§ 206a. Florida.

§ 207. Georgia.7

By S8 "any contract or agreement in violation of the provisions of this act, snall be absolutely void and shall not be enforcible either in law or equity."

By § 9 the provisions of the act are cumulative.

By § 10 "it shall not be lawful for any person, partnership, association, or corporation or any agent thereof, to issue or to own, trust certificates, or for any person, partnership, association or corporation, agent, officer or employee, or the directors or stockholders of any corporation" (etc., as in Ill. L. 1891, p. 206, § 2). Provision is also made for a fine of not less than $50 or more than $5,000. By 11 "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation or association or partnership, by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act" may sue therefor and recover "twofold the damages by him sustained" with costs. For similar provisions, see under Kan. (§ 212); Mich. (§ 217); Miss. (§ 219); Mo. (§ 220); Neb. (§ 222); N. M. (§ 223); Ohio (§ 227); Okla. (§ 228); S. D. (§ 230); Tenn. (§ 231); Utah (§ 233); Wis. (§ 235). See § 12 as to application of word "person." L. 1893, c. 19, was limited to combinations relating to live stock. See, as to prohibition of pooling combination between carriers, Const., art. 12, § 20.

See L. 1897, § 4534, as to sale of meat; Stewart v. Stearns & Cul

ver Lumber Co., 48 So. 19 (Supm. Ct. Fla., 1908).

Union

7 Following Connolly v. Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; 22 Supm. 431; 46 L. Ed. 679 (1902) (see § 209), tue anti-trust act of L. 1896, p. 68, was in Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 453; 41 S. E. 553, 563; 57 L. R. A. 547, 559; 90 Am. St. Rep. 126 (1902), held unconstitutional.

For prohibition against restriction upon competition in business of insurance, see Civil Code (1895), §§ 2085-8. "The general assembly of this State shall have no power to authorize any corporation to buy shares or stock in any other corporation in this State or elsewhere, or to make any contract or agreement whatever, with any such corporation, which may have the effect, or be intended to have the effect, to defeat or lessen competition in their respective businesses, or to encourage monopoly; and all such contracts and agreements shall be illegal and void." Const., art. 4, § 2, para. 4. In Trust Co. of Georgia v. State, 109 Ga. 736; 35 S. E. 323; 48 L. R. A. 520 (1900), such provision was held to declare no new principle, but to be "simply the embodiment of the common law." as to application to street railroad corporations. So in State v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 109 Ga. 716, 727, 728; 35 S. E. 37, 40, 41; 48 L. R. A. 351, 352 (1900), to be "simply declaratory of the common law principle recognized in Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582

See

(1869), the purpose being to make that principle, so far as corporations were concerned, the organic law of the State, and thus put it beyond the power of the legislature to grant to corporations any rights or privileges inconsistent with its terms." Central R. R. Co. v. Collins (decided before the existence of such constitutional provision) was here said to have been "evidently based upon the common law doctrine that contracts or agreements producing monopoly or lessening or defeating competition, were void." It was also here said (109 Ga. 735; 35 S. E. 44; 48 L. R. A. 359), that if such provision "contains a new principle unknown to the common law, then the clause in question is evidently not self-acting, for no light is thrown upon the new meaning intended to be given the words used. It would follow, therefore, that appropriate legislation would be necessary to carry into effect such a new principle, whatever it might be." The test of application of the prohibition was declared to be (109 Ga. 723; 35 S. E. 39; 48 L. R. A. 354), "whether or not such a contract is injurious to the public interest," the court saying (109 Ga. 726; 35 S. E. 40; 48 L. R. A. 355): "At common law the test of validity of agreements relating to a restraint of trade, or, what is the same thing, to lessening competition and encouraging monopoly, is whether or not the public interests have been injuriously affected." Here a consolidation of

railroad corporations was held not in violation of the prohibition inasmuch as it did not injuriously affect the public interests. The court said (109 Ga. 733; 35 S. E. 43; 48 L. R. A. 358); "We must look at the results in their entirety, and the effect upon the general public interested in the traffic of the road along its line. If that general effect be to increase competition to a far greater extent than it has been diminished at particular points, it cannot with reason be said that competition has been defeated or lessened. In point of fact it has actually been increased." Moreover such prohibition was held not applicable to the purchase or ownership or control of branch roads, it being said (109 Ga. 735; 35 S. E. 43; 48 L. R. A. 358): "Doubtless in the purchase of connecting lines and branch roads competition was lessened at given points, but the general effect of these consolidations and connections has really been to increase competition, has added greatly to the public convenience, furnished greater and more commodious facilities for traveling, has portation, has brought remote parts of the country in close proximity, as it were, to each other, has developed resources that would otherwise have remained dormant, by opening up the markets of the world to the products of the land, and has generally contributed to work to the welfare and prosperity of the people." See also, as to the effect of such provision, Kates v. Atlanta

repealed by that of 1893, infra. People ex rel. Akin v. Butler Street Foundry Co., infra (201 Ill. 257; 66 N. E. 356). In Chicago, Wilmington, etc., Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 445; 73 N. E. 770, 777 (1905), the act of 1891 was held not to repeal R. S. (Starr & Curtis' Ed., 1896), c. 38, § 96, making punishable criminally a conspiracy "to do any illegal act injurious to the public trade." See as to sufficiency of indictment thereunder. To the same effect, Sanford v. People, 121 Ill. App. 619 (1905). In People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co., 126 Ill. App. 636 (1906), the anti-trust legislation of the State was held not to abrogate "the common law rule with respect to combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade." But in Southern Fire Brick Co. v. Sand Co., 223 Ill. 616; 79 N. E. 313; 9 L. R. A. N. S. 446 (1906); affirming Garden City Sand Co. v. Southern Fire Brick & Clay Co., 124 Ill. App. 599 (1906), the act of 1891 was held inapplicable to a reasonable contract in restraint of trade.

See generally, as to application of act, Heimbuecher v. Goff, 119 III. App. 373 (1905).

By L. 1897, p. 298, was added an amendment exempting certain arrangements to maintain or increase wages, but this was held unconstitutional in People ex rel. Akin v. Butler Street Foundry Co., 201 Ill. 236, 259; 66 N. E. 349, 356 (1903), without, however, affecting the validity of the act sought to be

amended. See also Lafayette Bridge Co. v. City of Streator, 105 Fed. 729 (C. C. Ill., 1900); Chicago, Wilmington, etc., Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 454; 73 N. E. 770, 780 (1905). For similar exemptions, see under La. (§ 214); Mich. (§ 217); Mont. (§ 221); Neb. (§ 222); N. C. (§ 225); Wis. (§ 235). The act of 1891 has no extraterritorial effect. People ex rel. Akin v. Butler Street Foundry Co., supra (159 Ill. 249; 66 N. E. 353); Chicago Wall Paper Mills v. General Paper Co., 147 Fed. 491; 78 C. C. A. 607 (7th C., 1906). The prohibition of § 1 was held applicable to a corporation having fifteen hundred members, and thus described: "Appellee receives milk from members, anu accounts to them for the same; guarantees to members payment for milk sold by it; fixes and determines the price of milk; retains five cents upon each can of milk sold, for each year; has authority over all milk consigned by any of its members to any stand within the corporate limits of the city of Chicago; a member cannot sell his stock except to a shipper and producer of milk, and must own as many shares as he ships cans of milk per day, but not to own more than fifty shares of stock." Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Assoc., 155 Ill. 166; 39 N. E. 651; 27 L. R. A. 298 (1895). The court said: "The corporation as an entity may not be able to create a trust or combination with itself, but its individual shareholders may, in con

99 10

trolling it, together with it, create such trust or combination that will constitute it, with them, alike guilty." See also Harding v. American Glucose Co., infra. Such prohibition was in American Strawboard Co. v. Peoria Strawboard Co., 65 Ill. App. 502 (1896), applied to an extensive combination of manufacturers of strawboard and paper.

To similar effect with Welch v. Phelps & Bigelow Windmill Co. (see under Tex., § 232), as to a mere arrangement between principal and agent, see Weiboldt v. Standard Fashion Co., 80 Ill. App. 67 (1899). As to application of act to corporation organized to acquire patents, etc., see § 148.

In an indictment against corporations under the act, held unnecessary to allege the place of their organization, or whether they were authorized to transact or conduct business in the State. Chicago, Wilmington, etc., Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 446; 73 N. E. 770, 777 (1905).

10 L. 1891, p. 206, § 2; R. S. (Starr & Curtis' Ed., 1896), c. 38, § 100. For similar provisions, see under Ala. (§ 204); Iowa (§ 211); Kan. (§ 212); Ky. (§ 213); Mich. (§ 217); Mo. (§ 220); Ohio (§ 227); Utah (§ 233). See also under Me. (§ 215).

The act of L. 1893, p. 182; R. S.

(Starr & Curtis Ed., 1896), c. 38, §§ 109 et seq., was in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; 22 Supm. 431; 46 L. Ed. 679 (1902), as an entirety, held unconstitutional as repugnant to the 14th amendment, by reason of the provision of § 9, that the act should "not apply to agricultural products or live stock while in the hands of producer or raiser. See Dunbar v. American Telephone, etc., Co., 87 N. E. 521, 528 (Supm. Ct. Ill., 1909). See also under Ga. (§ 207); Ind. (§ 210); La. (§ 214); Mich. (§ 217); Mont. (§ 221); N. C. (§ 225); N. D. (§ 226); Tenn. (§ 231); Tex. (§ 232). Compare under Mont. (§ 221).

In Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 616, 625; 55 N. E. 577, 599, 602; 64 L. R. A. 738, 764, 767; 74 Am. St. Rep. 189 (1899), the prohibition of § 1 of the act of 1893, against a combination of capital or acts to create or carry out restrictions in trade and to prevent competition, had been applied to a combination among "six corporations engaged in the manufacture of glucose, which can only be manufactured in a certain district or extent of country, and which, with the exception of one small plant, were the only corporations engaged in such business." It also appeared that “the ability to