Bertran y Casañas v. Mullenhoff & Korber. of the express terms of the equity rule which requires that demurrers be verified by the parties interposing the same. No showing is made that it was impossible to obtain the verification of at least one of the defendants, and the court would be constrained to overrule the demurrer for this fatal defect if it were insisted upon, but, counsel for the complainants waiving said defect, the court proceeds to the consideration of the demurrer upon its merits. Examination of the salient points of this demurrer and the authorities cited in the defendants' brief in support thereof fails to convince the court of their merit or relevancy to the case made out by the bill of complaint. The point most strongly urged is that of laches on the part of complainants in not intervening before the sale in the foreclosure proceedings, or immediately thereafter; but this is overcome by the averments of the bill, which the defendants admit by way of demurrer, viz., that complainants only discovered since said foreclosure proceedings and the sale held thereunder, that the defendants had entered into a secret written agreement to substantially acquire title to the real estate as trustees to account to the defendants Fulladosa and Argueso and his wife. The complainants cannot be held guilty of laches until notice of fraud or of the secret transactions alleged is chargeable to them. The bill clearly alleges the present existence of a trust, and constructive fraud between the defendants for the purpose of depriving said complainants of their existing lien under their said second mortgage on the premises described in the first mortgage. The trust agreement alleged in the bill as a continuing trust is not prescribed or debarred by laches. The act of cancelation of the second mortgage after the sale under the alleged secret trust agreement could only be set aside by a court of equity, which alone affords a remedy against the successful use of the Bertran y Casañas v. Mullenhoff & Korber. forms of law in such cases, and alleged to have been invoked by the defendants herein. The bill avers that this cancelation and sale were so made for the express purpose of depriving complainants of what was justly due them under the said second mortgage. This transaction under the secret agreement of Mullenhoff & Korber, as the holders of said first mortgage, to buy in the property in question and to procure a cancelation on the records of the registry, after said sale, of the said second mortgage belonging to complainants, under the averments of the bill taken as admitted by this demurrer, would be the allowance, under the forms of law and principles thereof, of an injustice to an innocent third party, as to which only equity can grant relief, and which is not barred by the question of res judicata. We fail to see that the quotation from the decision of this court on the question of vendor's lien in the case of Guardiola versus Pizá Hermanos and the principles enumerated, under which, by the mortgage law of Porto Rico, all such liens on real estate were abolished, has any application to the present case, in which it is admitted a secret trust was entered into between Mullenhoff & Korber and the other defendants to bring about a collusive sale under the forms of law. It is not unnecessary to allege undue influence, duress, or fraud in the bill, as charged in the demurrer, but the acknowledged trust, collusive sale, etc., under the said secret agreement, are properly alleged in this bill, and make a case in the peculiar realm of equity, involving also ar accounting as well as a discovery. It may be that the complainants have refrained from the use of the word "fraud" or profuse charges thereof, as alleged in this demurrer. However, the bill does allege and positively charges that the defendants entered into a contract to injure complainants by depriving them of their rights under their said second mortgage. Bertran y Casañas v. Mullenhoff & Korber. The court has given the able and exhaustive brief of counsel for said defendants, displaying great research on the questions involved, close consideration and examination, but finds that the averments of the bill are sufficient in law to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer is therefore overruled. COMPAGNIES DES SUCRERIES DE PUERTO RICO, Complainants, บ. SANTIAGO IGLESIAS, THE FEDERACIÓN LIBRE DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE PUERTO RICO, Dfts. Equity, No. 306. 1. Upon a verified complaint supported by proper proof, a temporary restraining order will issue to prevent the officers and members of a labor union, and all persons acting under the authority or control of such union or its officers, from in any wise interfering with the peaceful operation of the business of an individual or corporation, by means of threats, violence, or intimidation of any kind; also from annoying or injuring any person, from entering into or continuing in the employment of such employer, and also to prevent the congregation of striking laborers upon or in the immediate vicinity of the employer's premises, in a violent, threatening, or hostile manner. 2. All persons in Porto Rico have a perfect right to affiliate with, organize, or conduct labor unions, so long as the same are conducted in a peaceful or proper manner, and in accordance with the laws of the land. But a court of equity will interfere to prevent serious injury to private rights or property whenever the same shall be seriously threatened, whether it be in the name of a labor strike or in any other manner. 3. A laborer must be always free to accept employment, to enter into employment, and to cease from such employment at any time, and under any circumstances which he may determine for himself, free from all molestation, intimidation, or threats of any kind; and an employer of labor has the same reciprocal right to the protection of the court to employ and discharge laborers, and to operate and manage his busi Compagnies des Sucreries v. Iglesias. ness and property, without interference or intimidation from any outside source. 4. "Picketing," which has been defined by the supreme court of the state of Washington as a malicious and aggressive interference of strikers with the business of employers, is declared to be illegal, and will be enjoined in a proper case. 5. Labor organizers and leaders must exercise great caution that the occurrence of strikes should not be made the occasion or excuse for rioting, violence, threats, incendiary appeals for the arraying of labor against capital. 6. It is well settled by the decisions of the highest courts that in a proper case a court of equity will enjoin a threatened strike, and that such injunction will issue in any case where labor organizations shall deliberately, in advance, conspire and combine to attack property of employers, by combining and agreeing to call a general strike for the enforcement of unjust demands, under conditions which must necessarily result in great loss or injury to employers. 7. In this case a decree pro confesso having been regularly entered and confirmed in open court, and no showing having been made of a meritorious defense, the restraining order is made permanent. Opinion and decree filed December 13, 1905. Messrs. Hartzel & Serra, solicitors for plaintiffs. MCKENNA, Judge, delivered the following opinion: In the above action a complaint was instituted by the complainant, operating a sugar central and plantation, against the defendants, during the month of April, 1905, at which time a strike of agricultural laborers was in force at the property of the complainant situate in the district of Ponce. An injunetion against the defendants as officers and members of the NOTE.-As to injunction against strikes, see note to Longshore Printing & Pub. Co. v. Howell, 28 L.R.A. 464. II. PORTO RICO.-2. Compagnies des Sucreries v. Iglesias. Federación Libre de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, as well as in their individual capacity, and their agents, servants, and all acting under their advice, direction, or authority, was prayed for to restrain all such persons from in any wise interfering with the peaceful operation of complainant's business and property by means of threats, violence, or intimidation of any kind, as also from annoying or injuring any persons entering into or continuing in the employment of complainant; and further praying to prevent the congregation of laborers upon or in the immediate vicinity of complainant's premises, in a violent, threatening, or hostile manner. The complainant, in praying for an injunction and restraining order, charged that the defendants officially and individually had promoted the strike of the agricultural laborers then in progress, and that, in doing so, had made threats of violence and destruction of property of complainant, and had been guilty of acts of intimidation and interference with such laborers who were willing to work. An exhibit attached to said bill was a communication by the defendant Iglesias, signed as the representative of the American Federation of Labor as well as representing the Federación Libre, defendant, directed to the complainant company, making certain demands which would be required in connection with the employment of complainant company's laborers, and presenting and threatening the alternative that an immediate strike of such laborers in the employment of complainant would be declared. A number of printed handbills, which had been circulated and posted publicly in the district where said strike was in progress, were also in evidence, the same having the authority of the said defendant, Federación Libre, or its officials. The contents of these publications were of a highly inflammatory character, calculated to incite the passions of workingmen and to arraign them |