Peck Steamship Line v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co. after describing the classes of people intended to be included, provides that "they, together with such citizens of the United States as may reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of "The People of Porto Rico,' with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred and with power to sue and be sued as such." It may be as well to notice at this point that Congress stu diously avoided calling the new jurisdiction, "the territory of Porto Rico." It will be seen by an examination of the Revised Statutes, § 1896 to 1904, inclusive, that Congress made no such omission in the naming of New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, or as to Oklahoma, May 2, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 81, chap. 182), or as to Hawaii (31 Stat. at L. 141, chap. 339); and, in fact, it will be found that at no time heretofore in the organization of territories has such an omission been made. It might also be well to notice here that the several organic acts of the territories heretofore organized provided that they were to be "erected into a temporary government by the name of 'the territory of,' " etc., so that no importance need be given to the fact that the Foraker act, above mentioned, states that it is: "An act temporarily to provide revenues," etc. Sec. 8 of this Foraker act provides: "That the laws and ordinances of Porto Rico, now in force, shall continue in full force and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified hereinafter, or as altered or modified by military orders and decrees in force when this act shall take effect, and so far as the same are not inconsistent or in conflict with the statutory laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable, or the provisions hereof, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative authority hereinafter provided for Porto Rico, or by act of Congress of the United States." Peck Steamship Line v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co. Sec. 9 provides for the nationalization of all vessels owned by the inhabitants of Porto Rico; and it is provided in § 14: "That the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States, except the internal revenue laws," etc. Sec. 16 provides that the judicial process shall run in the name of the United States, etc., and that criminal prosecutions shall be conducted in the name, and by authority, of "The People of Porto Rico," and that all officials shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Porto Rico. In addition to the paragraphs of law above quoted, providing that the statutory laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable, should have force and effect in Porto Rico, § 1891 of the Revised Statutes provides that: "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." It is, of course, questionable whether this latter section, notwithstanding its terms, can be said to apply to Porto Rico, certainly that part of it that refers to the Constitution, because this whole Foraker act, even while there is no repealing clause in it, is special in its nature, and studiously avoids extending, in terms, the Constitution of the United States to the island. But it would seem that a man as eminent as former Attorney General, now Senator, Knox, thought that this section applied to Porto Rico in an opinion in a matter referring to the registration of trademarks (23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 634), wherein he stated: "In so far as residents of Porto Rico are concerned, laws of Congress 'not locally inapplicable' have, by the act for the govern Peck Steamship Line v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co. ment of that island and by Revised Statutes, § 1891, been extended to it." It is a reasonable conception that when Congress, under its constitutional powers, enacts a general law seeking to remedy some widespread evil in the nation, and which evil exists in the territories equally with the states, if there is any language in the act itself denouncing the evil, that makes it applicable to the territories, fine distinctions as to the meaning of the word "territories" ought not to prevent the enforcement of the law in places where Congress has even ampler powers than it has in the states. Such acts being remedial in their nature, it was held, in Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 38 Fed. 55, and the rule is well established, that they should be liberally construed. And we think this is true to a reasonable extent, even when the new law denounces that as a crime which was not a crime before, especially when the proceeding under the act is a civil suit for damages. The antitrust, antimonopoly and antirebate law, the Elkins law, the pure food law, the employer's liability act, and similar laws of Congress, are necessary and salutary enactments, intended to cure widespread, intolerable evils. Some of them were not enacted soon enough, and others of them were not enforced soon enough with sufficient vigor. In fact, it is current judicial and political history, that their enforcement and enactment have taken more time than any other one subject in recent times. It would seem, therefore, that wherever such laws are not locally inapplicable, they ought to be enforced without interfering with proper and legitimate commercial transactions, or the rights of individuals or capital. The spirit from which violations of them emanates ought, if possible, to be discouraged at its inception, in all jurisdictions where the law is in force. While it is not necessary to express a positive opinion upon Peck Steamship Line v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co. the subject yet, in all probability the new rate bill enacted by Congress on June 29, 1906, and the other new laws above referred to, over which the Senate of the United States spent so much time, apply to Porto Rico. Like the antitrust act, they are intended to remedy widespread evils. The rate bill shows the intent of Congress, wherever it has complete power, as it certainly has with reference to a place like Porto Rico, to legislate drastically against contracts, combinations, conspiracies, and monopolies in restraint of trade, because in § 1, when fixing the sort of transportation of commodities it shall apply to, after mentioning the states and the District of Columbia, it sets out that it shall apply to transportation from one place in a territory to another place in the same territory. There are, no doubt, many other general laws that are in force in Porto Rico, that we do not at the moment call to mind. Much stress against the applicability of the act in question, to Porto Rico, is laid by counsel for defendants upon the question as to whether or not Porto Rico is what is now becoming known in certain acts of Congress as an "organized territory." Several acts of Congress, noticeably the new naturalization law of June 29, 1906, speak of "organized territories," in an apparent effort to make some distinction between the Philippines and Porto Rico on the one hand, and the other territories and the states on the other hand, or the Philippines alone and the other territories and states, including Porto Rico. Many acts of Congress, when denouncing certain acts and doings as crimes, refer to the states and territories and to the District of Columbia. Alaska has always been known as the "District of Alaska," and Congress has several times refused, in acts referring to it, to call it a territory. On the other hand, the Indian territory, which was, and is, in no sense an organized territory, as contemplated in this contention of counsel, has always been referred to Peck Steamship Line v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co. in acts of Congress and by the people as, "the Indian territory;" it therefore appears that the word "territory" is often loosely used. As recent as this last session of Congress, in the appropriation bill for the government of the territories (59th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 416, 417), Alaska is called a district and Porto Rico is called a territory; while on p. 295, Session Laws, same Congress, in an appropriation for shipwrecked seamen, Alaska is called a territory. And again, on p. 169, in the bill providing for the election of a delegate to the House of Representatives, the act opens by using the language: "That the people of the territory of Alaska shall be represented by a delegate," etc. It is perhaps because of the unique status of the people of Porto Rico in being received from Spain by the same treaty as the Philippines and being created into a body politic and denied citizenship of the United States, while owing permanent allegiance to the nation, that this apparent difficulty about the application of laws to it arises. The writer of this opinion knows from his experience in an effort to bring the southwest territories into the Union as states, that, whether it is well founded or not, Congress is possessed of a fear that the word "territory" has something in it that imports a promise of statehood to the section of country so characterized; but history does not support this fear, because California became a state in 1850 without ever having been a territory, and the Indian territory has just been blessed with an enabling act, without ever having been "organized." "A rose by another name would smell as sweet." And therefore, if Porto Rico can be said to be a territory, even with a small "t," all general acts of Congress applying to territories, when not locally inapplicable, should, in our opinion, under the Foraker act, be held to be in force here. It is difficult to see what is locally inapplicable about that portion |