just defined is illegal, as to the view that it is inseparably con 65 N. J. Eq. 91; 55 Atl. 465 (1903); Booth v. Burgess, 65 Atl. 226 (Ct. Ch. N. J. 1906; see under § 74). So under like conditions was held actionable the boycott of a hotel proprietor, made effectual by the announcement of intention not to patronize those patronizing him. Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. 290; 26 So. 791 (1899; see § 33; see also, as to elements of damage). So in Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1; 42 Atl. 607; 43 L. R. A. 803; 76 Am. St. Rep. 746 (1899), the boycott held illegal consisted of the action of an association, the only coercion, if any, consisting of the circumstance that a member not complying with resolutions thereof was subject to penalties under the by-laws. So in Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389; 83 N. E. 928; 16 L. R. A. N. S. 85; 122 Am. St. Rep. 119 (1908); Ertz V. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 140; 81 N. W. 737; 48 L. R. A. 90; 79 Am. St. Rep. 433 (1900), a boycott was held actionable in the absence of accompanying acts of coercion. In Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48 (C. C. N. Y., 1887), an action was held maintainable for a boycott of the plaintiff's business by sending notices to his customers, designed to intimidate them from dealing with it, by threat of loss and expense, whereby various persons were intimidated into refusing to deal with the plaintiff. Such acts were said to be not merely actionable, but misdemeanors at common law and under N. Y. Penal Code, § 168. This illustrates a class of cases wherein it is difficult to determine whether the threat of "loss and ex SO pense" produced a fear of violence or merely of loss of custom. If of violence, the case was probably rightly decided; if merely of loss of custom, in our view, wrongly. See § 6. See, on the general subject, articles in 33 Am. Law Rev. 885 (1899); 34 Id. 161, 468 (1900) by S. D. Thompson; 40 Id. 196 (1906) by J. W. Bryan; 41 Id. 336 (1907) by R. L. McWilliams; 42 Id. 200 (1908) by C. R. Darling; 16 Harv. Law Rev. 236 (1902-3) by E. F. McClennen; 18 Id. 423 (1905) by E. W. Huffcut; Id. 444 W. D. Lewis; 43 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 73 (1904) by C. R. Darling; 44 Id. 465 (1905) by W. D. Lewis. (1905) by As to legality of boycott as incident of strike, see Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin Union, 5 Ont. Law Rep. 463 (1903). By Ill. R. S. (Starr & Curtis' ed., 1896), c. 38, § 96, it is a crime to conspire to establish "a so-called boycott or blacklist." See Piano & Organ Workers' Union v. Piano & Organ Supply Co., 124 Ill. App. 353 (1906). By Ala. Crim. Code (1907), § 6396, it is made a criminal act to "print or circulate any notice of boycott, boycott cards, stickers, dodgers or unfair lists, publishing or declaring that a boycott or ban exists or has existed, or is contemplated against any person, firm or corporation doing a lawful business, or publishing the name of any judicial officer or other public official upon any blacklist, unfair list or other similar list because of any lawful act or decision of such official." To very similar effect is Colo. R. S. (1908), § 398 by What seems to "The verb 'to nected with acts that are indisputably illegal." us to be a better view has been thus expressed: boycott' does not necessarily signify that the doers employ violence, intimidation or other unlawful coercive means, but it which it is likewise made a criminal act "to loiter about or patrol the streets, alleys, roads, highways, trails or place of business of any person, firm or corporation engaged in any lawful business, for the purpose of influencing or inducing others not to trade with, buy from, sell to, work for, or have business dealings with such person, firm or corporation, or to picket the works, mine, building or other place of business or occupation of such other person, persons, firm or corporation, for the purpose of obstructing or interfering with or injuring any lawful business, work or enterprise, provided that nothing herein shall prevent any person from soliciting trade, custom or business for a competitive business." As to boycott being included within ordinary anti-trust act as "combination for the purpose of creating or carrying out a restriction in trade or commerce," see under Ohio (§ 227); as combination "to prevent others from conducting or carrying on the same business," or which tends "to prevent or preIclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves or others or the public generally," see under Neb. (§ 222). See, also, § 21 and under Mo. (§ 220); also under Federal anti-trust act, § 191. For prohibition against boycotting electors, see Miss. Code (1906), § 1062. As to application of U. S. R. S. § 5480, to use of mails for purpose of boycotting, see U. S. v. Raish, 163 Fed. 911 (D. C. Ill., 1908). See definitions, § 24. In State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 77; 8 Atl. 890, 897; 3 Am. St. Rep. 23, 35 (1887), after referring to the account of the origin of the word (see § 24) it was said: "If this is a correct picture, the thing we call a boycott originally signified violence, if not murder;" also: "Instances are not wanting in our own country where the boycott has been attended with more or less violence; and it cannot be denied that the natural tendency is, especially when applied by the ignorant and vicious, to attempt to make it successful by force. It too often leads to serious disturbances of the peace." So in Brace v. Evans, 3 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 561 (Allegheny Co., Pa., Com. Pl., 1888), an injunction was allowed employers against a boycott where, among the acts complained of were: the issue of circulars requesting all persons to cease patronizing them, some of such circulars hav"ing printed in large letters, "Boycott Brace Bros."; visiting their customers; inducing them to refrain from patronizing them; conspicuously displaying sign with words "Headquarters Brace Bros.' Boycott Committee"; following their wagons, with banners having the words "Boycott Brace Bros."; requesting their ents to cease dealing with them, and boycotting them on their refusal; distributing circulars and thereby collecting noisy crowds in front of their place may be correctly used in the sense of the act of a combination in refusing to have business dealings with another until he removes or ameliorates conditions which are deemed inimical to the welfare of the members of the combination, or some of them, or grants concessions which are deemed to make for that purpose.' " 10 § 26. Relation justifying boycott.-It has frequently been of business. The decision rested on cision was applied in Casey v. Cin- in In joined, it was said (118 Mich. 519; 77 N. W. 22; 42 L. R. A. 416): "When these defendants went in numbers of from five to twenty-five along the streets, and into the business houses of complainants' customers, distributing these circulars which contained false statements, and which commenced and closed with the words 'Boycott B. & Sons,' they intended in emphatic manner to convey to the customers of complainants that they would be treated in like manner unless they ceased to trade with complainants. The distance that this was done from the mill of the complainants does not detract from its character or harmfulness. It was just as effective and as wrong when done 1,000 feet from the mill as when done 10 feet from it. The act itself, not the distance, determines its character. . . . The defendants by their conduct gave every laborer and customer of complainants their definition of what they understood the term 'boycott' to mean. It would be idle to argue that these, circulars were not intended as a menace, intimidation and coercion. They were so used, and were 'a standing menace' to every one who wished to work for or trade with complainants." 10 Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 611; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 189 (1904). This was quoted held or assumed to be necessary that there exist some special relation to justify a boycott,11 and boycotts that have been held legal have, as a rule, been incidents or outgrowths of some special relation, commonly that of trade competitor. What has already been said with reference to a relation justifying a refusal to deal will, generally speaking, apply here. and applied in Lindsay v. Montana Federation of Labor, 96 Pac. 127 (Supm. Ct. Mont., 1908). 11 See Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 611; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 188 (1904). CHAPTER VI INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT § 27. Inducing breach of contract. 28. Justifying relation. 29. Malicious intent. 30. Fraud or misrepresentation. § 27. Inducing breach of contract.-As with the right to induce refusal to deal, so on principle it would seem clear enough that there is nothing inherently or necessarily illegal in inducing another to break his contract.1 Nevertheless within a comparatively recent period has been developed the doctrine that such inducing is illegal,2 this doctrine being merely an expan 1 In accord with the view expressed in the text is Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578; 33 Pac. 492; 21 L. R. A. 233 (1893), where it was held broadly that no action lies against one "who, from malicious motives, but without threats, violence, fraud, falsehood, deception or benefit to himself, induces another to violate his contract with the plaintiff." So in Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430; 8 Am. Rep. 559 (1872), it was held broadly that no action lies in such case in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. To the same effect, Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 242; 33 So. 211 (1902); Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388; 37 So. 2; 67 L. R. A. 65 (1904); Daly v. Cornwell, 34 App. D. 27; 54 N. Y. Suppl. 107 (1898), though see McDonald v. Edwards, 20 Misc. 523; 46 N. Y. Suppl. 672 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1897). 2 So held in Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216 (1853); Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333 (1881); Heath v. American Book Co., 97 Fed. 533 (C. C. W. Va., 1899); Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142 Fed. 606 (C. C. Ill., 1906); Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (C. C. Mass., 1906); Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. Exeter Boot & Shoe Co., 159 Fed. 824; 86 C. C. A. 648 (1st C., 1908); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Co., 161 Fed. 219 (C. C. Ill., 1908); Motley v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 161 Fed. 389 (C. C. N. Y., 1908); Mahoney v. Roberts, 110 S. W. 225 (Supm. Ct. Ark., 1908); Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608; 52 N. E. 924; 43 L. R. A. 797; 68 Am. St. Rep. 203 (1898); Guethler v. Altman, 26 Ind. App. 587; 60 N. E. |