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It is argued by the counsel for the defendant in error, that the happening of this event was certain, and that it was unnecessary for the legislature to perform any act which might occasion it, because the interest of the refiner, was a sure pledge for his sending out the sugars he had refined.

This is true, but the argument is not less strong when urged to prove, that the legislature might rely on this interest to produce the state of things, which would create the charge. If this interest was relied upon, for the fact on which a duty should become payable, it might well be relied upon to produce the fact on which the article should be chargeable with the duty; and it is unquestionably in the common course of legislative proceedings on the subject of revenue, to obtain security for the payment of duties, at the first convenient time after they shall have accrued.

If, as is contended for the defendant in error, the act of refining the sugar, creates a debt to be paid when sent out of the building, then the refiner becomes immediately the debtor of the government, and his situation by sending out the sugar, is changed in no other respect whatever, than that the debt before created does by that fact become payable. The position to be proved is that A, the refiner of sugars, becomes the debtor of the United States, to the full amount of the sugars refined, which debt does not accrue but only becomes payable on the fact of their being sent out of the building.

Let this proposition be examined.

If A becomes the debtor by the mere act of refining, then he remains the debtor until he shall be legally discharged. Suppose him to part with his manufactory and his capital stock, there being at the time of transfer a quantity of refined sugars in the building, which pass with it to the purchaser. If, by the act of refining, A became the debtor of the government, which debt became payable whenever the sugars should be sent out of the building, then A would remain the debtor-notwithstanding his sale, and would be liable for

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Yet this construction would be admitted to conflict with the obvious meaning of the law. Not only the person who sends out the sugars, is to account and pay for them, but if he fails to do so, the consequences of his failure fall entirely on himself. The sugar is forfeited, and if lost to the purchaser, his recourse could only be against the person from whom he purchased.

But let it be supposed, that A sends out his sugars and parts with his building, before the day on which the account is to be rendered, and the duties paid or secured. Who then would be the debtor of the government? Who in that case would be liable for the duties that had thus accrued? It is believed that only one answer could be given to this question. The person who sent out the sugars, would unquestionably be liable for the duties on them, and if they should be seized for the non-payment of them, the purchaser would have recourse to him for compensation.

If these positions be correct, it would seem to be a plain and necessary deduction from them, that the fact of sending out the sugars, not the fact of refining them, created the debt, and that the person sending them out became the debtor.

It has been argued that the provision of the 5th section, which requires a daily entry to be made on the books, of the quantity of sugars refined, evidences an intention in the legislature, to impose a tax on the article immediately. But this argument did not appear to be much relied on, and it is too apparent that the regulations of the 5th section were designed to furnish the means of detecting any fraud which might be attempted, in the account of sugars sent out of the building, to require that the court should employ any time in demonstrating the correctness of that construction.

The argument drawn from the 3d section, which uses the expression "the duties aforesaid," does not

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appear to operate more in favour of the construction contended for by the counsel for the defendant in error. The section is employed not in designating the tax to be collected, but the person to collect it, and the words have the same import, as if instead of "the duties aforesaid," the language had been changed and the words, "the duties imposed by this act" had been used.

The sections respecting drawbacks have been relied on by both plaintiff and defendant, as completely supporting his own construction of the act, but the court can perceive nothing in those sections in any degree affecting the case.

It has been stated by both parties, that all the revenue acts of the United States, may be considered as in pari materia, as forming one connected system, and therefore to be compared together, when any one of them is to be construed.

In pursuance of this doctrine they have been resorted to by the defendant in error, to show that the terms. used in the 2d section of the act under consideration are such as in all those acts import the imposition of a duty.

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This is not questioned. It is not denied that a tax is imposed,. nor would this have been denied if two of the three words used in the act had been omitted. is the general phraseology of laws enacted for the purpose of raising money, but to reason by way of analogy, from the acts quoted to that under consideration, it would be necessary to show, that these general terms had been construed to be more extensive than the particular regulations, which follow for the purpose of carrying them into execution. It is not recollected that this has been attempted.

It has been argued that the duty on spirits of the home manufactory, is laid on their distillation, not on their removal, and that the legislature must therefore be presumed also, to have imposed the duty on sugars, on the act of refining them, and not on the act of removal.

But the force of this argument is not admitted. Those political motives which induce the legislature to select objects of revenue and to tax them under particular circumstances, are not for judicial consideration. Where the legislature distinguishes between different objects, and in imposing a duty on them evidences a will to charge them in different situations, it is not for the courts to beat down these distinctions on the allegation that they are capriciously made, and therefore to be disregarded. It is the duty of the court to discover the intention of the legislature, and to respect that intention. Where the provisions of two acts are so unlike each other, that the comparison exhibits only a contrast, instead of saying that their opposing regulations were designed to be similar, it would seem much more reasonable to say that the one act exhibits a legislative mind materially variant in the particulars where the difference exists from what is exhibited by the other.

Every regulation of the act imposing a duty on spirits distilled within the United States, respects exclusively the time of distillation, and they are all essentially variant from the regulations of the act imposing a duty on snuff and refined sugars.

The duty on spirits is to be paid or secured previous to their removal. That on sugars is not to be paid or secured until after their removal.

The credit for the duties on distilled spirits is allowed from the date of a bond, to be quarter annually given for all the spirits distilled whether removed or not, so that the credit is as near as possible from the date of distillation.

The credit for the duties on refined sugars is allowed from the date of a bond quarter annually given for all the sugars removed from the building, so that the credit is as near as possible from the date of the removal.

Spirits having a duty imposed on them at the time of distillation are liable to seizure and confiscation if removed without paying or securing the duty.

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Sugars not being liable for the duty till removed are not seizable nor confiscable unless the refiner, after removal, shall have failed to pay or secure the duties which became payable at a given day after their removal.

With respect to country stills, the tax is laid on the capacity of the still, and is to be paid without regard to the quantity distilled, but if this tax should become oppressive it may be discharged by paying the duty on the quantity actually distilled. In this case no respect whatever is paid to the removal of the spirits. Their distillation alone attracts the attention of the legislature.

With respect to all refined sugars no duty can ever be demanded, unless the demand be predicated on the fact of removal.

Spirits being chargeable with the duty when distilled cannot be removed without a permit.

Sugars being only chargeable when sent out may be removed at the will of the refiner.

It is going very far indeed to argue a sameness of intention from these dissimilar regulations. The court thinks it much more correct to say that the intention of the legislature with respect to these different objects was entirely different, and that in the case of spirits the duty was imposed on the distillation, while in the case of sugars the duty was imposed on the removal.

It is not improbable that the difference in the progress made in the two pursuits, and the greater degree of forbearance required by the one than by the other; or that the difference in the facility with which frauds might be practised in the two cases, might occasion this apparent difference in the time of imposing the duty on the article. But this, it is repeated, is a legislative not a judicial inquiry and, if the difference exists, it must be respected, whatever may be the motives which produced it.

Some arguments have been drawn from the repealing law which have too much weight to be unnoticed.