the port, she is protected from the time of her arrival (n) and during her continuance there (o).

The words "at and from" a particular island or coast, protect a vessel whilst she is going from port to port in such island or on such coast, for purposes connected with the voyage (p), as, for instance, for the purpose of discharging an outward cargo (1); of loading a homeward cargo; or of joining convoy (r). If, however, a vessel is insured to sail from a particular place, which is named in the policy, she will not be protected if she sail from a different place, although it be within the same port (s). Where a ship was insured "at and from her port of lading," and she began to load her cargo at one place, and then proceeded to another several miles distant in the same creek, but not on the direct route of her voyage, and these places were not shown to constitute one port, although they were within the district of the same custom house, it was held that this was not authorized by the terms of the policy (t).

The words "at and from" a port imply, either that the ship is at the port mentioned, or that she will be there so soon after the time mentioned as not materially to vary the risk (u). And it is immaterial whether her delay was occasioned by the default or misfortune of the assured (a). These words also imply that the ship will arrive in such a condition as to enable her to lie in reasonable security. It is not necessary that she should arrive in such a state as to be then seaworthy for the voyage, but she must have been once at the place in good safety. If, therefore, she

(n) Haughton v. The Empire Marine Insurance Company, L. R., 1 Ex. 206. It was held in that case that the policy attached, though the vessel was not safely moored, and that it was to be construed irrespective of the terms of the outward policy. See also Foley v. The United Kingdom Fire Insurance Company, L. R., 5 C. P. 155.

(0) Motteux v. The London Assurance Company, 1 Atk. 545; Rotch v. Edie, 6 T. R. 413; Palmer v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 79; Williamson v. Innes, ib. 81, note. See as to the meaning of the words " during her stay and trade there," The Company of African Merchants v. The British and Foreign Marine Insurance Company, L. R., 8 Ex. 154. (p) See the judgment of Lord Mansfield in Bond v. Nutt, 2 Cowp. 606.

(2) Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & C. 538.

(r) Cruickshank v. Janson, 2 Taunt. 301; see also the judgment of Park, J., in Forshaw v. Chabert, 3 B. & B. 165.

(s) Constable v. Noble, 2 Taunt. 403. Even although the name of the place is the same as that of the port within the bounds of which it is included. Ib.; see also Payne v. Hutchinson, ib. 405, note.

(t) Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241. As to what constitutes a "port" within the meaning of a policy, see Harrower v. Hutchinson, L. R., 4 Q. B. 523, and 5 Q. B. 584, and the cases there cited.

(u) Hull v. Cooper, 14 East, 479; see also Mount v. Larkins, 8 Bing. 108; Motteux v. The London Assurance Company, 1 Atk. 548; Haughton v. The Empire Marine Insurance Company, L. R., 1 Ex. 206.

(x) De Wolf v. The Archangel Mar. Bank, L. R., 9 Q. B. 451.

arrives at the outward port so shattered as to be a mere wreck, the policy never attaches (y). This undertaking applies, however, only to the physical condition of the vessel; therefore, where a ship, on her arrival in safety at the port "at and from " which she was insured, was seized and condemned by a foreign government on account of political causes, it was held that the policy had attached (z).

goods.

In policies upon goods it is usual to name the period at which In policies on the risk is to attach. Where it is stated to be "from the loading thereof" at a particular place, goods which have been previously put on board at another port, as a portion of the outward cargo, are not protected (a). But where goods laden at one port are discharged and re-laden at another in order to allow the vessel to refit, they are covered by a policy which describes the latter port as the port of loading in the voyage, as "at and from" that port (b). If the place of loading is not named, it will be intended to be a loading at the place where the voyage is to commence (c). This strict construction has, however, been relaxed where there is anything on the face of the policy to show that the intention was to cover goods previously on board, as where the policy was declared to be "in continuation of others," which others included a voyage to the port of lading (d). And the same construction was put on a policy which expressed that the insurance was to commence from the loading, "wheresoever," &c. (e).

Having considered the cases which relate to the commence- Termination of risk, how ment of the voyage, or the terminus à quo, we will now mention described. those which relate to its conclusion, or terminus ad quem; leaving the decisions as to the intermediate passage to be considered under the head of deviation.

If the voyage be described as to a country generally, it terminates upon the arrival of the ship at any port in that country. And if as to a named port, it continues until the mooring of the vessel in that port in the usual place of discharge

(y) See the judgment of Lord Ellenborough in Parmeter v. Cousins, 2 Camp. 235.

(z) Bell v. Bell, 2 Camp. 475.

(a) Robertson v. French, and Langhorn v. Hardy, 4 Taunt. 268; Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East, 46; Mellish v. Allnutt, 2 M. & S. 106; Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651. See also Jones v. The Neptune Marine Insurance

Company, L. R., 7 Q. B. 702.

(b) Nonnen v. Kettlewell, 16 East, 176, and Carr v. Montefiore, 5 B. & S. 408; 33 L. J., Q. B. 256.

(e) Spitta v. Woodman, 2 Taunt. 416. (d) Bell v. Hobson, 16 East, 240; Joyce v. The Realm Insurance Company, L. R., 7 Q. B. 580.

(e) Gladstone v. Clay, 1 M. & S. 418.

for the cargo on board (ƒ). If it be stated to be to a port or ports in a particular district, the voyage continues until the vessel arrives at her last port of discharge in that district. If, however, her unloading at this port is rendered impracticable, as by an embargo or the like, the policy will be exhausted when the ship bas put into the last port in the district named which she can make with safety (g). Where a ship was insured "at and from St. Vincent, Barbadoes, and all or any of the West Indian Islands, to her port or ports of discharge and loading in the United Kingdom, during her stay there and thence back to Barbadoes, and all or any of the West Indian colonies, until the ship should have arrived at her final port as aforesaid," it was held that the adventure terminated at the place in the West Indian colonies where she substantially discharged her cargo from this country (h).

Until at In order to prevent questions arising as to the duration of anchor insurances after the arrival of the ship at her port of discharge, twenty-four hours in good a provision is not unfrequently inserted that the insurer's liasafety. bility shall continue until the ship is at anchor twenty-four hours in good safety. Under these words a ship is protected if arrested on her arrival in the port, or ordered back to perform quarantine (i). It has been said, that if a ship insured upon these terms to any particular port of delivery is forced by stress of weather into a different port, and there discharges part of her cargo, and afterwards proceeds to her port of delivery, the policy remains good; but that where the policy is general to a particular country, and the vessel comes to a port, and there voluntarily remains and discharges part of her cargo, the policy, whether on ship or goods, expires after she has remained there twenty-four hours (k). Even where the policy includes the above provision, doubts may arise as to whether the place at which the vessel is moored can be considered as her destination. This question may be affected by the state of the tide, the general usage of the port, or even by the intention of the master. Thus, where a vessel insured to London, by a

(f) Camden v. Cowley, 1 W. Bl. 417; Stone v. The Marine Insurance Company, Ocean Limited, of Gothenburg, 1 Ex. D.

81.

(g) Brown v. Vigne, 12 East, 283; but see Oliverson v. Brightman, 8 Q. B.

(h) Moore v. Taylor, 1 A. & E. 25. (i) Waples v. Eames, 2 Str. 1243; Minett v. Anderson, Peake, 211; Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East, 46.

(k) See the ruling of Lord Kenyon in Leigh v. Mather, 1 Esp. 412.

policy containing these terms, was moored for several days in the Thames, outside one of the docks into which the captain intended to take her, but he was prevented from so doing by ice in the river, it was held that the underwriters were liable for an injury which occurred to her whilst she was moving towards the dock; since, although she had been anchored more than twenty-four hours, it was not at her place of destination (1). In a more recent case, however, a vessel similarly insured, from Liverpool to Quebec and back to her discharging port in the United Kingdom, was chartered from Quebec with a cargo of timber to be discharged in Wallasey Pool, in the river Mersey. She arrived in the Mersey, and on the following day was towed up to the entrance of Wallasey Pool, but being unable to enter, by reason of her drawing too much water, the captain anchored, and after reporting the vessel, discharged the deck cargo, and a considerable portion of the other cargo, which proceedings. occupied several days. The ship then fell over, and sustained damage. The captain always intended to take her into Wallasey Pool with as much cargo on board as she could carry with safety. Upon these facts it was held that the underwriters were not liable, as the vessel had arrived as near to Wallasey Pool as she could safely get, had begun to discharge her cargo, and had been moored in safety twenty-four hours after her arrival at her port of discharge (m).

In all these cases the question is one of fact, depending upon the custom and usage of the port and the nature of the voyage (n).

When a policy insures a ship against loss for a certain period after her arrival at her port of discharge, and there is also a clause protecting her for twenty-four hours at anchor, the time so covered after her arrival is to be reckoned from the expiration of the twenty-four hours (o).

Where the insurance is on goods, the policy usually provides In policies on goods.

(1) Samuel v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 8 B. & C. 119; Stone v. The Marine Insurance Company, Ocean Limited, of Gothenburg, 1 Ex. D. 81.

(m) Whitwell v. Harrison, 2 Ex. 127. (n) Lindsay v. Janson, 4 H. & N. 699. See also Parker v. Winlow, 7 E. & B. 942; Wingate v. Foster, 3 Q. B. D. 582.

(0) Mercantile Marine Insurance Company v. Titherington, 5 B. & S. 765. See also Gambles v. The Ocean Marine Insurance Company of Bombay, L. R., 1 Ex. D. 141. In that case the words "for fifteen days whilst there after arrival" were held to cover a period within that time, although the cargo was discharged. As to what constitutes "safety," see Lidgett v. Secretan, L. R., 5 C. P. 190.