 230 (1902), an injunction was allowed against "in any manner knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause by threats, offers of money, payment of money, offering to pay or the payment of transportation expenses, induce ments or persuasions to any employee of the complainant under contract to render service to it to break such contract by quitting such service." 22 Thus, in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; 44 N. E. 1077; 35 L. R. A. 722; 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896); Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. 40 (C. C. La., 1893); affirmed in Hagan v. Blindell, 56 Fed. 696; 6 C. C. A. 86 (5th C., 1893); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903). See also decisions cited in § 66. Compare, under English statute against "watching or besetting," Lyons v. Wilkins, 1 Ch. (1896) 811; see subsequent decision in 1 Ch. (1899) 255. As to evidence of injury on application for injunction against intimidating from entering or remaining in employment, see L. D. Willcut & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 113; 85 N. E. 897, 899 (1908). In Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759; 53 Atl. 230 (1902), the injunction was against any "personal molestation of persons willing to be employed by complainant, with intent to coerce such persons to refrain from entering such employment; addressing persons willing to be employed by complainant, against their will and |