ADAMS et al. v. COWAN et al. (May 22, 1899.) No. 113. On writ of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the Sixth circuit. See 24 C. C. A. 198, 78 Fed. 536; 25 C. C. A. 547, 80 Fed. 448. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., John F. Hager, and J. L. Anderson, for petitioners. Judson Harmon, John J. Glidden, and John Little, for respondents. No opinion. Decree affirmed, with costs, by a divided court, and cause remanded to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky.

AMOS et al. v. CHOCTAW NATION. (February 20, 1899.) No. 467. Appeal from the United States court in the Indian Territory. W. T. Hutchings, for appellants. No opinion. Dismissed, with costs, on motion of W. T. Hutchings, for the appellants.

BECKNER v. SCOTT. (December 9, 1898.) No. 93. Appeal from the supreme court of the territory of Arizona. Arthur Brown, for appellant. No opinion. Dismissed, with costs, on authority of counsel for appellant.

BELLINGHAM BAY IMP. CO. v. CITY OF NEW WHATCOM (two cases). (January 3, 1899.) Nos. 97 and 98.

Mr. Justice BREWER. These cases involve the same questions as in Bellingham Bay & B. C. R. Co. v. City of New Whatcom, 19 Sup. Ct. 205, and the same judgments of affirmance will be entered in them.

BLYTHE CO. v. BLYTHE et al. (January 9, 1899.) No. 256. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of California. George W. Towle, Jr., E. S. Pilisbury, and John F. Dillon, for appellant. W. H. H. Hart, Frederic D. McKenney, John Garber, and Robert Y. Hayne, for appellees. No opinion. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the authority of Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 16 Sup. Ct. 490; Black v. Black, 163 U. S. 678, 16 Sup. Ct. 1199; Tucker v. McKay, 164 U. S. 701, 17 Sup. Ct. 1001; Carey v. Railway Co., 150 U. S. 170, 14 Sup. Ct. 63; Id., 161 U. S. 115. 16 Sup. Ct. 537; Ex parte Railroad Co., 95 U. S. 221; Cross v. De Valle, 1 Wall. 1; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 15 Sup. Ct. 266.

BOARD OF COM'RS OF SCOTT COUNTY, KAN., v. STATE OF KANSAS. (May 1, 1899.) No. 261. In error to the supreme court of the state of Kansas. See 49 Pac. 663. S. S. Ashbaugh, for plaintiff in error. A. A. Godard, for defendant in error. No opinion. Dismissed on the authority of Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff, 160 U. S. 374, 16 Sup. Ct. 318.

19 S.C.

CAPITAL NAT. BANK OF LINCOLN, NEB., et al. v. COLDWATER NAT. BANK OF COLDWATER, MICH. (two cases). McDONALD v. SAMUEL CUPPLES WOODENWARE CO. SAME v. GENESEE FRUIT CO. (January 3, 1899.) Nos. 73-76. A. E. Harvey and John H. Ames, for plaintiffs in error. L. C. Burr, for defendant in error Coldwater Nat. Bank. C. A. Brandenburg, for defendant in error Samuel Cupples Wooden-Ware Co. and Genesee Fruit Co.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER. For the reasons given in the opinion in Capital Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Cadiz (just decided) 19 Sup. Ct. 202, the writs of error in these cases are severally dismissed.

CHAPLIN v. UNITED STATES. (December 12, 1898.) No. 68. Appeal from court of claims. James Lowndes, for appellant. The Attorney General and Asst. Atty. Gen. Pradt, for the United States. No opinion. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with a direction to enter judgment for the claimant, on the authority of U. S. v. Elliott, 164 U. S. 373, 17 Sup. Ct. 140.

CHAPPELL et al. v. EDMONDSON AVE., C. & E. C. ELECTRIC RY. CO. (April 18, 1899.) No. 258. In error to the circuit court of Baltimore county, state of Maryland. Thomas C. Chappell, for plaintiffs in error. John N. Steele and William H. Buckler, for defendant in error. No opinion. Dismissed, with costs, pursuant to the tenth rule.

CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. v. CAMPBELL. (May 22, 1899.) No. 235. In error to the supreme court of the state of Kansas. W. F. Evans and M. A. Low, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice MCKENNA. The facts of this case are substantially the same as in No. 236 (Railway Co. v. Strum, 19 Sup. Ct. 979), except

as to the amount involved, and the court in which the proceedings in attachment were commenced, and the judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. BANK OF COMMERCE. (May 15, 1899.) No. 363. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. W. S. Taylor, for Stone, auditor, and others. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Bank of Commerce.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM. In the above case the same question is involved that has just been determined in No. 362 (19 Sup. Ct. 747), and there will be a like order reversing the judg ment. and remanding the case to the circuit court, with directions to dismiss the bill.

Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice WHITE dissented.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. CITIZENS' NAT. BANK. CITIZENS' NAT. BANK OF LOUISVILLE v. STONE, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. (May 15, 1899.) Nos. 365 and 405. Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. W. S. Taylor, for Stone, Auditor, and others. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Citizens' Nat. Bank.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The Citizens' National Bank was organized on the 8th day of August, 1874, its charter being stipulated to endure for a period of 20 years. On April 1, 1894, the charter was renewed and extended for 20 years. The bank in these two cases filed its bills to enjoin the collection of certain taxes on the ground that, by the effect of a statute of the state of Kentucky, usually referred to as the "Hewitt Act," an irrevocable contract had been entered into be tween the state and the bank, from which it resulted that the taxes complained of could not be levied without impairing the obligations of such contract. It was moreover averred that the existence of this contract had been judicially determined in a suit between the Third National Bank and the city of Louisville, to which suit the Citizens' National Bank, although not a party. was a privy, because of certain agreements alleged to have been made between the city of Louisville and the bank at the time the suit was brought by the Third National Bank. In consequence of this fact it was alleged that the existence of the contract between the Citizens' National Bank and the state had been judicially determined, and the decree to that effect was pleaded as res judicata. In addition, the taxes in question were alleged to be illegal, because imposed upon the franchise and property of the bank, and because they were discriminatory, and they were averred, besides, to be illegal under the state constitution and laws. The lower court held that the plea of res judicata established an irrevocable contract as to the taxes for years prior to the date of the extended charter, but that the thing adjudged did not conclude that there was an irrevocable contract as to taxes imposed after the date of the extension of the charter, because such taxes were not, and could not have been, in controversy in the cause in which the prior judgment had been rendered. Upon these grounds, in the second case (that is, No. 405) it decided that the complainant was without right to relief, and in the first case (No. 365) that it was entitled to the relief sought.

These two cases are in all material respects identical with the cases of Bank v. Stone, 19 Sup. Ct. 759, and City of Louisville v. Third Nat. Bank, infra, which have been just decided. For the reasons given in the decisions

rendered in those cases, it is ordered that the decree below rendered in No. 365 be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, and that rendered in No. 405 be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and that the last-mentioned case (viz. No. 405) be remanded to the court below, with directions to take such further proceedings as may be in conformity to this opinion, and it is so ordered.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. THIRD NAT. BANK. (May 15, 1899.) No. 364. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Third Nat. Bank.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, the Third National Bank, filed its bill to enjoin the collection of certain taxes, relying upon grounds in all respects like unto those alleged in case No. 404 (Bank v. Stone [just decided] 19 Sup. Ct. 759). There was, however, this difference between the facts of the latter case and those arising on this record: In this case the taxes sought to be enjoined were levied prior to the renewal of the charter of the bank. Because of this difference the court below concluded that the want of power to assess and levy was conclusively established by the presumption of the thing adjudged arising from the decree of the court of appeals of Kentucky (31 S. W. 1013), to which we have referred in case No. 404. We need not, however, consider the question of res judicata, upon which the court below based its conclusion, as we have in case No. 404, just announced, held, entirely without reference to the plea of res judicata, that taxes in form exactly like those here in question were illegal because levied upon the property and franchise of the bank, and not upon the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders. It follows, therefore, that the decree below which restrained the collection of the taxes was correct, and it is therefore affirmed.

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. WARNER. (October 24, 1898.) No. 336. Appeal from the United States circuit court of appeals for the Fifth circuit. See 31 C. C. A. 238, 87 Fed. 829. Samuel L. Gilmore and Branch K. Miller, for appellant. Richard De Gray, J. D. Rouse, Wil liam Grant, and Wheeler H. Peckham, for appellee. No opinion. Dismissed on the authority of Tennessee v. Bank of Commerce, 152 U. S. 454. 14 Sup. Ct. 654; Sawyer v. Kockersperger, 170 U. S. 303, 18 Sup. Ct. 946.

Mr. Justice WHITE took no part in the consideration and disposition of this motion.

CLIFFORD v. HELLER. (November 14, 1898.) No. 304. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey. William D. Daly, for appellant. James S. Erwin, for appellee. No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs.

CONSOLIDATED WATER CO. et al. v. BABCOCK et al. (March 20, 1899.) No. 231. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of California. Horace S. Oakley, C. K. Davis, Frank B. Kellogg, and C. A. Severance, for appellants. H. E. Doolittle, Wm. J. Hunsaker, A. B. Browne, and A. T. Britton, for appellees. No opinion. Dismissed on the authority of Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 14 Sup. Ct. 353; Van Wagener v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 369, 16 Sup. Ct. 376; Davis v. Geissler, 162 U. S. 290, 16 Sup. Ct. 796; Cornell v. Green, 163 U. S. 75, 16 Sup Ct. 969, and cases cited.

COVINGTON & C. EL. RAILROAD & TRANSFER & BRIDGE CO. v. WILSON. (October 10, 1898.) No. 173. In error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. C. B. Simrall, for plaintiff in error. No opinion. Dismissed, with costs, on authority of counsel for plaintiff in error.

DAVIS. UNITED STATES. (December 12, 1898.) No. 633. Appeal from the court of claims. No opinion. Docketed and dismissed on motion of Sol. Gen. Richards, for the appellee.

DEPOSIT BANK OF OWENSBORO v. CITY OF OWENSBORO et al. (April 3, 1899.) No. 149. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The relief sought by the plaintiff in error was the nullity of certain taxes levied by the city of Owensboro for the years 1893 and 1894. The grounds upon which this relief was prayed are in all material respects like unto those relied on in the two cases against the city of Owensboro, just decided. The charter and an amendment extending the same were both enacted after the act of 1856.

Indeed, this case, along with the other two, was disposed of by the Kentucky court of appeals in the same opinion, because of the identity of the questions presented. 39 S. W. 1030.

For the reasons given in the opinion in Citizens' Sav. Bank v. City of Owensboro (No. 669, this term) 19 Sup. Ct. 530, the decree is affirmed.

V.

DEPOSIT BANK OF OWENSBORO DAVIESS COUNTY et al. (April 3, 1899.) No. 150. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky. See 39 S. W. 1030.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

By a written stipulation it is agreed that this cause abide the result of No. 149,-Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. City of Owensboro, supra. The decree in that case having been affirmed, the same result is therefore necessary in this, and accordingly the decree of the court of appeals of Kentucky in this case is also affirmed.

DREXEL et al. v. UNITED STATES. (March 20, 1899.) No. 47. In error to the United States circuit court of appeals for the Third circuit. See 23 C. C. A. 581, 77 Fed. 944. Richard C. Dale, G. S. Graham, and Clayton E. Emig, for plaintiffs in error. The Attorney General, for the United States. No opinion. Dismissed, per stipulation, on motion of Sol. Gen. Richards, for the defendant in error.

DURANGO LAND & COAL CO. v. EVANS et al. (October 10, 1898.) No. 131. Appeal from the United States circuit court of appeals for the Eighth circuit. See 25 C. C. A. 523, 531, 80 Fed. 425, 433. David C. Beaman and Lucius M. Cuthbert, for appellant. John R. Smith, for appellees. No opinion. Dismissed per stipula

tion.

FARMERS' BANK OF NORBORNE et al. v. ROSELLE. (November 7, 1898.) No. 157. In error to the supreme court of the state of Missouri. Morton Jourdan, for plaintiffs in error. William B. King and William E. Harvey, for defendant in error. No opinion. Writ of error dismissed on the authority of Meyer v. Cox, 169 U. S. 735, 18 Sup. Ct. 944; McLish

v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118; Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, 11 Sup. Ct. 385; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 666, 14 Sup. Ct. 452; Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff, 160 U. S 374, 16 Sup. Ct. 318.

FARMERS' & TRADERS' BANK OF OWENSBORO v. CITY OF OWENSBORO et al. (April 3, 1899.) No. 151. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky. W. T. Ellis, Geo. W. Jolly, Wilfred Carico, and J. A. Dean, for plaintiffs in error. Chapeze Wathen, J. D. Atchison, and Robert S. Todd, for de fendants in error.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was chartered by the legislature of Kentucky in 1876. The charter limited the taxing power to 50 cents on each $100 of capital stock during the life of the corporation, which was fixed at 25 years. This suit was commenced by petition, asserting the nullity of certain taxes levied by the city of Owensboro for the years 1893 and 1894. The petition was twice amended. The cause of action alleged was, in every material respect, the same as that relied on in the case of Citizens' Sav. Bank v. City of Owensboro (No. 669 of the docket of this term) 19 Sup. Ct. 530, which we have just decided. For this reason the opinion in that case disposes of all the issues arising in this, and for the reasons therein given the decree of the court of appeals of Kentucky in this case rendered is affirmed.

Ex parte FAYERWEATHER et al. (two cases.) (December 5, 1898.) Roger M. Sherman, for petitioner. No opinion. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the determination of this motion.

Ex parte FAYERWEATHER et al. (November 7, 1898.) Roger M. Sherman, for petitioner. No opinion. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration and disposition of this motion.

Ex parte FAYERWEATHER et al. (January 23, 1899.) Roger M. Sherman, for petitioner. No opinion. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of certiorari denied. Announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision on this motion.

FIDELITY TRUST & SAFETY-VAULT CO. v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. SAME v. STONE, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. LOUISVILLE TRUST CO. v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. SAME v. STONE, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. (May 15, 1899.) Nos. 406409. Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. In these cases the respective trust companies who are appellants, all four being Kentucky corporations chartered subsequent to the year 1856, filed their respective bills to enjoin the assessment and collection of certain taxes. The want of power to assess and collect the taxes complained of was in each bill made to depend upon two substantially identical grounds, which were briefly these:

First. That a legislative act of the state of Kentucky, passed in 1886, and designated as the "Hewitt Act," had created an irrevocable contract between the state and the complainants, from which it arose that the taxes sought to be enjoined could not be assessed and collected with

out violating the clause of the constitution of the United States forbidding impairment by a state of the obligations of a contract.

Second. That in a suit previously brought by the Louisville Banking Company, a Kentucky corporation, it had been finally decided by the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky that the act in question (the Hewitt Act) had created in favor of the corporations accepting its provisions an irrevocable contract, which could not be impaired without violating the constitution of the United States. 31 S. W. 1013. It was averred in each of the bills that, although the complainants were not parties to the suit brought by the Louisville Banking Company, they were each, nevertheless, privies to the record and decree rendered therein, because of a certain agreement, which, it was averred, had been entered into between the complainants, the commissioners of the sinking fund and the city of Louisville, through the city attorney, from which the privity relied on was asserted to have been created. The agreement in question was stated in full in each of the bills. By virtue of the privity thus asserted the decree rendered in favor of the Louisville Banking Company was pleaded as establishing conclusively, by the estoppel arising from the thing adjudged, the irrevocable nature of the contract springing from the Hewitt act and the want of power to impair it by assessing or collecting the taxes in controversy. The court below decided that the complainants were not privies to the decision in the case of the Louisville Banking Company, because there was such a difference between the business of a banking company proper and that of a trust company that neither the commissioners of the sinking funds nor the city attorney of the city of Louisville had lawful power to agree that the liability of the trust companies to taxation should abide the result of the case brought by the Louisville Banking Company to test the right to tax it contrary to the contract which it was charged the Hewitt act had embodied. Because of the want of privity held not to exist, for the reason just stated, the court below decided that the plea of the thing adjudged was untenable. On the merits of the case, the court below held that, as each of the complainants had been chartered after the year 1856, subsequent to an act adopted by the Kentucky legislature in that year, reserving the right to repeal, alter, or amend all charters thereafter granted, there was not an irrevocable contract, and hence that the levy of the taxes complained of did not impair contract obligations. For these reasons the court sustained demurrers to each of the bills, and dismissed them. 88 Fed. 407. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Trust Cos. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. W. S. Taylor, for Stone, auditor, and others.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is unnecessary to determine whether the distinction between the business of a bank and that of a trust company was such as to cause it to be illegal to have agreed that the liability of the trust companies to taxation contrary to the Hewitt act should abide the result of the controversy as to the Louisville Banking Company, since we have just decided in Stone v. Bank (No. 362) 174 U. S. 412. 19 Sup. Ct. 747, that, irrespective of any distinction which might exist between the business of a bank eo nomine and that of a trust company, the commissioners of the sinking fund and the city attorney were without power to have made the agreement upon which the complainants relied in order to establish that they were privies to the decision in favor of the Louisville Banking Company. The plea of the thing adjudged depending upon the existence of privity being thus disposed of, there remains only to consider the alleged existence of an irrevocable contract arising from the Hewitt act. That no such contract arose from that

act as to corporations chartered after 1856, or whose charters were extended subsequent to that year, was decided in Citizens' Sav. Bank of Owensboro v. City of Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, 19 Sup. Ct. 530, 571. Indeed, the opinion in that case and the opinion announced in Stone v. Bank, supra, are decisive against the appellants, who were complainants below, as to every issue which arises for decision on these records, and the decrees below rendered are therefore affirmed.

FIRST NAT. BANK OF LOUISVILLE v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. SAME v. STONE Auditor, et al. (May 15, 1899.) Nos. 635 and 634. Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for First Nat. Bank. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. W. S. Taylor, for Stone, auditor, and others.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

In these two cases the appellant filed its bills to enjoin the assessment and collection of certain taxes. The grounds upon which the prayer for relief in each case was rested were substantially as follows:

First, that the taxes in question were levied upon the franchise and property of the bank, and not upon the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders, and were therefore illegal; second, that the taxes were discriminatory, because, as a consequence of the exemption of certain state banks from taxation by special contract, the property of the bank was taxed at a higher rate than other moneyed capital, in violation of the act of congress; and, third, that the taxes were illegal, because not in conformity to the state constitution and certain provisions of the state laws.

The court below decided that, although the taxes were imposed or contemplated to be assessed on the franchise or intangible property of the bank, nevertheless they were the equivalent of a tax on the shares of stock, in the names of the shareholders, and hence did not violate the act of congress. It moreover held that the remaining grounds were without merit. 88 Fed. 409.

The law under which the taxes in question were levied is the same one which was considered in Owensboro Nat. Bank v. City of Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537. The the ory of equivalency upon which the court below decreed the taxes to be legal was in that case fully examined, and held to be unsound.

It follows that the decrees below rendered in these cases were erroneous. It is therefore ordered that said decrees be reversed, and the cases be remanded to the lower court, with directions for such further proceedings as may be in conformity with this opinion. And it is so ordered.

FULLER et al. v. UNITED STATES. (De cember 12, 1898.) No. 69. Appeal from the court of claims. See 29 Ct. Cl. 566. James Lowndes, for appellants. The Attorney General and Asst. Atty. Gen. Pradt, for the United States. No opinion. Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with a direction to enter judg ment for the claimants, on the authority of U. S. v. Elliott, 164 U. S. 373, 17 Sup. Ct. 140.

GERMAN INS. CO. OF FREEPORT, ILL., v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF BOONVILLE, N. Y. (March 6, 1899.) No. 159. In error to the supreme court of the state of Kansas. See 48 Pac. 592. A. P. Jetmore, for plaintiff in error. W. H. Rossington and Charles Blood Smith, for defendant in error. No opinion. Dismissed on the authority of Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Co., 166 U. S. 648, 17 Sup. Ct. 709; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. City of Louisville, 166 U. S. 709, 17 Sup. Ct. 725, and other cases.